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SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
NORTH CAROLINA AND THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT, 1994
Rule 15(c) and the Relation Back of Corrected Party Names
The principal function of procedural rules should be to serve
as useful guides to help, not hinder, persons who have a legal right
to bring their problems before the courts.
_ Justice Hugo Blacl!
Theoretically, at least, Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure2 furthers the worthy purpose expressed by Justice
Black. Rule 15(c) can provide such help to a claimant who has filed
a timely but imperfect complaint and whose subsequent amended
complaint states a claim that the appropriate statute of limitations
would otherwise bar. The rule, if its conditions are met, accomplishes
this goal by allowing the amended complaint to relate back to the
date of the original complaint so as to overcome a limitations
defense? The rule, however, is silent on the issue of whether relation
back is permitted when the amended complaint does not change the
nature of the claim in any way, but merely corrects the name of the
party being sued. Consequently, when this issue has arisen, North
Carolina courts have looked to cases interpreting the corresponding
federal rule4 for guidance.5 In 1989, in Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina
1. Order Adopting Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 346
U.S. 945, 946 (1954).
2. N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c). The Rule states:
Relation back of amendments.-A claim asserted in an amended pleading is
deemed to have been interposed at the time the claim in the original pleading
was interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice to the
transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved
pursuant to the amended pleading.
Id.
3. Seek
4. FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c). In relevant part, Federal Rule 15(c) states:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
when... the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against
whom a claim is asserted if, ... within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for
service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment
(A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not
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Medicorp Enterprises,6 North Carolina formally adopted the United
States Supreme Court's test for addressing this issue.7 Since then,
however, Congress has amended Federal Rule 15(c)8 specifically to
render the Supreme Court's test inapplicable.' North Carolina has
yet to follow suit, continuing instead to use the now defunct federal
test. In 1994, the North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed three
amended complaint cases on statute of limitations grounds before
reaching the substantive merits of the claims.10 The most recent of
these cases, Franklin v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.," highlights the
differences both in operation and result between North Carolina Rule
15(c) and its recently amended federal counterpart.
be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should
have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party,
the action would have been brought against the party.
Id.
5. See, e.g., Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enters., 96 N.C. App. 277,283,385
S.E.2d 801, 806 (1989); Stevens v. Nimocks, 82 N.C. App. 350, 354, 346 S.E.2d 180, 182,
cert. denied, 318 N.C. 511, 349 S.E.2d 873 (1986); see infra text accompanying note 109.
6. 96 N.C. App. 277, 385 S.E.2d 801 (1989).
7. Id. at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806 (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986)).
See infra text accompanying note 109.
8. See supra note 4 for the current rule.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note, reprinted in 12 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE app. C (Supp. 1994). See infra
notes 113-17 for discussion as to why the test is now inapplicable.
10. See Franklin v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 117 N.C. App. 28,450 S.E.2d 24 (1994),
disc. rev. granted, 339 N.C. 611,454 S.E.2d 250 (1995); Crossman v. Moore, 115 N.C. App.
372, 444 S.E.2d 630, disa rev. granted, 337 N.C. 690, 448 S.E.2d 519 (1994); Medford v.
Haywood County Hosp. Found., 115 N.C. App. 474,444 S.E.2d 699, disc. rev. granted, 337
N.C. 802, 449 S.E.2d 747 (1994).
In Crossman, the plaintiff in a negligence action arising from an automobile accident
filed suit within the statute of limitations period naming "Van Dolan Moore" as the
defendant. Crossman, 115 N.C. App. at 372-73, 444 S.E.2d at 630. The accident report
had listed Van Dolan Moore as the driver, but had listed the driver's license number of
Moore's son, Van Dolan Moore II. Id. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to amend her
complaint, but since Moore II " 'neither knew [n]or should have known within the
prescribed limitations period that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the plaintiff's
action would have been brought against him,' " iUL at 374, 444 S.E.2d at 631, the court
of appeals held that the amended complaint did not relate back and affirmed the trial
court's issuance of summary judgment, id. at 376, 444 S.E.2d at 632.
In Medford, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Ha'ywood County
Hospital Foundation. Medford, 115 N.C. App. at 474, 444 S.E.2d at 700. After being
notified that he had sued the wrong party, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to
change the name of the defendant to Haywood County Hospital, but the trial court denied
his motion. Id at 474-75, 444 S.E.2d at 700. As in Crossman, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision because service of the original complaint did not occur
until after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 477, 444 S.E.2d at 701-02.
11. 117 N.C. App. 28,450 S.E.2d 24 (1994), disc. rev. granted, 339 N.C. 611,454 S.E.2d
250 (1995).
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This Note begins by detailing the facts of the Franklin case and
reviewing the majority and dissenting opinions of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals. 2 The Note then traces the recent evolution of
the judicial interpretation of North Carolina's Rule 15(c), analyzing
arguments both for and against interpreting the rule so that it
conforms to the federal rule.'4 The Note concludes that amendment
of North Carolina's rule to achieve conformity with the federal rule
is appropriate.
On August 22, 1989, Henry B. Franklin, while shopping at the
Winn-Dixie grocery store in Raleigh, slipped and fell on coleslaw
"lying in an aisle near a cash register.' 16  Mr. Franklin suffered
severe and permanent injuries that allegedly caused his death on
April 1, 1991.17 On August 24, 1992, the executors of Mr. Franklin's
estate filed a negligence claim, dated August 21, 1992, in Wake
County Superior Court and, rather than naming the proper defendant,
"Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.," they erroneously named "Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc." as the defendant. 8 On the same day, two summonses
were issued. 9 The first was directed to the defendant "Wiun-Dixie
Stores, Inc." but was defective for failure to specify the county in
which the action had been filed. 2 The second, an alias and pluries
summons,21 was virtually identical, and return of service showed that
"Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc." had been servedV2 On September 29,
1992, a second alias and pluries summons was issued, but this time
"Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc." was identified as the defendant although
the summons was still directed to "Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc."'  On
12. See infra notes 16-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 52-118 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 119-48 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
16. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 30, 450 S.E.2d at 25-26.
17. Id. at 30, 450 S.E.2d at 26.
18. It
19. IM
20. IS
21. An "alias summons" is "[a] summons issued when [the] original has not produced
its effect because [it is] defective in form or manner of service, and when issued,
supersedes the first writ." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 71 (6th ed. 1990). "Pluries" is a
"[p]rocess that issues in the third instance, after the first [summons] and the alias have
been ineffectual." Id. at 1154-55. In North Carolina, an alias or pluries summons may be
sued out at any time within 90 days after the date of issue of the last preceding summons
in the chain of summonses. N.C. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2). See Rosheli v. Sperry, 57 N.C. App.
305, 306, 291 S.E.2d 355, 356 (1982).
22. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 30-31, 450 S.2d at 26.
23. Id. at 31, 450 S.E.2d at 26. The name and address of the defendant on this
summons was C T Corporation System, 225 Hillsborough Street, Raleigh, North Carolina,
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December 23, 1992, two additional alias and pluries summonses were
issued.24 One identified "Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc." as the defendant
and was directed thereto; the other identified "Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc." as the defendant and was directed thereto? The last three
alias and pluries summonses were served on C T Corporation System,
the registered agent for both Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. and Winn-Dixie
Raleigh, Inc.'
Barry L. Ingle of C T Corporation System subsequently notified
the plaintiffs' attorneys, by letter dated December 31, 1992, that C T
Corporation System was returning the last two summonses-the first
because "Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc." was not on record with the
Secretary of State of North Carolina; the second because "Winn-Dixie
Raleigh, Inc." was not the party named as the defendant in the
complaint.27 More than four months later, on April 20, 1993, the
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming "Winn-Dixie Raleigh,
Inc." as the defendant, and served a copy of the amended complaint
and a notice of filing on both Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., "c/o C T
Corp. System, 225 Hillsborough Street, Raleigh, North Carolina
27603," and on the attorney for "Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc." personal-
ly.? The notice stated that the purpose of the amended complaint
was merely to change the word "Stores" in the original complaint to
"Raleigh."29 On May 19, 1993, defendant Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.
filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process, insufficiency of
service of process, and expiration of the governing statute of
27603. 1d. The return of service showed that it was served on " 'Winn-Dixie Stores of
Raleigh, Inc.' by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to C T Corporation
System Registered Agent, c/o Ron Strickland 'as the defendant is a corporation.' " Id.
Defendant "Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc." subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(4). Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 31, 450 S.E.2d at 26.
24. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 31, 450 S.E.2d at 26.
25. Id. Each of the summonses listed the address of the defendant as it had been
identified, but both summonses also listed the address of the defendant as C T Corporation
System, 225 Hillsborough Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27603. Id. Both summonses
were properly served. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 32,450 S.E.2d at 27. The letter asserted that C T Corporation System "must
be provided with the name of the corporation to be served as it is registered to do business
with the Secretary of State of North Carolina." Id (small capitals omitted).
28. Id. Plaintiffs filed the amended complaint pursuant to N.C.R. Crv..P. 15(a), which
provides that "[a] party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served." Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 32, 450 S.E.2d at 27.
29. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 32,450 S.E.2d at 27. The notice indicated the plaintiffs'
belief that they were merely changing the name of a party already in court and not
bringing in a completely new party.
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limitations? The Wake County Superior Court granted the motion
on all three grounds?'
A majority of the court of appeals affirmed the motion to dismiss
on the grounds of insufficient process and insufficient service of
process?2 Labeling the statute of limitations claim "the crucial issue
presented in this case,"'33 the court considered whether the plaintiffs'
amended complaint, filed after the expiration of the three-year statute
of limitations,' related back to the date of the original complaint
and, consequently, would survive a defense of untimeliness." The
majority, relying on Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp
Enterprises,6 reiterated the court's prior decisions, which had
adopted the then-current federal test for determining when relation
back should be allowed.3 If the trial judge can infer from "some
nexus among defendants.., that the new defendant had notice of the
original claim so as not to be prejudiced by the amendment," the
plaintiff, pursuant to North Carolina Rule 15(c), is permitted to
amend the complaint to add a new party, notwithstanding expiration
of the statute of limitations? The statute of limitations will continue
as a valid defense, however, if the "plaintiff's use of Rule 15(c) would
30. Id at 33, 450 S.E.2d at 27. This motion was filed pursuant to N.C. R. Crv. P.
12(b)(4), (5), and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1983), respectively.
31. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 33, 450 S.E.2d at 27.
32. Id at 36, 37, 450 S.E.2d at 29, 30.
33. Id at 38, 450 S.E.2d at 30. However, as Judge Wynn recognized in his dissent, the
defendant, by arguing the statute of limitations defense, made a general appearance in the
action and thus waived any objections to defective service. Id. at 41, 450 S.E.2d at 32
(Wynn, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (describing Judge
Wynn's dissent).
34. Pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Supp. 1993), "the statute of limitations
for personal injury due to negligence is three years."
35. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 38, 450 S.E.2d at 30.
36. 96 N.C. App. 277, 385 S.E2d 801 (1989); see also infra notes 91-111 and
accompanying text.
37. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 39, 450 S.E.2d at 31. Thus, as under the federal rule,
relation back occurs under North Carolina rules when:
1) the basic claim arises out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading, 2)
the party to be brought in receives such notice that it will not be prejudiced in
maintaining its defense, 3) the party knows or should have known that, but for
a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it, and
4) the second and third requirements are fulfilled within the prescribed
limitations period.
Id (quoting Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enterprises, 96 N.C. App. 277,283,385
S.E.2d 801,806 (1989) (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21,29 (1986))); see infra note
109 and accompanying text.
38. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 39, 450 S.E.2d at 31 (citing Ring Drug, 96 N.C. App.
at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806).
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circumvent any other procedural requirement ... or when the
plaintiffs failure to name the defendant originally is solely at-
tributable to the plaintiff" 39
Applying this test in Franklin, the court upheld the trial court's
ruling that the plaintiffs amended complaint did not relate back, and
thus the statute of limitations served as a bar. The court reasoned
that the defendant, Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., "would be unfairly
prejudiced by allowing the amendment to relate back, and [the]
plaintiffs' failure to name [the proper defendant] originally was solely
attributable to the plaintiffs"'" and "unjustified."42  The court
maintained that the amended complaint initiated an entirely new
action that occurred more than three years after the August 24, 1989
accident and thus was barred by section 1-52 of the North Carolina
General Statutes 3
Judge Wynn dissented from the court's decision, maintaining that
the "purpose of... [North Carolina's] Rules of Civil Procedure is to
resolve controversies on the merits rather than on pleading tech-
nicalities."' He pointed out that the federal test adopted by the
court in Ring Drug and relied on by the majority in the instant case
had been widely criticized as being too restrictive a reading of Federal
Rule 15(c), and that this criticism led to the amendment of the federal
rule "to specifically prevent the harsh result of the Schiavone test."45
39. Md (quoting Ring Drug, 96 N.C. App. at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806).
40. Id
41. Id.
42. Id. at 39-40, 450 S.E.2d at 31. The plaintiffs' attorney blamed the misnaming of
the defendant in the original complaint on misinformation furnished by the defendant's
insurance carrier. Ertel Berry, No Relation Back For Misnamed Store In Slip-And-Fall
Case, N.C. LAW. WcLY., Nov. 21, 1994, at 1.
43. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 30,40,450 S.E2d at 25-26,31. The court particularly
emphasized that the plaintiffs did not file their amended complaint until several months
after being notified that originally they had filed against an incorrect defendant. Id. at 40,
450 S.E.2d at 31-32.
44. Id. at 41, 450 S.E.2d at 32 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 42-43, 450 S.E.2d at 33 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also Joseph P. Bauer,
Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 728 (1988) (arguing
that the Supreme Court should not have felt bound by normal doctrines of statutory
construction when interpreting Rule 15(c)); Robert D. Brussack, Outrageous Fortune: The
Case for Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 683 (1988) (noting the
absurdity of the double standard in Rule 15(c) in that it "gives an advantage to misnamed
defendants over correctly named defendants"); Joseph Dornfried, Note, Schiavone v.
Fortune: Notice Becomes a Threshold Requirement for Relation Back under Federal Rule
15(c), 65 N.C. L. REV. 598, 615 (1987) (contending that the federal approach "sharply
curtails the availability of [R]ule 15(c) to fulfill its purpose"); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The
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Judge Wynn noted that under the amended federal rule, the required
notice "is no longer tied" to the limitations period; instead, receipt
within the period allotted for service of process constitutes sufficient
notice so long as
[the] party to be added to the action received notice of the
action within the period provided for service under Rule 4
so as not to be prejudiced in maintaining a defense, and
knew or should have known that but for the mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would
have named that party.
Judge Wynn deemed it "illogical" to use an invalid federal test to
interpret North Carolina's "own clear rule,"' 7 and instead suggested
that the court modify the Ring Drug test so that it would conform to
the federal amendment.'8 Since the plaintiffs served their initial
complaint upon C T Corporation System, the registered agent for
both "Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc." and "Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.,"
within the appropriate period for service in North Carolina,"9 Judge
Wynn concluded that the proper defendant, Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.,
had received notice of the action "so as not to be prejudiced in main-
taining a defense."50  Consequently, he would have allowed the
action to proceed on the merits51
In their approach to Rule 15(c), the North Carolina courts have
been significantly influenced by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Schiavone v. Fortune,5 2 which defined the scope of the
then-existing Federal Rule 15(c). The three plaintiffs in Schiavone
Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1507, 1572-73 (1987) (concluding that the ambiguities of Rule 15(c) should have
been resolved by Congress and not by the Supreme Court).
46. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 43, 450 S.E.2d at 33 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting).
48. IM at 44, 450 S.E.2d at 34 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
49. In North Carolina, personal service of summons must be made within 30 days of
the issuance of the summons. N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(c). However, this time may be extended
by the issuance of alias and pluries summons. N.C. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2).
50. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 44, 450 S.E.2d at 34 (Wynn, J., dissenting). See also
Anderson Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Key Way Transp., Inc., 94 N.C. App. 36, 44-45, 379
S.E.2d 665, 670 (1989) (finding that service upon a company's registered agent was service
upon the company).
51. Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 44,450 S.E.2d at 34 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
52. 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
53. It at 29. The Court granted certiorari to settle a conflict among the appellate
courts with respect to the time period within which notice must be received for the
amended complaint to relate back. IM at 22. Compare eg., Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d
1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1985) (construing "within the limitations period" narrowly to exclude
"time for service of process") and Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 740 F.2d 714,716 (9th Cir.
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filed complaints in the federal district court in New Jersey, alleging
libel in a cover story appearing in Fortune magazine.' Each of their
complaints named "Fortune" as the defendant and described
"Fortune" as a " 'foreign corporation having its principal offices at
[the] Time and Life Building ... in New York.' "5 However, the
complaints were improperly drafted, because "Fortune" was only a
trademark and name of an internal division of a New York cor-
poration, Time, Incorporated ("Time").56 Because Tme was not
named as a defendant, the company's registered agent refused to
accept service.57 Approximately two months later, after the ex-
piration of New Jersey's one-year statute of limitations for libel, the
plaintiffs amended their complaints to identify the defendant as
" 'Fortune, also known as Time, Incorporated.' "58 Tme moved to
dismiss the complaints, arguing that because the amended complaint
was not served within the limitations period, it did not relate back to
the original filing date.59 The district court granted Time's motion,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed, both holding that the proper defendant had not received
notice within the period set out by the statute of limitations.'
At the time of Schiavone, Federal Rule 15(c) allowed relation
back when:
within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1)
had received such notice... [so as] not [to] be prejudiced in
maintaining [a] defense ... and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the
1984) (same), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985) with Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692
F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982) (interpreting "within the limitations period" liberally to
encompass the time for service of process) and Ingrain v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 572 (2d
Cir. 1978) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
54. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 22. The story was titled The Charges Against Reagan's
Labor Secretary, and appeared in the May 31, 1982 issue. Id.
55. Id. at 22-23.
56. Id. The plaintiffs did not allege that Fortune was a separate legal entity with the
capacity to be sued. Id. at 23 n.2.
57. Id. at 23. Notably, the attempted service was made after the statute of limitations
had expired but within the time allowed for service of process. Id. at 33 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see infra note 76.
58. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 22-23 (quoting the plaintiffs' complaints).
59. Id. at 23-24. These amended complaints were served on Time by certified mail on
July 21, 1983. Id. at 23.
60. Id. at 23-25.
2196 [Vol. 73
1995] CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 15(c) 2197
proper party, the action would have been brought against
him.61
Because Time received notice of the action within the time allowed
for service of process, the issue became the scope of "the period
provided by law for commencing the action."'62 Viewing the issue as
a matter of statutory construction,61 the Court held that the plain
language of the Rule dictated that the scope of "the period provided
by law for commencing an action" be the applicable limitations
period.' Consequently, the Court affirmed the. lower courts'
dismissal of the amended complaints.'
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, maintained that "[t]he
Court's result [was] supported neither by the language nor the
purpose of the Federal Rules, or of Rule 15(c) in particular."'67 He
argued that Tine would not be prejudiced if the amendment were
allowed to relate back, because the amended complaint added nothing
to Time's understanding that it was the party being sued.' As such,
Justice Stevens contended that the amended complaint was not one
" 'changing the party against whom a claim is being asserted.' ,,69
Justice Stevens reasoned that the rule had no applicability because
Rule 15(c) "discloses an obvious purpose to protect parties who are
not named in the original complaint from prejudice that may arise
when they are subsequently 'brought in by amendment,' " and
therefore that Tune did not come within the meaning of the rule.7°
61. Id. at 24 n.5 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)) (emphasis added).
62. See id. at 25-26.
63. See id. at 30-32. The Court did recognize an inherent arbitrariness in its
interpretation, but it accepted such arbitrariness as "characteristic of any limitations
period" and "imposed by the legislature and not the judicial process." Id. at 31.
64. Id. at 30. The Court found support for this construction in the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 15(c). Id.; see WRIGHT El" AL., supra note 9, at 176. At least
one commentator has criticized the Court for giving too much weight to the Advisory
Committee. See Bauer, supra note 45 at 728-29.
65. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 32.
66. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined in Justice Stevens's dissent.
67. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 33-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens garnered support for his
conclusion from a letter sent by Time's registered agent to Time's legal department
indicating that the agent noted the discrepancy in the corporate title upon receipt of the
original summons. Id. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens compared the amended
complaint here to one that merely corrects a misspelling in the original. Id. at 36 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 35-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens maintained that, even if the rule applied, the
Court's plain language analysis was unpersuasive'n He disagreed
with the majority that the plaintiffs were required to amend within the
statute of limitations period.72 Instead, he maintained that the
language in Rule 15 "imposing the deadline for amendments that
relate back ... [did not] refer to the statute of limitations," but
instead "describe[d] 'the period provided by law for commencing the
action against him.' 3 According to Justice Stevens, this period
"includes two components, the time for commencing the action by
filing of a complaint and the time in which the action 'against him'
must be implemented by the service of process."'74 Seeing no reason
not to construe Rule 15 as encompassing both components, Justice
Stevens pointed out that the rule requires that a party brought in by
amendment receive such notice so as not to be prejudiced in
maintaining a defense.75 He maintained that this requirement is
satisfied if the defendant receives a notice that "is just as timely and
just as informative as that which would have been received if no
mistake had occurred."'76 Finding that Time had become aware of
no less information than it would have had the original complaint
been appropriately designated, Justice Stevens concluded that the
notice was adequate.77
Shortly after the Schiavone decision, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals decided Stevens v. Nimocks,78 a legal malpractice case. The
plaintiff, John Stevens, filed a malpractice claim against Steven H.
Nimocks, an individual, and Nimocks and Taylor, a partnership,
alleging that the defendants had negligently and improperly advised
him to plead guilty to a charge of armed robbery.79 Process was
properly served on Nimocks personally and as an agent of the
71. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens labeled the Court's work an
"unnecessary and unjust construction." Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Ic. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)) (alteration in
original).
74. Id. at 37 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)).
75. Id. at 37-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In federal court, for example, a properly named
defendant may not receive notice of a timely filed action until some 120 days after the
expiration of the statute of limitations. Federal Rule 4(m) allows 120 days after the filing
of the complaint for service of the summons and complaint. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(m)
(formerly FD. P. Civ. P. 40)).
77. Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. 82 N.C. App. 350,346 S.E.2d 180, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 511,349 S.E,2d 873 (1986).
79. Id. at 351, 346 S.E.2d at 180.
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partnership.'0 The defendant partnership's subsequent answer was
signed by both Nimocks and Taylor.8 Six months later, the plaintiff
amended his complaint to include Taylor personally. 2 The amended
complaint was served on Taylor approximately two months after filing
the amendment.s
Taylor moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
statute of limitations barred any action against him, and the trial court
granted his motion.' On appeal, the plaintiff contended, among
other things, that the amended complaint related back to the date of
the filing of the original complaint and thus satisfied the statute of
limitations.85 The court of appeals, finding no applicable North
Carolina precedent, looked to federal precedent for "enlighten-
ment. 816 Applying the same reasoning as had the United States
Supreme Court in Schiavone, the court found Taylor's knowledge of
the action insufficient to put him on notice that he might later be sued
personally.' Instead, the court found that Taylor did not receive
sufficient notice until he was personally served with the amended
complaint, more than seven years after the tortious acts allegedly
occurred.88 Maintaining that Taylor was "clearly prejudiced by [the]
delay, ' 89 and declining to hold that a partner is subjected to personal
liability by participating in a malpractice suit involving the partner-
ship, the court concluded that the amended complaint did not relate
back, and the action against Taylor was therefore barred by the
statute of limitations.'
80. Id. The plaintiff's personal claim against Nimocks was summarily dismissed
because the plaintiffs' contingent claim against Nimocks had been discharged in
bankruptcy. Ma.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 351, 346 S.E.2d at 180-81.
85. Id. at 352,346 S.E.2d at 181. The plaintiff also asserted that Taylor had tolled the
statute of limitations by appearing in his individual capacity to verify the answer in the
original action, and that Taylor should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations
as a bar because of his actual notice and participation in the lawsuit. Id.
86. Id. at 354,346 S.E.2d at 182-83 (citing Norton v. International Harvester Co., 627
F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1980)).
87. Id. at 357, 346 S.E.2d at 184.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Instead, the court held that the partner cannot be held individually liable
unless individually served with process. Id.
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In Ring Drug Co. v. Carolina Medicorp Enterprises,9 the North
Carolina Court of Appeals formally adopted the Schiavone test for
relation back.92 In Ring Drug, the plaintiff, Ring Drug Company,
was the exclusive provider of prescription medicines to Blumenthal
Jewish Home For the Aged, Inc. ("Blumenthal") for almost sixteen
years.93 The contract between the two was terminable by either
party upon thirty days notice.94 In March 1984, the plaintiff notified
Blumenthal that it would be unable to serve the on-site pharmacy that
Blumenthal was establishing.95 In July 1984, Blumenthal responded
by informing the plaintiff that it was terminating the contract as of
September 1, 1984.96 The plaintiff contended that it had lost the
Blumenthal account because Carolina Medicorp, Inc. ("Medicorp")
and its subsidiaries had unfairly competed by securing preferential
pricing from drug manufacturers through Forsyth Memorial Hospital
("Forsyth"), in violation of North Carolina General Statute section 75,
which forbids unfair trade practices. 7  The plaintiff subsequently
filed a timely suit against Carolina Medicorp Enterprises ("Carolina
Enterprises"), a subsidiary of Medicorp and Forsyth. 8  The
complaint was served on Paul Wiles, the registered agent for both
named defendants.99 However, even though Medicorp was the sole
owner and parent corporation of Carolina Enterprises, Forsyth, and
Salem Health Services ("Salem Health"),1" the plaintiff failed to
name Medicorp in its complaint.' On September 23, 1988, the
plaintiff amended its complaint to include both Medicorp and Salem
Health as defendants."° The amended complaint was served on
Wiles, who was also the registered agent for Medicorp and Salem
91. 96 N.C. App. 277, 385 S.E.2d 801 (1989).
92. Id at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806.
93. Id at 279, 385 S.E.2d at 803.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id at 279, 385 S.E.2d at 803-04.
99. Id at 279, 385 S.E.2d at 804.
100. Id at 279, 385 S.E.2d at 803.
101. Id at 279, 385 S.E.2d at 804.
102. Id
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Health.O3 Both of these parties moved to dismiss," arguing that
the amended complaint was not filed in a timely manner.ra 5
The court held that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on
September 1, 1984.11 Consequently, unless the amended complaint
related back to the date of the original filing, the plaintiff's claim
against Medicorp and Salem Health was barred by the four-year
statute of limitations. 7 Formally adopting the federal test, "dis-
cussed at length in Stevens but not explicitly relied upon in that
case,"''x1 the court reasoned that a complaint relates back when:
1) the basic claim arises out of the conduct set forth in the
original pleading, 2) the party to be brought in receives such
notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its
defense, 3) the party knows or should have known that, but
for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have
been brought against it, and 4) the second and third re-
quirements are fulfilled within the prescribed limitations
period1°9
Applying the federal test, the court held that relation back
occurred with respect to Medicorp because, among other things: "the
claim against Medicorp arose from the same conduct alleged in the
original complaint;" Medicorp was the "parent corporation and sole
owner of Carolina Enterprises and Forsyth;" Medicorp had "the same
registered agent as its subsidiaries;" Medicorp was "engaged in the
same type of enterprise as Forsyth;" Medicorp had received notice
within the appropriate time so as not to be prejudiced; and Medicorp
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake, it would have
been named in the original complaint."1 With respect to Salem
103. Id. The amended complaint was served on September 26, 1988. Id.
104. Id. The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss as to Salem Health, but denied
it as to Medicorp. Id. at 280, 385 S.E.2d at 804. He did, however, grant summary
judgment to Medicorp, Carolina Enterprises, and Forsyth on the ground that none of them
had sold prescriptions to Blumenthal. d. By contrast, "[allegedly, Salem Health had
engaged in all [of] the dealings with Blumenthal." Id
105. Id. at 280, 385 S.E.2d at 804. In North Carolina, pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. §
75-16.2 (1988), a claim for unfair trade practice must be filed within four years after the
cause of action accrues. Ring Drug, 96 N.C. App. at 280, 385 S.E.2d at 804.
106. Ring Drug, 96 N.C. App. at 281, 385 S.E.2d at 804. The court found that the
plaintiff's claim was "most closely analogous" to a breach of contract, and therefore the
claim accrued on the date that the contract with Blumenthal was terminated. Id.
107. Id. at 281, 385 S.E.2d at 805.
108. Id. at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806.
109. Id. (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986)).
110. Id. at 284, 385 S.E.2d at 806. The record indicated that Medicorp's lawyer was
aware that the plaintiff believed that Medicorp or one of its subsidiaries operated the
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Health, however, the court held that relation back did not occur
because the plaintiff's failure to name it in the original complaint was
"an unjustified failure ... to name Salem Health in a timely
fashion.""1
In 1991, Congress-perhaps encouraged by several critical journal
articles"--amended Federal Rule 15(c), thereby rendering
Schiavone a dead letter." Among other changes, the amended rule
changed the old rule by allowing relation back when the defendant
brought in by amendment receives the requisite notice, not "within
the period provided by law for commencing the action against
him,"" but instead "within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for
service of the summons and complaint.""l u As the rule is now
written, so long as the defendant is notified within 120 days of the
filing of the original complaint pursuant to Rule 4(m),"6 is not
prejudiced by the delay, and knows or should have known that, but
for a mistake, the action would have been brought against him
originally, he may not attack an amended complaint that merely
corrects an error originally made in identifying the defendant."'
The new rule indicates an intent to reverse the result in cases like
Schiavone."
North Carolina has not yet incorporated the amended federal
approach into its own procedural rules. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals recently recognized that the application of the old federal
test to North Carolina Rule 15(c) should be reexamined, but it
claimed that it was "not the function of [the] Court to legislate," nor
was the court in a position to overrule Ring Drug."' Consequently,
pharmacy at Blumenthal. I&
111. Id.
112. See supra note 45.
113. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, at 176.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1966).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) (1991).
116. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(m).
117. See FED. R. CiV. P. 15(c). In addition to the 120 day allowance for service of
process, the Rule now also allows any additional time resulting from a court-ordered
extension. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(m).
118. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9. In fact, the Advisory Committee Notes to the
Federal Rules state quite clearly that the Rule "has been revised to change the result in
Schiavone v. Fortune... [because,] on the basis of the text of the former rule, the court
reached a result in Schiavone v. Fortune that was inconsistent with the liberal pleading
practices secured by Rule 8." Id. Federal Rule 8(f) states that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice." FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(0.
119. Crossman v. Moore, 115 N.C. App. 372,376,444 S.E.2d 630,632, disc rev. granted,
337 N.C. 690, 448 S.E.2d 519 (1994).
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Ring Drug remains good law in North Carolina. As case after case
in North Carolina is dismissed,"2 the obvious question remains:
Should North Carolina likewise amend its version of Rule 15(c)?
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has acknowledged that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are appropriate sources of guidance
for interpreting its own procedural rules. 2 The "general policy" of
the Federal Rules is to "disregard technicalities and form and
determine the rights of litigants on the merits."'" As such, the
Federal Rules are to "be construed... to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."' The North Carolina
Supreme Court has endorsed a similar policy with respect to the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure." North Carolina's own
Rule 8(f), identical to its federal counterpart,' 5 indicates further
support for this objective by mandating that "[a]l pleadings shall be
so construed as to do substantial justice.""
However, true "substantial justice" can be obtained only by
affording the defendant proper consideration. A primary method 6f
protecting the defendant's rights is through enforcement of the
applicable statute of limitations. These statutes facilitate "the speedy
disposition of claims within a reasonable time after their origin.""
They are designed to prevent defendants from being brought into
court so long after the occurrence of the events being litigated that
"evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared."' They represent "a deadline after which the defen-
120. See supra notes 11, 16-51 and accompanying text.
121. See, eg., Johnson v. Johnson, 14 N.C. App. 40, 42, 187 S.E.2d 420, 421 (1972).
122. Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) (noting that. "[t]he Federal
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel
may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is
to facilitate a proper decision on the merits"); Bauer, supra note 45, at 730 (arguing that
rules of procedure are "merely vehicles for the resolution of a dispute on the merits").
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
124. See, e.g., Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 99, 187 S.E.2d 697, 702 (1972) (noting
that "it is the essence of the Rules of Civil Procedure that decisions be had on the merits
and not avoided on the basis of mere technicalities") (citing 3 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACriCE § 15.13 (1968)).
125. See supra note 118.
126. N.C. R. CIV. P. 8(f).
127. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d. 553, 559 n.13 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963); see also Coppersmith v. Insurance Co., 222 N.C. 14, 17, 21
S.E.2d 838, 839 (1942) ("Equity will not afford relief to those who sleep upon their rights,
or whose condition is traceable to that want of diligence which may fairly be expected
from a reasonable and prudent man.").
128. American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538,554 (1974) (quoting Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342,349 (1944)). For a listing
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dant may legitimately have peace of mind,"'2 9 for at some point,
"the right of the defendant to be free from stale claims... comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them."'3  To protect these
interests of defendants, statutes of limitations are inflexible, allow no
judicial discretion, and operate without regard to the merits of the
plaintiff's claim.'
The goals of procedural rules and statutes of limitations intersect
at Federal Rule 15(c). Designed to allow a plaintiff's legitimate claim
to proceed despite some procedural error, the rule indicates a liberal
approach to litigation. However, by conditioning relation back of
an amended complaint on the receipt of sufficient notice, the rule also
respects the defendant's interests. 3 Schiavone played a prominent
role in establishing the scope of "sufficient notice," defining it as
notice to the defendant received within the applicable statute oflimitations.' 34
By defining the scope of "sufficient notice" in terms of the statute
of limitations, this test clearly protects the defendant, but in many
cases it may not further the liberal policy underlying the procedural
rules. The Federal Rules, like those in North Carolina, recognize two
different time constraints: the time for commencing the action, and
the additional period of time allowed for service of process.' 35
of several subsidiary policies underlying statutes of limitation, see Lewis, supra note 45, at
1511-12.
129. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980); see also Brussack, supra
note 45, at 682 ("[Tlhe statutes allow potential defendants to continue their lives or
businesses by providing a date after which an incident can be relegated to the past.").
130. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554 (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
131. Pearce v. Highway Patrol Voluntary Pledge Comm., 310 N.C. 445, 450-51, 312
S.E.2d 421, 425 (1984) (citing Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 370, 98 S.E.2d 508, 514
(1957)); see 'also Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 256 (D. Del. 1965)
("[S]tatutes of limitations are not approximate goals to be aimed at. They cannot be
extended willy-nilly by the court as it might extend the time for a brief to be filed.... The
court cannot substitute its own ... notions of fair play ... for a clear mandate of the
law.").
132. The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 1991 amendment to Federal
Rule 15(c) specifically indicate that the amendment was necessary to implement the
"liberal pleading practices" secured elsewhere in the federal rules. See WRiGHT ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 176.
133. See Brussack, supra note 45, at 673 (noting that "Rule 15(c) reflects the
uncontroversial premise that some post-limitations amendments must be regarded as
subject to the limitations defense, while other amendments can be allowed after the statute
has run without frustrating the aims of limitations doctrine").
134. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986); see also supra notes 62-64 and
accompanying text.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
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According to the operation of these rules, even a correctly named
defendant may not receive notice of a timely action until he is served
with process and that may not occur until after the expiration of the
statute of limitations. 6 Consequently, Schiavone created a double
standard3 7 that operated to the detriment of plaintiffs.33 A
defendant brought into court by amendment was required to receive
notice at an earlier stage in litigation than a defendant properly
named originally.139
Congress's 1991 amendment of Federal Rule 15(c) eliminated the
double standard in federal courts."4 Prior to the amendment, courts
reasoned that the plain language of Rule 15(c) compelled strict
interpretation; thus, the double standard resulted.' 4' Amendment
of the rule rendered this argument a nullity in federal courts.
The double standard, however, remains in effect in North
Carolina. One possible justification for retaining it is that parties who
bring actions so close to the expiration of the statute of limitations
deserve their plight.42 Clearly, such culpability of the plaintiff
136. Dornfried, supra note 45, at 603.
137. Id.
138. Commentators have criticized the Schiavone majority for completely ignoring this
consequence of its holding. See Dornfried, supra note 45, at 607-08; Brussack, supra note
45, at 683 ("Rule 15(c) sometimes gives an advantage to misnamed defendants over
correctly named defendants-an advantage that makes no sense in terms of the aims of
limitations doctrine and that leaves potentially meritorious actions unnecessarily vulnerable
to the limitations defense because of easily made pleading mistakes.").
139. The Schiavone double standard was not unforeseen, however, for several federal
court decisions pre-dating Schiavone had recognized that Rule 15(c) could be applied so
as to reach this result. See, eg., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Martz v. Miller Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D. Del.
1965). The court in Martz labeled the double standard an "anomalous result" but felt
compelled to abide by it nonetheless. Martz, 244 F. Supp. at 254. In contrast, the court
in Ingram eschewed this theory, stating that "there is no reason why a misnamed defen-
dant is entitled to earlier notice than he would have received had the complaint named
him correctly," Ingram, 585 F.2d at 571, and instead favored the more liberal approach of
requiring notice within the time allowed for service of process. Id. at 572.
140. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text; see also Weisgal v. Smith, 774 F.2d
1277, 1279 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The language of the Rule requires, in plain and clear terms,
that the notice be given 'within the limitations period' ... [and] ... [i]t is our respon-
sibility to apply the Rule as it is written.. . ."); Odence v. Salmonson Ventures, 108 F.R.D.
163, 170 (D. RI. 1985) ("Just as any issue of statutory construction must begin (and often
end) with the language of the statute itself, construction of a rule of procedure must start
with the verbiage of the rule." (citation omitted)).
142. See Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D. 329,332 (E. D. Mo. 1980) ("'When
filing this close to the deadline, the margin for error is slight. It is axiomatic that when the
margin for error is slight, a slight error can be costly.").
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played a factor in the Schiavone decision.143 As another court
stated, "[h]ad [the plaintiff] not dawdled well into the eleventh hour,
he would not be caught in the time warp which he now brands as
'unfair.' His lack of elementary prevenance earns him scant sym-
pathy."' Opponents of this view argue, however, that this sort of
punitive dismissal is manifestly unfair when there are legitimate
reasons for a delayed, but still timely, filing.145
Another possible justification for keeping the double standard in
North Carolina involves North Carolina's rule allowing for extensions
of time for service of process. A North Carolina plaintiff who is
unable to effect timely service on a defendant may seek an extension
of time either by securing an endorsement on the original summons
or by suing out an alias or pluries summons.' The statute does not
limit a plaintiff to a fixed number of extensions, so a plaintiff who
follows the procedural guidelines could theoretically extend the time
for service of process indefinitely.47 Consequently, if the current
interpretation of the federal rule were applied in North Carolina, the
time allotted for notice to a defendant brought in by amendment
could similarly be extended indefinitely. Thus, elimination of the
double standard might subvert the policies behind the statutes of
limitations requirement of a fixed period within which to bring a
complaint.' This potential unfairness, however, is easily eliminated
by imposing a fixed limit after which Rule 15(c) would be inap-
plicable.
These policy considerations demonstrate that it is time for the
North Carolina General Assembly to follow the lead of Congress and
recognize the error inherent in its current version of Rule 15(C).
149
It is unfair for trivial pleading mistakes to deprive plaintiffs of their
143. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 28 (1986) ("This was not a situation where the
ascertainment of the defendant's identity was difficult for the plaintiffs. An examination
of the magazine's masthead clearly would have revealed the corporate entity responsible
for the publication.").
144. Odence, 108 F.R.D. at 171.
145. See, eg., Brussack, supra note 45, at 696-97.
146. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(d).
147. The corresponding federal rule mandates that service of process must be
accomplished within 120 days of the filing of the complaint or the complaint will be
dismissed, unless the plaintiff can show "good cause" for his failure; in which case, the
court may "extend the time for service for an appropriate period." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
148. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
149. See Allen v. River Edge Motor Lodge, 861 S.W.2d 364,366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)
("For consistency and fairness the Rule should be amended to allow relation back where
the proper party received notice of the action within the time allowed for service of the
original process.").
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opportunity to pursue potentially meritorious claims. Rule 15(c) is
designed to cure this unfairness by enabling plaintiffs to overcome a
limitations defense.' Since a plaintiff likely will not discover his
own pleading error until after he has served his original complaint,
and since timely service may often be accomplished after the
expiration of the statute of limitations, it is manifestly illogical to limit
the application of Rule 15(c) to those situations in which the
defendant receives notice within the limitations period. 51
Franklin clearly illustrates this point. 2 The proper defendant,
Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., may not have received notice of the action
within the limitations period, but it likely did receive notice within the
period allowed for service of process and would not have been
prejudiced in defending against the action. Therefore, Winn-Dixie
Raleigh should not have escaped liability merely because the wrong
corporate entity was named in the suit. Such a result is clearly
antithetical to the idea of "liberal pleading practices."' 53
North Carolina should amend its Rule 15(c) in accordance with
the federal rule and allow relation back of an amended complaint
when the correct defendant has received proper notice within the time
allowed for service of process. Such a change would eliminate the
double standard created by the application of the Schiavone test and
would better accomplish the purpose of Rule 15(c)."5 Inevitably,
however, such an amendment would lead to litigation concerning the
meaning of "time allowed for service of process." Accordingly, to
preserve the policy of protecting the interests of defendants that
150. See Bashara v. Corliss, 632 A.2d 30,33-34 (Vt. 1993) (Morse, J., dissenting) ("The
sole purpose of the concept of relation back.., is to save claims that would otherwise be
time barred.").
151. It makes little sense to maintain the current policy as an incentive for parties and
their attorneys to initiate litigation more promptly, because the filing of complaints near
the statute of limitations deadline is an inevitable part of litigation strategy. Moreover, the
current policy encourages defendants, particularly corporate defendants, to structure
themselves so as to evade service of process as long as possible in an effort to avoid
litigation if the original complaint was drafted improperly. As the attorney for the
Franklin plaintiffs noted, "application of the old federal rule encourages a litigation shell
game on the part of defendants who ... are doing everything they can to keep proper
service from being accomplished." Berry, supra note 42, at 1 (quoting attorney William
Moore, Jr., who argued the plaintiff's appeal in Franklin).
152. See supra notes 16-51 and accompanying text.
153. See Franklin, 117 N.C. App. at 43-44, 450 S.E.2d at 33-34 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
154. This proposal, if enacted, would still serve the aims of the limitations doctrine
because defendants misnamed originally would be entitled to the same notice that a
properly named defendant would get, but no more. See Brussack, supra note 45, at 688.
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underlies statutes of limitation,'5 "time allowed for service of
process" should be expressly limited, either to the original period of
30 days or to some other fixed period. Otherwise, the period for
relation-back would be extended concurrently with an extension of
the period for service of process, and the interests of the defendant
could conceivably be compromised. Together, these changes to the
North Carolina Rules of Civil, Procedure will help produce just
outcomes both for plaintiffs and defendants.
PETER A. ZORN
155. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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Let Truth Be Their Devise:1 Hargett v. Holland and the
Professional Malpractice Statute of Repose
Suppose that a fellow named King Lear seeks the assistance of
an attorney. Lear may reasonably expect the attorney to render his
services with diligence and skill.2 If the attorney negligently fails to
exercise sufficient diligence or skill, and his negligence injures Lear,
then Lear may reasonably expect compensation as the. result of a
malpractice judgment or a settlement.3 In recent years, many courts
have recognized that a lawyer can also have a duty to someone with
whom he has never contracted, if that someone is the intended
1. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act I, se. 1, 1. 108, at 1256 (Houghton
•Mifflin 1974) (c. 1604) (consisting of the source of the paraphrase). The play opens with
old King Lear dividing his kingdom among his three daughters-Goneril, Regan, and
Cordelia--so that he may "[u]nburthen'd crawl toward death." Id. at 11. 36-53. Lear
suggests that he will reward his daughters to the extent they express their love for him.
Id. at 11. 51-53. Goneril and Regan pledge "all" their love to Lear in the most high-
sounding words, and receive their territories. Id. at 1.55-82. But when Cordelia is asked
to speak, she replies that she cannot honestly pledge "all" her love to her father, since
"half" must be reserved for a future husband. Id. at 1. 87-103. Lear becomes confused,
offended, and angry.
Lear: So young, and so untender?
Cordelia: So young, my lord, and true.
Lear: Let it be so: thy truth then be thy dow'r!
Id. at 11. 106-08.
2. The North Carolina courts, for example, recognize that when a lawyer
contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents
that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill, and ability necessary
to the practice of his profession and which others similarly situated ordinarily
possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation
entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and
diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his
client's cause.
Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517,519, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954). The case law requires
North Carolina attorneys to exercise "such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of
ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks
which they undertake." Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 356, 329 S.E.2d 355, 366 (1985).
3. All states recognize a cause of action for legal malpractice. See; eg., Andrews v.
Wade & De Young, Inc., 875 P.2d 89 (Alaska 1994); Espinosa v. Sparber,'Shevin, Shapo,
Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1993); Collins v. Greenstein, 595 P.2d 275
(Haw. 1979); Morris v. Hunter, 652 A.2d 80 (Me. 1994). The expectation of a legal
remedy for attorney malpractice has fairly deep historical roots; one account traces the
cause of action to the early eighteenth century. John W. Wade, The Attorney's Liability
for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 755 (1959).
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beneficiary of services for which he was hired.' For example, if
Cordelia is the intended beneficiary of Lear's will, and Cordelia's
devise goes to Regan because Lear's attorney negligently misdrafted
the will, then Cordelia may expect compensation when Lear dies and
she fails to receive what he intended her to have. The courts have
opened the door to allow people like Cordelia a legal remedy.'
4. At common law, attorneys could be held liable for malpractice only to those with
whom they shared "privity of contract": a contractual, attorney-client relationship. See
1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACFICE § 7.4, at 365 (3d ed.
1989); BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). The privity requirement
sometimes "operated to deny a cause of action to the only party affected by the attorney's
negligence," such as the clearly intended beneficiary under a will. Developments in the
Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1561
(1994) [hereinafter Lawyers' Responsibilities]. In 1961 the California Supreme Court
punctured the privity requirement by permitting third-party beneficiaries to a will to sue
the drafting attorney for negligence. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688-89 (Cal. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). In the wake of Lucas, "the vast majority of modern
decisions have favored expanding privity beyond the confines of the attorney-client
relationship." 1 MALLEN & SMrH, supra, § 7.10, at 379. The claimants who have most
commonly benefited from the overthrow of the privity rule are the "beneficiaries of
negligently drafted wills [and] lenders who rel[y] on improperly drafted title certifications,"
since these parties are often "clearly intended to benefit by a client's retention of an
attorney." Lawyers' Responsibilities, supra, at 1561. Most courts that impute to attorneys
legal duties beyond privity have adopted an "intended beneficiary test" to determine
whether the attorney owed a duty to a third party. Id. (citing Tom W. Bell, Comment,
Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1533, 1539 (1992)). Under this test, both the attorney and the client must have expressly
intended the plaintiff to benefit from the legal services, and this benefit must be the
" 'primary or direct purpose of the transaction or relationship.'" Id. at 1561-62 (quoting
Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. 1982)).
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not articulated a similar test specifically
applicable to claims of legal malpractice. However, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
has endorsed a general balancing test to determine whether a plaintiff lacking privity of
contract with a defendant may yet claim against him in tort. The factors of the test are:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the other person;
(2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that he suffered
injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury; (5) the moral blame attached to such conduct; and (6) the policy of
preventing future harm.
United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400, 406-07, 263 S.E.2d 313, 317, disc. rev.
denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980). The factors of the test are the same factors
articulated in Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958), in which the California Supreme
Court held that a notary public who negligently failed to direct proper attestation of a will
he drafted was liable in tort to an intended beneficiary who was damaged because of the
invalidity of the instrument. Id. at 17-19. This test formed the basis of the Lucas decision.
See Lucas, 364 P.2d at 688-89. For a discussion of how a lawsuit by beneficiaries of a will
against the drafting attorney would fare in North Carolina, see infra note 176 and
accompanying text.
5. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
STATUTE OF REPOSE
Lawyers have a competing expectation: They expect that after
enough time elapses, they will no longer have to defend themselves
against claims of negligently rendered services.' After claims have
aged long enough, the argument goes, they become too difficult, too
costly to defend.7 Traditionally, states have balanced these expec-
tations of attorneys and clients with statutes of limitations, which bar
claims for legal malpractice at some specified time after the cause of
action accrues Courts and legislatures later adopted more flexible
rules to offset the hardship that strict application of these statutes
caused some claimants.9 Beginning in the late 1960s, however,
widespread publicity of an insurance "crisis" prompted legislatures to
enact "statutes of repose" to lay to rest claims of products liability
and professional malpractice."0 Statutes of repose restrict a claim-
ant's ability to obtain legal remedy far more than statutes of
limitations do, since they begin to run regardless of whether the
claimant has been injured, or is aware that he has been injured."
In Hargett v. Holland,2 the North Carolina Supreme Court
addressed North Carolina's statute of repose for claims of professional
malpractice. Section 1-15(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes
bars suits for professional malpractice brought more than four years
after the "last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of
action."'3 In Hargett, the court held that a lawyer who contracted
6. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177,
1185 (1950) [hereinafter Statutes of Limitations].
7. Id.
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990). For a brief account of the
development of statutes of limitations in the United States, see infra notes 45-58 and
accompanying text.
9. These rules are known as the damage rule, the discovery rule, and the continuous
representation rule; they delay the moment at which an action accrues. See infra notes 75-
86 and accompanying text.
10. The "crisis" has been reported extensively, though some criticize the label "crisis"
as inaccurate. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
11. 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF AcrONS § 1.3.2.1, at 30-31 (1991).
12. 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994).
13. The full text of the relevant section of the professional malpractice limitations
statute reads:
Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action for malpractice
arising out of the performance or failure to perform professional services shall be
deemed to accrue at the time of the occurrence of the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action: Provided that whenever there is bodily injury
to the person, economic or monetary loss, or a defect in or damage to property
which originates under circumstances making the injury, loss, defect or damage
not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin, and the injury, loss,
defect or damage is discovered or should reasonably be discovered by the
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only to draft a will had no continuing duty thereafter to make a will
that effectuated the testator's intent. 4 Therefore, the attorney's
"last act" for purposes of the statute was his negligent misdrafting of
the will, rather than his failure to correct it before the testator died."5
The statute of repose thus barred the action for negligent misdrafting
by the plaintiffs, beneficiaries under the will who claimed that the
attorney's misdrafting cost them a share of what their father intended
to devise them. 6 Although the plaintiffs claimed to have evidence
of the attorney's drafting negligence, this "truth," and not an
increased portion of their father's estate, was to be their devise.17
This Note summarizes the facts and holding of Hargett.8 It then
offers a brief history of statutes of limitations and repose, explaining
both their purposes and their methods of operation. 9 It focuses on
the North Carolina experience with statutes of limitations and repose,
with a discussion of the genesis of section 1-15(c) and how the North
Carolina appellate courts have interpreted it.' The Note then
analyzes the Hargett decision, concluding that the decision is
consistent with the North Carolina Supreme Court's past commentary
on the statute of repose and with the legislative intent behind it.2
claimant two or more years after the occurrence of the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action, suit must be commenced within one year from
the date discovery is made: Provided nothing herein shall be construed to reduce
the statute of limitation in any such case below three years. Provided further, that
in no event shall an action be commenced more than four years from the last act
of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action: Provided further, that where
damages are sought by reason of a foreign object, which has no therapeutic or
diagnostic purpose or effect, having been left in the body, a person seeking
damages for malpractice may commence an action therefor within one year after
discovery thereof as hereinabove provided, but in no event may the action be
commenced more than 10 years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to
the cause of action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (1983) (emphasis added). While § 1-15(c) uses the term "statute
of limitation," the standard term today seems to be "statute of limitations." See, e.g.,
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990); 2 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICrIONARY 2230 (1976); 1 CoRMAN, supra note ll,passim. The emphasized
portion of the statute above is properly called a statute of repose, and not a statute of
limitations. 1 id § 1.3.2.1, at 30-31. For a discussion of the distinction between the two,
see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
14. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 655, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
15. Id. at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
16. Id.
17. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 45-99 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 100-53 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 154-89 and accompanying text.
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However, this Note contends that the North Carolina General
Assembly should reconsider the statute in light of the hardship it
worked upon the Hargett plaintiffs, and the hardship it will work upon
those similarly situated, with Hargett as precedent.' The Note
suggests legislation that would afford a more ample remedy to the
intended beneficiaries under a will who were deprived of their devise
by a lawyer's negligence.' This legislation would bring North
Carolina law into line with the law of the great majority of jurisdic-
tions, without precipitating or exacerbating an insurance "crisis" for
lawyers.2 4
On November 6, 1991, the children of Vann W. Hargett sued
attorney Robert Holland, alleging that "in or about 1978" Mr.
Holland negligently drafted their father's willy Mr. Holland denied
that he prepared the will or supervised its execution and moved to
dismiss the claim by pleading, inter alia, that the applicable statute of
limitations barred it.' The professional malpractice limitations
statute in North Carolina bars the filing of malpractice claims "more
than four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the
22. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
25. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 653-54, 447 S.E.2d at 787. According to their complaint, the
four plaintiffs were the children of the marriage of Vann W. Hargett to Sarah R. Hargett.
Record at 4, Hargett v. Holland, 111 N.C. App. 200, 431 S.E.2d 784 (No. 9220SC589)
(1993), rev'd, 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994). Plaintiffs alleged that their father's
testamentary intent was to transfer a life estate in the family farm to plaintiffs' stepmother,
Elizabeth H. Hargett, and to transfer a remainder interest therein in fee simple to the
plaintiffs and the plaintiffs alone. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 653, 447 S.E.2d at 787. The
complaint further stated that on the day the will was presented for probate, a dispute arose
regarding the rightful recipients of the remainder interest in the family farm. Record at
5. The dispute was ultimately resolved by an unpublished opinion of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, which declared that the remainder interest was to pass to "the testator's
heirs at law pursuant to the North Carolina laws of intestacy," which heirs included the
four plaintiffs, and the two stepchildren of Vann Hargett by his marriage to Elizabeth
Hargett. Id. at 17-18; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (1984). Plaintiffs alleged that since Mr.
Holland "negligently failed to use appropriate verbiage so as to effectuate the intent of the
testator," they were deprived of one-third of their interest in the farm. Record at 6.
26. Record at 19; Hargett, 337 N.C. at 654,447 S.E.2d at 787. For th6 full text of the
relevant section of the professional malpractice limitations statute, see supra note 13. Both
the defendant in his answer and the trial judge in his order referred only to applicable
statutes of limitations. See Record at 19, 22. However, the statute of repose within § 1-
15(c), and no other statute of limitations within the professional malpractice limitations
statute, is the foundation of the holding in Hargett. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 652, 447 S.E.2d
at 786.
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cause of action."'27 The trial judge granted defendant's motion on
the ground that the statute of limitations had expired before suit was
filed.2s
The court of appeals reversed.29 For purposes of the appeal
only, the parties had stipulated that the defendant prepared Vann W.
Hargett's will on or before September 1, 1978, and that the testator
died on November 7, 1988.30 The court of appeals concluded that
the defendant had a continuing duty to correct the will until the
testator died.31 The court thus deemed "the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action," for purposes of the applicable
statute of repose, 2 to have occurred immediately before the testator
died.3 This "last act" was the defendant's failure to act to correct
the mistaken will. 4 Since this "last act" fell within four years of the
filing of the complaint, the claim was not barred.5
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' decision.4 The court reiterated past commentary on the
absolute nature of the statute of repose for professional malprac-
tice,37 noting that the plaintiffs' claim was maintainable only if it was
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c). For the complete text of this statute, see supra note
13.
28. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 787. In fact it is a statute of repose, and
not a statute of limitations, which the supreme court found to bar plaintiffs' claim. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 654, 447 S.E2d at 787.
30. Record at 21.
31. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 652, 447 S.EM2d at 786.
32. For the definition of "statute of repose" that the North Carolina Supreme Court
espouses, see infra note 37 and accompanying text. For a more general description of the
term, see infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
33. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
34. IM at 655, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
35. I at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
36. Id. at 653, 447 S.E.2d at 786.
37. The court distinguished the term "statute of repose" from "statute of limitations,"
in keeping with its own precedent:
Unlike statutes of limitations, which run from the time a cause of action
accrues, "[s]tatutes of repose.., create time limitations which are not measured
from the date of injury. These time limitations often run from defendant's last
act giving rise to the claim or from substantial completion of some service
rendered by defendant." Trustees of Rowan Tech. v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs.,
313 N.C. 230, 234 n.3, 328 S.E.2d 274, 276-77 n.3 (1985).
.. In Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E.2d 469 (1985), this Court
held:
[Tihe period contained in the statute of repose begins when a specific
event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or
whether an injury has resulted.... Thus, the repose serves as an ...
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brought within four years of "the last act of defendant giving rise to
the claim."3 Under the alleged arrangement between the defendant
and Vann W. Hargett-a contract to prepare a will, to which the
defendant was an attesting witness-the court held that the defen-
dant's duty to the testator was only to prepare and supervise the will's
execution 9 The court specifically adverted to the absence of any
allegations of an ongoing attorney-client relationship between the
testator and the defendant, and the lack of any allegations of facts
which might imply the existence of such a relationship.4 Without
such allegations, the alleged contractual arrangement, by itself,
imposed no continuing duty on the defendant to review, correct, or
redraft the testator's will.41 Pursuant to the contract between the
defendant and the testator, the defendant prepared the will and then
supervised its execution.42 Therefore, the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the claim was his supervision of the will's execution in
1978, thirteen years before the plaintiffs filed suit.43 Thus, held the
court, the statute of repose barred the plaintiffs' claim."
England's Limitation Act of 1623'5 has been identified as the
first modern-era statute limiting the time in which personal actions
may be brought.4 It was enacted primarily to keep "inconseque-
ntial" claims out of the King's courts.47 The Limitation Act was
adopted by most of the American colonies and served as the
framework for almost every state's general statute of limitations.
absolute barrier that prevents a plaintiffs right of action even before his
cause of action may accrue, which is generally recognized as the point
in time when the elements necessary for a legal wrong coalesce.
Id. at 633, 325 S.E.2d at 474-75 (citations omitted).
Hargett, 337 N.C. 651,654-55,447 S.E.2d 784,787-88 (1994). The statute of repose within
§ 1-15(c) reads, "[In no event shall an action be commenced more than four years from
the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c).
38. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 655, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
39. Id. at 655-56, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
40. Id
41. Id.
42. Id. at 653, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
43. See id. at 653-54,447 S.E.2d at 787. Holland supervised the execution of Hargett's
will on September 1, 1978. Id. at 653, 447 S.E.2d at 787. Hargett died on November 7,
1988. Id. Plaintiffs filed suit on November 6, 1991. Id. at 654, 447 S.E2d at 787.
44. See id. at 653-54, 447 S.E.2d at 787.
45. 21 Jam., ch. 16 (1623) (prohibiting certain actions in contract and tort from being
brought after specified periods of time had elapsed).
46. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 6, at 1178.
47. Id.
48. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
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In the nineteenth century the United States Supreme Court
articulated several policy justifications for statutes of limitations. The
statutes were said to protect defendants from being harmed by the
loss of evidence over time.a9 The greater the lapse of time between
the alleged wrong and the filing of suit, it was noted, the more likely
that memories of what really transpired would have faded, and the
more likely that witnesses to the occurrence would have died or
disappeared.0 Those sued would face great difficulty in mounting
a solid defense against old claims.5 ' Statutes of limitations were also
thought to impose a "salutary vigilance" upon potential claimants."
By the late 1800s, the Supreme Court was extolling statutes of
limitations as "vital to the welfare of society and.., favored in the
law." 3 Justice Swayne characterized the statutes as punishment for
negligent claimants, and as a tool for "promot[ing] repose by giving
security and stability to human affairs."'54
A lengthy analysis of limitation statutes which appeared in the
Harvard Law Review in 1950 observed that statutes of limitations had
become so firmly "imbedded in [the] law.., that legislatures seldom
reconsider them in the light of the various functions that they actually
perform."' People were said to have "reasonable expectation[s]"
that they would not be called to meet "ancient obligations," and it
was believed that statutes of limitations should secure those expec-
tations.56 Another proffered rationale was that courts should not be
burdened with claims that have become ever more tenuous with the
passage of time." Recent Supreme Court decisions and a treatise on
the limitation of actions have confirmed the persistence of these
justifications."
49. Richards v. Maryland Ins. Co., 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 84, 88 (1814).
50. Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (3 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828).
51. Id.
52. M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270, 279 (1830).
53. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
54. Id.
55. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 6, at 1185.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980) (noting that statutes
of limitations are acknowledgments that with respect to claims, at some time it is likely
that fact-finding will be inaccurate, or settled expectations will be upset); United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (noting and implicitly approving the rationale of repose
behind statutes of limitations); 1 CORMAN, supra note 11, § 1.1, at 11-17."
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Statutes of limitations set maximum time periods beyond which
the right to bring an action on a given claim is extinguished5 9 The
moment at which the statute of limitations period begins to run
depends on the language of the statute and the courts' interpretation
of that language. Many states, including North Carolina,' have
statutes which state that the period generally begins to run when the
plaintiff's cause of action "accrues."'" A cause of action62 "accrues"
when all of its essential elements have come into existence.s The
accrual date differs depending upon the type of claim,' and the
accrual date for a particular type of claim may vary among jurisdic-
tions. If the statute of limitations does not specify when a certain
cause of action accrues, the issue is left for the courts to decide.'
The following discussion of accrual is restricted to how courts
have approached accrual in cases of legal malpractice. 67 The
essential elements of any negligence claim, including a claim of legal
malpractice, are: (1) The defendant owed a legal duty to the plaintiff
to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) the defenidant failed
to conform her conduct to the required standard and thereby
breached her duty to the plaintiff; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual loss
or damage as a result of the defendant's deficient conduct; and (4) the
defendant's deficient conduct had a reasonably close causal connec-
59. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(a).
61. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 18.9, at 92.
62. A "cause of action" is a set of facts which gives one the right of judicial redress
as against another. See, e.g., Duncan Coffee Co. v. Clement, 246 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952).
63. See, e.g., Georgia v. O'Herion, 54 P.2d 657, 660 (Okla. 1936) (per curiam) ("[A]s
a general rule, the accrual of a cause of action means the right to institute and maintain
a suit; and, whenever one person may sue another, a cause of action has accrued ....").
64. Compare, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (requiring that professional malpractice
actions be brought within four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the
cause of action) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1983) (requiring an action for damages
arising from the defective condition of an improvement to real property to be brought
within six years of defendant's last act or omission giving rise to the cause of action).
65. Compare, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (requiring that professional malpractice
actions be brought within four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the
cause of action) with IDAHO CODE § 5-219 (1990) (requiring actions for professional
malpractice to be brought "within two years").
66. 1 CORMAN, supra note 11, § 6.1, at 373.
67. Recognizing that the term "legal malpractice" can encompass a multitude of
offenses, and that statutory and judicial definitions of legal malpractice differ, this Note
uses the term in its most common sense, to signify the negligent rendering of legal services.
See 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 4, § 1.1, at 2-4.
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tion with the resulting injury to the plaintiff. Strictly speaking, a
claim that an attorney negligently rendered legal services should
accrue, at the earliest, when the plaintiff has actually been harmed by
the attorney's negligence, since harm is an element of a negligence
claim.69 However, the prevailing standard of the past, the "occur-
rence rule," fixed the time of accrual at the time of the attorney's
negligent act.70 Since the occurrence rule presumed that clients are
at least nominally injured at the time of the attorney's act or
omission, it could be said that the "harm" element of the negligence
claim was always present at the point of accrual.71 The malpractice
claim accrued at the time of the attorney's negligence even if the
plaintiff did not then suffer actual damages, or was not then aware
that he had suffered damages. 2 Application of the occurrence rule
worked serious hardships on malpractice claimants when the
attorney's negligence was not immediately ascertainable, or when the
harm caused by that negligence did not occur until much later
Because of these harsh results, the occurrence rule was aban-
doned or tempered in almost all jurisdictions.74 New rules have
replaced the occurrence rule or supplement it so as to "toll," or delay,
the running of the statute of limitations period ("toll the statute").
The "damage rule" is one such innovation. It requires that the client
sustain actual injury before the malpractice action accrues.7' It
appears to be the most widely used tolling mechanism. The damage
rule effectively eliminates the false presumption of the occurrence rule
that the client's damages and the attorney's negligence are necessarily
coincident, and thereby affords a greater remedy to claimants than the
occurrence rule.
The "discovery rule," on the other hand, tolls the statute until the
client discovers, or reasonably should discover, the essential facts of
his cause of action.76 Since the discovery rule does not toll the
statute of limitations if the plaintiff reasonably should know that his
68. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,
at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
69. 1 CORMAN, supra note 11, § 6.1, at 370; Statutes of Limitations, supra note 6, at
1201.
70. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 4, § 18.10, at 94-95.
71. See id.
72. See id at 98.
73. Id
74. Id at 100.
75. Id
76. Id § 18.14, at 127-28.
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claim exists, it still encourages plaintiffs to keep "salutary vigilance,"
and it avoids stale claims. The discovery rule is particularly valuable
to plaintiffs in the context of legal malpractice, given the special
nature of the attorney-client relationship.77 If malpractice claims are
not governed by the discovery rule, the attorney who knows of her
own negligence is encouraged not to tell her client about that
negligence until the statute of limitations has run.78 The client
unschooled in the law often cannot easily detect whether his lawyer
has been negligent.79 Even if a client suspects that his lawyer has
been negligent, his fiduciary relationship with the lawyer encourages
him to trust the lawyer's choices.80 Moreover, as to malpractice
which occurs amid legal proceedings, the volume of related paperwork
and the length of adjudication may hamper the detection of negli-
gence before the statute has run.8 ' The discovery rule helps compen-
sate for these disadvantages that a client faces. It has proven
immensely popular and is now the predominant accrual doctrine
throughout the country.
Finally, the "continuous representation rule" defers accrual of the
malpractice claim until the attorney stops representing the claimant
in a particular matter." Like the discovery rule, it offers attorneys
little encouragement to stall action on an ongoing matter until the
limitation period has run. 4  Moreover, it enables the client to
preserve the attorney-client relationship without penalty; the attorney
has time to correct the perceived error and avert harm or remedy
harm done, and the matter for which the attorney was retained can
be resolved optimally, without interference." Stale claims are still
discouraged since the lawyer will retain documents of ongoing
matters, and since the client must assert his claim within a set time
after his relationship with the lawyer ends. 6
77. Jeffrey A. Batts, Note, Statute of Limitations Accrual in Attorney Malpractice
Actions: Thorpe v. Dement, 20 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 1017, 1025-26 (1984) (citing Neel
v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 428-33 (Cal. 1971)).
78. Id. at 1026.
79. lId
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 2 MALLEN & SMrTH, supra note 4, § 18.14, at 132 & n.21.
83. Id. § 18.12, at 115.
84. Batts, supra note 77, at 1028 (citing Siegel v. Kranis, 288 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1968); Wilson v. Econom, 288 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)).
85. 2 MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 4, § 18.12, at 115.
86. See id
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Over the past thirty years many state legislatures have, with
respect to certain claims, bucked the trend of liberalizing statutes of
limitations. The late 1960s and 1970s saw a dramatic increase in the
number of claims filed by consumers alleging that they were injured
by defective products87 or negligently provided medical services.88
The manufacturing, health-care, and insurance industries pressed for
reforms, claiming that the increased number and size of judgments
and settlements for plaintiffs were elevating insurance rates to "crisis"
levels.8 9 At the same time, the number and size of legal malpractice
claims were also rising rapidly."0 Higher underwriting costs drove
87. E.g., Terry M. Dworkin, Product Liability of the 1980s: "Repose is not the Destiny"
of Manufacturers, 61 N.C. L. REv. 33, 33-35 (1982); Michael M. Martin, A Statute of
Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 745,745-46 (1982). The claim
that the increase in products liability claims had reached "critical" levels has been
contested. See; e.g., John Vargo, Products Liability, 15 IND. L. REV. 289,289-90 n.2 (1982)
("[N]o real evidence of greatly increased claims or costs was ever produced to substantiate
an actual crisis in the products liability area."). The fact remains that many state
legislatures responded as though there were a "crisis" by enacting remedial legislation. See
infra note 92 and accompanying text.
88. E.g., Milton S. Blaut, The Medical Malpractice Crisis-Its Causes and Future, 44
INS. COUNS. J. 114, 118-19 (1977); Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of
the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5, 6. Claims
that a medical malpractice "crisis" existed have also been criticized. See, e.g., Thomas A.
Eaton, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Medical Malpractice in Georgia: A Reassessment, 17 GA.
L. REV. 33, 53 n.85 (1982) ("[T]here is mounting evidence that the "medical malpractice
crisis' of the 1970's was greatly overplayed."). Once again, however, legislatures in fact
responded as though there were such a "crisis." See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Frank J. Vandall, Undermining Torts' Policies: Products Liability
Legislation, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 673,679-82 (1981) (discussing complaints by manufacturers
and insurers regarding products liability insurance rates, and legislative responses to those
complaints); see generally Robinson, supra note 88 (detailing the medical malpractice
insurance rate climb and efforts by lobbyists and legislatures to slow it).
Among the explanations for the increase in products liability claims were consumers'
increased awareness of their rights and judges' recognition of strict liability for defective
products. See, eg., Dworkin, supra note 87, at 33. The medical malpractice crisis has been
attributed to "the liberalization of tort doctrine." See Robinson, supra note 88, at 18. The
fact that jurisdictions had adopted or were adopting plaintiff-friendly accrual rules made
potential defendants' prospects even worse.
90. See, e.g., Jo ANN FELIX, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO LEGAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE ix-x (1982) (stating that by 1975 many insurers' legal malpractice premiums
were ten times more than they had been in the late 1960s; reporting that insurers ascribed
the increases to predictions of severe increases in the number and dollar amount of claims
against lawyers); CHARLES P. KiNDREGAN, MALPRACriCE AND THE LAWYER 54 (1978)
(noting that recent legal malpractice policies were significantly more expensive than past
policies, frequently offered only limited coverage, and were available from fewer
companies since many had left the market); Ronald E. Mallen, The Profile of Legal
Malpractice Liability, in LAW FIRM LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS: PRACI'ICAL
APPROACHES FOR A DIFFICULT MARKET 3,3 (1986) (stating that "[iun the mid-1970s...
legal malpractice claims appeared to be exploding").
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many insurers out of the malpractice and products liability insurance
markets, and the insurers that remained increased their rates
sharply." A great number of state legislatures responded by passing
laws aimed at reducing the costs of insurance and increasing its
availability. 2 Part of this response was the enactment of statutes of
repose.
Unlike statutes of limitations, which restrict the time for bringing
suit to a specified period after the claim has accrued, 93 a statute of
repose restricts the time during which one may bring suit on a claim
to a period after the occurrence of a specified event.94 Very often
that event is the defendant's wrongful act. Therefore, statutes of
repose may run against potential claimants who have no present right
of action because they have not yet been harmed. Statutes of repose
may also run against potential claimants who have been harmed but
are not yet aware of that fact. Statutes of repose effectively reinstate
the occurrence rule.95 They are supported by exactly the same
rationales that undergird statutes of limitations.96 However, they are
peculiarly the result of perceived insurance "crises" in the areas in
which they are adopted.97 They represent the belief that in certain
cases, there comes a time when the benefits gained by an absolute
barrier to suit outweigh the costs to potential claimants who are
denied judicial redress. The statutes have been challenged on
constitutional grounds with mixed results;9" North Carolina's appel-
91. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 88, at 8-9 (referring to the "actual or threatened
withdrawal" of insurers from the medical malpractice market); Howard Alan Learner,
Note, Restricting Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro
Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 143, 143 n.1
(1981) (stating that between 1960 and 1970 physicians' malpractice premiums rose 949.2%
for surgeons and 540.8% for non-surgeons); Joseph E. Page & Marcy M. Stephens, The
Product Liability Insurance "Crisis:" Causes, Nostrums and Cures, 13 CAP. U. L. REV. 387,
388 (1984) (describing greater than 300% rate hikes in product-liability insurance
premiums between 1974 and 1976).
92. See Mitchell S. Berger, Note, Following the Doctor's Orders-Caps on Non-
Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 173, 175-76 (1990)
(noting that all states but West Virginia enacted legislation to decrease the rates of medical
malpractice insurance); Terry M. Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57
TuL. L. REv. 602, 604 & nn.10-12 (1983) (stating that in the previous six years, over two-
thirds of the states had adopted "some product liability reform," and that nearly half of
the states had enacted limitation statutes).
93. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
94. 1 CORMAN, supra note 11, § 1.3.2.1, at 30-31.
95. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
98. See 1 CORMAN, supra note 11, §§ 132.1-1.3.2.8, at 30-50.
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late courts have, to date, denied every constitutional challenge leveled
at statutes of repose.99
North Carolina's professional malpractice limitation statute has
its roots in the North Carolina Constitutional Convention of 1868.
Members of the convention commissioned three men to prepare, inter
alia, a code of civil procedure for the state."° That commission
proposed, and the General Assembly adopted, a general statute of
limitations that remained virtually unchanged for one hundred years:
"Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed
in this title after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where,
in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute .... .1
Under this statute and its similar successors,"° the North Carolina
courts considered the time of accrual to be time of the defendant's
wrongful act,"° and they applied the occurrence rule inflexibly."~
99. See, e.g., Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 47-48, 332 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1985)
(upholding § 1-50(6), a products liability statute of repose, as not unconstitutionally vague,
and as non-violative of equal protection and the excessive emoluments and open courts
provisions of the North Carolina Constitution); Walker v. Santos, 70 N.C. App. 623, 624,
320 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1984) (holding that § 1-15(c) does not violate open courts provision
of state constitution); Roberts v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 537-41,
289 S.E.2d 875, 878-80 (1982) (holding that § 1-15(c) is not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to defendants and does not violate federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause
or the state constitution's Excessive Emoluments Clause), affd, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d
384 (1983). But see Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C. App. 589,595,284 S.E.2d
188, 192 (declaring § 1-50(6) void as violative of the open courts provision of the North
Carolina Constitution), modified, 306 N.C. 364, 372, 293 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1982) (holding
that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 1-50(6), and therefore
declining to reach the constitutional issue).
100. JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA CONsrn ON: A REFERENCE GUIDE
14 (1993).
101. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF NORTH CAROLINA § 17 (1868). In 1884 the
quoted section was modified so as to remove the commas before and after the words "in
special cases." CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF NORTH CAROLINA § 138 (1884). The
word "title" was changed to "chapter" in 1905. 1 REVISAL OF 1905 OF NORTH CAROLINA
§ 360 (1905). The statute was unchanged when included in the 1919 compendium of North
Carolina statutes, CONSOLIDATED STATUTES OF NORTH CAROLINA § 405 (1919), and
when included in the first version of the General Statutes of-North Carolina as § 1-15
(1943). In 1967 the General Assembly amended § 1-15 by repealing the last sentence. Act
of June 27, 1967, ch. 954, § 3(a), 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 1274, 1348. The last sentence had
read, "The objection that the action was not commenced within the time limited can only
be taken by answer." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1953).
102. See supra note 101.
103. See, e.g., Wilson v. Crab Orchard Dev. Co., 276 N.C. 198,214,171 S.E.2d 873,884
(1970); Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459, 461, 142 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1965); Shearin v. Lloyd, 246
N.C. 363, 367-68, 98 S.E.2d 508, 511-12 (1957).
104. James C. Eubanks III, Note, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 688, 689 (1971). At the
time, § 1-52(5) provided that a claim based upon injury to another's person or right must
be brought within three years of when the cause of action accrued. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
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In 1971 the General Assembly altered the general statute of
limitations so as to mitigate the harshness of the rule in the contexts
of medical malpractice and products liability. 5 The legislature
designated existing section 1-15 as section 1-15(a), and added a new
subsection:
(b) Except where otherwise provided by statute, a cause of
action, other than one for wrongful death, having as an
essential element bodily injury to the person or a defect or
damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time of
its origin, is deemed to have accrued at the time the injury
was discovered by the claimant, or ought reasonably to have
been discovered by him, whichever event first occurs;
provided that in such cases the period shall not exceed 10
years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the
claim for relief 6
The statute established the discovery rule as the standard of accrual
for claims regarding latent bodily injuries. It also functioned as a
statute of repose for these claims, extinguishing the right to bring suit
ten years following the last act of the defendant giving rise to the
claim.
No sooner had this statute been passed than the litigation and in-
surance "crises" came to pass."°  North Carolina House Bill 567
created the North Carolina Professional Liability Insurance Study
Commission, and directed it "to make a thorough and comprehensive
study [of] any and all aspects of professional liability insurance,"
including "[t]he problems which professionals (particularly profes-
sionals in the health care professions) have in obtaining professional
liability insurance in North Carolina.""~ The Commission's report
detailed the recent national and state malpractice experiences.C9
52(5) (1969).
105. See Eubanks, supra note 104, at 688-89.
106. Act of July 21, 1971, ch. 1157, sec. 1, § 1-15(b), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1706, 1706
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Supp. 1971)).
107. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
108. Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 623, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 749.
109. NORTH CAROLINA PROFEssIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE STUDY COMMISSION,
REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LIABILrrY INSURANCE STUDY
COMMISSION pt. 1, at 4-17 (1976) [hereinafter INSURANCE REPORT]. This publication
actually contains two reports. The main report, backed by 11 of the 12 Commissioners,
is labeled "Recommendations and Findings." INSURANCE REPORT, unnumbered page
headed "Contents" [hereinafter "Commission Report"]. The second report, labeled
"Minority Report," was written by State Senator Tom Suddarth. INSURANCE REPORT pt.
2, at 1-20. While the Commission Report uses the general terms "professional liability
insurance," "professional malpractice," and simply "malpractice" throughout, it is
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According to the report, the insurance industry blamed the medical
malpractice premium hikes on three factors: increasing claims,
declining insurance company investments, and "the fact that claims
against health care providers may be instituted long after the
occurrence of the alleged negligent act or omission which allegedly
caused the injury."'  According to insurers, the longer the "tail
period" within which claims may be filed, the more difficult it is to
project claims and the more costly it is to handle claims and
litigation."' The Commission concluded that reducing the
limitations period for medical malpractice would help insurers better
predict claims and costs, and would make trial preparation easier for
defendants since the claims against them would be more recent."'
unmistakably aimed at addressing problems of medical malpractice. See, e.g., INSURANCE
REPORT pt. 1, at 4-6 (consisting of a section titled "The National Malpractice Experience,"
which speaks of the "medical malpractice phenomenon" and the increasing costs of health
care services); idt at 23-25 (describing patients' compensation funds and physician-owned
mutual insurance associations). Nowhere does the Commission Report address malpractice
by another specific group of professionals. The dissenting Minority Report mentions other
specific professionals just once:
[I]t seems only fair and just that every lawyer, doctor, engineer, architect, or
other professional, be liable for the consequences of his own negligent conduct,
at least until such time as the injured party has had a reasonable opportunity to
know he's been injured and has had a reasonable opportunity to secure a fair
hearing of his claim.
A lawyer searching a title whose client first learns of his error 4-1/2 years
later should not be able to avoid legal responsibility by pleading a four-year
statute of limitations. He should be accountable for his negligence until discovery
and a reasonable time thereafter within which his client can bring suit. Likewise,
it is legally and morally indefensible that a sponge or a pair of scissors discovered
4-1/2 years following surgery gives rise to no compensation against the surgeon
whose negligence caused the injury.
INSURANCE REPORT pt. 2, at 9.
110. INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 109, pt. 1, at 4-5.
111. Id. at 5. Since it is harder to predict the number of claims that will be filed during
longer tail periods, insurers are prone to charge unusually high rates to guard against
exposure during those periods. Accurate rate-making is further complicated by "long
tails" (long tail periods), since future claims must be judged at their future value, based
on uncertain rates of inflation. FELIX, supra note 90, at 13-14 (discussing "occurrence"-
type policies in the context of legal malpractice insurance).
One way insurance companies adjusted to long tail periods was to alter policy
coverage. Traditional "occurrence" policies cover the insured for acts and omissions
creating liability during the year of policy coverage, no matter when claims are filed based
on those acts or omissions. Insurers began switching from occurrence policies to "claims-
made" policies, which insure policy holders only against claims made during the year of
coverage, regardless of when the act or omission giving rise to the claim occurred.
INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 109, pt. 1, at 5. Claims-made policies allow insurance
companies to assess their exposure more accurately. FELIX, supra note 90, at 14.
112. INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 109, pt. 1, at 27.
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"However," the Commission cautioned, "the statute must be long
enough to provide reasonable opportunity for plaintiff-patients to
discover latent or consequential injuries."" It recommended a
statute of repose that would extinguish the right to bring action for
"professional malpractice" four years after "the date of the negligent
act." After receiving the report, the General Assembly enacted
section 1-15(c), the malpractice statute of limitations and repose that
the Hargett court applied." The broad wording of the new statute,
which took effect on January 1, 1977, afforded more absolute
protection not only to doctors, but also to all those offering "profes-
sional services."" Section 1-15(c) remains unchanged to this
day." 6
The North Carolina Supreme Court has seldom addressed section
1-15(c) over the past seventeen years, and the court's commentary in
most of those cases does not shed bright light on its holding in Hargett
v. Holland. In a 1980 opinion, the court observed in passing that
section 1-15(c) changed the time of accrual of professional malpractice
actions "from the date of discovery of injury to the date of the
defendant's last act which gave rise to the action," and that for most
latent injuries, "the statute established a four-year period of limitation
113. Id.
114. Act of May 12, 1976, ch. 977, sec. 2, § 1-15(c), 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 2d Sess. 1976,
at 3, 3-5. For the text of § 1-15(c), see supra note 13. The legislature also inserted the
following clause into subsection (b), after the word "death": "or one for malpractice
arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services." Id. § 1, at
3.
115. Id § 9, at 7. Section 1-15(b) was repealed in 1979, but was substantially rewritten
into the General Statutes when the legislature inserted a new subsection and rewrote an
existing one. See Act of May 28,1979, ch. 654, § 3, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687, 689 (adding
new subsection N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) and rewriting existing subsection N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-53(4)).
The broad wording of the statute afforded protection to "professionals" general-
ly-including attorneys-despite the fact that the General Assembly had directed the
Insurance Study Commission to give "particularnl" attention to the problems which health
care professionals had in procuring insurance, see supra note 108 and accompanying text,
and despite the fact that all of the Insurance Report's specific findings dealt with the health
care field, see supra note 109.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has itself noted that § 1-15(c) "was enacted
specifically in response to a so-called medical malpractice 'crisis' experienced by North
Carolina and many of her sister states." Trustees of Rowan Technical College v. J. Hyatt
Hammond Assocs., 313 N.C. 230,236, 328 S.E.2d 274,277-78 (1985). For a discussion of
Rowan, see infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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measured from .. the defendant's last act which gave rise to the
clain. , 117
In the 1985 case Black v. Litlejohn"8 the court was called upon
to define "injury" as it is used in the medical malpractice discovery-
rule clause of section 1-15(c)." For assistance the court looked to
the "purpose and spirit of the statute and what it sought to ac-
complish," as well as "the history and circumstances surrounding the
legislation and the reason for its enactment.""l The court described
the medical malpractice "crisis" during which section 1-15(c) and the
North Carolina Medical Malpractice Actions laws were enacted.'
It then pointed out that while the Insurance Study Commission had
recommended an "exclusive one-year-from-discovery provision with
a four-year outer limit" for all non-apparent injuries resulting from
professional negligence, the General Assembly retained the ten-year
outer limit for the discovery of foreign objects." These four- and
ten-year statutes of repose, the court believed, were "consistent ivith
the purpose and spirit of the medical malpractice act, that is, to
decrease the number and severity of medical malpractice claims in an
effort to decrease the cost of medical malpractice insurance."'"
They amounted to a wise "compromise ... balanc[ing] the needs of
the malpractice victims and those of health care providers and in-
surers."' 2 The court found that the legislature's inclusion in section
1-15(c) of two discovery provisions for non-apparent injuries, and its
retention of the ten-year statute of repose for the discovery of foreign
objects, indicated an intention to give claimants "the maximum
117. Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 112,270 S.E.2d 482,485 (citing Stanley v. Brown,
43 N.C. App. 503, 259 S.E.2d 408 (1979), disc. rev. denied, 299 N.C. 332, 265 S.E.2d 397
(1980)).
118. 312 N.C. 626, 325 SME.2d 469 (1985).
119. The clause reads:
[Wihenever there is bodily injury to the person, economic or monetary loss, or
a defect in or damage to property which originates under circumstances making
the injury, loss, defect or damage not readily apparent to the claimant at the time
of its origin, and the injury, loss, defect or damage is discovered or should
reasonably be discovered by the claimant two or more years after the occurrence
of the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action, suit must be
commenced within one year from the date discovery is made ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c).
120. Black, 312 N.C. at 630, 325 S.E.2d at 473.
121. Id. at 631, 325 S.E.2d at 473 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-21.11 to -21.14 (1981)
(relating to medical malpractice generally)).
122. Id. at 632, 325 S.E.2d at 474.
123. Id. at 633, 325 S.E.2d at 475.
124. Id. at 637, 325 S.E.2d at 477.
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opportunity in delayed discovery situations to pursue their cause of
action subject to the outer time limits in the statute."1 5 Moreover,
the court believed that the policy of fairness underlying discovery
rules encourages that they be "construed broadly" for plaintiffs'
benefit.12
The plaintiff in Black had undergone a hysterectomy on the
advice of her gynecologist, who prescribed and performed the surgery
because, he claimed, it was the only way to alleviate her en-
dometriosis.1  She later fortuitously discovered that a drug was
available for the treatment of endometriosis, and that her hysterec-
tomy therefore had been unnecessary."~ While she knew of her
"injury," in the sense of the removal of her organs, when it occurred,
Ms. Black did not know that any negligence was involved until years
later.1 29  The court broadly construed the one-year-from-discovery
provision of section 1-15(c) to require an awareness that negligence
was involved in the physical "injury.'' "° It explicitly rejected the
reasoning of the court of appeals that the plaintiff could reasonably
have discovered, by seeking a second opinion before or after her
surgery, that the defendant's conduct was negligent.1 The supreme
court noted that the fiduciary relationship of trust between doctor and
patient "envisions an expectation by both parties that the patient will
rely upon the judgment and expertise of the doctor," as well as the
doctor's special knowledge, and that in such a relationship, the patient
was under no affirmative duty to explore whether her doctor had
been negligent." Finally, the court held that the plaintiff's cause
of action should not be dismissed, because it was filed within one year
after discovering defendant's negligent act, and "well within the four-
year outer limit"---implying that the "last act of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action" was his surgery upon the plaintiff.
Three months later, in Trustees of Rowan Technical College v. J.
Hyatt Hammond Associates,' the court decided that a statute of
125. Id.
126. Id at 645, 325 S.E.2d at 482.
127. I& at 626-27, 325 S.E2d at 471.
128. Id. at 627, 325 S.E.2d at 471.
129. IA at 645, 325 S.E.2d at 482. The defendant performed surgery upon the plaintiff
on October 1,1978. Id at 628,325 S.E.2d at 472. The plaintiff discovered sometime after
August 17, 1981 that she had suffered an "injury." I&
130. Id. at 645, 325 S.E.2d at 482.
131. Id at 646, 325 S.E.2d at 482.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 647, 325 S.E.2d at 483.
134. 313 N.C. 230, 328 S.E.2d 274 (1985).
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repose found in section 1-50(5)' z applied to claims against architects
and engineers, and that section 1-15(c) did not; the term "profe-
ssional" in section 1-15(c) was held not to include those oc-
cupations.'36 The Rowan court reviewed the legislative history of
section 1-15(c) and concluded that "it was enacted specifically in
response to a so-called medical malpractice 'crisis' experienced by
North Carolina and many of her sister states,"'" and was designed
"primarily to deal with malpractice problems in the health care
field."' 38 It found that the legislature intended the statute to apply
to "malpractice claims against all professionals who are not dealt with
more specifically by some other statute."' 9 Since section 1-50(5)
more specifically addressed construction-based claims against
architects and engineers than did section 1-15(c), the latter statute was
inapplicable to those claims"14 However, the court noted that had
1-15(c) applied, the plaintiff's claim would have been barred, since it
was filed more than four years following the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the claim.' 4' The Rowan defendant's "last act" was his
completion of performance under the contract.'
In several cases decided before Hargett, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals considered whether a professional had some continuing
duty towards the person who contracted her services, in order to
determine when the professional's "last act" occurred for purposes of
the malpractice statutes of limitations and repose. In Sunbow
Industries v. London, the plaintiff had retained the defendant
attorney to represent it in a sale of assets to DBE, Inc." The day
the sale was concluded, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1969) (amended 1981) (constituting a statute of repose
for claims resulting, inter alia, from defective and unsafe conditions in improvements to
real property). Although this statute was amended in 1981, the court found that plaintiff's
claim had accrued before the amendment became effective; therefore, the prior version
of the statute applied to the claim. Rowan, 313 N.C. at 233-34, 328 S.E2d at 276.
136. Rowan, 313 N.C. at 231, 328 S.E2d at 275.
137. Id. at 236, 328 S.E.2d at 277-78.
138. Id. at 239, 328 S.E.2d at 279.
139. Id. at 238, 328 S.E.2d at 279.
140. Id. at 239, 328 S.E.2d at 279.
141. Id. at 234, 328 S.E.2d at 276-77.
142. Id. The court last interpreted § 1-15(c) in 1991, when it found the statute
inapplicable to a claim against an insurance agent which sounded in "negligent advice,"
rather than professional malpractice. Pierson v. Buyher, 330 N.C. 182,185,409 S.E.2d 903,
905 (1991).
143. 58 N.C. App. 751, 294 S.E.2d 409, disc rev. denied, 307 N.C. 272, 299 S.E.2d 219
(1982).
144. Id. at 751, 294 S.E.2d at 409.
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DBE under which the plaintiff took a security interest in the assets
which had been sold. 45 The attorney failed to fie a financing
statement or otherwise perfect the plaintiff's security interest in DBE,
so that when DBE filed for bankruptcy two years after the conclusion
of the sale, plaintiff was subordinated as a creditor.'" The defen-
dant moved to dismiss plaintiff's claim on the grounds that his last act
of negligence for purposes of section 1-15(c) occurred on the date the
sale was consummated, and that accordingly the statute of limitations
barred plaintiff's claim.'47  The court held that an attorney who
represents a party in this capacity has a duty to file the financing
statement so long as filing it "would protect some interest of his
client," and therefore, the attorney's "last act giving rise to the cause
of action" for purposes of the statute of limitations occurred the
instant before DBE went bankrupt.'
The court of appeals has held that when a physician negligently
renders a continuous course of treatment for a patient, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the negligent treatment
ends.'49 However, the court of appeals specifically declined to
extend this doctrine to a case in which a doctor was hired to diagnose
a patient's breast mass but failed to detect any tumor.'u According
to the court, since the doctor and patient had no further contact after
the examination, the date on which the doctor informed the patient
of his conclusions by letter was the last possible ."act" giving rise to
the malpractice suit.' The court refused to apply the "continuous
course of treatment" rule to a case involving a "continuous course of
non-treatment.''5 2  In contrast, in a case in which a periodontist
performed oral surgery on a patient and later examined the patient
at regular dental check-ups, the court of appeals imputed a continuing
duty to the doctor to diagnose the patient's oral disease;' 53 his "last
act" thus occurred at his last examination of the patient. This was the
extent of "continuous duty" evaluation by the North Carolina
appellate courts until the Hargett decision.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 752, 294 S.E.2d at 410.
148. I11 at 753, 294 S.E.2d at 410.
149. See Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50, 58, 247 S.E.2d 287, 293 (1978).
150. Mathis v. May, 86 N.C. App. 436,436,358 S.El2d 94,95, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C.
794, 361 S.E2d 78 (1987).
151. It at 440, 358 S.E.2d at 97.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Schneider v. Brunk, 72 N.C. App. 560, 565-66, 324 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (1985).
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To decide whether the statute of repose of section 1-15(c)" 4
barred the plaintiffs' suit, the Hargett court first had to determine
what constituted the "last act of the defendant" giving rise to the
claim that Mr. Holland had negligently drafted their father's will. The
two candidates for the "last act" were (1) the date on which the
lawyer drafted the will, as the trial court seemed to find; 5 or (2)
the last moment at which the lawyer could have amended the will
before harm ensued-immediately before the testator's death-as the
court of appeals found.' 6  The "time of death" rule would be
correct if the lawyer had a continuing duty to correct the mistaken
will until the testator died.'
The supreme court chose not to impute this duty to the defen-
dant, 8 and the plaintiffs lost. The court articulated a standard by
which the scope of an attorney's duty is to be determined: "Just as
a physician's duty to the patient is determined by the particular
medical undertaking for which he was engaged, an attorney's duty to
a client is likewise determined by the nature of the services he agreed
to perform."' 9  In Hargett the alleged contractual relationship
between Vann Hargett and Robert Holland embraced only the
drafting of a will and the supervision of its execution."6  "After
[the] defendant completed these acts," the court stated, "he had per-
formed his professional obligations; and his professional duty to
testator was at an end."'' The court cited its Rowan decision for
support,62 even though that opinion had not squarely addressed
whether architects or engineers have a continuing duty to inspect or
repair completed construction projects. The Rowan decision
mentioned in dictum that were section 1-15(c) applicable, its statute
of repose would have run, because the last act of the defendant giving
rise to the claim-certification that the general contractor had
completed construction-had occurred more than four years before
suit was filed." The Hargett court noted that the Rowan court had
154. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
155. See Hargett, 337 N.C. at 654, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
156. Id. at 655, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. IM. at 656, 447 S.E.2d at 788 (emphasis added).
160. IM.
161. Id.
162. See Id. at 656-57, 447 S.E.2d at 789.
163. Trustees of Rowan Technical College v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs., 313 N.C. 230,
234, 328 S.E.2d 274, 277 (1985).
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imputed no continuing duty to inspect or repair the" completed
construction (although for the Rowan court to have done so would
have been sua sponte and far afield of the relevant issues of that
case).16'
Instead of overruling the court of appeals' 1982 Sunbow'"
decision, the supreme court distinguished it. The first distinction it
drew was that Sunbow involved the statute of limitations provision of
1-15(c), while Hargett involved the statute of repose. However, the
court offered no explanation why the words "last act of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action," used identically in the statute of
limitations and repose provisions of 1-15(c), should be interpreted
differently depending on which provision is at issue.
Second, the court said that the defendant attorney in Sunbow was
retained in part to "perfect'] the plaintiff's security interest in the
assets" of the sale.'6 Generally, if an attorney is hired to represent
a secured party, as was the attorney in Sunbow,67 her failure to
perfect the party's security interest "will present an easily proved case
of malpractice."'" Sunbow does not discuss the plaintiff cor-
poration's understanding of the nature of the services that its attorney
agreed to perform for it. The syllabus for Sunbow states only that
the plaintiff alleged that it had retained defendant "to represent it in
the sale of certain assets," and not specifically to perfect its security
interest in the assets of the sale.169  However, for purposes of
discussion, this Note will assume that the Sunbow court was correct
in its conclusion that the scope of the attorney's duty encompassed
perfecting his client's security interest, and that the Hargett court was
correct in its understanding that the "nature of the services" which the
Sunbow attorney agreed to perform included perfecting the security
interest.Y In Sunbow, the last "act" of the defendant was his
164. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 657, 447 S.E2d at 789.
165. Sunbow Indus. v. London, 58 N.C. App. 751,294 S.E2d 409, disc. rev. denied, 307
N.C. 272,299 S.E.2d 219 (1982).
166. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 657, 447 S.E2d at 789.
167. Sunbow, 58 N.C. App. at 751, 294 S.E.2d at 409.
168. Samuel J.M. Donnelly & Mary Ann Donnelly, 1989 Survey of New York Law,
Commercial Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 125, 161 (1990) (citing S & D Petroleum Co. v.
Tamsett, 534 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)).
169. Sunbow, 58 N.C. App. at 751, 294 S.E.2d at 409.
170. In a case with facts strikingly similar to those in Sunbow, the Illinois Court of
Appeals stated:
[Tihe mere fact that an attorney is employed to prepare papers that are
required to be recorded does not make it, without more, the attorney's
duty to have them recorded. There must be a special undertaking for
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failure to act (i.e., to file the security interest) before such inaction
injured the plaintiff (i.e., deprived it of secured creditor status in a
corporation that declares bankruptcy)., It was not his represen-
tation of the plaintiff at the conclusion of the sale of assets. Contrast
Hargett, in which the defendant's last "act" was not his failure to act
(i.e., to amend the will) before such inaction injured the plaintiffs (i.e.,
deprived them of part of the devise that their father intended them
to have). Instead, his negligent drafting of the will in the first place,
and his supervision of its execution, comprised his "last act."
It is difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between the facts
of Sunbow and Hargett. According to Hargett, "an attorney's duty to
a client is... determined by the nature of the services he agreed to
perform."' Since DBE could have gone bankrupt at any moment,
the defendant's failure to file the financing statement as soon as the
sale was consummated constituted negligence. This appears to be the
exact analogue of the situation in Hargett, in which the defendant's
alleged failure to draft the will so as to achieve the testator's intent
constituted negligence-the testator could have died at any moment.
Both instances of negligence could have been corrected before any
harm resulted, but the Hargett court deemed it proper to impute a
"duty to correct" the negligence to the Sunbow attorney alone. It is
true that the Sunbow attorney's negligence was rooted in an omission,
whereas the Hargett attorney's negligence was rooted in an act. But
the nature of the negligence has nothing to do with the "nature of the
services" the attorney agreed to perform, which is the test the Hargett
this purpose, or the original employment must be broad enough to
include it.
It is true [that, in this case,] defendant was employed to act as plaintiffs' attorney
in connection with the sale of plaintiffs' assets, and not specifically to file a
financing statement. But the contract for sale itself expressly provided that
plaintiffs would receive as security for the unpaid purchase price, "[a] security
agreement in the form and substance approved by [defendant] together with a
proper financing statement for filing under the Uniform Commercial Code * *
*." In his own words defendant was retained for the purpose of "consummating"
the contract. He was responsible for drafting and did draft the security
agreement and the financing statement ... and it was he who saW to their
execution. To require a specific direction by clients to their attorney to file such
executed documents under such circumstances would be unrealistic. The only
possible inference is that defendant's employment was broad enough to
encompass the task of filing the financing statement.
Practical Offset, Inc. v. Davis, 404 N.E.2d 516,520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (quoting 7 AM. JUR.
2D Attorneys at Law, at 150 (1963)). This Note will assume that similar reasoning underlay
the court of appeals decision in Sunbow.
171. Sunbow, 58 N.C. App. at 751, 294 S.E.2d at 409.
172. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 656, 447 S.E2d at 788.
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court purported to employ as its rule of decision.'n Even without
reference to the court's "nature of the services" test, why a negligent
omission should give rise to a duty to correct the negligence, but a
negligent act should not, is a mystery. Indeed, while the repose
provision of section 1-15(c) refers to the "last act" of the defendant,
and not to the last act or omission of the defendant, the beginning of
section 1-15(c) states, "Except where otherwise provided by statute,
a cause of action for malpractice arising out of the performance or
failure to perform professional services shall be deemed to accrue at
the time of the occurrence of the last act of the defendant giving rise
to the cause of action ...."' The plain language of the statute
indicates that the term "last act" was meant to embrace both the
performance of and the failure to perform professional services, both
acts and omissions.
It is also true that the harm in Sunbow inured to the negligent
attorney's client, whereas the harm in Hargett inured to beneficiaries
who lacked a contractual relationship with the negligent attorney.
However, North Carolina courts recognize claims by those lacking
contractual privity with a defendant' 5 and would almost certainly
recognize a suit by intended beneficiaries of a will against the will's
drafter.76 There is no apparent reason to discriminate based on the
173. Id.
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c) (emphasis added).
175. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
176. The North Carolina appellate courts have never directly held that a third party
beneficiary to a will may sue the drafter of a will for negligence, even though privity of
contract is lacking between the beneficiary and the drafter. In a 1984 decision, however,
the court of appeals suggested that it was prepared to do so. Beneficiaries under a will
sued both the executrix named in the will, and an attorney/co-executrix whom the named
executrix had hired for assistance, for negligence in connection with the administration of
the will. Ingle v. Allen, 71 N.C. App. 20, 20-21, 321 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1984), disc rev.
denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E2d 391 (1985). Holding that the trial court improperly
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court found "no quarrel with
plaintiff's contention that [the attorney/co-executrix] owed a duty of care to the plaintiff
as a beneficiary under the will." Id at 26, 321 S.E.2d at 594. The court noted that "[i]t
is well settled in North Carolina that privity of contract is not required in order to recover
against a person who negligently performs services for another and thus injures a third
party." Id
The court of appeals has endorsed this doctrine in several circumstances. In one case,
a hotel that had leased certain furnishings and fixtures had, pursuant to the leasing
agreement, retained an attorney to perform a title search upon a piece of property used
as collateral for the agreement. United Leasing Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400,401,263
S.E.2d 313, 315, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 685 (1980). After the
agreement was executed, the lessor learned of an outstanding lien on the collateral
property, a fact not disclosed to the plaintiff by the lessee or the attorney. Id. The court
of appeals recognized the lessor's right to sue the lawyer and his firn for damages
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relationship between the negligent attorney and the injured party.
The cases seem irreconcilable. When one takes into account the
purpose behind the professional malpractice statute of repose,
however, it is the Hargett court's approval of Sunbow, and not the
Hargett decision itself, that is surprising. The court previously
described section 1-15(c) as an element of the medical malpractice act,
intended to lower medical malpractice insurance costs by decreasing
the number of claims fled."7 It later interpreted the broad term
"professional malpractice" to indicate a legislative intent to protect all
professionals not dealt with more specifically by another statute,17
by legislatively reinstating the occurrence rule.179 If the Hargett
court had imputed to the defendant a continuing duty to inspect and
repair wills, it could have initiated the judicial destruction of the
professional malpractice statute of repose. The kind of duty which
the court of appeals imputed to the attorney when it considered the
stemming from negligence. Id. at 407, 263 S.E.2d at 318. In another case, condominium
owners who bought their homes from the general contracting firm that built them sued
both the builder and the architect for damages resulting from an allegedly faulty pipe
system. Quail Hollow East Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 47 N.C. App.
518, 519, 268 S.E.2d 12, 14, disc rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527, 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980). In
allowing the suit against the architect, the court of appeals stated, "Where breach of such
contract results in foreseeable injury... to persons so situated by their economic relations,
and community of interests as to impose a duty of due care, we know of no reason why
an architect cannot be held liable for such injury." la at 523, 268 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting
Davidson & Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 41 N.C. App. 661,667,255 S.E.2d 580,
584, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 295, 259 S.E.2d 911 (1979)).
As noted supra note 4, the "intended beneficiary test" expressly adopted by the court
of appeals in 1980 is precisely the test that led the California Supreme Court in 1961 to
recognize a cause of action by third party beneficiaries to a will against the drafting
attorney. Miller, 45 N.C. App. at 406-07,263 S.E.2d at 318; Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,
688-89 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). This fact, along with the precedent,
strongly suggests that North Carolina courts will recognize a cause of action by third party
beneficiaries to a will against the drafting attorney.
In the Hargett case, both the court of appeals and the supreme court seemed to
presume that such a claim was valid; neither opinion addressed the matter. In their
complaint the plaintiffs alleged that as a result of his attorney-client relationship with Vann
W. Hargett, Mr. Holland had a continuing duty to Mr. Hargett and to the plaintiffs as
intended beneficiaries, to provide a will which would effectuate Mr. Hargett's desires and
thereby benefit the plaintiffs. Record at 4, Hargett v. Holland, 111 N.C. App. 200, 431
S.E.2d 784 (No. 9220SC589) (1993), rev'd, 337 N.C. 651, 447 S.E.2d 784 (1994). Mr.
Holland answered by alleging, inter alia, that the complaint failed to state a claim for which
relief could be granted. Id. at 19. The trial court dismissed the case on the grounds that
the statute of limitations had run, id at 22, and this defense became the only one the
higher courts discussed.
177. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 633, 325 S.E.2d 469, 475 (1985).
178. Trustees of Rowan Technical College v. J. Hyatt Hammond Assocs., 313 N.C. 230,
238, 328 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1985).
179. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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Hargett case was a duty to correct his negligence before the negli-
gence resulted in harm. The court of appeals so held despite the fact
that this "duty to correct" was not explicitly part of his contractual
arrangement with Mr. Hargett. If the supreme court had affirmed this
holding, by what criterion could other cases of legal malpractice be
distinguished? Why would any other attorney whose alleged
malpractice resulted in harm more than four years after the malprac-
tice not have a continuing duty to correct her negligence?
In the prominent case Heyer v. Flaig,s"° the California Supreme
Court offered a reason why the testamentary context is special.
Rather than phrasing the attorney's duty as a "duty to correct," it
imputed to an attorney who negligently drafted a will "a duty of care
to the [beneficiaries of the will] to effectuate in a non-negligent
manner the testamentary scheme of the testatrb."'' 1  Since the
testatrix relied on the attorney's drafting to effectuate her intent until
her death, the attorney's duty "effectively to fulfill the desired
testamentary scheme continued until the testatrix' death, when the
testatrix' reliance became irrevocable."'" But this is no real dis-
tinction. Regardless of the "nature of the services" the lawyer agrees
to provide, a client always expects his lawyer to render services
without negligence, and always relies on the lawyer to do what he
asks her to do."m The Heyer court was, at base, imputing to the
attorney no less than a continuing duty to correct her own negligence.
The difference in the testamentary context is that the negligence will
seldom be discovered and the damage will not result until the testator
dies, usually after the statute has run." Thus the real reason to
impute a "continuing duty to correct" on will drafters, and not on
other attorneys who have not continually represented a client, has
nothing to do with the client's expectation that services will be
rendered non-negligently. It has everything to do with the fact that,
in this discrete area, actual damages and the discovery that negligence
caused them will typically occur well after the negligent drafting, well
after the statute of limitations or repose has run.
180. 449 P2d 161 (Cal. 1969), overruled in part on other grounds by Laird v. Blacker,
828 P.2d 691 (Cal.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
181. IL at 166.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
184. Cf. Mathis v. May, 86 N.C. App. 436,440,358 S.E.2d 94, 97 (holding that a doctor
who negligently failed to diagnose a one-time patient's tumor had no "continuing duty"
to treat or diagnose the tumor), disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 794, 361 S.E.2d 78 (1987).
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For the North Carolina courts always to impute to attorneys a
duty to correct negligence before harm results, however, would be to
denature the statute of repose into a statute of limitations. The "last
act... giving rise to the cause of action" would always occur, as the
court of appeals held in Hargett, the instant before harm ensued."s
With a wave of the judge's wand, the "damage rule" of accrual would
effectively replace the "occurrence rule" of accrual that the legislature
clearly intended when it enacted the statute of repose. The Hargett
holding demonstrates due caution about legislating from the bench.
Hargett suggests, however, three situations in which a continuing
duty to correct negligence may yet be found. First, in theory, there
may be situations in which a continuing duty to correct negligence is
explicitly part of the attorney-client agreement. However, it will be
the rare client indeed who is so familiar with the law that she knows
she must request such a contractual provision to preserve a malprac-
tice claim. The more common situation in which courts may find a
duty to correct negligence is when the attorney continues to represent
a client after the negligence is done. The Hargett court stated that a
continuing duty to review, correct, or rewrite Mr. Hargett's will
"might arise" from "an ongoing attorney-client relationship between
testator and defendant," but that no such relationship was alleged or
implied here. 6 To draw an analogy, it cited the North Carolina
Court of Appeals cases that had applied the "continuous course of
treatment" doctrine to cases of medical malpractice."s While the
North Carolina appellate courts have never explicitly adopted or
rejected the "continuous representation" rule,"s the Hargett decision
suggests the supreme court is prepared to recognize it. Presumably,
the continuous representation rule would delay the running of the
statute of repose against an attorney who drafts a will, if the attorney
performs further will-related services, such as the alteration of some
provisions of the will according to the testator's wishes."s
185. Hargett, 337 N.C. at 655, 447 S.E2d at 788.
186. Id. at 655-56, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
187. The cases cited were Ballenger v. Crowell, 38 N.C. App. 50,247 S.E.2d 287 (1978),
and Mathis v. May, 86 N.C. App. 436, 358 S.E.2d 94, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 794, 361
S.E.2d 78 (1987). Hargett, 337 N.C. at 656, 447 S.E.2d at 788.
188. "It remains an open question in North Carolina as to whether we recognize the
"continuous representation' doctrine." Sharp v. Teague, 113 N.C. App. 589, 594, 439
S.E.2d 792, 795 (1994).
189. "Under [the continuous representation] doctrine... the statute of repose do[es]
not accrue until the earlier of either the date the attorney ceases serving the client in a
professional capacity with regard to the matters which are the basis of the malpractice action
or the date the client becomes aware or should become aware of the negligent act." Id.
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These two situations-an express agreement by the attorney to
correct negligence, and continuous representation-do not undermine
the professional malpractice statute of repose. In each case there is
a distinct "last act" that can be pointed to as part and parcel of the
nature of the services the attorney agreed to perform. The lawyer
will not be unfairly surprised if she is sued for malpractice not long
after she discontinues the services that form the basis of the lawsuit.
However, by approving the holding in Sunbow, the Hargett court has
indicated that there is a third category of cases in which a duty to
correct negligence may be found. These are cases in which a duty to
correct negligence will be inferred from the attorney-client agreement.
How the courts will apply Hargett's "nature of the services agreed
upon" test to identify these cases is a wide-open question. As noted
above, the only real difference between the attorney's negligence in
Hargett and the attorney's negligence in Sunbow is that the former
consisted of an act, whereas the latter resulted from an omission.
Why the distinction is legally valid is unclear. Hargett's approval of
Sunbow has given claimants some small opportunity to argue an
implied duty to correct negligence, despite the supreme court's denial
of such a claim in Hargett. That means it is still possible, theoretical-
ly, for courts essentially to substitute the damage rule of accrual for
the occurrence rule when they find injustice in the statute of repose's
denial of remedy to a plaintiff However, given the Hargett decision
and its tacit deference to the intent of the legislature as embodied by
the professional malpractice statute of repose, courts are unlikely to
infer a duty to correct negligence very often.
If the Hargett decision was necessary to maintain the efficacy of
the statute of repose, it demonstrates the great inequity that the
statute of repose can yield. Will-drafting is inherently a kind of legal
service that rarely discloses negligent rendering until many years after
the negligence, and it is a service which, if rendered negligently,
injures no one until the testator's death."9° If the statute of
limitations or repose for malpractice actions based on the negligent
misdrafting of a will begins to run when the negligent act occurs, then
beneficiaries rarely have a remedy for a defectively drafted will
because the error is usually not discovered until the testator dies and
(emphasis added).
190. Evelyn Betts Thomason, How Estate Planners Can Cope with the Increasing Risk
of Malpractice Claims, 12 EST. PLAN. 130, 130 (1985).
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the statute has run.' Prior to death, discovery of negligence can
only be made by the testator or the drafting attorney."9  The
average client, however, is likely to invest trust in the lawyer's abilities
(particularly if the lawyer holds himself out to be a specialist) and is
unlikely to understand the legal implications of the language of a
will."9 Even in those cases in which the negligent drafting is clear
from the document's face-even to the layperson (such as when the
will says "Regan" when the intended beneficiary is "Cordelia")-it
remains true that no one is injured by the negligence until the testator
dies. Before then, the will is "ambulatory," subject to revocation or
revision by the testator during his or her lifetime. 94 Regardless of
how negligently a will is drafted, whether or not the negligent drafting
harms any intended beneficiary depends entirely on the status of the
will at the moment the testator dies. At that moment, and at no time
before, the will is legally effective. 95 Since beneficiaries under a
will have no right to any portion of the testator's estate until the
testator dies, no injury occurs until then. Therefore, they have no
cause of action until the testator dies.'96 Moreover, since courts are
rarely willing to reform a misdrafted will to effectuate the testator's
191. Martin D. BegleiterAttorney Malpractice in Estate Planning-You've Got to Know.
When to Hold Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 KAN. L. REV. 193, 209-10 (1990) (citing
Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 166 (Cal. 1969), overruled in part by Laird v. Blacker, 828
P.2d 691 (Cal.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992)). Certainly in many cases, and probably
in most cases, a testator survives the last drafting of her will by more than four years, the
time limit for professional malpractice suits under section 1-15(c).
192. A will is the private property of the testator, so that even if a potential beneficiary
wanted to examine the will, he would have no right to do so.
193. See, e.g., Meyers v. Imperial Casualty Indem. Co., 451 So. 2d 649, 655 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) ("In an attorney-client relationship, a client is entitled to rely on the expertise
and diligence of his attorney. This is particularly true where ... the client ha[s] little
experience or knowledge regarding the matter which the attorney was engaged to
handle."); Jeffrey A. Batts, Note, Statute of Limitations Accrual in Attorney Malpractice
Actions: Thorpe v. Dement, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1017, 1025-26 (1984) (describing
the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client); cf. Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C.
626, 646, 325 S.E.2d 469, 482 (1985) (noting that the fiduciary relationship between a
doctor and his patient "envisions an expectation by both parties that the patient will rely
upon the judgment and expertise of the doctor"; refusing to impose upon the patient an
affirmative duty to explore whether her doctor had been negligent). See also supra notes
2-3 (discussing aspects of legal malpractice).
194. PAuL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WIMIS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 62 (2d
ed. 1994).
195. See, eg., Kelley v. Sutliff, 80 So. 2d 636, 640-41 (Ala. 1955).
196. Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161,166 (Cal. 1969), overruled in part by Laird v. Blacker,
828 P.2d 691 (Cal.), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
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intent after his death, the only remedy intended beneficiaries have is
to sue the drafting attorney for malpractice.'9
Mr. Hargett's will was drafted about two years after the new
statute of repose became law, and he did not die until ten years
later.198 Thus it is not surprising that it took seventeen years for a
case such as this one to reach the North Carolina Supreme Court. The
North Carolina appellate courts seem quite willing to recognize an
action by the intended beneficiaries under a will, as a matter of
justice.199 But the broadly worded statute of repose effectively cuts
off that cause of action at the knees, as the Hargett case demonstrates.
No legislation in any of the fifty states or the District of
Columbia operates more harshly against claimants of legal malpractice
than North Carolina General Statute 1-15(c). Only seven other
jurisdictions have limitations statutes which expressly apply to legal
malpractice, or non-medical professional malpractice.' Of those
jurisdictions, only Alabama and Montana have a statute of repose for
legal malpractice. 1 Alabama has a two-year statute of limitations
for legal malpractice claims, a six-month discovery period if the negli-
gence could not reasonably have been discovered within the two
years, and an absolute four-year statute of repose that begins when
the "act, omission, or failure complained of" occurs.' Montana
197. Gerald P. Johnston, Legal Malpractice in Estate Planning and General Practice, 17
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 521, 522-23 (1987) (citing Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon
Hosp., 448 A2d 190 (Conn. 1982)); 4 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE
ON THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 32.1-32.2, at 228-39 (1961).
198. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; Hargett, 337 N.C. at 653, 447 S.E.2d
at 787.
199. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
200. ALA. CODE § 6-5-574 (1993) (stating that four year statute of repose for legal
malpractice runs from the time of the "act or omission or failure giving rise to the claim");
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95-11(4) (West 1982) (requiring that action for non-medical
professional malpractice be brought "within two years"); IDAHO CODE § 5-219 (1990)
(requiring that action for professional malpractice be brought "within two years"); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-2-206 (1993) (stating that actions based on attorney's professional
negligent act must be commenced within three years after plaintiff "discovers or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the act, error, or omission"; no
legal malpractice action may be commenced after 10 years from the date of the act, error,
or omission); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 214 (McKinney 1990) (requiring that action for
non-medical malpractice be brought "within three years"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2305.11(A) (Anderson Supp. 1994) (stating that actions for non-medical malpractice must
be brought within one year of accrual); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(2) (Supp. 1994)
(requiring that actions for attorney malpractice must be brought within one year of
accrual).
201. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
202. ALA. CODE § 6-5-574(b). The statute was enacted in 1988. 1d
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requires a plaintiff to bring suit on a legal malpractice claim within
three years of the plaintiff's discovery of the negligence on which the
claim is based, but the action must be commenced no later than "10
years from the date of the act, error, or omission" alleged.' Thus
Alabama's and North Carolina's statutes, nearly identical, operate
most strictly against intended beneficiaries of a will who seek a
remedy for deprivation of the testator's intended bequest. A
significant majority of state appellate courts that have addressed the
issue have held that a cause of action in favor of a beneficiary to a
will does not accrue until the testator's death.' However, the
appellate courts in those jurisdictions were not restricted in their
decisionmaking by a professional malpractice statute of repose, as the
North Carolina Supreme Court was in Hargett.
In the name of fairness to intended beneficiaries under a will who
are barred by the statute of repose, this Note recommends that the
North Carolina General Assembly amend the statute. When it
enacted section 1-15(c) in 1976, the General Assembly, despite the
report of the Insurance Study Commission, retained the ten-year
statute of repose provision for "foreign objects," such as sponges, left
in the body of a patient by negligent surgeons. 5  The General
Assembly saw fit to provide plaintiffs in "hidden sponge"-type cases,
in which injury and discovery of negligence often occur long after the
negligent act, an especially long amount of time within which to sue
for compensation. By the same token, the legislature should see fit
203. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-206 (1993). The statute was enacted in 1977. Id.
204. Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 165-66 (Cal. 1969), overruled in part by Laird v.
Blacker, 828 P.2d 691 (Cal.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992); McLane v. Russell, 512
N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), affd on other grounds, 546 N.E.2d 499 (Ill. 1989);
Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281,290 (Ind. 1981); Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30,
32 (Iowa 1982); Price v. Holmes, 422 P.2d 976, 982-83 (Kan. 1967); Succession of
Killingsworth, 270 So. 2d 196,205 (La. Ct. App. 1972), modified, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973);
Jaramillo v. Hood, 601 P.2d 66, 67 (N.M. 1979); Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331
N.W.2d 325, 330 (Wis. 1983). But see Goldberg v. Bosworth, 215 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1961) (holding that the cause of action accrues at the time of the negligent
misdrafting of the will).
205. Section 1-15(c) provides, in part:
where damages are sought by reason of a foreign object, which has no
therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, having been left in the body, a person
seeking damages for malpractice may commence an action therefor within one
year after discovery thereof as hereinabove provided, but in no event may the
action be commenced more than 10 years from the last act of the defendant
giving rise to the cause of action.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(c). The Insurance Study Commission had recommended a four-
year statute of repose for all instances of professional malpractice. INSURANCE REPORT,
supra note 109, pt. 1, at 28.
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to provide plaintiffs in misdrafted will cases, in which injury and
discovery of negligence often occur long after the negligent act, an
especially long amount of time within which to sue for compensation.
The amendment to section 1-15(c) could employ language nearly
identical to the "foreign object" provision:
Provided further, that where damages are sought by a
person alleging that, because of the negligent drafting or the
negligent supervision of the execution of a will, the person
received less than the testator intended the will to convey to
the person, a person seeking damages for malpractice may
commence an action therefor within one year after discovery
thereof as hereinabove provided, but in no event may the
action be commenced more than 15 years from the last act
of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action.'
This language would preserve the general statute of repose for other
cases, without burdening attorneys who draft wins to the point that
their insurance rates would "skyrocket"-fifteen years is not a terribly
long amount of time.'
An alternative, appealing on its face, proves too problematic.
This alternative is to amend General Statute 1-15 so as to (1) exempt
legal malpractice claims by the intended beneficiaries under a will
from the statute of repose, (2) provide that such tort claims accrue
when actual damage results, and (3) sanction the judicial creation of
a constructive trust in favor of the intended beneficiaries if they prove
their case. A constructive trust is a fiduciary relationship between
two parties imposed by a court when one party has acquired property
under such circumstances that it is unfair for him to keep the
property.' In the case of a negligently drafted will, the party who
206. The selection of 15 years as the proposed statute of repose is, of course, somewhat
arbitrary. It is intended to better reflect the amount of time that testators typically survive
the execution of their wills. Apparently, no statistical data exists as to the average or
median length of time that testators survive the execution of their wills. Without such
data, choosing the optimal time period for the statute of repose cannot aspire to be much
more than guesswork---"educated" guesswork at best.
For a detailed argument as to what factors should be considered in determining an
"optimal" statute of limitations or repose for medical malpractice claims, see PATRICIA
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 174-85
(1985) (taking into account, inter alia, the uncertainty of changing rules, differences in
types of insurance policies, efficient risk allocation, and prevention).
207. Recall that only two of fifty-one United States jurisdictions have any statute of
repose for professional malpractice, and Montana's is ten years long. See supra notes 200-
03 and accompanying text.
208. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 460
(4th ed. 1990).
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acquired the property that the testator intended for another would
become a constructive trustee, with a duty to transfer the property to
the intended beneficiary.' For example, if Lear intended his estate
to pass to Cordelia, but because of misdrafting it passes to Regan, and
Cordelia proves Lear's intent, then the court would adjudge Regan to
be the constructive trustee of the estate for the benefit of Cordelia.
Most courts remain adamant against "grant[ing] reformation to
correct a mistake in a will after its probate," by the use of a construc-
tive trust or otherwise, unless the true intent of the testator appears
on the face of the will.21 However, some modem commentators
have advocated constructive trusts as means of correcting mistaken
wills.
211
The exemption/constructive trust amendment described above has
two strong advantages over the prior amendment. First, intended
beneficiaries of a testator who outlives the last drafting of his will by
more than fifteen years will always be afforded a remedy. Second, if
an attorney were found negligent long after she drafted the will, she
would not be forced to pay. Instead, the unintended beneficiary
would hold the property transferred under the will in trust for the
intended beneficiary, and would be required to give it over. Since an
intended beneficiary would in all likelihood bring an action for
negligent drafting of a will immediately after probate,2 2 the proper-
ty would remain whole and the intended beneficiary would be fully
compensated by the corpus of the constructive trust. This would
absolve the drafting attorney from all liability, so that her malpractice
insurance rates would not skyrocket 2
This exemption/constructive trust approach, however, poses
problems as well. If a drafting attorney is effectively shielded from
209. Cf. Latham v. Father Divine, 85 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1949) (adopting "the rule
that, where a legatee has taken property under a will, after agreeing ... to devote that
property to a purpose intended and declared by the testator, equity will enforce a
constructive trust to effectuate that purpose, lest there be a fraud on the testator").
210. Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners' Errors: The
Argument for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L REV. 1, 3 (1990).
211. E.g., John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the
Ground of Mistake. Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521,571-
77 (1982); deFuria, supra note 210, at 35 n.50.
212. It is at this time the intended beneficiary is injured and will most likely discover
negligence in the drafting.
213. Recall that the driving force behind the statute of repose is the desire to reduce
the number and severity of malpractice claims to which lawyers are subject, in an effort
to keep malpractice insurance available and affordable. See supra notes 88-97,107-14 and
accompanying text.
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financial liability for negligence, then even though intended
beneficiaries are given a remedy, drafting attorneys are not en-
couraged by sanction of law to draft wills with due care. Moreover,
with her reputation as her only personal stake in the case, a lawyer
sued for negligently drafting a will would have less incentive to
provide a strong defense than she would if her money were at risk.
Having a strong interest in the case's disposition, the allegedly
unintended beneficiary would undoubtedly intervene in the case.214
Consequently, an action for legal malpractice, in which a plaintiff
alleges that an attorney negligently failed to draft a will in accordance
with her agreement with the testator, would practically metamorphose
into a dispute over the will. Since the agreement between the testator
and the attorney "is almost always oral, extrinsic evidence, including
oral statements, is admissible to prove the terms of that contract."2'
Hence extrinsic evidence to establish the testator's intent, normally
inadmissible in a case in which a party claiming to be an intended
beneficiary seeks reformation of a will, would be admitted into a case
in which the real parties in interest would be contending beneficiaries
under a will.216 This impinges too greatly on universally accepted
wills doctrine to be acceptable.2 7 The exemption/ constructive trust
amendment is too problematic to be enacted.
The proper action to take at present is to amend the professional
malpractice statute of repose so as to permit intended beneficiaries
under a will a more fair and reasonable opportunity to pursue claims
of negligent drafting. The amendment recommended above, which
provides for a fifteen-year statute of repose tempered by the discovery
rule, fulfills that goal without eviscerating the statute of repose. Such
an amendment conforms with the General Assembly's past judgment
that an exception to the statute of repose is warranted in "hidden
214. See N.C. R Civ. P. 24(a)(2) (providing intervention of right to all applicants
claiming an "interest relating to the property... which is the subject of the action," when
"the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may... impair or impede
the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties"); FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (same).
215. Begleiter, supra note 191, at 201 (citing 3 ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACrS § 573, at 369 n.11 (1960 & Supp. 1971)).
216. Cf. Kirgan v. Parks, 478 A.2d 713, 719 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (holding that if the
language of a will is unambiguous, "no extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that the
testator's intention was different from that which the will discloses," reasoning that
evidence intended to alter the language of a will would violate the statute that requires all
wills to be drafted in accordance with certain formalities), cert. denied, 484 A.2d 274 (Md.
1984).
217. See supra notes 210, 216 and accompanying text.
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sponge"-type cases. While the Hargett case was soundly decided,
since a contrary holding could have rendered the statute of repose
impotent, it underscored the need for legislative action in this discrete
area of legal malpractice claims. The proposed amendment to section
1-15(c) should be enacted, lest the intended beneficiaries of
negligently drafted wills receive nothing more than knowledge of the
fact that they were meant to benefit."8
MICHAEL JOHN BYRNE
218. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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"Specters" and "Litigious Fog"?: The Fourth Circuit
Abandons Catalyst Theory in S-1 & S-2 by and through P-1
& P-2 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina
prevail: to gain victory by virtue of strength or superiority[;] ... to
be or become effective or effectual[;] be successful'
Imagine this. You bring a civil rights lawsuit against your state
in federal district court, seeking declaratory relief The district court
rules in your favor on all counts, and the state appeals the decision.
While the appeal is pending, the federal agency with authority over
enforcement of the rights in question issues a letter ruling which
favorably relies on your victory and the district court's position2 The
ruling similarly finds against the challenged state policy, and the
agency threatens to withdraw federal funding should the state not
amend its law in compliance with the ruling. The federal circuit court
of appeals then declares the appeal moot because your suit achieved
its objective3 and remands the case to the district court to determine
your eligibility for an attorney's fees award. The district court
naturally awards those fees because it had ruled in your favor and was
not reversed. Now imagine the unimaginable: The court of appeals,
which had mooted the appeal because of your informal success and
remanded the case to the district court for a fee determination,
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1797 (Philip Babcock et
al. eds., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1971); see also Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 7 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In ordinary usage, 'prevailing' means winning. In the context
of litigation, winning means obtaining a final judgment or other redress in one's favor.").
2. The term "letter ruling" is most commonly associated with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) and the Tax Code; in that context, a letter ruling is a written statement
issued by the IRS to a taxpayer that interprets and applies tax law to a specific set of facts.
MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 1305, 771-72
(3d ed. 1988). More generically, a letter ruling is any statement issued by a government
agency to an interested party that interprets the area of law to which the agency is
connected, and applies it to a specific set of facts. See, e.g., McKittrick v. City of Chicago,
29 F.3d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. City of Chicago v. Alex, 115 S. Ct. 665
(1994) (comprising of letter rulings interpreting Fair Labor Standards Act issued by
Department of Labor); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242,243 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(comprising of letter ruling interpreting copyright laws issued by Register of Copyrights);
Bloomington Nat'1 Bank v. Telfer, 816 F.2d 1305, 1310 n.5 (7th Cir. 1990) (letter ruling
interpreting federal banking laws issued by Federal Reserve Board).
3. Assuming its good faith, the state will suitably change the challenged policy due
to the federal pressure brought to bear in response to your suit.
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reverses the district court's award on the ground that you did not
"prevail" in the eyes of the law.
As absurd as this scenario may sound to layman and lawyer alike,
it was the reality for two litigants in the Fourth Circuit who had the
apparent misfortune of obtaining exactly the relief they sought
without further straining an already strapped judiciary. By a bare
majority, the en banc Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in S-1 & S-2
by and through P-1 & P-2 v. State Board of Education of North
Carolina4 denied recovery of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs on the
ground that post-mootness events cannot confer "prevailing party"
status on a plaintiff for fee award purposes.' In so doing, the circuit
abandoned the so-called "catalyst theory"6 as a test of prevailing
party status for recovery of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Fees Act).7 The decision
4. 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 205
(1994). The en bane majority adopted as its own Judge Wilkinson's dissenting opinion
from the 2-1 panel decision which it vacated, S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51, and the en bane
dissenters adopted Judge Phillips' majority opinion from the 2-1 panel decision, id. For
the sake of concision, because the later case adopted all of its substantive discussion from
the original panel decision, this Note will use short forms for both the panel decision and
the en bane decision which followed. The short form [S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at ()] will be
used throughout this Note when referring to the en bane decision, and the short form [S-1
& S-2, 6 F.3d at (_)] will be used when referring to the panel decision. This Note also
refers to two additional, separate cases whose plaintiffs are S-1 & S-2 as well: S-1 & S-2
v. Spangler, 650 F. Supp. 1427 (M.D.N.C. 1986), vacated in part as moot, 832 F.2d 294 (4th
Cir. 1987); and S-1 & S-2 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987). However, no short
form will be generally used to represent these cases.
5. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51.
6. "Catalyst theory" is a causation-centered test of prevailing party status that focuses
on the practical outcome of litigation. S-1 & S-2 by and through P-1 & P-2 v. State Bd.
of Educ. of N.C., 6 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 1993), reh'g en bane granted, opinion vacated,
21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 205 (1994).
Under this theory, if a plaintiff proves that the existence of his lawsuit accomplished an
important objective of the lawsuit by acting as a catalyst for a defendant's favorable
actions toward the plaintiff, then the plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees even though
his lawsuit was not formally adjudicated. Id. The paradigmatic situation for application
of "catalyst theory" exists when defendants voluntarily change their behavior to eliminate
the complained-of conduct. See, e.g., Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225, 230-31
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2965 (1993) (holding that the plaintiffs' suit caused the
defendant county's "voluntary remedial actions" in improving conditions at the county
jail).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter Fees Act]. The Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a,
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. §
2000bb et seq.], or title VI of the.Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et
seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
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reversed the Fourth Circuit's longstanding recognition of the theory
and will severely limit the availability of fee awards to future civil
rights plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit.
This Note first provides a brief description of the case's factual
and legal background.8 It then discusses the history of fee awards in
general, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,' and
judicial construction of the Act.'° The Note next analyzes the
decision in detail1 and concludes that the elimination of catalyst
theory defies the explicit congressional intent behind the Fees Act and
will unnecessarily hamper the vindication of civil rights in the Fourth
Circuit.Y
When the original action commenced, S-1 and S-2, two han-
dicapped children, were enrolled in the Asheboro, North Carolina city
school system.' In the fall of 1983, their parents enrolled them at
their own expense in a private school for half of each school day to
receive special education services.14 The following school year, the
parents demanded that the Asheboro City Board of Education
provide the children with either an individualized education program
comparable to the one at the private school, or transportation and
tuition for the children to continue at the private school for the 1984-
85 school year. 5 The parents based their demand on the Education
of the Handicapped Act (EHA),'6 claiming that the City Board was
not providing their children with the "free appropriate public
Id.
8. See infra notes 13-44 and accompanying text.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
10. See infra notes 45-149 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 150-232 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
13. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 161.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (1988) (amended 1990). In 1990, the Act was renamed the
"Individuals with Disabilities Education Act" (IDEA). Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901(a), 104
Stat. 1141 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (Supp. V 1993)).
Throughout the former ERA, the words "handicaps" and "handicapped children" were
replaced with the words "disabilities" and "children with disabilities." Pub. L. No. 101-476,
§ 901(b), 104 Stat. 1141 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-85 (Supp. V
1993)). Because the events involved here occurred when the Act was called the EHA, all
references to the Act in this Note will be to the EHA, not the IDEA.
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education" guaranteed by the EHA.Y7 The parents also demanded
tuition reimbursement for the 1983-84 school year. 8
When the City Board denied their tuition reimbursement claim,
the parents demanded a "due process hearing" as required by North
Carolina law.' The hearing officer refused to hear the parents'
claim, declaring that he lacked the authority to award tuition
reimbursement or to make findings of fact attendant to a tuition
reimbursement claim.' ° The parents petitioned the North Carolina
State Board of Education either to rule that the hearing officer had
authority to hear their claim, or to amend the state regulations
enacted pursuant to the EHA to confer the proper authority on the
officer.2 ' f The State Board denied the petition.'
The parents then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City Board, the State Board, and the chairman of the State Board,
C.D. Spangler, Jr., alleging that the City Board, acting through the
hearing officer, had deprived them of federal procedural rights
secured by the EHA and applicable federal regulations when it
refused to decide their tuition reimbursement claim.' In addition
to their substantive claims,24 the parents sought costs and attorney's
17. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 161. Congress stated the purpose of the EHA in these words:
"To assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate
public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs [and] to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents
or guardians are protected." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1988). To accomplish its "ambitious
objective," the EHA provides for federal money to be granted to "state and local
educational agencies which undertake to implement [its] substantive and procedural
requirements." School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368
(1985). The EHA contemplates that "free and appropriate" education will be provided
where possible in regular public schools, but also provides for placement in private schools
at public expense when that is not possible. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1988); 34 C.F.R. §§
300.132, .227, .307, .347, .550-.556 (1994).
18. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 161. The City Board eventually placed the children
appropriately in the school system, but refused the parents' reimbursement claim for the
1983-84 school year and for the period during the fall of 1984 when they were negotiating
a placement for the children. Id.
19. Id at 162. The hearing is provided for in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-116 (1994), a
statute enacted pursuant to the ERA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1988).
20. S-1 & S-2; 6 F.3d at 162.
21. I&
22. Id.
23. Id
24. The parents sought to recover tuition expenses from the City Board, or, in the
alternative,
a declaration that the State rules preventing hearing officers from deciding tuition
reimbursement claims violated the parents' rights under federal law, an order
enjoining Spangler and the State Board from promulgating and enforcing these
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fees from all defendants pursuant to the Fees Act. In 1986, "the
district court granted the parents' motion for summary judgment on
their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, concluding that the
EHA required a state administrative hearing at which [the] parents
could receive tuition reimbursement as appropriate relief for
violations of the Act." ' The court issued an order directing the City
Board and its administrative hearing officer to conduct a hearing on
the parents' claim for reimbursement; the order also enjoined
Spangler and the State Board from further interpreting North
Carolina law in a manner inconsistent with the court's interpretation
of the EHA.27 All of the defendants appealed the decision.
While the appeal was pending, the Office of Special Education
and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS) of the United States
Department of Education29 issued a letter rulinge expressly endor-
sing the district court's holding that the EHA requires states to
authorize their hearing officers both to decide parents' reimbursement
claims and to order reimbursement where the "conditions" set forth
in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education3 are
met?
2
In response to the letter ruling, the Fourth Circuit vacated the
order of the district court and held for "prudential reasons" that the
rules, and an order compelling the City Board and its hearing officer to conduct
a hearing on this particular reimbursement claim.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing S-1 & S-2 v. Spangler, 650 F. Supp. 1427 (M.D.N.C. 1986), vacated in
part as moot, 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987)).
27. Id.
28. Id. While the appeal was pending, the parents and the City Board partially settled
the case. Id. The parents agreed to a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of all their claims
against the City Board in return for reimbursement of their accrued tuition expenses. Id.
The State Board and Spangler were not parties to the settlement, and the parents did not
dismiss any of their claims against them. Id.
29. The OSERS has supervisory authority over federal grant-in-aid monies issued to
the states under the ERA. S-1 & S-2 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1987).
30. A definition of "letter ruling" is given supra at note 2.
31. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
32. S-i & S-2, 832 F.2d at 298. The Burlington Court stressed the broad discretion
granted district courts by the EHA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369. That discretion allows
a district court to grant reimbursement for private school expenses where a "free
appropriate public education ... designed to meet the [handicapped student's] unique
needs" is not possible. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1988)); see supra note 17. Since
the Burlington opinion does not refer to any "conditions" as such, the OSERS ruling's
reference to "conditions" set forth in Burlington probably means the Court's recitation of
the numerous "procedural safeguards" listed in the EHA. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368-69;
see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b), (e)(2) (1988).
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appeal was moot?3 On remand, the district court filed a memoran-
dum opinion on March 30, 1992, which awarded $30,143.18 in
attorney's fees to the parents.O The court reasoned that " 'by virtue
of Plaintiff's complaint sufficient federal pressure was brought to bear
on the State of North Carolina that Section 115[C]-116 was amended
to comply with federal law.' "I The State Board appealed this
decision, arguing that post-mootness events cannot serve as a basis for
declaring plaintiffs prevailing parties, that the amendments in question
did not support such a determination, and that the OSERS letter
ruling was not in response to the parents' claims and was unimportant
if it was.36
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's award, applying catalyst theory to hold that post-mootness
events can under some circumstances establish § 1983 plaintiffs as
prevailing parties for fee award purposes.37 The majority held that
a sufficient "causal nexus" existed between the plaintiffs' suit and the
state's amendment of the statute to qualify plaintiffs as prevailing
parties for fee award purposes, and that the circuit's previous mooting
of the underlying § 1983 action had no effect on the chain of
causation." Judge Wilkinson dissented on the ground that the
33. S-1 & S-2, 832 F.2d at 298. The court did not believe that its intervention was
necessary, since the issues raised in the appeal were "[not] capable of repetition yet likely
to evade review." Id The court remanded for a determination of "whether and in what
amounts attorney's fees should be recoverable against the state defendants." Id While
the court was justified in its assumption that the state defendants would comply in good
faith with the letter ruling, that compliance was anything but swift. Although the North
Carolina General Assembly amended § 115C-116 in 1988 to permit hearing officers to
recommend tuition reimbursement decisions to the State Board, Act of July 8, 1988, ch.
1079, § 1, 1987 (Regular Session 1988) N.C. Sess. Laws 508, 510 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-116(h) (1994)), the OSERS objected to the amendments on the
ground that hearing officers still lacked the authority to make binding decisions regarding
reimbursements. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51. After the OSERS threatened to withdraw over
$5 million in federal education funds if the state did not comply with federal law to
OSERS' satisfaction, the General Assembly enacted legislation authorizing administrative
law judges to make binding decisions, subject to appeal, regarding a child's special
educational needs. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 163 (citing Act of July 28, 1990, ch. 1058, 1990
N.C. Sess. Laws 736 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-116(h) (1994)). The
amendments were promulgated nearly three years after the plaintiffs' claims had been
declared moot. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 162-63.
34. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 163.
35. Id
36. Id
37. Id at 164-66. The majority relied on Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (4th
Cir. 1979), which set out the theory and its requirements. See infra notes 75-77 and
accompanying text for a more extended discussion of the Bonnes test.
38. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 164.
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Supreme Court had rejected catalyst theory in Farrar v. Hobby, a
1992 decision which considered the effect of a nominal damages
award on prevailing party status under the Fees Act.39 According to
Judge Wilkinson, the plaintiffs did not "obtain an enforceable
judgment . . . or comparable relief through a consent decree or
settlement" as required by Farrar,' and thus could not qualify as
prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.4
Upon rehearing en banc, a seven-judge majority adopted Judge
Wilkinson's dissent as its opinion and briefly clarified the opinion's
precise holding.42 The majority explicitly abandoned catalyst theory
as a test of prevailing party status, and held that the court's prior
prudential mooting of the appeal operated to vacate the judgment
below and prevented the parents from being found prevailing parties
by virtue of postdismissal events.43 The six dissenters adopted the
panel majority's opinion as their own.4
The debate over catalyst theory and fee awards in the civil rights
context is but one small part of a more general dialogue concerning
fee awards that has taken place over two centuries of American
jurisprudence. Fee awards in the United States are subject to the so-
called "American no-fee rule," a judicially created doctrine45 that
requires each party to litigation to bear its own attorney's fees
regardless of a suit's outcome.' The rule long prevented prevailing
39. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
40. Id. at 573.
41. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 168 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
42. S-1 & S-2,21 F.3d at 51.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. M. Isabel Medina, Comment, Award of Attorney Fees in Bad Faith Breaches of
Contract in Louisiana-An Argument Against the American Rule, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1173,
1179 (1987).
46. 1 ALBA CoNTE, ATrORNEY FEE AWARDS 519-20 (2d ed. 1993). In Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967), the Supreme Court set out
three justifications for the rule: (1) a litigant should not be punished for prosecuting or
defending an action in good faith; (2) a poor person may be discouraged from bringing a
valid lawsuit by the prospect of having to pay for the opposing party's legal fees; and (3)
the judicial system would be unreasonably burdened because of the time and expense of
making fee determinations. Id. at 718.
At common law, cost awards were not allowed. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,247 (1975). However, England has by statute authorized
cost awards (including attorney's fees) for centuries. Id. The Alyeska Court stated that
"[a]lthough the matter is in the discretion of the court, counsel fees are regularly allowed
to the prevailing party [in England]." Id. This "English Rule" is grounded on two
premises: (1) the prevailing party ought to be fully compensated for all injuries caused by
the defeated party, including attorney expenses; and (2) frivolous litigation will be deterred
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litigants from obtaining a fee award, absent express statutory
authorization.47 The rule was originally viewed as a progressive
change in the law because it made litigation available to plaintiffs who
otherwise would be deterred by the prospect of paying attorney's fees
to victorious defendants.4" However, its effect was often the op-
posite; attorneys were frequently unwilling to accept cases from
poorer clients, even if success were likely, simply because of the
probability that those clients would not have the funds to pay for the
legal services.49 This problem was particularly acute in the area of
civil rights claims, which commonly involved lower-income plaintiffs
seeking only injunctive relief50 In response to the shortcomings of
the American rule, Congress began as early as 1870 to remedy the
problem ad hoc by enacting statutes with explicit fee-shifting
provisions for prevailing plaintiffs.5" By 1975, more than fifty such
federal fee-shifting statutes were in effect.
52
When presented with civil rights suits not covered by one of these
fee-shifting statutes, and not falling within one of the three narrow
exceptions to the American rule,53 the courts often used their
equitable powers to award fees to successful plaintiffs on the theory
that such compensation was warranted to promote the public interest
and to effectuate important congressional policy objectives.54 This
approach, dubbed the "private attorney general" doctrine, applies to
litigation where nonpecuniary relief is sought, or where the amount
of pecuniary relief sought relative to the cost of services would
if losing parties must pay the opposing party's fees. Medina, supra note 45, at 1177 n.20.
47. Medina, supra note 45, at 1177 n.20.
48. Daniel L. Lowery, "Prevailing Party" Status for Civil Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-
Shifting's Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (1993). Three narrow
exceptions to the American rule are: (1) "common fund" doctrine, whereby a class
representative maintaining a suit on behalf of a monetary fund for the benefit of a class
of persons may obtain fee reimbursement from the common fund or from the absent class
members; (2) "substantial benefit" entitlement, a more complicated and expansive version
of "common fund" doctrine; and (3) "bad faith" of opposing counsel. 1 CONTE, supra
note 46, at 5-10.
49. Lowery, supra note 48, at 1443.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1443-44 & n.14.
52. For a listing of these statutes, see SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., CIVIL RIGHTS
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS Acr OF 1976 (PUBLIC LAW 94-559, S. 2278)-SOURCE BOOK:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 220-21 (Appendix A) (Comm.
Print 1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK].
53. See supra note 48.
54. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
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otherwise deny access to judicial redress.'5 In Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises,6 the Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of
the private attorney general doctrine in Title 17 suits, stating: "If
[the plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone
but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority." 8  After Newman,
almost every federal circuit applied the private attorney general
doctrine to shift fees in civil rights actions even without explicit
statutory authorization. 9
The Supreme Court first addressed the validity of the doctrine's
use absent express statutory provision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
v. Wilderness Society ° After extensively discussing the development
of the American no-fee rule,6 the Court concluded that the judiciary
55. 1 CONTE, supra note 46, at 520; SouRCE BOOK, supra note 52, at 10. The term
"private attorney general" was first used by Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Indus. v.
Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943):
Instead of designating the Attorney General, or some other public officer,
to bring [an action], Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on
any non-official persons, or on a designated group of non-official persons,
authority to bring a suit... even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public
interest. Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney
Generals.
Id. at 704 (footnote omitted). Cases applying the private attorney general doctrine are too
numerous for citation here. For a listing of many of them, see Hearings on the Effect of
Legal Fees on the Adequacy of Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of
Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 888-
1024, 1060-62 (1973).
56. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1988). Newman was a Title II lawsuit involving
racial discrimination in public accommodations by restaurants. Newman, 390 U.S. at 400.
Title II specifically gives courts discretion to award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b). Due to this explicit authorization, the Newman
Court held that a party who prevails in a Title H lawsuit should ordinarily be awarded
attorney's fees "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust."
Newman, 390 U.S. at 402. This presumption of fee entitlement in Title II cases was later
incorporated into § 1988 fees. 1 CONTE, supra note 46, at 8 n.46. The "special
circumstances" exception has been narrowly construed and is rarely successfully invoked
to deny a fee award. See Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719,738-39 (1980)
(dictum).
58. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
59. 1 CONTE, supra note 46, at 520; see id. at 520 n.8 (listing a number of those circuit
decisions). One commentator has stated that the doctrine's purpose is to permit courts to
award fees when the plaintiff has vindicated "a right that (1) benefits a lirge number of
people, (2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal importance." Carl Cheng,
Comment, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1929, 1929 (1985).
60. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
61. Id. at 247-68.
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would encroach on the authority of Congress were it to create
exceptions such as the private attorney general doctrine.6' The
Court disapproved further use of the doctrine absent express statutory
authorization, holding out of deference that only Congress could
"carve out specific exceptions" to the no-fee rule.'
Congress responded quickly to remedy the "anomalous gaps" in
the civil rights laws created by Alyeska 4 with the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 197665 (Fees Act). The express
purpose of the Fees Act was to revive the private attorney general
doctrine as developed in pre-Alyeska federal cases.66 The Fees Act
extended fee authorization for prevailing parties to certain civil rights
62. Id. at 269. Ironically, the American rule was judicially, not legislatively, created.
See Medina, supra note 45, at 1179.
63. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269. This deference was first expressed in Arcambel v.
Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306,306 (1796), where the Court ruled that the judiciary would
not create a general rule, independent of any statute, allowing awards of attorney's fees
in federal courts. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 249. The Arcambel Court overturned the inclusion
of attorney's fees as damages on the grounds that" '[t]he general practice of the United
States is in oposition [sic] to it; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute.' " Id. at 249-50 (quoting Arcambel, 3 U.S. at 306).
64. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5908, 5909 (also reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 52); H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 52, at 209-11.
65. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For the text of the Fees Act, see
supra note 7.
66. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 3-6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5910-
13. According to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
There are very few provisions in our Federal laws which are self-executing.
Enforcement of the laws depends on governmental action and, in some cases, on
private action through the courts. If the cost of private enforcement actions
becomes too grea there will be no private enforcement. If our civil rights laws are
not to become mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot
enforce, we must maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in
these [civil rights] cases.
S. REP. NO. 1011, supra note 64, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5913 (emphasis
added). The legislative history indicates that courts should exercise their award discretion
consistently with the case law interpreting the fee provisions of the Civil Rights Act, and
cites many federal decisions for support, including Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc.,
390 U.S. 400,402 (1968) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court held that a prevailing
party under Title II "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstan-
ces would render such an award unjust." See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 4,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912; H.R. REt. No. 1558, supra note 64, at 8,
reprinted in SoURCE BOOK, supra note 52, at 216; supra notes 56-58 and accompanying
text.
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statutes lacking their own fee-shifting provisions.67 In discussing the
meaning of "prevailing party," the House Committee on the Judiciary
stated:
The phrase "prevailing party" is not intended to be
limited to the victor only after entry of a final judgment.
following a full trial on the merits. It would also include a
litigant who succeeds even if the case is concluded prior to
a full evidentiary hearing before a judge or jury. If the
litigation terminates by consent decree, for example, it would
be proper to award counsel fees. A "prevailing party"
should not be penalized for seeking an out-of-court set-
tlement, thus helping to lessen docket congestion. Similarly,
after a complaint is ified, a defendant might voluntarily
cease the unlawful practice. A court should still award fees
even though it might conclude, as a matter of equity, that no
formal relief, such as an injunction, is needed.a
For over a decade after the passage of the Fees Act, case law
interpreting the term "prevailing party" proliferated.69 With some
exceptions and variations, the common position was that, although a
plaintiff need not obtain formal relief to recover fees,7" the plaintiff
must enjoy "substantial or essential" success in obtaining the objective
of the suit,7' and the suit must be a proximate cause of any relief
obtained. The last is the causation-centered test of prevailing party
67. These statutes are listed in the text of the Fees Act itself, which is set out supra,
note 7. All of them were passed before 1964-since that year, "every major civil rights law
passed by the Congress has included, or has been amended to include, one or more fee
provisions." S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 3-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5910-11 (list of post-1964 legislation omitted).
68. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 64, at 7, reprinted in SouRCE BOOK, supra note
52, at 215 (citations omitted); see also S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 5, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912 (stating that parties need not prevail on all issues to merit
a fee award as long as they prevail on an "important matter in the course of litigation,"
and that "parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through
a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief') (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
69. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1994) (annotations).
70. See, ag., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) ("[Nlothing in the language of
§ 1988 conditions the District Court's power to award fees on full litigation of the issues
or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights have been violated.").
71. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983), the Supreme Court suggested
without deciding that plaintiffs may become prevailing parties for fee purposes by
succeeding on "any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing suit" (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Morrison v.
Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669,671 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (requiring plaintiff's essential success
in obtaining the relief he seeks), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617
F.2d 163, 168 n.9 (8th Cir. 1980) (requiring success on a substantial claim).
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status known as "catalyst theory."'72 The theory likely arose out of
liberal interpretation of the Fees Act in early cases--courts went far
to effectuate the legislative intent of encouraging private attorneys
general.73
While the lower federal courts agree that a plaintiff claiming
prevailing party status through informal success must demonstrate a
causal connection between the lawsuit and the favorable result, they
disagree whether the plaintiff must also demonstrate some merit to
the lawsuit's claims. TWo distinct lines of authority have evolved in
the circuit courts. The majority rule, developed in the First Circuit
and known as the Nadeau test, "requires a showing both that the
lawsuit provoked the defendant's remedial action and that the suit
contained a colorable fee-generating claim."' The minority view
72. The theory was widely recognized in the federal circuit courts after passage of the
Fees Act. See, eg., Degidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding the
plaintiffs' lawsuit the catalyst for bringing about changes in prison health care, even though
the plaintiffs did not obtain the injunctive relief sought); Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 312-13 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the district court properly
awarded attorney's fees on the basis that the plaintiff's lawsuit was the catalyst for changes
in the defendant's pretermination procedures), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); Sablan v.
Department of Fin., 856 F.2d 1317, 1325-27 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding necessary causal link
between suit and change in the defendant's conduct, and holding that the plaintiff also
satisfied the requirement that his claim have a basis in law); Taylor v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 1551, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding the plaintiffs prevailing
parties under § 1988 even though the case was ultimately dismissed for mootness when the
city repealed the relevant ordinance); Reigh v. Schleigh, 829 F.2d 1334, 1335-36 (4th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (holding that, although the defendants prevailed in judicial proceedings,
the plaintiffs' suit caused amendment of challenged state attachment procedures, thereby
qualifying them as prevailing parties), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 968 (1988); Heath v. Brown,
807 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (requiring the district court to determine
on remand whether the plaintiffs' lawsuit was a "substantial factor" or "significant catalyst"
in motivating the defendant's change in enforcement procedures, according to the "well-
established standard in the Circuit for determining the 'prevailing party' status of a
plaintiff whose claims are mooted by settlement or by subsequent unilateral acts of the
defendant"); Exeter-West Greenwich Regional Sch. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 52-53
(1st Cir. 1986) (holding that mootness does not preclude a finding of prevailing party status
if the catalyst test is satisfied); Perlman v. City of Chicago, 801 F.2d 262, 268 (7th Cir.
1986) (implicitly recognizing catalyst theory, but holding the that plaintiff failed to satisfy
its requirements), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987); Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor
& Indus., 663 F.2d 443,451 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff's success in arbitration
resulted from her preparation for a Title VII lawsuit, and awarding fees for that
preparation even though the suit never went to trial), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
73. 1 CoNTE, supra note 46, at 521.
74. 2 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLUN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES 47 (2d ed. 1991). The test was first enunciated by the First
Circuit in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978). The Nadeau court
required plaintiffs to pass a "legal as well as factual" test: "If it has been judicially
determined that defendants' conduct, however beneficial it may be to plaintiffs' interests,
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hails from the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bonnes v. Long75 and does
not require a plaintiffs unadjudicated claims to meet a substantiality
threshold:
Th[e] inquiry [into whether the fee claimant is a "prevailing
party"] is properly a pragmatic one of both fact and law that
will ordinarily range outside the merits of the basic
controversy. Its initial focus might well be on establishing
the precise factual/legal condition that the fee claimant has
sought to change or affect so as to gain a benefit or be
relieved of a burden. With this condition taken as a
benchmark, inquiry may then turn to whether as a quite
practical matter the outcome, in whatever form it is realized,
is one to which the plaintiff fee claimant's efforts contributed
in a significant way, and which does involve an actual
conferral of benefit or relief from burden when measured
against the benchmark condition.76
Decisions from both the majority and minority camps have deemed
plaintiffs prevailing parties under § 1988 in a wide. variety of
circumstances where a significant causal connection exists between the
lawsuit and success achieved through formal consent judgments,
informal out-of-court settlements, the defendants' remedial action
correcting the challenged policies or practices, and legislative or other
third-party action that favorably moots the lawsuit."
The Supreme Court has never confronted catalyst theory head-
on, but a number of its early decisions either tacitly, recognized its
is not required by law, then defendants must be held to have acted gratuitously and
plaintiffs have not prevailed in a legal sense." Id. According to the Nadeau court, this
"legal" inquiry does not require the district court to decide that the plaintiff would have
prevailed on the merits of her claims; it is sufficient that the plaintiff has asserted a fee-
generating claim that is not "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless." Id. (internal
quotation mark omitted).
The Nadeau approach is followed by the District of Columbia, Second, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. 2 SCHWARTz & KIRKLIN, supra, at 49 &
nn.166-73 (cite list at nn.166-73 omitted).
75. 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979) (Bonnes 1).
76. Id, at 1319 (emphasis added). The original S-1 & S-2 majority (later the
dissenters) relied on this passage when they argued for the continued viability of catalyst
theory in the Fourth Circuit. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 164. The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly
reaffirmed this test. See; ag., Disabled in Action v. Mayor of Baltimore, 685 F2d 881,885
(4th Cir. 1982); DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92, 93 (4th Cir. 1982); Bonnes v. Long, 651
F.2d 214, 217 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 961 (1982) (Bonnes II). The Bonnes
test is sometimes referred to as the "benchmark" test. See Gillespie v. Brewer, 602 F.
Supp. 218, 223 n.7 (N.D. W. Va. 1985). It is recognized in some form by the Third and
Eleventh Circuits. 2 SCHWARTz & KaRKLI, supra note 74, at 63.
77. 2 SCHWARTZ & KIRKLiN, supra note 74, at 53 n.185, 65 n.211 (survey of circuit
decisions omitted).
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viability or reserved decision on its exact contours. 8 The Court's
early cases were in line with a liberal construction of the Fees Act,
emphasizing the import of congressional intent to encourage "private
attorneys general. ' 79  Furthermore, the Court's denial of certiorari
to a number of decisions based on catalyst theory may suggest that
the Court recognizes and approves of the theory.'
Beginning in 1987, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
on prevailhig party status under § 1988.1 In Hewitt v. Helmss2 the
78. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 763 (1987) ("We need not decide the
circumstances, if any, under which this 'catalyst' theory could justify a fee award.");
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 n.9 (1985) ("We express no view as to the nature
or degree of success necessary to make a plaintiff a prevailing party."); Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 439 n.15 (1983) (instructing district court on remand to
consider specifically whether claimant's "lawsuit was not a catalyst" for achieving a
favorable result on an issue actually decided against claimant); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446
U.S. 754, 756-57 (1980) (per curiam) (noting legislative history which "indicates that a
person may in some circumstances be a 'prevailing party' without having obtained a
favorable 'final judgment' "or" 'without formally obtaining relief ").
79. See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (plurality opinion).
The Rivera plurality explicitly recognized that "success" for § 1988 purposes is a function
of both the plaintiff's individual benefit from the relief obtained and the nature of the
public benefit achieved through the litigation. Consequently, the plurality stated,
"Regardless of the form of relief he actually obtains, a successful civil rights plaintiff often
secures important social benefits that are not reflected in nominal or relatively small
damages awards." Id at 574 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989)
(adopting the Nadeau two-part catalyst test), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990); Reigh v.
Schleigh, 829 F.2d 1334, 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (finding plaintiffs to be
prevailing parties even absent success by adjudication because their suit caused defendants
to amend their challenged attachment procedures), cerL denied, 485 U.S. 968 (1988);
Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Labor & Indus., 663 F.2d 443, 451-52 (3d Cir. 1981)
(holding that plaintiff's arbitration success resulted from her preparation for a Title VII
lawsuit, and awarding fees for that preparation even though the suit never went to trial),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam) (requiring essential success on the merits and stating that a plaintiff's lawsuit
need only be a material factor, not the sole factor, in "bringing about the defendant's
action"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
81. While the line of cases beginning in 1987 is most vital to a discussion of the
Court's treatment of prevailing party status, some decisions before that year also addressed
the issue, albeit in a more limited fashion. See e.g., Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (stating that
plaintiffs may be deemed prevailing parties if they succeed on "any significant issue" in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit sought in bringing the lawsuit) (dictum);
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980) (holding that informal relief, as through a
consent decree or settlement, may be sufficient to support a fee award under § 1988);
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754,757 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a plaintiff must
"establish] his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims" before he can be
said to prevail). The Hensley dictum did not deter some lower courts from requiring
success on the central issue in the litigation to justify a prevailing party finding. Hence,
the Court revisited the issue in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist.,
489 U.S. 782,790-92 (1989), and reaffirmed the Hensley standard, specifically disapproving
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Court considered the case of a plaintiff prisoner who had brought suit
under § 1983 against state prison officials in Huntington, Pennsyl-
vania. 3  The prisoner, Helms, alleged that his due process rights
were violated when he was found guilty of misconduct solely on the
basis of uncorroborated hearsay evidence at his disciplinary
hearing."s The district court rendered summary judgment against the
plaintiff several months after his release from prison, but the Third
Circuit reversed and remanded the case, finding in particular that the
determination that Helms was guilty of misconduct was based on
hearsay evidence, and that he had therefore been denied due
process.8s On remand, Helms sought only to recover monetary
damages and did not ask for declaratory relief8. 6 The district court
denied him any remedy and granted summary judgment to the
defendants; Helms appealed his case to the Third Circuit.' While
the appeal was pending, the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections
voluntarily adopted regulations governing the use of information from
confidential sources in inmate disciplinary proceedings."8
Helms then sought to recover attorney's fees under the Fees Act,
but the district court rejected his claim. 9 The court of appeals
reversed, finding Helms to be a prevailing party because "its prior
holding that Helms's constitutional rights were violated was 'a form
of judicial relief which serve[d] to affirm the plaintiffs assertion that
the defendants' actions [had been] unconstitutional and which [would]
serve as a standard of conduct to guide prison officials in the
future.' "' The court of appeals also directed the district court to
the "central issue" test. Garland is discussed more extensively in.fia at n6tes 119-28 and
accompanying text.
82. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
83. Id at 757.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 757-58. The court of appeals instructed the district court to enter summary
judgment for the plaintiff if the defendants could not establish a claim of qualified
immunity. Id.
86. Id. at 758.
87. Id, The district court's denial of remedy to the plaintiff and grant of summary
judgment to the defendants were based on the court's finding that the defendants had
established their claim of qualified immunity. Id. On appeal, Helms sought both
monetary damages and equitable relief in the form of expunction of his misconduct
conviction from his record. Id.
88. Id. at 759. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision without opinion.
Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (quoting Helms v. Hewitt, 780 F.2d 367, 370 (3d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 755
(1987)).
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reconsider whether Helms's suit was a "catalyst" for the defendants'
remedial actions in amending their procedures.9' Defendants
petitioned for certiorari with the Supreme Court, and certiorari was
granted.92
The Supreme Court held that Helms did not obtain "at least
some relief on the merits of his claim" as required by precedent.93
Because Helms received no damages, no equitable relief due to his
prior release, and no informal relief through a consent decree or
settlement, the Court held that he obtained no legally significant
relief-94 The majority rejected Helms's argument that the Third
Circuit's prior holding constituted a "vindication of rights," qualifying
him as a prevailing party under § 1988.91 Objecting to equating
mere "statements of law" with declaratory judgments, the majority
held that the Third Circuit's interlocutory ruling that Helms's
constitutional rights had been violated did not, and could not,
constitute a form of declaratory judgment.96 According to the
majority, a judicial pronouncement constitutes relief on the merits
only if it settles "some dispute which affects the behavior of the
defendant towards the plaintiff," Helms failed this "behavioral
test"9' because the only relief he obtained was the "moral satisfac-
tion . . . result[ing] from [a] favorable statement of law in an
otherwise unfavorable opinion."99 Helms's "vindication of rights"
argument failed because that vindication had no effect on the
behavior of the prison officials towards him due to his release before
judgment."°  Hence, according to the majority, Helms did not
obtain any formal relief-'0'
Despite its strict approach to the elements of formal reieft the
majority admitted that "[i]t is settled law.., that relief need not be
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 760 (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (per curiam)).
94. Id. According to Justice Scalia, who wrote for the majority, Helms could not be
considered a prevailing party by virtue of the interlocutory ruling that the complaint
should not have been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional claim, because "[t]hat
is not the stuff of which legal victories are made." Id. at 760.
95. Id. at 761-62.
96. Id. at 760.
97. Id. at 761 (emphasis added).
98. See Lowery, supra note 48, at 1449-51 (discussing the Court's new "behavioral
test").
99. Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 762.
100. Id.
101. Id at 760-62.
2260 [Vol. 73
CATALYST THEORY
judicially decreed in order to justify a fee award under § 1988."'12
The majority then discussed the so-called "equivalency doctrine,"
which looks to whether an action by the defendant toward the
plaintiff is the "equivalent" of a judicial decree. 3 According to the
majority, since the purpose of the judicial process is to cause an action
by the defendant toward the plaintiff, actions outside of the
courtroom, such as a settlement or a voluntary change in behavior by
the defendant toward the plaintiff, may be the functional equivalent
of a formal judicial pronouncement." Consequently, the Court
explained, when a lawsuit induces voluntary action by the defendant,
and when that action constitutes the kind of relief the plaintiff had
originally sought, "the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed despite
the absence of a formal judgment in his favor."' 5 However, under
the facts of the case, the majority held that the equivalency
doctrine-and through it, catalyst theory-provided no recourse."
Rather than invoking standards of causality between a suit and the
benefit obtained," 7 the Court based its holding that Helms was not
entitled to prevailing party status under catalyst theory on the fact
that he had already been released from prison when the prison
changed its challenged policies." As a result, he "did not and
102. Id at 762.
103. The equivalency doctrine, according to the Court, "is simply an acknowledgment
of the primacy of the redress over the means by which it is obtained." Id at 761. Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, explained the Court's reasoning.
In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the
end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action)
by the defendant that the judgment produces .... Redress is sought through the
court, but from the defendant .... The real value of the judicial pronoun-
cement-what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a "case or controversy"
rather than an advisory opinion-is the settling of some dispute which affects the
behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 762-63. Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the defendants'
voluntary change in policy during the pendency of Helms's litigation gave Helms informal
relief substantially equivalent to the relief he sought. Id. at 768 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Whether his litigation catalyzed that change was, according to Justice Marshall, an issue
of fact for the district court to decide in its discretion. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall concluded that, should the district court deem the suit a catalyst, a fee
award would be justified. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 763 ("We need not decide the circumstances, if any, under which this
'catalyst' theory could justify a fee award under § 1988."). If not an express endorsement
of the theory, this constitutes at least a tacit admission of its existence and its potential
viability under other facts.
108. Id.
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could not get redress from promulgation of the informant-testimony
regulations" which had been instituted during pendency of his appeal
under § 1988. 9 The majority refused to "retroactively [label him]
a 'prevailing party' . . . even though he was not such when final
judgment was entered."" e
One year later, in Rhodes v. Stewart,"' the Court summarily
reversed the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of a fees award, relying solely
on the behavioral test of Hewitt and narrowing its scope.' A per
curiam majority held that the court of appeals had misinterpreted its
holding in Hewitt, stating, "Although the plaintiff in Hewitt had not
won a declaratory judgment, nothing in our opinion suggested that the
entry of such a judgment in a party's favor automatically renders that
party prevailing under § 1988."" The Court reaffirmed Hewitt's
behavioral test of prevailing party status, ruling that a declaratory
judgment "constitute[s] relief, for purposes of § 1988, if, and only if,
it affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff""' 4
According to the majority, these plaintiffs "could not get redress"
from a ruling, in their favor because the case was moot before
judgment." In other words, the plaintiffs received no personal
benefit from the judgment and thus no "relief" for fee award
109. Id.
110, Id. at 764.
111. 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (per curiam).
112. Id. at 3-4. In Rhodes, the plaintiffs were incarcerated in an Ohio correctional
facility when they filed a complaint alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by officials who refused to allow them to subscribe to a pornographic
magazine. Id. at 2. On April 2,1981, the district court ruled that correctional officials had
failed to apply the proper procedural and substantive standards in denying the inmates
their request, and ordered compliance with those standards. Id. Two months later, the
court awarded fees to the plaintiffs, and the award was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals. Id The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case for further consideration in light of Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983). Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 2. On remand from the court of appeals, the district court
confirmed its earlier award. Id. at 3. On appeal the State finally pointed out that neither
plaintiff was in the State's custody when the original order was issued in 1981: one had
died in 1979, and the other was paroled in 1978 and given final release from parole in
1980. Id. Despite this retroactive mootness, the court of appeals upheld the award,
concluding that mootness when the judgment was issued did not undermine the plaintiffs'
status as prevailing parties for award purposes. Id. The panel majority in the circuit's
affirmance order characterized the relief the plaintiffs had received as declaratory and
concluded that the grant of a declaratory judgment to the plaintiffs satisfied Hewitt's
requirements and justified an award of attorney's fees. Id.
113. Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 2.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,763 (1987)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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purposes.116 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented
on two grounds: (1) that Hewitt did not control the outcome in this
case because the issue there was whether a party can "prevail"
notwithstanding the lack of a formal judgment in his favor, and (2)
that the majority misinterpreted the term "prevailing." 117  Justice
Blackmun wrote:
[T]his case presents the question whether to be a
"prevailing party" it is enough to win one's lawsuit. Hewitt
did not decide this question.., since it did not concern a
plaintiff who had obtained "all or some of the relief he
sought through a judgment." . . . In ordinary usage,
"prevailing" means winning. In the context of litigation,
winning means obtaining a final judgment or other redress
in one's favor. While the victory in this case may have been
an empty one, it was a victory nonetheless. In the natural
use of our language, we often speak of victories that are
empty, hollow, or Pyrrhic. Thus, there is nothing anomalous
about saying that respondent prevailed although he derived
no tangible benefit from the judgment entered in his
favor.11
In the 1989 case Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indepen-
dent School District,"' the Court approached the problem of
defining "prevailing" under the Fees Act from a different angle than
it had in Hewitt and Rhodes. In Garland, the plaintiffs filed for
attorney's fees under § 1988 after winning a partial summary
116. Id The Court intimated that the result would have been different had this suit
been brought as a class action: The remaining class members could satisfy the behavioral
test and get redress from the declaratory judgment. See id.
117. Id at 6-8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. I at 6-7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760). Justice
Blackmun first argued that the petition for certiorari should have been denied because the
action was moot--courts usually do not grant remedies in moot cases, so the case did not
deserve the Court's plenary consideration. Id. at 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun did not argue that the plaintiffs should receive a fee award, but rather that the
case should not have been decided without the benefit of full briefing and argument once
certiorari had been granted-however incorrect that grant may have been. Id. at 7-8
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He observed that, even though the claim became moot, the
fact that a party should not have prevailed would not ordinarily deprive him of an
attorney's fees award. I& at 8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He then stated that an
exception to that principle should perhaps be made when the defect in judgment goes to
the court's jurisdiction-an issue which should be decided only upon full consideration.
Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
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judgment on several of their claims.'" The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of fees, finding that the plaintiffs had not
prevailed on the "central issue" of the lawsuit and were thus ineligible
for fee awards under the Fees Act.'' The Supreme Court
unanimously held that this "central issue" test was inappropriate for
prevailing party determinations,"z and adopted the First Circuit's
view, enunciated in Nadeau v. Helgemoe,' that plaintiffs cross the
threshold to a fee award of some kind when they succeed on "any
significant issue in the litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit
the parties sought in bringing suit."'2 Most important, the Court
subtly altered the behavioral test of Hewitt and Rhodes by setting
forth a new standard for prevailing party determinations: "[T]o be
considered a prevailing party within the meaning of § 1988, the
plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution of the dispute which
120. Id. at 787. In Garland, several teachers unions and union members brought suit
under § 1983 alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the
defendant school district's policy prohibiting communication among teachers about
unionization. Id. at 785. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
on most of the issues raised by the plaintiffs, but the Fifth Circuit reversed in part and
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on several of the claims. Id. at 785-87. While
the Fifth Circuit agreed that the school district was not required to give union represen-
tatives access to school facilities during school hours, it found unconstitutional the school
district's prohibition of schoolday communications by teachers pertaining to union
activities. Id. at 786. It also found that the district's practice of disciplining teachers who
violated this policy had a "chilling effect" on the teachers' First Amendment rights. Id.
Finally, the court of appeals held that prohibiting teacher use of internal mail and billboard
facilities to discuss employee organizations was unconstitutional. Id. As to those claims,
the Fifth Circuit granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Id. at 787. On
appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. Id.
(citing Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 479 U.S. 801, 801 (1986)).
121. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 837 F.2d 190, 193 (5th
Cir. 1988), rev'd, 489 U.S. 782 (1989). The Fifth Circuit conceded that its definition of
"prevailing party" was narrower than that of other circuits. Id. at 192.
122. Garland, 489 U.S. at 792. The Court found that the "central issue" test was
"directly contrary to the thrust of [its] decision in [Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424
(1983)]," which was consistent with congressional intent to award interim fee awards
pendente lite " 'where a party has prevailed on an important matter in the course of
litigation, even when he ultimately does not prevail on all issues.' " Garland, 489 U.S. at
790 (quoting S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5912; and H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 64, at 8, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note
52, at 216). According to the Court, "[tihe incongruence of the 'central issue' test in light
of the clear congressional intent that interim fee awards be available to partially prevailing
civil rights plaintiffs is readily apparent." Id.
123. 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978); see supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing
Nadeau).
124. Garland, 489 U.S. at 791-92 (quoting Nadeau, 582 F.2d at 278-79) (alteration in
original).
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changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant."'"
According to the Court, "The touchstone of the prevailing party
inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee
statute."' Once such a change has occurred, the degree of the
plaintiff's success goes only to the reasonableness of the award, not to
its availability' The "any-significant-issue" test thereby serves to
qualify a plaintiff as a prevailing party if the "legal relationship" test
is satisfied by the alteration provoked, but may also act to limit the
amount of an award."' The nebulous nature of this new "legal
relationship" test caused confusion among the lower federal courts,
particularly where the effect of nominal damages awards on the
prevailing party inquiry was at issue. 29 This confusion led directly
to the Court's next decision on prevailing party status three years
later in Farrar v. Hobby,' the source of the Fourth Circuit's
abrogation of catalyst theory in S-1 & S-2."
In Farrar, the plaintiff alleged due process violations and
malicious prosecution in connection with the closing of his school for
delinquent, disabled, and disturbed teens.m The plaintiff sought
$17 million in damages but was awarded only nominal damages. 3
The district court awarded the plaintiff $280,000 in fees plus expenses
125. Id. at 792 (emphasis added). Surprisingly, the unanimous opinion cited Hewitt and
Rhodes as directly stating this proposition. Id. Neither of those opinions mentions
alteration of the parties' "legal" relationship. Hewitt speaks only of alterations of
defendants' conduct which "affect the relationship" between the plaintiff and the
defendant. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987). Rhodes does not even use the
relationship concept-it requires only behavioral changes on the part of the defendant
toward the plaintiff. See Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam). The
Garland Court used no introductory signals when it cited Hewitt and Rhodes as support
for its "legal relationship" test, which may indicate that it assumed the tests were not very
different at all. See Garland, 489 U.S. at 792.
126. Garland, 489 U.S. at 792-93.
127. See ia
128. See i.
129. See, eg., Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir. 1991), affd sub
nom. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992) (observing that none of the other circuits had
applied Hewitt or Rhodes to the problem of nominal damages awards, even though all but
the Eleventh Circuit had handed down relevant opinions after Hewitt, and even though the
Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had delivered decisions after Rhodes).
130. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
131. See S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51.
132. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 570.
133. Id. The jury found that the defendant had" 'committed an act or acts under color
of state law that deprived [the plaintiff] of a civil right' "but that this conduct was not" 'a
proximate cause of any damages' "suffered by Joseph Farrar. Id (quoting App. to Brief
in Opposition A-3).
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and interest.' 4 A divided Fifth Circuit panel reversed the fee
award, holding that the plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and thus
were not entitled to fees under § 1988. 5 The Fifth Circuit relied
on Hewitt, Rhodes, and Garland in ruling that the nominal damages
award did not "in any meaningful sense 'change the legal relation-
ship' " between the plaintiff and the defendant.n6 The court of
appeals also held that, when the sole relief sought is money damages
and only nominal damages are awarded, the success achieved is not
success on a " 'significant issue that achieve[d] some of the benefit.
. . sought in bringing suit' " that is required by Supreme Court
precedent.'
The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit erred in not
recognizing the plaintiffs as prevailing parties under the settled
principle that plaintiffs who obtain only nominal or modest relief are
considered prevailing parties for fee award purposes." The Court
reaffirmed Garland's "legal relationship" test and added the
controversial language at issue in S-1 & S-2 when it stated, "No
material alteration of the legal relationship between the parties occurs
until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent
decree, or settlement against the defendant."' 9 According to the
Court, a judgment for damages in any amount, whether compensatory
or nominal, "modifies the defendant's behavior for the plaintiff's
benefit by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he
otherwise would not pay"," and effects the "material alteration" of
the parties' legal relationship necessary to push plaintiffs across the
threshold to fee award eligibility.''
134. Idt
135. Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311,1315 (5th Cir. 1991), affd sub nor. Farrar
v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. IM (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
791-92 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted in original).
138. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573, 575 (1992). The Court stated, "[Tihe prevailing party
inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained .... [T]he 'technical' nature
of a nominal damages award or any other judgment does not affect the prevailing party
inquiry ...." Id. at 574.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id. The Court held 8-1 that plaintiffs who receive nominal damages are still
prevailing parties for fee award purposes. See id at 572 (majority opinion); id at 579
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
and Souter). Only Justice O'Connor, who concurred with the judgment, disagreed with
that holding. See i at 575-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor would deny
fee awards to all de minimis and merely technical victories which serve no public purpose.
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However, the Court upheld the circuit's reversal of the district
court's fee award, holding that the amount of the fee award depends
on the degree of success achieved.'42 The Court noted that "[t]his
litigation accomplished little beyond giving petitioners 'the moral
satisfaction of knowing that a federal court concluded that [their]
rights had been violated' in some unspecified way."'43 The Court
concluded that the "technical" nature of the plaintiff's success in
obtaining only nominal damages in a suit seeking only compensatory
damages "highlight[ed] the plaintiff's failure to prove actual, compen-
sable injury. ... When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages
because of [the] failure to prove an essential element of his claim for
monetary relief, ... the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor recognized that "[t]he
difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought is
not the only consideration in civil rights litigation,"'45 and stressed
that nominal damage awards can represent victories insofar as they
vindicate rights, even without proof of actual damages.'4 Justice
O'Connor stated that courts must look to other factors in making
their determination, particularly "the significance of the legal issue on
which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed," and whether the
plaintiff's success "accomplished some public goal other than
occupying the time and energy of counsel, court, and client."' 47
Justice O'Connor expressly recognized that the Fees Act is "a tool
that ensures the vindication of important rights, even when large sums
of money are not at stake, by making attorney's fees available under
Id at 577-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see infra notes 145-49 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's stance in this case and her recognition
of the "public purpose" intent behind the Fees Act).
142. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 574-75.
143. Id at 574 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762 (1987) (alteration in
original)).
144. Id. at 574-575. Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Stevens,
concurred with the majority's holding that § 1988 entitled this plaintiff to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees, but would have remanded for a determination of what
constitutes a reasonable amount, stating that "the Court should follow its sensible practice
and remand the case for reconsideration of the fee amount," especially since the issue was
neither presented in the petition for certiorari, nor briefed by the petitioners. Id. at 579-80
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 578 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
146. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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a private attorney general theory."' However, she was unable to
find a public purpose served by this litigation, and concurred in
denying fees to the plaintiff.149
TWo years later in S-1 & S-2 the Fourth Circuit had its first
opportunity to address the viability of catalyst theory after Farrar.
The opinions in S-1 & S-2 break down into two distinct areas of
argument: whether the Supreme Court abandoned catalyst theory in
Farrar and its other recent cases, and, regardless of Farrar, whether
catalyst theory is simply a bad doctrine which ought to be aban-
doned.5
There are two possible interpretations of Farrar's controversial
language:' (1) the difficult language is mere dictum and must be
taken in the context of that case's issues, which did not include
catalyst theory, because the Supreme Court would not reject such an
established doctrine without expressly stating that it was doing so and
providing reasons for that rejection; or (2) the Court's list of ways to
earn prevailing party status was meant to be exclusive, indicating its
intent to abrogate the theory in line with its recent decisions that have
increasingly restricted the prevailing party inquiry. The former view
was taken by the original Fourth Circuit panel majority, but was
rejected on rehearing en banc by a majority in favor of the latter.152
148. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); cf. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,574-76
(1986) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing the importance of the social benefits often
achieved by successful civil rights plaintiffs that are not reflected in nominal damage
awards).
149. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 578-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated
that "one searches in vain for the public purpose this litigation might have served," and
rejected as "regrettably obtuse" the district court's speculation that a large fee award could
serve to deter this kind of lawless conduct in the future. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Court's continuing disregard for the private attorney general doctrine is dramatically
underscored by the fact that Justice O'Connor's opinion is the only significant recognition
of public benefit as a measure of success out of all four of the decisions examined: Farrar,
see supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text; Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989), see supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text;
Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (per curiam), see supra notes 111-18 and accom-
panying text; and Hewitt v. Helms, 488 U.S. 755 (1987), see supra notes 82-110 and
accompanying text.
150. A third distinct issue was whether, assuming catalyst theory's existence arguendo,
these plaintiffs satisfied its causal requirements. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 164-65. The court's
discussion in this area is significant only insofar as it supports the sundry arguments on
both sides of the two primary issues in the case. A summary of the arguments made for
and against a finding that this suit "catalyzed" the State's remedial action is set out infra
at note 230.
151. See supra text accompanying note 139.
152. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51.
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Overall, the Supreme Court's recent chain of prevailing party
decisions has signalled a retreat from its early liberal construction of
the Fees Act."3 The Court has gradually moved away from the
explicit congressional intent to encourage private attorneys general by
limiting the scope of the prevailing party inquiry.' In particular,
the Court has increasingly focused on the private benefit obtained by
the litigation as the primary factor in determining prevailing party
status.' That course virtually ignores the "important social
benefits" often achieved by civil rights litigation which a plurality of
the Court recognized as equally determinative in City of Riverside v.
Rivera.- 6  This Supreme Court retreat allowed Judge Wilkinson,
and later six of his fellow judges, to interpret Farrar as abrogating
catalyst theory, even though the issue of its viability was not before
the Court, and even though the Farrar Court did not once mention
the catalyst theory in its opinion."5 Judge Wilkinson stated:
Farrar's specification of the three avenues by which a
party can prevail for § 1988 purposes [(enforceable
judgments, consent decrees, or formal settlements)] does no
more than continue the process of refining Hewitt. In its
153. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's early Fees
Act decisions).
154. See supra notes 82-144 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 82-144 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases in which
the Court focused on how the defendant's behavior toward the plaintiff had changed, or
how the defendant's legal relationship with the plaintiff had changed). A glaring
inconsistency seems to exist between the Court's reliance on private benefit as the primary
requirement for a fee award and Congress's explicit intent to encourage "private attorneys
general"-who, per the ordinary meaning of language, would be acting for the public's
benefit as well as their own in bringing such claims, and hence would not need to be
certified as class representatives.
156. 477 U.S. 561 (1986). See generally David Shub, Note, Private Attorneys Genera
Prevailing Parties, and Public Beneft" Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights Plaintiffs,
42 DUKE LJ. 706, 713 (1992) ("As a result of this disregard [for the private attorney
general intent behind the Fees Act], the Court has adopted a faulty standard for
determining when a civil rights plaintiff is eligible for an award of attorney's fees, focusing
only on the private relief which a plaintiff obtains."). This commentator stated, "Since
Rivera, the Court has not rejected the analysis of the legislative history presented by the
Rivera plurality-it has simply ignored it." Id.; see e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1558, supra note
64, at 2, reprinted in SOuRCE BOOK, supra note 52, at 210 (referring with approval to
courts which "prior to Alyeska ... had allowed fees on the theory that civil rights plaintiffs
act as 'private attorneys general' in eliminating discriminatory practices adversely affecting
all citizens"); S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,
5910 (expressing the importance of having civil rights plaintiffs vindicate their rights so that
"those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws [do not] proceed with impunity").
157. See S-I & S-2, 6 F.3d at 171 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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embrace of catalyst theory, the majority not only ignores
Farrar, it bucks a clear decisional trend.158
While this may evince a rather myopic view of the Supreme
Court's recent precedent, it is not wholly unsupportable. The Court
has continually refined its definition of a prevailing party, moving
from Hewitt's "behavioral test," which co-exists comfortably with a
catalyst theory of recovery, to the "legal relationship" approach of
Garland and Farrar, which does not.5 9 However, interpreting that
precedent to eliminate catalyst theory may be a long stretch. Uneasy
precedential fit and slight textual inconsistency might not, by
themselves, provide sufficient justification for stealing away a tool so
vital to effectuating the congressional intent behind the Fees Act.' 60
In fact, every other circuit that has addressed the viability of catalyst
theory after Farrar has come to this conclusion: The Third, 61
Fifth,162 Seventh,' 63 Eighth,"6 and Tenth" Circuits have all di-
rectly held that their versions of catalyst theory survive Farrar. Each
of those cases involved purely voluntary action by defendants, without
any judicial directive whatsoever."6 In addition, the First and Sixth
Circuits have each cited Farrar for various purposes in cases which
involved their catalyst rules, suggesting that those courts found
nothing in Farrar to suggest that catalyst theory was no longer
158. Id. at 171 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
159. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing the "behavioral test");
supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (discussing the "legal relationship" test); see
also infra notes 184-94 and accompanying text (attempting to explain this dilemma and
reconcile Farrar with the continued existence of catalyst theory).
160. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing the history and intent
behind the Fees Act).
161. Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 549-50 (3d Cir. 1994).
162. Craig v. Gregg County, 988 F.2d 18, 20-21 (5th Cir. 1993), cited in S-1 & S-2, 6
F.3d at 167 (panel majority citing for support in retaining the theory).
163. Cady v. City of Chicago, 43 F.3d 326,328 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994); Bristow v. Drake St.
Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 353 (7th Cir. 1994); Zinn ex reL Blankenship v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276
(7th Cir. 1994).
164. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 17 F.3d 260,263
n2 (8th Cir. 1994).
165. Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-52 (10th Cir. 1994); American Council of the
Blind, Inc. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 249, 250-51 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 184 (1993).
166. See Zinn, 35 F.3d at 275-76 (reviewing cases).
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viable.'67 In the words of the Seventh Circuit, "The Fourth Circuit
is alone... in its reading of Farrar."'6
In deciding whether catalyst theory survives the Supreme Court's
recent precedent, the primary issue a federal court must address is
whether it may be reconciled with the Court's new "legal relation-
ship" test. In Hewitt v. Helms,69 the first link in the chain, the
majority expressly declined to decide whether catalyst theory could
justify fee awards under § 1988,170 but the opinion's language
strongly supports the idea:
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be
judicially decreed in order to justify a fee award under §
1988. A lawsuit sometimes produces voluntary action by the
defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of the relief
he sought through a judgment--e.g., a monetary settlement
or a change in conduct that redresses the plaintiff's grievan-
ces. When that occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have
prevailed despite the absence of a formal judgment in his
favor.17 1
In fact, in his dissent Justice Marshall"7 seemed to take for granted
the Court's general approval of the theory.' He approved of the
Court's choice to not address catalyst theory in that case, however,
stating that a discussion of which types of "catalyzed" action qualify
as "informal relief" sufficient to support a fee award under § 1988 was
"wisely [left] for another day."' 74
167. See Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 238 (1st
Cir. 1993), cited in S-I & S-2, 6 F3d at 167 (panel majority citing as support for upholding
the theory); Citizens Against Tax Waste v. Westerville City Sch., 985 F.2d 255,257-58 (6th
Cir. 1993), cited in S-i & S-2, 6 F.3d at 167 (same).
168. Zinn, 35 F.3d at 274.
169. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
170. Id. at 763.
171. Id. at 760-61; see also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) ("Nothing in the
language of § 1988 conditions the District Court's power to award fees on full litigation
of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff's rights have been violated.");
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980) (per curiam) (noting language in
legislative history that "parties may be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate
rights... without formally obtaining relief"); supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text
(discussing Hewitt's "equivalency doctrine").
172. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens. Hewitt,
482 U.S. at 764.
173. See id. at 768 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Maher, 448 U.S. at 129-30). Justice Marshall
believed that whether the suit "catalyzed" the defendants' remedial change in conduct was
an issue of fact for the district court. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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One year later in Rhodes v. Stewart, the Court addressed the
issue of whether a formal declaratory judgment can qualify plaintiffs
for a fee award, even when the action was moot before that judgment
was entered.'75 The Court ruled in the negative, holding that the
plaintiffs did not satisfy Hewitt's behavioral test because they were no
longer in prison at the time of judgment, and therefore did not qualify
as prevailing parties.176 Rhodes did not address the issues of volun-
tary changes in conduct and informal relief."
The Court's next decision in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v.
Garland Independent School District is the origin of the problem for
catalyst theory because it changed the behavioral test-which
comported nicely with catalyst theory-into a "legal relationship" test:
"[A]t a minimum, to be comsidered a prevailing party within the
meaning of § 1988, the plaintiff must be able to point to a resolution
of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and
the defendant."'7 8 This language has been used to support the
conclusion that Garland repudiated the premise of catalyst theory, in
that the legal relationship between the parties cannot be changed by
a defendant's voluntary action. 79 However, it must be noted that
the "legal relationship" language related to the Court's admonition
that mere technical victories could be too insignificant to qualify a
party for prevailing party status; Garland involved only the issue
whether plaintiffs who did not succeed on all of their claims could still
be considered prevailing parties for fee award purposes."' The
Court's true holding in the case was merely a reaffirmation of an old
principle-plaintiffs need only succeed on "any significant issue in the
litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in
175. Rhodes, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam).
176. Id. at 4.
177. See id.
178. Garland, 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989).
179. See Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting that the district court errantly relied upon Garland's "legal relationship" language
for that purpose to attack the premise of catalyst theory).
180. Garland, 489 U.S. at 792-93. The behavioral' test would cause difficulties in this
regard because mere technical victories do in fact change the defendant's behavior toward
the plaintiff in some, albeit small, way. The Court likely changed its test for that reason.
This may help explain why the Court did not claim that it was establishing a new test and
did not treat its dictum as of paramount importance. Perhaps it considered the two tests
to be the same, and thought its "legal relationship" language was merely a subtle
refinement of Hewitt's behavioral test. See supra note 125 (arguing that the Garland
Court's failure to use introductory signals when it cited Hewitt and Rhodes as support for
its "legal relationship" test may indicate its assumption that the tests were not very
different).
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bringing suit" in order to qualify for prevailing party status-in
response to the misguided "central issue" test then being applied in
some of the lower federal courts.18'
In Farrar, the Court tacked onto the "legal relationship" test
language which Judge Wilkinson and the en banc S-1 & S-2 majority
interpreted as foreclosing catalyst theory: "No material alteration of
the legal relationship betweeh the parties occurs until the plaintiff
becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement
against the defendant."' '  On the basis of this cryptic passage,
Judge Wilkinson and the majority stated that "[t]here is no way...
that Farrar and a broad 'catalyst theory' of attorneys' fees recovery
can be reconciled. "18 If the Supreme Court's language is taken
only in a strictly literal sense with no regard for context, that view
would be correct. However, regard for context is very often the key
to interpreting any language, judicial or otherwise. That key was not
used by the en banc majority in S-I & S-2.
The Farrar Court sought only to clarify some confusion among
the circuits concerning the effect of nominal damages on the
prevailing party inquiry. The issue, like that in Garland, did not
concern catalyst theory at all, since the Farrar plaintiff had in fact
obtained an enforceable judgment."l Consequently, taken in
context, Farrar's troublesome language was dictum used to support
the Court's holding that even nominal damage recipients are
technically still prevailing parties under the Fees Act because they
hold an enforceable judgment against the defendants (even though
the "reasonable fee" they receive may be no fee at all due to their de
minimis success in a suit seeking only compensatory damages).' 5
By emphasizing the formality of the plaintiffs' relief, the Court merely
buttressed its technical conferral of prevailing party status.
In this attempt to strengthen its reasoning, the Court neglected
to mention catalyst theory as a possible route to the result it reached
because the theory was not even distantly relevant to that purpose.
Judge Wilkinson and the majority in S-1 & S-2 used that language, on
its face very clear, to support the conclusion that catalyst theory is
dead. 6 No other circuit has come to the same conclusion.'8
181. Garland, 489 U.S. at 791-92 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F2d 275, 278-89
(1st Cir. 1978)).
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. S-i & S-2, 6 F.3d at 168 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
184. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 570 (1992).
185. Id. at 574-75; id. at 576 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 168 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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Like the en banc dissenters, the other circuits have instead chosen to
focus on the context in which the statement was made:
If the one sentence in Farrar that specifies "enforceable
judgment, consent decree, or settlement" is lifted out of
context and treated as being all the Court said on the
subject, it surely could be read as at least an oblique death-
knell for catalyst theory. But the context as defined- by the
actual issue before the Farrar court and by what else the
Court said on the subject belies any such drastic reading.
Given the importance that catalyst theory long has had
in prevailing party doctrine... we would expect that if the
Court intended'to hold it no longer a viable theory it would
address the issue head-on in a case in which it was
dispositive.s
The fact that the issue of catalyst theory's viability was not before the
Farrar Court provides strong support for the conclusion that the
Court had no intention of eliminating it, a consideration relied upon
by the other circuits in upholding the theory."l So too does the fact
that the Farrar opinion cites, without comment, passages from Hewitt
v. Helms9 ' and Maher v. Gagne,' in which the Court at least
tacitly approved of fee awards resulting from defendants' voluntary
remedial actions."l If the Court truly did intend to abrogate the
theory, it would have at least mentioned this inconsistency and
attempted to resolve it and distinguish those cases."l The Supreme
187. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (listing cases from the other
circuits).
188. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 166, quoted in Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21
F.3d 541,549 (3d Cir. 1994).
189. See, e.g., Baumgartner, 21 F.3d at 547 ("[lit is not likely that the Supreme Court
would overturn such a wide-spread theory without even once mentioning it, particularly
when it was inapplicable to the case at hand."); Zinn ex reL Blankenship v. Shalala, 35
F.3d 273,276 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting the same passage from Baumgartner).
190. 482 U.S. 755 (1987).
191. 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
192. See S-1 & S.2, 6 F.3d at 167 (treating this as an important factor in upholding the
theory and stating, "We do not believe that had the Court intended in Fairar to abrogate
a theory this well-established, it would have cited without comment these earlier decisions
which, as a matter of course, recognized its existence and utilization."), quoted in
Baumgartner, 21 F.3d at 549, and in Zinn, 35 F.3d at 276 (adding that "any possible doubt
about the Court's intent is put to rest, in our view, by the fact that the same passages that
have been read to preclude the award of fees when defendants have acted voluntarily are
derived from and cite the very cases (Helms and Maher) in which the Supreme Court has
approved that practice").
193. It may be surmised that the conservative faction (consisting of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas, Scalia, O'Connor, and Kennedy) in Farrar knew exactly
what it was doing when it excluded catalyst theory from its list of ways to achieve
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Court is not usually in the habit of abandoning well-entrenched
doctrines without stating its rationale or even mentioning the doctrine
being abandoned."4 Nor is it in the habit of addressing issues not
before it and issuing broad, all-encompassing rulings with no judicial
restraint whatsoever.
For all of these reasons, the original panel majority in S-1 & S-2
dismissed Farrar's troublesome language as "one sentence [of dictum]
... lifted out of context" by the dissent, and held that catalyst theory
remained viable. 5 Judge Wilkinson accused the majority of taking
a "nervy course" in doing so: "[W]hile a circuit court is necessarily
entrusted with the interpretation and application of Supreme Court
pronouncements, it is not empowered, sua sponte, to set them
aside."'96  While that is undoubtedly true, circuit courts are also
entitled to an explanation if and when the Supreme Court takes such
prevailing party status. Interview with Professor Melissa J. Saunders, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Apr. 10, 1995). Professor
Saunders opined that a majority of the Court would not go "blithely along with" any
discernible attempt to abrogate catalyst theory, and would likely reject such an attempt.
Id. It is worth noting that none of the partial dissenters in Farrar (who had taken liberal
positions in favor of fee awards in previous cases) sensed the problem inherent in the
troublesome passage.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens had previously joined Justice Marshall's dissent in
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755,764 (1987), which argued for a more liberal prevailing party
inquiry and stressed the settled principle that "informal relief may be sufficient to support
a fee award under § 1988." Id. at 767 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 6 (1988) (per curiam), emphasized his view that
even "Pyrrhic" victories qualify a party as "prevailing" within the meaning of § 1988. Id.
at 7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Even though Justice O'Connor joined in the Farrar
majority and takes a restrictive stance regarding nominal damages awards, see supra notes
145-49 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's "de minimis exception" to
conferral of prevailing party status), her express recognition of the "private attorney
general" doctrine in previous cases supports the idea that she had no intention of
abandoning catalyst theory in Farrar. See e-g., Texas State Teachers Ais'n v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793 (1989) (unanimous opinion by O'Connor, J.)
("Petitioners have ... served the 'private attorney general' role which Congress meant to
promote in enacting § 1988."). Farrar was the first case on the issue for Justice Souter,
so one cannot divine his inclinations by examining the precedent. Justice White is
something of an anomaly because he joined all of the previous majorities (Hewitt, Rhodes,
and Garland) yet wrote the opinion in which he dissented in part from the Farrar majority.
Because he dissented on the ground that nominal damages awards do not merit automatic
refusal of attorney's fees awards (he would have left the "reasonableness" determination
to the district court), see Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 579-80 (White, J., dissenting), it may
reasonably be presumed that he would have fallen on the liberal side of the prevailing
party inquiry, and likely would have upheld catalyst theory if he had been squarely
confronted with the issue in Farrar.
194. See supra note 192.
195. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 166-67.
196. Id. at 168 n.1 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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a drastic measure as that which the en banc majority attributed to
it."9  In fact, according to the en banc dissenters, acting on this
expectation "show[s] respect rather than disrespect for the Court and
its processes, and for the values of stare decisis."'r s
197. See id. at 167 n.2 (panel majority opinion). The Farrar Court never even hinted
that it was attempting a reexamination of the longstanding circuit precedent employing
catalyst theory. According to the en bane dissenters, the circuits are entitled to expect an
explanation "when the Court is about something as important as the dissent claims for it
here." Id.
198. Id. The panel majority opinion, which was later adopted by the en bane dissenters,
speculated that catalyst theory may not even have been necessary for these plaintiffs to
achieve prevailing party status, because they did obtain an enforceable declaratory
judgment and order from the district court. See id. at 167 n.3. According to the panel
majority, the "critical reference point" for assessing prevailing party status in a fully
litigated case is upon entry of the primary judgment on the merits of the case. Id.
Whether the issue may be separated from the existence of catalyst theory is doubtful,
however, since the paradigmatic situation for application of catalyst theory has been when
the defendants voluntarily change their behavior to eliminate the complained-of conduct.
See, e.g., Pembroke v. Wood County, 981 F.2d 225, 230-31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 2965 (1993) (holding that the plaintiffs' suit caused the defendant county's voluntary
remedial actions in improving prison conditions). Such voluntary actions, in suits that seek
only equitable relief, will render the underlying claim moot. Hence, the issue becomes
whether the suit "catalyzed" that action, an issue that depends on the continued viability
of catalyst theory.
Judge Wilkinson strongly disagreed with the panel majority, stating, "The judgment's
vacatur on appeal render[ed] it a legal nullity .... Plaintiffs' lawsuit lost whatever force
it had as a catalyst the day it was mooted by this court." S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 169-70
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). This view ignores the fact that catalyst theory is most often
invoked when the lawsuit is later mooted due to a defendant's voluntary remedial actions,
and confuses two separate issues: (1) whether a vacated judgment may still be considered
an "enforceable judgment" for fee purposes, and (2) whether catalyst theory survives.
Because these plaintiffs did not receive an interim fee award pendente lite, the first is
irrelevant. The second is, of course, the controversial focus of this Note.
Common sense and abundant case law stand squarely behind the en bane dissenters
here. A subsequent mooting for "prudential reasons" and not on the merits should not,
assuming the viability of catalyst theory, dictate against the conferral of prevailing party
status. The Supreme Court of Vermont has justified this position by stating, "[lit would
be counter-productive to force the plaintiff to litigate the unlawfulness of defendant's acts
to obtain attorney's fees, where the underlying controversy has been otherwise resolved
without judicial action." Kirchner v. Giebink, 584 A.2d 1120, 1121-22 (Vt. 1990). Many
other courts have applied the same rationale. See, ag., Heath v. Brown, 807 F.2d 1229,
1233 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (requiring district court to determine on remand whether
the plaintiffs' lawsuit was a "substantial factor" or "significant catalyst" in motivating the
defendant's change in enforcement procedures, according to the "well-established standard
in the Circuit for determining the 'prevailing party' status of a plaintiff whose claims are
mooted by settlement or by subsequent unilateral acts of the defendant") (emphasis added);
Exeter-West Greenwich Regional Sch. Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F2d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1986)
("The law in this and other circuits is that the plaintiffs may be 'prevailing parties' for
purposes of § 1988 even though their § 1983 action was dismissed as moot."); Grano v.
Barry, 733 F.2d 164, 168 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); Coalition for Basic Human Needs
v. King, 691 F.2d 597, 602 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375,1379 (11th
[Vol. 732276
CATALYST THEORY
Given the implausibility of reading the Supreme Court's recent
precedent to abrogate catalyst theory, something else must have
convinced six others to join Judge Wilkinson and adopt his opinion as
their own on rehearing. That something was an open dislike for
catalyst theory, which triggered the drastic arguments Judge Wilkin-
son used to attack what he obviously considers its fatal shortcomings.
The fundamental issue in S-1 & S-2 was whether the Fourth Circuit
deemed catalyst theory a bad doctrine which ought to be discarded,
not whether the Supreme Court had eliminated it. Farrar provided
a- convenient noose, albeit one made of the weakest threads, with
which to hang catalyst theory, and allowed Judge Wilkinson to cast
his dislike of it in the light of legitimacy. As the dissenters noted, his
opinion trumpeted the idea that Farrar clearly abdicated the theory,
yet was "largely and lengthily devoted.., to explaining why catalyst
theory is a bad theory that should be discarded."' 99 The elimination
of catalyst theory is not entirely undesirable, because its absence
would simplify the courts' task of determining prevailing party status.
If relief is required by one of the three easily recognizable avenues
listed in Farrar, district courts would need not, as Judge Wilkinson
phrased it, "untangle a web of supposed causal connections to
determine whether a party prevailed."'  Six other judges in the
Fourth Circuit implicitly agreed that the difficulties of catalyst theory
outweigh its benefits, and the theory was slain.
In Part 1-A of his opinion,2' Judge Wilkinson claimed that
catalyst theory conflicts with the "plain language" of § 1988, which
Cir. 1982) (same); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671-72 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(same), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 120 (5th Cir.
1980) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 851 (9th
Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); Hyundai Motor Am. v. J.R. Huerta
Hyundai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 915, 917 (E.D. La. 1991) (granting motion for attorney's fees,
stating that civil rights plaintiffs may prevail and receive attorney's fees in a case that
settles or otherwise becomes moot before judgment is rendered on the merits, if catalyst
theory is satisfied); cf. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (per curiam) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("[Tihe fact that a party should not have 'prevailed' ordinarily would not
deprive him of attorney's fees.").
199. S-i & S-2, 6 F.3d at 167 n.3.
200. Id. at 171-72 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
201. Judge Wilkinson's opinion is divided into two sections, the second of which
contains four parts designated alphabetically. Three of them disparage catalyst theory for
being what it is: Parts II-A, 11-C, and 11-D. See id, at 170, 171-72 (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting). Part 11-B, see id. at 170-71, details Judge Wilkinson's reading of the Supreme
Court precedent, expanding on his opinion's introduction. This Part was implicitly dealt
with earlier in this Note in a critique of the en banc majority's reading of the relevant
Supreme Court precedent. See supra notes 150-98 and accompanying text.
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"allows [fee] awards ... to a 'prevailing party,' not simply to anyone
who influences a change in behavior or policy."'  He stated that
"prevailing parties" are only those who succeed in their status as
parties, not as "agents of reform," and whose success is "buttressed
by a court's authority or required by a rule of law."' He then
quoted the "legal relationship" test of Garland along with Farrar's
controversial sentence, intimating that the necessary "material
alteration of the legal relationship" cannot be achieved absent at least
some degree of judicial involvement.' As discussed above, this
idea reflects a serious misreading of the precedent.' It also shows
a distinct disregard for the congressional intent to encourage private
attorneys general, who by definition act as "agents of reform" in
bringing suits under the statutes enumerated in § 1988.1 That is
especially the case where plaintiffs such as those in S-1 & S-2 bring
civil rights suits only for injunctive and declaratory relief which will
likely benefit many.'
Part II-C best exemplifies Judge Wilkinson's dislike for catalyst
theory. There, Judge Wilkinson argued that catalyst theory serves
only to encourage uncalled-for secondary litigation, "exacerbat[ing]
the 'specter of satellite litigation' " that concerned the panel
majority.' He continued: "This collateral litigation over attorney's
fees is often more heated, more arcane, and over far higher monetary
stakes than the underlying lawsuit. The relationship of all of this
activity to the larger public good is becoming increasingly difficult to
202. Id. at 170 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1993)).
Of course, this ascetic view ignores the fact that the meaning of "prevailing party" has
been the primary subject of § 1988 litigation since the Act's birth, and that many other
courts, in cases too numerous for citation, have interpreted "prevailing party" to include
those who merely "influence" changes in behavior or policy.
203. Id. (Wilkinson, 3., dissenting).
204. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566,573 (1992),
and Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,792-93 (1989)).
205. See supra notes 150-98 and accompanying text.
206. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,402 (1968) (per curiam) ("If [the
plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private
attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.").
Although Newman was decided eight years before the Fees Act was promulgated, it was
frequently cited in the Act's legislative history as typifying the private attorney general
doctrine so revered by Congress. See supra note 66.
207. Cf. Cheng, supra note 59, at 1929 (stating that the doctrine's purpose is to award
fees when the plaintiff has vindicated "a right that (1) benefits a large number of people,
(2) requires private enforcement, and (3) is of societal importance").
208. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 171 (Wilkinson, I., dissenting) (quoting iL at 164 (panel
majority opinion)).
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discern."'  This focus on monetary compensation diverges sig-
nificantly from the basic precept of the private attorney general
doctrine, which is aimed almost exclusively at litigation that does not
involve "monetary stakes," but that is brought by impecunious
plaintiffs seeking equitable relief210 While the doctrine does not
exclude actions for damages, or plaintiffs with means, it most certainly
was not created for them.21
An equally important consideration is that the determination of
whether a plaintiffs lawsuit "catalyzed" a defendant's remedial action
is an issue for the district court to determine in its discretion. It
follows that the circuit courts should accord great deference to the
district courts' "ringside view of the relevant conduct of the parties
and of the underlying legal dispute."'' Judge Wilkinson accurately
noted the majority's concern over the specter of satellite litigation, but
subtly omitted the context in which that concern was voiced: " 'In
view of the specter of satellite litigation over attorneys' fees, appellate
review of lower court decisions in this area, appropriately, is
limited.' )M The panel majority's view is in line with the
presumption established in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises,214
and later expressly adopted in the legislative history of the Fees
Act,2 5 that plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to a fee award unless
209. I& (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
210. See, eg., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 2 ("In many cases arising under our
civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with
which to hire a lawyer."), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5910; H.R. REP. No. 1558,
supra note 64, at 3 ("[P]rivate lawyers were refusing to take certain types of civil rights
cases because the civil rights bar, already short of resources, could not afford to do so."),
reprinted in SoURCE BOOK, supra note 52, at 210.
211. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)
(speaking only of plaintiffs who obtain injunctions as private attorneys general). The
doctrine also does not exclude actions in which the benefit sought will not inure to a large
segment of the public, even though fee awards in those suits would naturally not be as
exemplary of the private attorney general doctrine. See Sullivan v. Pennsylvania Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 663 F.2d 443,451 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
212. Alexander v. Mayor of Cheverly, 953 F.2d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1992).
213. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 164 (quoting Alexander, 953 F.2d at 161) (emphasis added);
see also Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304,308-09 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating
that abuse of discretion is the standard for appellate review of fee awards); Taylor v. City
of Fort Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 1551, 1556 (1987) (same). The abuse of discretion standard
comes from the language of the Fees Act, which provides that "the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (emphasis added).
214. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
215. S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 64, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908,5912;
H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 64, at 2, reprinted in SOURCE BOOK, supra note 52, at 210.
1995] 2279
2280 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
"special circumstances would render it unjust."216 Were the circuit
courts to follow Newman's dictate and curtail their review of fee
determinations in deference to the district courts' "ringside seats,"
collateral litigation over attorney's fees would not be a major concern
at all. 217
Judge Wilkinson stated that the absence of catalyst theory would
"reduce" litigation over attorney's fees.218 While that may be true,
"reducing" legitimate attempts to collect attorney's fees under § 1988
can be viewed as a subversion of the congressional intent behind the
Fees Act.219 Judge Wilkinson employed some florid rhetoric to
buttress his argument that "the catalyst-based approach.., has left
us utterly at sea."' He railed against the "litigious fog" emanating
from catalyst theory, listed a number of difficult questions raised by
the theory and claimed that the panel majority's approach
provided "[no] guidance-only criteria that invite further
litigation."'  He also stated that catalyst theory would force courts
to "plumb the legal hereafter" instead of "consult[ing] the confines of
a case."' Ignored by Judge Wilkinson was the fact that every other
circuit had dealt with these apparently insurmountable difficulties in
the past and somehow managed to wade through this thorny thicket,
and that those considering the theory's viability after Farrar did not
216. Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
217. The primary reason why the "specter" of satellite litigation haunted S-1 & S-2 is
that the court felt compelled to address the viability of catalyst theory in light of Farrar,
which was decided after the district court made its fee determination. When the case was
originally remanded to the district court for a fee determination, the Fourth Circuit stated,
"By remanding we of course express no view on the parents' entitlement to costs and
attorneys' fees against the state defendants. That is for first instance determination by the
district court." S-1 & S-2 By and Through P-1 & P-2 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 298 n.3
(4th Cir. 1987). That case was decided unanimously by a panel consisting of Circuit Judges
Phillips, Ervin, and Wilkinson. Id. at 295. This same panel of judges later decided the 2-1
case (with Judge Wilkinson dissenting) which was later vacated by the Fourth Circuit
sitting en banc. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 161. In the panel opinion, the two-judge majority
stated, "Unless we are prepared to believe [Judge Wilkinson]. capable of a cruel
hoax-which obviously we aren't-this [remand with express directions for a fee
determination to be made] must indicate that he didn't at the time think the vacatur would
make a fee award inappropriate." Id. at 168 n.3.
218. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 171 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
219. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
220. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 171 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
221. The list consisted of the following queries: "How far outside the merits should
courts look? What is a significant contribution? When is a lawsuit causally connected and
when is it not? What is the meaning of 'in whatever form' an outcome is realized?" ItL
at 171 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
222. Id (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 170 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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share his grim view of catalyst theory.?2 Unfortunately for Fourth
Circuit civil rights plaintiffs, Judge Wilkinson's "parade of horribles"
was likely the most persuasive tool used to sway six of his associates
to join him.
Part ll-D of Judge Wilkinson's opinion focused on the deterrence
of "salutary" changes by defendants which might result from the use
of catalyst theory?5 He portrayed the theory as a "penalty" on
state and local officials for making such changes and claimed that it
"provides incentives for filing marginal, even frivolous, lawsuits."'
He continued: "Any change in conduct by the defendant, for
whatever reason, may offer a promising payout to attorneys who file
a complaint, whether or not that complaint has any ultimate legal
merit."' This ad hominem attack purposely disregards the reality
of the theory, which requires a strong showing of causation and at
least a "colorable" claim in the majority of jurisdictions.'
Catalyst theory, as previously applied in the Fourth Circuit,
identifies the "practical... outcome" of litigation, compares it to the
"benchmark" condition the plaintiff sought to change, and looks to
see whether that outcome was provoked "in a significant Way" by the
plaintiff's efforts, and whether it actually confers a "benefit or relief
from burden when measured against the benchmark condition." 9
224. Only three circuits had at the time addressed the issue-the First, Fifth, and Sixth.
See iU at 167 (listing the cases from those circuits). However, none of them even
mentioned any difficulty in applying the theory-in fact, they looked upon it rather
favorably. Since S-1 & S-2 was decided, all of the other circuits have upheld the theory,
and all have lacked Judge Wilkinson's grim outlook. See supra notes 161-67, citing some
of the cases from other circuits.
225. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 172 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
227. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
228. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing this majority approach). The
panel majority surprisingly debated whether the plaintiffs' claims were at least colorable,
even though Fourth Circuit precedent did not require that inquiry. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at
165-66. Perhaps they did so to cover all bases in response to Judge Wilkinson's opinion,
originally the dissent, which attempted to argue the point. Id. at 169 (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, Judge Wilkinson's dissent made it appear that the majority was
lowering its standard of causation: "[B]y adopting a porous standard for prevailing party
status-that a plaintiff's position be 'arguably supported by case or statutory law,'-the
majority subjects these defendants to liability for attorneys' fees without offering them the
opportunity to refute the claims asserted against them." Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). Judge Wilkinson either did not realize, or more likely, deliberately
failed to acknowledge, that his circuit is the patriarch of the minority rule which does not
require "colorable" claims to satisfy catalyst theory. See supra notes 75-76 and
accompanying text (discussing the circuit's minority stance).
229. S-1 & S-2,6 F.3d at 164 (panel majority) (quoting Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316,
1319 (4th Cir. 1979)).
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The circumstances involved in S-1 & S-2 completely satisfied that test.
The plaintiffs' claim did not, contrary to Judge Wilkinson's assertions,
rely on a "simple chronology" of events to show causation, nor was
it "frivolous" in any way' Judge Wilkinson painted the panel
majority as radical extremists who would treat the Fees Act as "a
license to shake down government officials," and "disable public
officials" from making beneficial remedial changes."' He then
decried the use of § 1988 to allow parties to "pursu[e] personal visions
of the public good," stressing again his view that the Fees Act was not
meant to be a "means of effecting social change of the generic
sort."
232
While Judge Wilkinson was no doubt correct that the Fees Act
is not meant to provide a "shake down" entitlement to civil rights
plaintiffs, his requirement that voluntary changes in conduct be
"formalized" before prevailing party status may inure carries with it
onerous consequences.' If the success of an action begins to look
promising, defendants will change their conduct to avoid an attorney's
fees determination should a final judgment be rendered. Such
changes will cause the prudential mooting of the underlying actions,
provided that only equitable relief is sought.
230. Both the majority and dissenting opinions discussed at length whether the plaintiffs
satisfied catalyst theory at all, assuming its viability arguendo. The panel majority analyzed
the facts and concluded that the State "would not have ameliorated its position without
the parents' suit." rd. at 165. Despite Judge Wilkinson's claim that "[e]ven under the
expansive standards of catalyst theory, this evidence of causation is astonishingly thin," id
at 169 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), even a cursory reading of these facts would seem to
support the panel majority's conclusion. The fact that the desired amendment of state law
occurred three years after the plaintiffs' appeal was mooted was a consequence, not of the
suit's irrelevance in bringing about the change, but of the State's reluctance to comply with
the OSERS letter ruling. See supra note 33. Over a third of the OSERS letter ruling was
devoted to a discussion of this suit. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 165. In fact, the ruling concluded
that" '[t]he court's reasoning in the Spangler decision is sound.... OSERS concurs with
[that] reasoning ... and shares [the court's] opinion that EHA-B requires States to
authorize its hearing officers to decide reimbursement claims in an impartial due process
proceeding.' " Id. (quoting OSERS Letter Ruling, issued June 17,1987) (emphasis added).
It can hardly be claimed that the State's was" 'a wholly gratuitous response to an action
that in itself was frivolous or groundless.' " Id. (quoting Garcia v. Guerra, 744 F.2d 1159,
1163 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985)). The district court obviously
thought otherwise when it ruled for the plaintiffs on all of their claims, and the OSERS
agreed. As a final note, it is important to understand that the Fourth Circuit mooted the
appeal "in part based on the recognition that this causal chain would remain intact, and
that OSERS would probably force the State to comply if it refused to do so." Id. at 164.
In other words, had the OSERS not acted as it did, the appeal would have succeeded.
231. S-1 & S-2, 6 F.3d at 169 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 169, 171 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
CATALYST THEORY
At first glance this result may seem acceptable, even desirable,
since it would significantly decrease the courts' burden and give
plaintiffs the relief they seek. However, this course of action would
totally undermine the intent of the Fees Act to encourage lawyers to
take civil rights cases from impecunious plaintiffs, and would
eventually result in the very condition the Fees Act sought to
remedy-unequal access to justice and unvindicated civil rights.2'
It would also entirely ignore the Supreme Court's "equivalency
doctrine," established in Hewitt v. Helms, which stressed that the
judicial decree is "not the end but the means... [to the] redress...
sought.., from the defendant."' 5 Formal settlements and consent
judgments are two alternatives to a formal judicial decree, but they
are not the only alternatives. Catalyst theory recognizes the impor-
tance of those alternatives and ensures that informally successful suits
do not go unrecognized.
While renegade status sometimes merits praise, as, for instance,
when the majority stands for injustice or inequity, the Fourth Circuit's
lonely stance as the sole circuit to abandon catalyst theory in response
to Farrar does not. Rather, it paints this circuit as the least solicitous
of civil rights enforcement, and the least attentive to congressional
intent. These auspicious distinctions are the result of the S-1 & S-2
en banc majority's strictly literal reading of the Farrar language, a
reading which ignored the context of that language and attributed to
the Supreme Court an unprincipled abandonment of a well-es-
tablished theory. They are even more the result of an unfounded fear
of "specters" and "litigious fog," a fear not shared by the other
circuits. In light of the fact that all other circuits considering the issue
have chosen to stand by the long-settled use of this vital theory, the
Fourth Circuit should reconsider its activist stance at the first
opportunity. Catalyst theory must remain viable to ensure the
effectuation of manifest congressional intent and the vindication of
valuable civil rights.
MARTIN PATRICK AVERILL
234. Cf. Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,576-80 (1985) (plurality opinion) (discussing
the congressional intent behind the Fees Act). The requirement also poses a very real
danger that courts, in an effort to avoid quashing meritorious fee recoveries, will stop
prudentially mooting actions where defendants voluntarily change their conduct. Instead,
the courts will require full litigation in every case. While this would protect plaintiffs and
serve the purposes of the Fees Act, it would also be extremely ineffective and costly.
235. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987); see supra notes 103-05 and accom-
panying text (discussing the doctrine).
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Excessive Means: Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil
In Rem Forfeitures under United States v. Chandler
The forfeiture of property pursuant to criminal conviction is
deeply rooted in English common law.' In seventeenth-century
England, a person convicted of a felony faced death and the loss of
any fee simple real property interest.2 Early English courts regarded
such measures as a powerful and proper deterrent to criminal activity,
and recent measures by the federal government suggest that it agrees.
Since 1978, Congress has included forfeiture provisions in more than
one hundred laws,3 and in 1984, Congress amended the civil for-
feiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act
of 1970 to include real property4 because the "traditional criminal
sanctions of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish
the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs."5 However, the
United States Supreme Court recently limited the federal
government's use of forfeiture in response to alleged drug violations
by finding that all forfeitures of property under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)
1. See David C. Brown, The Forfeitures at Salem, 1692,50 WM. & MARY Q. 85,86-87
(1993) (stating that English felons "incurred serious property consequences that originated
in the feudal system of land tenure"). At common law, inanimate objects involved in
unlawful acts were also forfeitable to the Crown as "deodands." Austin v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993). The deodand originates from "Biblical and pre-Judeo-
Christian practices, which reflected the view that the instrument of death was accused and
that religious expiation was required." Id
2. See Brown, supra note 1, at 87. The loss of a felon's estate resulted from the
"corruption of blood" that accompanied a death sentence. Id. The " '[c]orruption'
extinguished the heritable quality of a felon's blood and blocked the descent of his fee-
simple land." Id. Under the forfeiture laws and the principle of "year, day, and waste,"
the King could strip or "waste" the felon's land of all its value for a year and a day before
the property escheated to the delinquent's superior lord. Id.
3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Forfeiture: A Diminishing Power, TRIAL, Apr. 1994, at
66, 66. Over $2.6 billion in personal and real property assets have been seized since 1985.
Id. Between 1985 and 1992, the Asset Forfeiture Fund controlled by the United States
Justice Department grew from $27 million to $531 million. Id. In 1992 alone, "a-
pproximately $531 million worth of homes, land, businesses, currency, cars, planes, yachts,
and livestock were forfeited under these statutes." Stacy J. Pollock, Note, Proportionality
in Civil Forfeiture: Toward a Remedial Solution, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 456,457 (1994).
4. H.R REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 215, § 306 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3398.
5. Id. at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374.
CIVIL IN REM FORFEITURES
and (a)(7) are subject to scrutiny under the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.6
In United States v. Chandler,7 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered whether the forfeiture of a thirty-three acre farm
involved in the violation of federal drug laws constituted an excessive
fine under the Eighth Amendment.! A unanimous three-judge
panel9 concluded that the farm "was both a substantial and
meaningful instrumentality of the alleged drug offenses."'10
Therefore, the court expressed "no difficulty in concluding that the
forfeiture... did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment."" In addition, the court adopted a three-part
"instrumentality" test for assessing civil forfeitures for drug violations
within the context of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 2
After summarizing the facts in Chandler, this Note examines
both the majority'4 and concurring' opinions, paying particular
6. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993). The second clause of the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of "excessive fines." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII, cl. 2.
According to relevant Code provisions, "[a]ll conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles,
or vessels" are subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(1988). In addition, "[a]ll real
property, including any right, title, and interest" is likewise forfeitable. Id. § 881(a)(7).
Pursuant to the latter provision, real property is forfeitable if it "is used or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of
this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment ... ." Id. The
procedure for civil forfeiture under these provisions is the same as that governing seizures
in admiralty. See id. § 881(b). Once the government establishes "probable cause to
believe that the property is subject to civil forfeiture under [the Act]," it may request the
issuance of a warrant authorizing the seizure of property. Id. § 881(b)(4). The
government is not required to establish the involvement of the property's owner; rather,
the burden is on the owner to invoke the "innocent owner" provisions by establishing that
the violation occurred "without [his] knowledge or consent." See id. § 881(a)(6), (a)(7);
see also infra note 60 (discussing whether inquiry into the owner's culpability is necessary).
7. 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
8. Id. at 360.
9. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Williams
joined. Id. Judge Wilkinson also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 368
(Wilkinson, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 366.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 365. The test evaluates the following: 1) the nexus between the offense and
the property and the property's role in that offense, 2) the role and culpability of the
owner, and 3) the possibility of separating the "offending" portion of the property from
the remainder. Id.; see also infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the
instrumentality test adopted by the Chandler court).
13. See infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
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attention to the "instrumentality" test adopted by the court.16 It
next reviews the relevant background law,'7 highlighting judicial ap-
proaches to defining "excessiveness" employed in other jurisdic-
tions.1 The Note then scrutinizes the Chandler decision in light of
the Supreme Court's holding in Austin and tests employed in other
jurisdictions, 9 and the Court's traditional Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.' Finally, this Note concludes that the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly excluded factors normally
used in analyzing punishments under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause,2' and in doing so, articulated an appropriate
constitutional standard for applying the Excessive Fines Clause to civil
forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881.'
In United States v. Chandlerz the federal government brought
a civil in rem action against Tract 1 of Little River Farms in
Orange County, North Carolina.25 The government sought title to
the thirty-three acre property because of its alleged involvement in
illicit drug activity prohibited under Title II of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse and Control Act ("the Act").' The property's owner,
15. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 55-100 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 67-100 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 101-30 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
23. 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
24. In theory, an in rem proceeding relies on the legal fiction that the property itself
has primarily "offended," and therefore, the guilt or innocence of the owner is a collateral
matter. See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921). However,
Justice Scalia argues that the conceptual basis for 21 U.S.C. § 881 demands that "the
property must 'offend' and the owner must not be completely without fault." Austin v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2814 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6), (7) (1988) (prohibiting forfeiture of any
property for an act or omission committed or omitted "without the knowledge or consent
of that owner").
25. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 360.
26. ld.; see 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (codifying the forfeiture provisions
of the Controlled Substances Act). In its complaint, the United States alleged that Little
River Farms was "used or intended to be used" in violation of 21 U.S.C. 99 801-58 (1988).
Chandler, 36 F.3d at 360-61; see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) (permitting forfeiture of
"[a]ll real property ... which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of [the Act]").
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Robert H. Chandler II, intervened in the action and filed a claim to
the farm in response.'
At trial, the government presented three witnesses who testified
that they had "distributed, packaged, sold, purchased and used
controlled substances, including marijuana, cocaine and quaaludes" on
the property." Following the conclusion of the government's
evidence, the district court concluded that probable cause existed to
enable forfeiture of the farm and therefore shifted the burden to
Chandler to demonstrate, "by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the property was not used for illegal purposes or that he did not know
about the illegal use."29
After Chandler presented witnesses who testified that they had
never seen Chandler, nor any of the government's witnesses, in
possession of illegal drugs on the property, the jury found for the
government, concluding that, among other things, Chandler possessed
the requisite level of awareness regarding the illegal activity.3° The
property was forfeited to the United States on July 9, 1993, pursuant
to a decree and judgment.' On appeal, Chandler argued that the
forfeiture "constituted an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth
Amendment" because he had not given consent for, nor did he have
any knowledge of, the property's involvement in illegal activities?2
27. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 361. Chandler maintained that the property had not been
used in any violation of drug laws, specifically denied personal involvement in alleged drug
transactions, and claimed that he had neither given consent for, nor had any knowledge
of, the use of the property in violations of the Act. Id.
28. Id. Government witness John Baucom testified that Chandler paid him for
"maintenance-type work" on the farm with marijuana, cocaine, and quaaludes. Id.
Likewise, witness Doug Frazee testified that he received similar payment for similar work
on at least a dozen occasions. Id.
29. Id. On appeal, Chandler asserted that the district court erred in allowing the
government to present its evidence first and then shifting the burden of proof on the
forfeiture issue to him. Id. at 367. However, since Chandler sought to introduce new
evidence through the appeal to support his claim, the court held that allowing the
government to proceed first was not error because "it would have been improper for the
district court to limit the government to the evidence presented in the first trial but allow
Chandler to [benefit from] the previous trial's experience." Id. Furthermore, the court
held that the district court did not err in shifting the burden, citing its precedents to the
effect that "[u]ndoubtedly, Congress may alter the burden of proof in a civil proceeding
as it sees fit, without constitutional implications." Id. (quoting United States v. Santoro,
866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989)).
30. Id. at 361. The jury also concluded that the property had been used to commit
drug violations and that proceeds from such illegal activity were used to improve the
property. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 362.
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He contended, in the alternative, that forfeiture of the entire farm was
excessive and that, at most, only the house and garage were subject
to forfeiture.33 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
Chandler's arguments on appeal and, in doing so, sought "to state the
appropriate standard to be applied in conducting an excessiveness
analysis under the Eighth Amendment for in rem forfeitures.
34
The Fourth Circuit's standard was designed to provide lower
courts with guidance "in determining excessiveness of an in rem
forfeiture under the Eighth Amendment."3 Writing for a unani-
mous panel, Judge Niemeyer stated:
[A] court must apply a three-part instrumentality test that
considers (1) the nexus between the offense and the proper-
ty and the extent of the property's role in the offense, (2)
the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility
of separating offending property that can readily be
separated from the remainder. 6
Furthermore, Judge Niemeyer offered five factors that a court should
consider when assessing the "strength and extent of the nexus
between the property and the offense."'37 However, Judge Niemeyer
concluded that none of the five factors alone was dispositive; rather,
a court must determine that, "under the totality of circumstances,...
the property was a substantial and meaningful instrumentality in the
commission of the offense.,
38
In reaching its decision, the court relied substantially on Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion in Austin v. United States39 regarding the
relationship between forfeiture and a given property's worth.4' The
33. I&
34. Id. at 363.
35. Id. at 365. The court reviewed the various approaches taken by other jurisdictions
and concluded that courts had generally "combine[d] the two principles of instrumentality
and proportionality to come up with various multi-factor tests." Id. at 363 (citing United
States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725,732 (C.D. Cal. 1994) as an example of the
multi-factor approach); see also infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text (reviewing the
multi-factor test used in Zumirez Drive).
36. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365.
37. Id. The factors are: (1) whether the use of the property was fortuitous or
planned; (2) the property's importance in the success of the activity; (3) the time frame
involved and the spacial extent of the property's use; (4) whether the activity was repeated
or an isolated event; and (5) whether the purpose of "acquiring, maintaining, or using the
property was to carry out the offense." Id.
38. 1d.
39. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
40. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 363-64 (citing Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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court in Chandler agreed with Justice Scalia's assessment of the
"conceptual basis" of the forfeiture provisions contained in § 881:
"[T]he property itself is the object of the action, and not its value [as]
Justice Scalia noted."'" Therefore, according to the court "the value
of the property is irrelevant to whether it is forfeitable."' Further-
more, Judge Niemeyer noted that since Congress did not adopt a
particular pecuniary punishment for drug offenses, "it intended to
punish by forfeiting property of whatever value which was tainted by
the offense."'43 Therefore, the court had little trouble in finding that
the entire farm could be forfeited as an important and necessary
instrument of the drug offenses. 4
Once the court established that the requisite nexus between the
property and offense was present, it turned to the relevance of the
property owner's guilt or innocence. Here, the court held that,
although the owner's culpability bears little on the question of
whether a forfeiture is proper, it does affect the constitutionality of
the action.45 In short, the court stated that "where the owner's
involvement in the offense is only incidental, as opposed to extensive
... this fact will weigh on the excessiveness side of the scales."
46
However, in light of the testimony of the government's witnesses, the
court concluded that Chandler's participation went beyond mere
awareness or fortuitous involvement, and established that he was
actively involved "in the commission of the illegal conduct."'
Finally, Judge Niemeyer addressed Chandler's argument that only
the farmhouse and garage, as the site of the alleged activity, should
be forfeited.' While the court recognized that separation of the
"offending" portion from the remainder is a valid inquiry, it rejected
Chandler's argument because "the property itself was maintained and
improved by payments made with drugs."49  Moreover, the court
41. Iai at 364 (citing Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)).
42. I&
43. I.
44. Id at 366. The court noted that the secluded location of the farmhouse and
property afforded Chandler the opportunity to engage in over 130 drug transactions. Id
45. Id.
46. Id. at 364.
47. I& at 366.
48. IS The government witnesses all testified that the illegal activity usually occurred
in the farmhouse and garage. See id. at 361, 366. For the court, however, this fact was not
controlling. See ia at 361, 366.
49. I at 366. The court reasoned that "[w]hile it would appear that the farm had
substantial purposes other than serving as an instrument of drug activity, the property
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refused to engage in an ad hoc separation analysis and issued a caveat
to future petitioners seeking a partial forfeiture:
[W]hile Chandler has urged that we mitigate the punishment
that the forfeiture will impose on him by forfeiting only the
areas of the 33-acres where the farmhouse and the garage
are located, he has provided no evidence that this area is on
a separately platted property that could be readily
separated °
In employing its three-part instrumentality test and affirming the
forfeiture of Tract I of Little River Farms, the court flatly rejected
any "proportionality" analysis under the Eighth Amendment 1
Judge Niemeyer noted that such an analysis was born otf and is
exclusive to, a claim of "cruel and unusual punishment." 2 He stated
that the principle of proportionality is not relevant when considering
the excessiveness of a forfeiture because "[t]he statute does not limit
the value of the property subject to forfeiture, and the history of the
Eighth Amendment supports no such constitutional limitation." 53 In
his concurrence, Judge Wilkinson agreed that a proportionality test is
not warranted under the statute because it deviates from the
factfinder's inquiry and ultimately "serves only to insulate those who
have 'hit it big' in the drug trade."'
The decision in Chandler is the progeny of the Supreme Court's
holding in Austin v. United States,55 in which the Court held that the
nevertheless was an important, if not necessary, instrument for the drug activity, in
providing a secluded location." Id.
50. Id
51. Id. at 365-66. The court briefly reviewed the three-part proportionality test for
Eighth Amendment challenges adopted by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277 (1983), but it decided that the test did not apply to the Excessive Fines Clause. Id.
(citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 284); see infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing
the Chandler court's reading of Solem) and 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
test adopted by the Court in Solem).
52. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365.
53. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 366 (citing Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2807-10
(1993)).
54. Id. at 369 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Judge Wilkinson noted that an instrumen-
tality test is not only warranted in constitutional terms, but would also serve judicial
economy.
By answering the statutory inquiry in the affirmative, the trier of fact determines
not only [that] forfeiture is appropriate, but to a great extent that forfeiture of
the property is not harsh or excessive under an instrumentality test. Such a
verdict would foreclose an Eighth Amendment challenge in all but egregious
circumstances.
Id. at 369 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
55. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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Eighth Amendment is applicable to civil forfeitures under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) 6 The Court divided over whether civil in rem
forfeiture "serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.""7 However,
the majority opinion stated that "forfeiture under these provisions
constitutes 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,'
... and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amend-
ment's Excessive Fines Clause." 8 However, the Court declined to
articulate the proper test for determining "excessiveness," instead
announcing: "Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to
consider that question in the first instance."59
In an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's conclusion that all civil
56. Id. at 2812. Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, concurred in part and in the judgment, id at 2815, as did Justice Scalia, id at
2813.
57. Id. at 2810. In Part I of the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun concluded that
some degree of culpability assignable to the owner is an inherent ingredient in civil
forfeiture because the Court had never applied "the guilty-property fiction to justify
forfeiture when the owner had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
unlawful use of his property." Id. at 2809. However, Justice Kennedy found Justice
Blackmun's conclusions suspect and unnecessary: "I share Justice Scalia's belief that Part
III of the Court's opinion is quite unnecessary for the decision of the case, fails to support
the Court's argument, and seems rather doubtful as well." Id. at 2815 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also David Lieber, Eighth
Amendment-The Excessive Fines Clause, 84 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 805,805 (1994)
("[T]he actual innocence issue clouds what otherwise might have been a clear affirmation
of the right of civil defendants to Eighth Amendment protection when they are sued by
the government.").
58. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (citations omitted) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,265 (1989)). The innocent owner provisions of the Act
greatly influenced the Court, and led the majority to find that they "serve to focus the
provisions on the culpability of the owner in a way that makes [forfeiture pursuant to §
881] look more like punishment, not less." Id. at 2810-11. The innocent owner
provisions-as codified in 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C), (a)(6), and (a)(7)-in essence provide
an affirmative defense, see Chandler, 36 F.3d at 362, for claimants who can establish that
the illegal act was committed "without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner," 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988). Section 881(a)(7) concerns forfeitures of real
property, and the innocent owner provision in that section omits the phrase "willful
blindness of the owner." This omission may suggest that the standard of innocence for a
real property owner is something less than that of an aircraft or vessel owner covered
under § 881(a)(4).
For a discussion of a Court holding specific to § 881(a)(6), see J. William Snyder, Jr.,
Note, Reining in Civil Forfeiture Law and Protecting Innocent Owners from Civil Asset
Forfeiture.: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1333,1334-35 (1994)
(discussing the Supreme Court's decision allowing holders of subsequent interest in
property against which a forfeiture action is brought to invoke the innocent owner
defense).
59. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812.
1995] 2291
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
forfeitures are predicated upon some degree of culpability assignable
to the owner.' ° Yet he had little trouble finding that civil forfeitures
represent "punishment," and that the forfeiture provisions of § 881
represent a "fine" requiring scrutiny under the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment. 1
Justice Scalia then proposed a standard by which lower courts
might conduct an "excessiveness" inquiry.62 He stressed that the
only relevant factor in the inquiry should be whether "the confiscated
property has a close enough relationship to the offense"' such that
a court could "render the property, under traditional standards,
'guilty' and hence forfeitable." ' Thus, the proper inquiry, according
to Justice Scalia, is whether the property is an "instrumentality" of the
illegal activity.6
While the majority did not expressly adopt Justice Scalia's test,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, conceded that an
"instrumentality" analysis may be germane to an excessiveness
inquiry:
Justice Scalia suggests that the sole measure of an in rem
forfeiture's excessiveness is the relationship between the
60. Id at 2813-14 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Scalia not only found the majority's inquiry into "actual innocence" unnecessary,
he also offered a rebuke of Justice Blackmun's conclusion: "If the Court is correct that
culpability of the owner is essential, then there is no difference ... between the traditional
in rem forfeiture and the traditional in personam forfeiture. Well-established common-law
distinctions should not be swept away by reliance on bits of dicta." Id at 2814 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Traditionally, American courts have distinguished between proceedings instituted
against the person, in personam, from those against property, in rem. See, e.g., JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDuRE § 3.3, at 96 (2d ed. 1993) ("Although a
judgment with respect to property clearly affected the rights and duties of those who
claimed an interest in it, in rem jurisdiction was said to operate directly on the property
itself, and only indirectly on the claimants.").
61. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
62. Id at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
63. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
64. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
65. See id (Scalia, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Scalia distinguished in rem forfeitures from strict "monetary fines" that are judged
appropriate in relation to the offense committed. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). He insisted that forfeitures of property relate only to their
unlawful use. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the Constitution is not offended unless "an in rem
forfeiture goes beyond the traditional limits that the Eighth Amendment permits [and]
applies to property that cannot properly be regarded as an instrumentality of the offense."
Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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forfeited property and the offense. We do not rule out the
possibility that the connection between the property and the
offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way
limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors
in determining whether the forfeiture of Austin's property
was excessive.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Austin to resolve the
Eighth Circuit's "apparent conflict with the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit over the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to in
rem civil forfeitures."'67 To a great extent, the conflicting approaches
that created the dilemma in Austin have given courts some guidance
in formulating Eighth Amendment excessiveness tests. In United
States v. 508 Depot Street,' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the forfeiture at issue in Austin.6 9 In doing so, the court of
appeals "reluctantly agree[d] with the government"7 and held that,
in the context of an in rem proceeding, the guilt or innocence of the
property owner "is constitutionally irrelevant."'" Although expres-
sing a desire to employ a "proportionality" review "in civil actions
that result in harsh penalties,"72 the Eighth Circuit felt "constrained
to agree with the Ninth Circuit that '[i]f the constitution allows in rem
forfeiture to be visited upon innocent owners ... the constitution
hardly requires proportionality review of forfeitures.' "' In United
States v. Tax Lot 1500,74 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
claimed to "have found no case holding the eighth amendment
applicable to civil forfeiture actions."'75 The court relied heavily on
the historical difference between in rem and in personam proceedings
66. IL at 2812 n.15 (citation omitted).
67. Id at 2804.
68. 964 F.2d 814 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct.
2801 (1993).
69. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803 (citing Depot Street, 964 F.2d at 817). The claimant was
indicted on four counts of violating South Dakota's drug laws. Id He pleaded guilty to
one count and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment by the state court. Id On
September 7, 1990, the United States instituted an in rem forfeiture against Austin's
mobile home and body repair shop pursuant to U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1988). Austin,
113 S. Ct. at 2803. The Court of Appeals decision upheld the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the United States. Id.
70. Depot Street, 964 F.2d at 817.
71. Id. (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-87
(1974)).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).
74. 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989).
75. Id at 233.
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and the legal fiction of actions in rem.76 Thus, the court reasoned
that "[g]iven the Supreme Court's willingness to underwrite this
historical fiction... it is difficult to deny the government's conclusion
that the eighth amendment's proportionality requirement does not
apply."'  The court declined to entertain any further argument on the
issue and offered a laconic legal maxim in support of its holding:
'The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.' "78
The same year that the Eighth Circuit and Ninth Circuit agreed
that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil forfeitures, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a different
conclusion. In United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive,79 the court
held that "[f]orfeitures that are overwhelmingly disproportionate to
the value of the offense must be classified as punishment unless the
forfeitures are shown to serve articulated, legitimate civil pur-
poses."' ' The court determined that "disproportionately large"
forfeitures raise a rebuttable presumption that the action is
punitive."' However, the court did not expound on this issue
76. Id at 235. The court concluded that "the historical development of the two
actions has led courts to continue the fiction that in rem proceedings are against the res,
rather than against the individual, even when the result is to create new members of the
homeless." Id
77. Id (citations omitted).
78. Id (quoting O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881)).
79. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
80. Id at 35. In reaching its holding, the court relied on United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989). In Halper, an employee of a medical laboratory was fined for submitting
65 false claims for Medicare reimbursement, each of which overstated the billed amount
by nine dollars for a total fraud of $585. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438. The Government
sought a civil penalty of $2000 and double damages for each violation pursuant to the
False Claims Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988). Id A unanimous Court
recognized that such a penalty could be "so extreme and so divorced from the Govern-
ment's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment." Id at 442; see also Lieber,
supra note 57, at 809 (stating that in Whalers Cove, the Second Circuit "decided that the
issue of whether a forfeiture was punitive under Halper ought to be considered on a case-
by-case basis").
The court in Whalers Cove read Halper as applicable to civil forfeitures. Whalers
Cove, 954 F.2d at 35. Thus, it determined that "a sanction must be classified as punitive
when the size of the sanction can not fairly be attributed to remedial purposes, 'but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes.' " Id
(quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448). In short, if a forfeiture can be classified as a punitive
civil sanction under Halper, the Eighth Amendment protections attach. Id
81. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 37. Ironically, the court conceded that "a forfeiture
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) will not be presumed punitive where the seized property has
been used substantially to accomplish illegal purposes, so that the property itself can be
said to be 'culpable' or an instrumentality of crime." Id at 36 (emphasis added).
However, the court did not reach this issue because the Government did not seek
forfeiture on instrumentality grounds. Id at 37.
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because the forfeiture before the court did not "violate the
constitutional limits on punishment" set by the Eighth Amendment.'
In determining that there was no violation of the Eighth
Amendment by a forfeiture pursuant to § 881(a)(7), s the court in
Whalers Cove' used the proportionality principle developed by the
Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm 5 In Solem, the Court considered
"whether the Eighth Amendment proscribes a life sentence without
possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony."86 The Court
held that "a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for
which the defendant has been convicted"'  and established a three-
factor proportionality test:
[A] court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.s
In the wake of the Austin Court's "resolution" of the conflict
created by Tax Lot and Whalers Cove,89 the District Court for the
Central District of California attempted to articulate a test for
determining whether or not a forfeiture pursuant to § 881 violates the
Eighth Amendment. In United States v. 6625 Zunzirez Drive,9 the
82. I& at 37-38.
83. Id. at 38-39. The court did not find the forfeiture "aberrational" when compared
to punishments in other jurisdictions for similar crimes. Id. at 39. Furthermore, Judge
Walker observed that the statute only required a nexus between the property and the
offense, and he concluded that the "drug activity was sufficiently connected... to bring
the property within the purview of the statute" because the use of the claimant's
condominium allowed for the offense "to be conducted in an atmosphere of relative
privacy." Id. at 33; see also infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (analyzing the
Eighth Amendment inquiry in Whalers Cove).
84. Id. at 38-39.
85. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
86. Md. at 279.
87. Id. at 290.
88. Id. at 292.
89. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in
Austin); see also Pollock, supra note 3, at 474 (stating that the decision in Austin fails to
instruct prosecutors and courts as to how they should "define a constitutionally 'excessive'
forfeiture"); William P. Barnette, Note, Austin v. United States: Applying the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to Statutory in rem Forfeitures, 39 LOY. L. REV.
871, 883 (1994) ("IThe true import of the Austin decision will not be known until the
Court establishes a test for determining whether a forfeiture is excessive under the Eighth
Amendment.").
90. 845 F. Supp. 725 (CD. Cal. 1994).
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District Court adopted a "multi-factor" test designed to balance con-
siderations regarding "(i) the inherent gravity of the offense compared
with the harshness of the penalty; (ii) whether the property was an
integral part of the commission of the crime; and (iii) whether the
criminal activity involving the defendant property was extensive in
terms of time and/or spatial use."'"
The Zumirez Drive court briefly recounted Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Austin favoring a strict instrumentality test that would
only consider the relationship between the forfeited property and the
offense. 2  Although the court found this inquiry "relevant," it
defended the use of other factors dealing with the claimant's
culpability:
[T]he use of the word "offense" in the phrase "relationship
of the property to the offense" implies that an offense or at
least offensive conduct has occurred, giving rise to the civil
forfeiture. Since the claimant is the person punished for the
offense, and since an offense cannot occur without some
human participation, it would be illogical not to consider
relevant the extent of the claimant's involvement in the
offense.93
While the claimant in Zumirez Drive encouraged the court to
employ the Solem factors,94 the court declined to adopt the test
because "[t]he Solem factors are guidelines for evaluating whether a
punishment violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, not
the Excessive Fines Clause."' Furthermore, the court found the
factors in Solem "inappropriate, as well as unworkable"96 in the
excessive fines context and declared that "[b]y addressing both the
claimant's and the property's relationship to the offensive conduct
[the new test] accurately determines whether punishment imposed by
civil forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause."98
91. Id. at 732.
92. Id. at 734 n.4 (citing Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 731. The court incorporated the first prong of the Solem test into its multi-
factor inquiry. Id. at 731-32.
95. Id. at 731.
96. Id. at 732.
97. Id. at 731-32. The court reasoned that only the first of the Solem factors is useful
in assessing excessiveness because "[a]s a practical matter, it is impossible to meaningfully
compare the value of property subject to a civil forfeiture based on a criminal act with the
possible criminal penalty for that act imposed in the same and other jurisdictions." Id.
98. Id. at 734 n.4.
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Most notable in Zumirez Drive is the fact that, although the first
"prong" of the court's test is borrowed from Solem, Zumirez Drive
also requires that a court consider whether an owner (1) has been
charged and convicted, (ii) has not been formally charged at all, or
(iii) has been charged but adjudged not guilty.99 The court also
announced that "[c]learly, the focus of the Eighth Amendment
analysis should be on the claimant's conduct, the gravity of which
decreases in each of the three situations."'"
Following Austin v. United States,"0 ' the Fourth Circuit began
to develop a constitutional standard for applying the Excessive Fines
Clause to civil asset forfeitures."° In Chandler, the Fourth Circuit
adopted a three-part "instrumentality" test that reflected the court's
reading of Austin."° Moreover, the court's test is a logical exten-
sion of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
the holdings of lower courts regarding § 881. Although Judge
Niemeyer paid homage to Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin, the
test that the court ultimately adopted goes beyond what Justice Scalia
endorsed.'
In the majority opinion, Judge Niemeyer invoked the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Austin that "in rem civil forfeiture proceedings
are subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive
Fines Clause."' 5 Furthermore, Judge Niemeyer remarked that
Justice Scalia accurately summarized the conceptual basis of the
forfeiture provision of § 881 as follows: "'[T]he property must offend
and the owner must not be completely without fault.' ,,"0 When
considered with the legal fiction surrounding property forfeiture,"°7
99. Id. at 733. The Zumirez Drive court cited Austin for the proposition that, since
civil forfeiture punishes, at least in part, the claimant's offensive conduct, such conduct is
a necessary ingredient in the excessiveness analysis. Id.
100. Id.
101. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
102. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 363. In remanding a previous case to the district court for
further development, the Fourth Circuit noted that "in light of Austin, 'an inquiry into the
proportionality between the value of the instrumentality sought to be forfeited and the
amount needed to effectuate the legitimate remedial purposes of the forfeiture would seem
to be in order.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir. 1993)).
103. Id at 365; see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion in
Chandler).
105. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 362 (citing Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2801).
106. Id at 364 (quoting Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotations omitted).
107. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the legal fiction of offending
property).
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these two conclusions provide a firm basis for Judge Niemeyer's
statement that "while the extent of the owner's culpability may be of
minor relevance to the question of whether ... a forfeiture can
properly be imposed, it becomes more relevant when determining
whether the 'fine' is excessive."1 8  In other words, although the'
common law test for forfeiture may be satisfied by the historical
fiction of "offending property," the Eighth Amendment inquiry
affords the individual property owner additional protection. Thus, the
owner's degree of culpability is a vital constitutional con-
sideration."°
In addition, the court in Chandler concluded that the Solem test
"does not apply to the Excessive Fines Clause analysis." ' Judge
Niemeyer stated that the principle of proportionality "derives from
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and not the Excessive
Fines Clause."'1 Although the Supreme Court has had few oc-
casions to interpret the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment," the court in Chandler did not appear constrained by
108. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364.
109. See Robin M. Sackett, Comment, The Impact of Austin v. United States:
Extending Constitutional Protections to Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Proceedings, 24
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 495, 521-22 (1994) (calling for an end to the use of the
property fiction because "it is difficult to reconcile [it] with the Austin h6lding," and its
continued use "impedes the court's ability to extend needed constitutional protections to
claimants in civil forfeiture proceedings").
110. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365. Judge Niemeyer stated that the proportionality principle
central to the Solem test has been put in doubt by the Court. Id. (citing Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 964-66 (1991)). In Harmelin, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, declared in dicta that the proportionality principle does not exist in the Eighth
Amendment and that Solem was decided incorrectly. Id. (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 964-
66). Justice Kennedy, joined in his concurring opinion by Justices O'Connor and Souter,
suggested limiting the test because "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence" but merely prohibits "grossly dispropor-
tionate" sentences. See Hannelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). But cf. Lieber, supra note 57, at 823 (arguing that between
the instrumentality and proportionality approaches it is most likely that the Court "will
choose a standard in keeping with the type of proportionality test it has used in other
Eighth Amendment contexts"). See also W. David George, Note, Finally, An Eye For An
Eye.: The Supreme Court Lets the Punishment Fit the Crime in Austin v. United States, 46
BAYLOR L. REv. 509. 509 (1994) ("Although Solem concerned proportionality under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, it has been applied by two circuit courts in
determining the proportionality of criminal forfeitures.") (citing United States v. Sarbello,
985 F.2d 716, 722-23 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Bushner, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413-15 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
111. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 365.
112. See, e.g., Lieber, supra note 57, at 808 ("[Ihe Excessive Fines Clause prohibition
has received very little attention either from the framers of the Constitution or from the
Supreme Court.").
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Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has its foundations in the cruel
and unusual punishments context. Furthermore, the court correctly
observed that it would be difficult to compare similar "punishments"
in other jurisdictions when the inquiry is not one of sentencing but
rather forfeiture "of specifically identified property."" Finally,
Judge Niemeyer emphasized that "[t]he statute does not limit the
value of property subject to forfeiture, and the history of the Eighth
Amendment supports no such constitutional limitation."" 4
It is possible to view the decisions in Whalers Cove and Chandler
as alternative approaches to the excessiveness inquiry, distinguished
only by their differing treatment of the Solem factors." However,
the decision in Whalers Cove does not reflect a complete Eighth
Amendment inquiry because the court relied exclusively on the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause."6 The court insisted that it "need
not decide at exactly what point a fine or forfeiture might violate the
Excessive Fines Clause."" 7  In short, the court's reliance on the
Solem factors admittedly lacked any attention to the Excessive Fines
Clause and left the court to conclude that "a fine of many thousands
of dollars for a minor drug offense is not beyond the pale.""'
The fact that the Chandler court elected to call its three-factor
inquiry an "instrumentality test" is somewhat confusing. The court
initially appears to adopt Justice Scalia's position in Austin that the
only relevant enterprise is defining the relationship between the
property and offense." 9 However, Judge Niemeyer broke with
Justice Scalia's analysis in stating that "[w]hile our aim under this
instrumentality test for determining excessiveness is directed at
discovering the property's role in the offense, we are also mindful that
113. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 366.
114. Id
115. While the Whalers Cove court employed the Solem factors, United States v.
Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1992), the court in Chandler rejected
them, 36 F.3d at 365.
116. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 39 ("As to the Excessive Fines Clause, the Supreme
Court has provided no guidance, except to observe that fines must be closely scrutinized
because they benefit the Government.").
117. Id.
118. Id.; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (holding that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits "barbaric punishments" and "sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed").
119. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364. The court emphasized that the "intuitive excessiveness
analysis centers on the relationship between the property and the offense" such that the
property may be classified as an "instrumentality" because it "was supportive, important,
or even necessary to the success of the illegal activity." Id.
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the punishment effected by a forfeiture is imposed on the owner."'12
As discussed above, the property owner's role and culpability are
germane to the constitutional excessiveness inquiry."' Therefore,
the court in Chandler appropriately included the culpability of the
owner as a factor in its instrumentality test.'2
As more jurisdictions begin to adopt their own tests for deter-
mining the excessiveness of § 881 forfeitures, the critical issue is what
test the Supreme Court will uphold, or even adopt. In Chandler,
Judge Niemeyer suggested that there is a stark difference between the
Fourth Circuit's instrumentality approach and that of the multi-factor
approach employed by other jurisdictions." In fact, he cited
Zumirez Drive as indicative of the multi-factor approach embraced by
other courts.24 However, a close reading of Zumirez Drive reveals
that the "multi-factor" test articulated in that decision and the
instrumentality approach in Chandler are substantially similar."z
Although the court in Zumirez Drive cited Solem as the source of its
first factor, the court then focused on the culpability of the
claimant." Thus, both tests consider the property owner's guilt or
innocence, and both tests use various methods of determining the
relationship between the property and offense.12
As a practical matter, the differences of opinion exhibited by the
justices with respect to Part III of United States v. Austin about how
to regard forfeitures involving the truly innocent owner are irrelevant
120. Id
121. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
122. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 363-64; see supra text accompanying note 36.
123. Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364.
124. Id. (citing United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 731-32 (C.D.
Cal. 1994)); see also United States v. 427 & 429 Hall Street, 853 F. Supp. 1389, 1399 (M.D.
Ala. 1994) (articulating a two step test that "emphasizes 'instrumentality' analysis but
includes 'proportionality' analysis"); United States v. 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337,341
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (comparing the relationship of the property to the offense and "the value
of the property against the nature of the offense").
125. But cf. Pollock, supra note 3, at 475 ("In light of the different options available to
the courts ... the likelihood of the emergence of a uniform standard for determining
'excessiveness' in civil forfeiture appears improbable.").
126. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Zumirez Drive test).
127. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Chandler instrumen-
tality test); supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Zumirez Drive multi-
factor test). Both tests also reflect Justice Blackmun's invitation for lower courts to
consider "other factors" in addition to "the connection between the property and the
offense." See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 n.15 (1993); see also Pollock,
supra note 3, at 475 ("Austin also seems to give the courts the power to make proportion-
ality determinations on any basis they see fit, as long as the courts remain faithful to the
forfeiture statutes.").
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in the context of § 881.'8 The innocent owner provisions prevent
such an injustice.129 Rather, the vital issue in the aftermath of
Austin is how much weight a court should assign to an analysis of the
claimant's guilt. Given that the approaches taken in Chandler and
Zumirez Drive are substantively the same, the Supreme Court may
not feel compelled to adopt a particular approach.' However,
should the Court choose to endorse an existing test, it may find the
approach in Chandler superior. The court in Chandler effectively
avoids any use of the Solem factors-applicable, if at all, within the
context of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Rather, the
court focuses narrowly on the provisions involved and the forfeiture
of property by inquiring into the nexus between the property and the
offense. 1
Justice Scalia may not agree with an "instrumentality" test that
requires courts to consider the owner's degree of involvement.'
However, as the court in Zumirez Drive observed, the commission of
an offense requires human participation.s Moreover, the Chandler
court emphasized that the Eighth Amendment applies to persons
within the context of forfeitures, not merely to their property.Y
Therefore, an instrumentality test that focuses primarily on the
relationship of the property to the offense, while considering the
owner's role in the offense, vindicates the protective role of the Bill
of Rightss and offers a rational means of applying the Excessive
128. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (reviewing the split among justices over
the actual innocence issue in Austin).
129. See supra note 58 (discussing the Austin Court's review of the innocent owner
provisions of the Act).
130. However, the need for an effective test to determine excessiveness under the
Eighth Amendment is further highlighted by incidents such as the killing of multi-
millionaire Donald Scott by sheriff's deputies in Malibu, California. See Sarah Henry, The
Thin Green Line, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 1994, at TW8, TW8. In a March, 1993 report,
Ventura County District Attorney Michael Bradbury concluded that the raid on Scott's
200-acre property was partly motivated by a desire to seize the ranch for the government.
IL
131. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's instrumen-
tality test in Austin).
133. United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 733 (C.D. Cal. 1994); see
also supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Zumiret Drive court's
discussion of Justice Scalia's concurrence in Austin).
134. See supra text accompanying note 43 (noting that the court found that Congress
intended forfeitures as a punishment for conduct).
135. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Supreme Court struck
down federal legislation that stripped persons of citizenship for "departing from or
remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war ... for the purpose
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Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the awesome federal
power of drug forfeitures pursuant to § 881.
CHRISTOPHER ZEMP CAMPBELL
of evading or avoiding training and service." Id. at 146 n.1. (quoting Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 349, 66 Stat. 163, 267-68). The Court held the law
unconstitutional because it was essentially punitive in nature and inflicted punishment
"without affording the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments." Id. at 166. In doing so, the Court stated that "the Bill of Rights which we
guard so jealously and the procedures it guarantees are not to be abrogated merely
because a guilty man may escape prosecution or for any other expedient reason." Id. at
184 (emphasis added).
Author David Lieber suggests that the holding in Austin "extends an important
protection to defendants who face the power of the government in civil rather than
criminal court." Lieber, supra note 57, at 805; see also Snyder, supra note 58, at 1368
("[Tihe Court also has grown increasingly dissatisfied with the draconian nature of civil
forfeiture."); Henry, supra note 130, at TW8 (reporting that critics "maintain that asset
forfeiture has turned police agencies into bounty hunters, who, in their quest for cash, have
harmed innocent citizens or those guilty of only minor offenses").
In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993), the
Court held that persons subject to pre-trial seizure are entitled to the "right to prior notice
and a hearing" because these safeguards are "central to the Constitution's command of
due process" under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 500. But cf id. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the probable cause protections
inherent in the Fourth Amendment are adequate). Viewed together, the Court's decisions
in Austin, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126
(1993) (plurality opinion), and James Daniel show a regression from the Court's strong
support of civil forfeiture for drug violations. See Richard C. Reuben, Putting Brakes on
Forfeiture: High Court Rulings Forcing Revisions in Pretrial Seizure Process, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1994, at 14, 14. In his conclusion, Richard Reuben quotes criminal defense lawyer
William C. Taylor, m: "It's hard to look at this series of cases and not get the message
that the Supreme Court thinks the government has taken asset forfeiture as far as it can
go, and that the courts are going to begin to impose some restraint." d. at 16.
An Informed Consumer is the Best Defense: Charitable
Solicitation Regulation in North Carolina Under N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 131F-1 to -28
Last year in North Carolina, professional fund-raiser Response
Dynamics, Inc., collected over three million dollars in the name of
various charities,' over eighty-six percent of which was eventually
used for the benevolent purposes for which it was donated.2 Telecom
Telemarketing Service, Inc., another professional fund-raiser, also
collected over three million dollars from North Carolinians, but only
twenty-five percent of the money Telecom raised ever reached the
charities for which it was donated? Although all donors undoubtedly
would want to differentiate between a telephone call from Telecom
and one from Response Dynamics, they may be frustrated to know
that this is virtually impossible under current law.
For at least a decade, the North Carolina General Assembly has
tried to protect consumers from charity fraud.4 In 1985 the General
Assembly enacted a statute that required professional fund-raisers5
to disclose the percentage of contributions received that the fund-
raiser remitted to charities during the previous year before requesting
1. Solicitation Licensing Branch, North Carolina Department of Human Resources,
1993 Detailed Summary of Professional Solicitors' Activities in North Carolina from Final
Accounting Reports Received Between May 1, 1993 and April 30, 1994 (1994)
(unpublished statistics, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter 1993
Detailed Summary]. Response Dynamics solicited donations on behalf of the following
charitable organizations: American Indian Heritage, Council for International Develop-
ment, Famine Relief Fund, National Association of Chiefs of Police, and National
Children's Cancer Society, Inc. Id.
2. IM.
3. Id. Telecom solicited contributions for two organizations: Highway Patrol
Chapter Police Benevolent Association and North Carolina Police Benevolent Association.
Id. Both organizations are unions rather than traditional charities. Telephone Interview
with Lionel Randolph, Solicitation Licensing Branch, North Carolina Department of
Human Resources (Jan. 27, 1995).
4. For the purposes of this Note, the term "charity fraud" includes deception,
misrepresentation, and fraud in the solicitation of charitable contributions whether
perpetrated by a charitable organization or a professional fund-raiser.
5. "Professional fund-raiser" is an umbrella term that includes those who advise
charities about how to conduct solicitation campaigns but do no soliciting themselves
(usually referred to as fund-raising consultants or fund-raising counsel), and those who are
hired to conduct solicitation campaigns on the charity's behalf (usually called solicitors).
Telephone Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 3.
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additional donations.6 However, in 1988 the United States Supreme
Court struck down that portion of the North Carolina statute7 in one
of a series of cases affording those conducting charitable solicitations
the same protections as those engaging in other forms of protected
speech.' Since that time, the lower federal courts have defined a
narrow range of acceptable state regulation of charitable solicitation.9
In light of these cases the North Carolina General Assembly
enacted a new charitable solicitation statute in 1994.10 This statute
attempts to balance the free speech rights of those conducting
charitable solicitations with the state's interest in protecting its citizens
from fraud.' For example, the statute "recognizes the right of
persons or organizations to conduct solicitation activities"12 but
requires that they obtain a license before soliciting contributions in
North Carolina. 3 Similarly, the statute insists that professional fund-
raisers inform potential donors of the fact that the caller is a paid
solicitor.'4 It does not, however, require that the caller reveal, unless
requested, what percentage of the donation is tax deductible or how
much of the money collected will be remitted to the charity." In an
6. Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 497, § 8, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 551, 552, repealed by Act
of July 15, 1994, ch. 759, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 594 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
131F-1 to -28 (1994)).
7. Id; see Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1988).
8. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-801; Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947, 965-69 (1984); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S.
620, 632-37 (1980); infra notes 23-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
holdings in Riley, Schaumburg, and Munson).
9. See, e.g., Famine Relief Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1990);
American Ass'n of State Troopers, Inc. v. Preate, 825 F. Supp. 1228 (M.D. Pa. 1993);
Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Pearson, 700 F. Supp. 421 (S.D. Ind. 1988);
infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
10. Act of July 15, 1994, ch. 759, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 594 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 131F-1 to -28 (1994)).
11. Telephone Interview with A.P. Sands I, former North Carolina State Senator and
sponsor of the new statute (Jan. 24, 1995). See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-1 (1994).
13. Id. § 131F-5(a) ("[A] charitable organization, sponsor, or person that intends to
solicit contributions in this State ... shall obtain a license."); id. § 131F-15(a) ("[A] person
shall not act as a fund-raising consultant in this State unless that person has obtained a
license."); id. § 131F-16(a) ("[A] person shall not act as a solicitor in this State unless that
person has obtained a license.").
14. Id. § 131F-17(a)(1) ("Prior to orally requesting a contribution... a solicitor shall
clearly disclose ... [t]hat the caller is a paid solicitor."). Charitable organizations
conducting their own solicitation must disclose the organization's name, its principal place
of business, and the purpose for which the solicitation is made. Id. § 131F-9(b)(1), (2).
15. Id. § 131F-17(a)(4), (5). Although the professional fund-raiser must disclose this
information upon request, the disclosure does not have to be made during the solicitation;
the statute requires only that such disclosures be made within 14 days of the request. Id.
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effort to draft a statute that could withstand constitutional challenges,
the General Assembly narrowly tailored the statute's provisions. 6
This Note first examines the Supreme ,Court decisions that have
limited states' abilities to regulate charitable solicitation" and the
lower court decisions that have delineated a narrow range of
acceptable regulations."8 It then describes the provisions of the new
North Carolina statute that respond to these decisions, 9 illustrating
how the new North Carolina charitable solicitation statute is securely
within the permissibie range of constitutional regulations.' The
Note finally suggests that the statute provides considerable protection
from charity fraud while respecting the free speech rights of charitable
organizations and professional fund-raisers,2' and considers whether
the new statute will accomplish its stated goal of fraud prevention.'
The United States Supreme Court's first decision in its free
speech trilogy addressing charitable solicitation was Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,24 which struck
down a local ordinance that effectively prohibited solicitation by any
§ 131F-17(4) ("If requested by the person being solicited, the solicitor shall inform that
person, in writing, within 14 days of the request, of the fixed percentage of the gross
revenue or the reasonable estimate of the gross revenue that the charitable organization
or sponsor will receive as a benefit from the solicitation campaign."). Section 131F-17(5)
contains a similar provision for information regarding the tax deductibility of contributions.
Id. § 131F-17(5). The statute requires charitable organizations conducting their own
solicitations to reveal tax deductibility information immediately upon request instead of
in writing within 14 days. I. § 131F-9(b)(4) ("Upon request, [the charitable organization
must disclose] the amount of the contribution which may be deducted as a charitable
contribution under federal income tax laws.").
16. Telephone Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 3.
17. See infra notes 23-68 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 77-134 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 122-23, 127-34 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
23. Some authors refer to Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988),
Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984), and Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) as the "Schaumburg
trilogy." See, e.g., Jon Strauss, First Amendment Protection of Charitable Solicitation, 13
WHTriER L. REV. 669, 669 (1992) (referring to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit's use of the term "Schaumburg trilogy" in Young v. New York City
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146,154-57 (2d Cir. 1990)). Other authors refer to the same three
cases as the "Riley trilogy." See e.g., John Dziedzic, Comment, Krishna v. Lee Extricates
the Inextricable. An Argument for Regulating the Solicitation in Charitable Solicitation, 17
U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 665, 666 (1994). Assuming that trilogies should be named for
the first case in the series, this Note will refer to the three cases collectively as the
"Schaumburg trilogy."
24. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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organization failing to prove that at least seventy-five percent of the
money raised would "be used directly for the charitable purpose of
the organization."'  The Court reasoned that some charitable groups
combine advocacy, education, and dissemination of information with
fund-raising.6 The Court next determined that "because charitable
solicitation does more than inform private economic decisions and is
not primarily concerned with providing information about the ...
costs of goods and services," it is entitled to the greater First
Amendment protection afforded non-commercial speech, rather than
the lesser protection given "purely commercial speech."'  Applying
standard First Amendment analysis,' the Court determined that the
ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve the Village's primary
interest-the prevention of fraud.29 In fact, the Court failed "to
perceive any substantial relationship between the 75-percent re-
quirement" and the Village's asserted interests.3 ° Therefore, because
25. I& at 624 (citing SCHAUMBURO, ILL., CODE ch. 22-20(g) (1975)). The ordinance
defined "charitable purpose" to exclude solicitation expenses, salaries, overhead, and other
administrative expenses. I& at 622. As part of the solicitation license application, the
ordinance required organizations to furnish "satisfactory proof" in the form of a "certified
audit of the last full year of operations" that 75% of the solicitation proceeds will be used
directly for the organization's charitable purpose. Id. at 624 (citing SCHAUMBURG, ILL.,
CODE ch. 22-20 (1975)).
26. Id. at 632.
27. Id. The First Amendment protects speech on economic, political, and social issues:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend.
I. First Amendment protections are extended to state actions by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 662, 666 (1925); U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,
§ 2. Although the commercial speech doctrine is elusive, the Court has suggested that
commercial speech is entitled to a lower level of constitutional protection because the
greater objectivity of commercial speech makes it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate
statements for fear of silencing the speaker. Stephen H. Block, Note, The Post-Riley Era
An Analysis of First Amendment Protection of Charitable Fund-raising, 10 CARDOzO ARTS
& ENT. LJ. 101, 107 (1991). For the history of the commercial speech doctrine and an
argument that it should be applied to charitable solicitations, see Kevin R. Knight, Note,
The Life of Riley: Complete First Amendment Protection Versus Deferential Commercial
Speech Standards for Professional Fund-raising Solicitors, 23 IND. L REV. 145,148-63,165-
67 (1990).
28. Where speech regulations are based on the communicative impact, a state may
serve its legitimate interests only by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those
interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Schaumburg,
444 U.S. at 637 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)).
29. Id at 637. The Court found that some charitable groups might legitimately fail
to meet the 75% limitation because of the costs of continuing this type of informative and
persuasive speech. Id. at 637 n.10.
30. Id. at 638. The Court noted that the fact that some groups expended more than
one-quarter of their funds on administrative costs bore no relationship to whether the
solicitation might be fraudulent. IdS
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the Village's legitimate interest in fraud prevention could be
"sufficiently served by measures less destructive of First Amendment
interests,"31 the Court struck down the ordinance as overly broad.32
With its Schaumburg decision, the Court "did not adopt the
notion that charitable solicitation is immune from regulation."'33
Rather, the Schaumburg Court recognized that a statute that served
a "strong, subordinating interest"'  through "narrowly drawn
regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily
interfering with First Amendment freedoms" could be sustained.35
Although the Village's ordinance claimed to serve substantial
interests,36 the Court found that there was only a tenuous connection
between those interests and the statute's prohibitions; therefore, the
Village must protect its interests in a manner less destructive of free
speech rights 7 The Court thus implied that for a restriction on
charitable solicitation to be constitutional, its objective must be
achieved using the least restrictive means possible.38 In the fifteen
years since Schaumburg, the federal courts have identified several
such constitutional state regulations on charitable solicitations.39
Four years after Schaumburg, the Court extended First
Amendment protection to charitable solicitations conducted by for-
profit fund-raisers. In Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co..'
a professional fund-raiser challenged a Maryland statute that
prohibited charitable organizations from paying professional fund-
raisers more than twenty-five percent of the funds raised.41 In a five
31. Id at 636.
32. Ia- at 639.
33. Dziedzic, supra note 23, at 672.
34. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 636.
35. Id at 637. For example, the Court suggested that "[e]fforts to promote disclosure
of the finances of charitable organizations... may assist in preventing fraud." Id. at 637-
38.
36. The interests advanced by the Village included preventing fraud, protecting public
safety, and safeguarding residential privacy. Id at 636-38.
37. I& at 636-37.
38. Strauss, supra note 23, at 672. By employing this test, the Court included
charitable solicitation among the most protected types of speech. See supra note 27. A
lower level of protection is accorded commercial speech. Strauss, supra note 23, at 672.
For a detailed examination of the commercial speech doctrine, see Knight, supra note 27,
at 148-63.
39. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
40. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
41. Id. at 950 & n.2 (citing the Act of May 17,1976, ch. 679,1976 Md. Laws 1862,1870
(Act Concerning Charities) (amended and reorganized 1986)). Although similar to the
ordinance in Schaumburg, see supra note 25 and accompanying text, the Maryland statute
contained provisions allowing the Secretary of State to waive the 25% restrictions in those
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to four decision; the Court found that the protection afforded to
solicitations by charities in Schaumburg extended to professional fund-
raisers.42 According to the Court, the key to Schaumburg was its
determination that solicitations are characteristically intertwined with
protected speech.43 That conclusion was equally true when the
solicitation was conducted by a professional on behalf of the charity;
the existence of a commercial relationship between the charity and
the for-profit fund-raiser did not alter the Court's free speech
analysis. 4 Therefore, the Court invalidated the Maryland statute,
concluding that it was imprecisely tailored and created an unnecessary
risk of chilling the exercise of free speech.45
In the final case in this trilogy, Riley v. National Federation of the
Blind,' the Court sustained a challenge by a "coalition of profes-
sional fund-raisers, charitable organizations, and potential charitable
donors"'47 to several provisions of the North Carolina charitable
solicitation statute.' First, the Court considered a provision that
limited the fees that professional fund-raisers could charge charitable
instances "where the 25% limitation would effectively prevent the charitable organization
from raising contributions." Munson, 467 U.S. at 950 n.2 (citing the Act of May 17,1976,
ch. 679, 1976 Md. Laws 1862, 1870 (Act Concerning Charities) (amended and reorganized
1986)).
42. Munson, 467 U.S. at 968-69. Justice Rehnquist's dissent distinguished the
Maryland statute as "primarily ... an economic regulation setting a limit on the fees
charged by professional fund-raisers." IcL at 978 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, because the statute was "merely an economic regulation," it should
be "judged and approved under the minimum rationality standard traditionally applied to
economic regulations." I at 979 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In essence, Justice
Rehnquist attempted to distinguish the speech aspect of charitable solicitation from its
commercial aspects and argued that different standards should apply to each. ILd. at 980-
81. As Chief Justice, Rehnquist later reiterated this argument in his Riley dissent. Riley
v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 805-07 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("The Court has recognized that the commercial aspects of newsgathering and publishing
are different from the editorial function, and has upheld regulation of the former against
claims based on the First Amendment .... 'Charitable solicitation,' when pursued by
professional fund-raisers... deserves no more favorable treatment.") (citations omitted).
Once again, however, he was unable to convince a majority of the Court to recognize such
a distinction.
43. Munson, 467 U.S. at 959.
44. Dziedzic, supra note 23, at 673.
45. Munson, 467 U.S. at 967-68. In other words, the Court found the statute
"unconstitutionally overbroad." Ia at 970.
46. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
47. Strauss, supra note 23, at 678.
48. The Riley Court struck down §§ 4, 8, and 10 of the Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 497,
1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 551, 552-54 (repealed 1989). Riley, 487 U.S. at 784.
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organizations.49 The Court rejected North Carolina's argument that
the fee provision was an economic regulation with only' an indirect
effect on protected speech5 Instead, the Court reaffirmed the
holdings of Schaumburg and Munson:5 "[T]here is no nexus
between the percentage of funds retained by the fund-raiser and the
likelihood the solicitation is fraudulent."" Therefore, as it had in
Schaumburg and Munson, the Court struck down North Carolina's fee
limitation as not narrowly tailored to protect the public from fraud.53
Next the Court addressed a provision requiring fund-raisers to
disclose to potential donors the percentage of funds raised in prior
solicitations that were actually conveyed to charity' This provision
appeared carefully drafted to follow the Schaumburg Court's
suggestion that requiring charitable organizations to disclose their
finances would be a constitutionally acceptable means of preventing
fraud.5 However, the Riley Court reasoned that such "compelled
speech"56 is inherently content-based because "[m]andating speech
that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the
content of speech."'  Applying "exacting First Amendment
49. Riley, 487 U.S. at 787-95. The North Carolina statute prohibited fund-raisers from
charging "an excessive and unreasonable" fee. Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 497, sec. 10, §
131C-17.2(a), 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 551, 553 (repealed 1989). The statute defined
"unreasonableness" according to the following three-tiered schedule: Fees less than or
equal to 20% of the funds raised were presumed reasonable; fees between 20% and 35%
were presumed reasonable, but would be deemed unreasonable if the state showed that
the solicitation did not involve dissemination of information or advocacy of public issues
as directed by the charitable organization; and fees greater than 35% were presumed
unreasonable, but would be deemed reasonable if the fund-raiser showed either that the
high fee was necessary to support the dissemination of information, or that the charity's
ability to raise funds would otherwise be significantly diminished. Id. §§ 131C-17.2(b) to
(d).
50. Riley, 487 U.S. at 788-89.
51. See supra notes 29-32 and 43-45 and accompanying text.
52. Riley, 487 U.S. at 793.
53. 1d. at 789-90.
54. 1& at 795-801. The statutory provision required:
During any solicitation and before requesting or appealing either directly or
indirectly for any charitable contribution a professional solicitor shall disclose to
the person solicited... [t]he average of the percentage of gross receipts actually
paid to the persons established for a charitable purpose by the professional fund-
raising counsel or professional solicitor conducting the solicitation for all
charitable sales promotions conducted in this State by that professional fund-
raising counsel or professional solicitor for the past 12 months ....
Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 497, § 8, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 551, 552 (repealed 1989).
55. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
56. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795.
57. Id
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scrutiny,""8 the Court thus struck down the disclosure requirement
as "unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored."59
Finally, the Riley Court considered and struck down a re-
quirement that professional fund-raisers obtain a license before
engaging in charitable solicitations.' The Court noted that in order
to be constitutionally valid, licensing requirements for speakers must
provide that the licensor either issue the license or go to court within
a specified, brief period of time.6' Because the North Carolina
licensing provision specified no time within which the licensing
decision must be made, the Court held that it permitted unlimited
delay and was therefore unconstitutional.62
Schaumburg, Munson, and Riley placed the entire charitable
solicitation process "squarely within the protection of the First
Amendment."' In those cases, the Court held that the act of
solicitation, regardless of who conducts it or whether it results in a
contribution, is an exercise of free speech that must be protected. 64
Therefore, states must treat charitable solicitation with the same
deference given political or religious speech.' However, this
required deference may severely limit the ability of "states to regulate
fund-raising effectively."'  In fact, one contemporary scholar
believes that these cases essentially free "charitable solicitors from all
statutory restrictions except for registration requirements and all but
the most fundamental anti-fraud or consumer protection statutes."67
However, modem state regulation of charitable solicitation has not
become quite as severely restricted as some commentators have
predicted.'
58. Id. at 798.
59. I&
60. Id at 801-02. The contested provision required that "[a]ny person who acts as
professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor shall apply for and obtain an
annual license.., and shall not act as a professional fund-raising counsel or professional
solicitor until after obtaining such license." Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 497, § 4, 1985 N.C.
Sess. Laws 551, 551 (amended 1989); cf. id. § 3 ("A person other than a professional
solicitor or professional fund-raising counsel may solicit charitable contributions after filing
the application.").
61. Riley, 487 U.S. at 802.
62. Id.
63. Block, supra note 27, at 110.
64. Id. at 111.
65. Id. at 112.
66. Id. at 102.
67. Id. at 112.
68. Id. at 102; see also Matthew M. Ogbum, Note, Regulation of Charitable
Fundraising: Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 24 U.S.F.
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In the Schaumburg trilogy, the Court explicitly recognized that
fraud prevention is a sufficiently substantial state interest to justify
narrowly tailored government regulation of charitable solicitation.69
Since Riley, the lower federal courts have identified several ways in
which states may assert that substantial state interest without
infringing on First Amendment rights. For example, several courts
have determined that a requirement that professional solicitors
disclose their professional status before requesting money is narrowly
tailored to promote the state's interest in preventing charity fraud.70
Similarly, courts have also held constitutional mandatory written
disclosures on printed solicitation materials and mandatory post-
solicitation gift confirmations.7' In addition, although the Riley
Court struck down mandatory pre-solicitation disclosure of the
L. REv. 205, 207 (1989) (predicting that the Court's decisions leave states no choice but
to employ "less efficient laws"); Development in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations:
Charitable Solicitation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1635 (1992) (explaining that the Court's
charitable solicitation opinions, coupled with federal income tax laws, result in a "a system
that maintains incentives for charitable solicitation, but in which countervailing legal
restrictions have disappeared").
69. See, eg., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 792 (1988) ("The
interest in protecting charities (and the public) from fraud is, of course, a sufficiently
substantial interest to justify a narrowly tailored regulation."); Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980) ("The Village's legitimate interest in
* preventing fraud can be better served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition
on solicitation .. ").
70. See, eg., American Ass'n of State Troopers, Inc. v. Preate, 825 F. Supp. 1228,
1237-38 (M.D. Pa. 1993); Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Pearson, 700 F. Supp.
421, 441-42 (S.D. Ind. 1988). These lower courts found support for their holdings in a
footnote of the Riley Court's opinion. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 799 n.11 (suggesting that a
state requirement that a fund-raiser disclose his or her professional status would be
sufficiently narrow to withstand First Amendment scrutiny). Both courts noted that in
Riley, Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority opinion only as to this footnote, implying
that the footnote was well-considered dicta. See American Ass'n of State Troopers, Inc,
825 F. Supp. at 1237-38 (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 803-04 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment)); Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Ass', Inc., 700 F. Supp. at
441-42 (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 803-04 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
71. See, e.g., Famine Relief Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747,752 & n.4 (4th Cir.
1990) (sustaining a statutory provision requiring professional solicitors to disclose in writing
that financial statements were available from the state); Telco Communications, Inc. v.
Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1231-32 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding as narrowly tailored
mandatory written disclosure of the fact that the fund-raiser's annual financial statements
were available from the state); Lucas v. Curran, 856 F. Supp. 260, 271 (D. Md. 1994)
(affirming written disclosure of both the fund-raiser's professional status and the
availability of financial statements from the state); Indiana Voluntary Firemen's Ass'n, 700
F. Supp. at 445-46 (upholding constitutionality of an Indiana law requiring written post-
solicitation disclosure of professional status).
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percentage of funds going to charity, the Fourth Circuit has since
held that the fund-raiser must provide this information if requested to
do so by the potential donor.73 Other decisions have upheld the
constitutionality of registration fee provisions,74 struck down
solicitation script approvals7 and defined the minimum due process
requirements applicable to regulation of charitable solicitation.76
The new North Carolina charitable solicitation statute takes full
advantage of the range of permissible regulatory controls defined by
these lower court decisions.'O However, the General Assembly also
very carefully drafted the statute to avoid infringing the free speech
rights defined by the Schaumburg trilogy.7 This delicate balance is
reflected in the General Assembly's statement of the statute's
purpose:
The General Assembly recognizes the right of persons or or-
ganizations to conduct solicitation activities. It is the intent
of the General Assembly to protect the public by requiring
full disclosure by persons who solicit contributions from the
public [and] ... to prohibit deception, fraud, and mis-
representation in the solicitation and reporting of
contributions.79
The new statute advances the state's substantial interest in fraud
prevention in two ways. First, through detailed licensing, record
keeping, and reporting requirements, the statute makes the entire
charitable solicitation process as transparent as possible to state
72. Riley, 487 U.S. at 798; accord Telco Communications, Inc. v. Barry, 731 F. Supp
670, 680-81 (D.N.J. 1990); see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
73. Famine Relief Fund, 905 F.2d at 752.
74. See, eg., Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139,145-46 (4th Cir. 1994)
(upholding a sliding fee scale as narrowly tailored to match the costs incurred by Maryland
in implementing the statute); National Awareness Found. v. Abrams, 812 F. Supp. 431,
434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that registration fees are permissible if the amount is
nominal and defrays the state's cost of administering the solicitation statute).
75. See, e.g., Carbaugh, 885 F.2d at 1232-33 (finding an unconstitutional prior restraint
where the statute required solicitors to submit the script of an oral solicitation to the state
at least 10 days prior to the commencement of solicitation); Barry, 731 F. Supp. at 683
(finding that review of solicitation scripts is rife with the potential for abuse and is an un-
constitutional prior restraint on speech).
76. Famine Relief Fund, 905 F.2d at 753 (defining the minimum constitutionally
acceptable due process protections as the following: requiring the state to carry the
burden of proof, allowing the free exercise of protected speech pending judicial review,
and ensuring prompt judicial review).
77. Telephone Interview with Darlene Graham, Consumer Protection Section, North
Carolina Attorney General's Office (Jan. 30, 1995).
78. Telephone Interview with A.P. Sands I, supra note 11.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-1 (1994).
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regulators.'0 This allows the state to effectively monitor the flow of
money from the public-through professional fund-raisers-to the
charities. Second, through mandatory"' and on-request disclosure
requirements,' the statute ensures that the public receives as much
information as possible from those soliciting without chilling free
speech.' Because the state is limited in what it may require fund-
raisers to disclose, an inquisitive public is the state's best line of
defense against charity fraud. On the other side of the balance, the
statute provides exceptionally stringent due process protections for the
free speech rights of charities and professional fund-raisers. 4
Before imposing new requirements on professional fund-raisers
and charitable organizations, the 1994 statute first defines solicitation
more broadly than the old statute 5 and then identifies more
precisely those entities subject to regulation. 6 Under the new
statute, charitable "solicitation" includes any request for "money,
property, financial assistance, or any other thing of value on the...
representation that it will be used for a charitable ... purpose.
' 's
80. See infra notes 94-113 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
83. The Supreme Court has essentially determined that professional fund-raisers can
only be required to tell the truth, but not the whole truth, at the point of solicitation. See
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988). In Riley, the Court stated
that " [a]lthough the... factual information might be relevant to the listener, and ... could
encourage or discourage the-listener from making a ... donation, a law compelling its
disclosure would clearly and substantially burden the protected speech." Id
84. See infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
85. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-2(18) (1994). The statute defines solicitation as "a
request, directly or indirectly, for money, property, financial assistance, or any other thing
of value on the plea or representation that it will be used for a charitable... purpose...
or will benefit a charitable organization." Id. The statute specifically notes that "[t]he
selling or offering or attempting to sell is a 'solicitation' whether or not the person making
the solicitation receives any contribution." Id However, "[i]t is not a 'solicitation' when
a person applies for a grant or award to the government or to an organization that is
exempt from federal income taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
and described in section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code." L Section 501(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code contains a long list of organizations that are exempt from federal
income taxation, including: "corporations ... organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,"
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (CCH 1993); "labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations," id. §
501(c)(5); "fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations," id § 501(c)(8); and "[a]
post or organization of past or present members of the Armed Forces of the United
States," id § 501(c)(19).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131F-2(3), -2(6), -2(10), -2(19), -2(20) (1994).
87. Id § 131F-2(18). In essence, solicitation is any request for anything of value
however made, so long as the pitch indicates that the money given will benefit a charitable
purpose. Solicitation may occur by:
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However, even under the expanded definition of solicitation, many
groups remain specifically exempt from the charitable solicitation
regulations.88 The General Assembly believed that these groups
pose a low risk of charity fraud because they either solicit only from
their own membership or are associated with a group that will provide
sufficient oversight.89 The 1994 statute also aims to more accurately
regulate the entire charitable solicitation process. To that end, the
new statute sharpens the distinction between the types of professional
fund-raisers and applies different requirements to each group. Under
the new statute, the key difference between a "fund-raising consul-
tant"'  and a "solicitor"'" is that the fund-raising consultant "does
a. Any oral or written request.
b. Any announcement to the press, radio, or television, by telephone or
telegraph, or by any other communication device.
C. Distributing, posting, or publishing any handbill, written advertisement,
or other publication that directly or by implication seeks to obtain any
contribution.
d. Selling or offering or attempting to sell any good, service, chance, right,
or any thing of value to benefit a charitable organization or sponsor.
Id.
88. Id. § 131F-3. The new statute exempts religious institutions, government agencies,
groups that receive less than $25,000 annually and who do not compensate any person for
their work with that group, accredited educational institutions, hospitals, public television
and radio stations, qualified community trusts, charity volunteers and employees,
investment advisors and attorneys, and volunteer emergency service employees. Id.
89. Telephone Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 3. For example, the
General Assembly believed that the governing boards of hospitals and accredited
educational institutions would provide sufficient oversight for fund-raising by these groups.
Id The General Assembly chose to exclude religious institutions to foreclose the
possibility that the statute would be constitutionally challenged on Free Exercise or
Establishment Clause grounds. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. I.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-2(10) (1994). According to the statute, a fund-raising
consultant is any person who meets all of the following:
a. Is retained by a charitable organization or sponsor for a fixed fee or
rate under a written agreement to plan, manage, conduct, consult, or
prepare written material for the solicitation of contributions in [North
Carolina].
b. Does not solicit contributions or employ, procure, or engage any person
to solicit contributions.
C. Does not at any time have custody or control of contributions.
Id.
91. Id. § 131F-2(19). The statute defines a solicitor as:
any person who, for compensation, does not qualify as a fund-raising consultant
and does either of the following:
a. Performs any service, including the employment or engagement of other
persons or services, to solicit contributions for a charitable organization
or sponsor.
b. Plans, conducts, manages, consults, whether directly or indirectly, in
connection with the solicitation of contributions for a charitable
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not at any time have custody or control of contributions."'92 Because
solicitors may handle contributions directly, the bonding and licensing
requirements for solicitors are more stringent.9 3
Licensing requirements apply to both charitable organizations and
professional fund-raisers.94 To obtain a license, the charity or
professional fund-raiser must submit an application containing
statutorily specified information95 and must pay the appropriate
license fee.96 The new statute streamlines the license application
procedures for charitable organizations in several ways. Charities are
now permitted to substitute copies of their IRS reporting forms for
the required financial information. 7 In addition, auditing of such
reports by an independent certified public accountant is now optional
rather than required.98 The new statute also establishes consolidated
application requirements for parent organizations99 that prefer to
organization or sponsor.
Id.
92. Id. § 131F-2(10)(c).
93. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
94. N.C. GErN. STAT. § 131F-5(a) (1994) ("[A] charitable organization... that intends
to solicit contributions in [North Carolina], to have funds solicited on its behalf, or to
participate in a charitable sales promotion or sponsor sales promotion shall obtain a
license."); id. § 131F-15(a) ("[A] person shall not act as a fund-raising consultant in [North
Carolina] unless that person has obtained a license from the Department."); id. § 131F-
16(a) ("[A] person shall not act as a solicitor in [North Carolina] unless that person has
obtained a license from the Department."). Throughout the new statute (and throughout
this Note), the word "Department" refers to the North Carolina Department of Human
Resources. Id. § 131F-2(7). That department is charged with implementing the statute.
See id. §§ 131F-2(7), -23.
95. Id § 131F-6. Charitable organizations must submit a detailed list of information,
including: the name, address, and telephone number of the charitable organization; the
purpose for which it is organized; the purpose for which contributions will be used; the
names and addresses of the organization's officers, directors, trustees, and salaried
executive personnel; a list of major program activities; the names of the individuals in
charge of solicitation activities; a financial report for the previous fiscal year; and the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of any professional fund-raiser who will act on
behalf of the charitable organization. Id. A fund-raising consultant's application must
include the address and telephone number of the applicant's principal place of business;
the names and addresses of all officers, directors, and owners; familial relationships
between owners, directors, officers, and employees of the organization; and an indication
of whether any person associated with the applicant has been convicted of an offense
related to charitable solicitation within the last five years. Id. § 131F-15(b). Solicitors
must submit similar information. Id. § 131F-16(b).
96. See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-6(a)(9) (1994).
98. Id. § 131F-6(a)(10).
99. Id. § 131F-2(15) (" 'Parent organization' means that part of a charitable
organization or sponsor which coordinates, supervises, or exercises control over policy,
fund-raising, and expenditures, or assists or advises one or more chapters, branches, or
1995] 2315
2316 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
submit one set of information covering all branches or affiliates
throughout the state."3 Furthermore, the 1994 statute restructures
the license fees and solicitor bonding requirements. License fees for
professional fund-raisers have doubled.'0 ' License fees for
charitable organizations are now assessed according to a tiered system
calibrated to the amount of contributions received by the charity
during the last fiscal year"° or, for parent organizations filing a
consolidated application, to the number of state-wide affiliates.103
Similarly, the bonding requirements for solicitors have been substan-
tially increased and are now based on the total contributions received
in the last fiscal year."°4 North Carolina now has some of the most
stringent solicitor bonding requirements in the nation."°
To ensure that the solicitation process is as transparent as
possible to state regulators, the statute has expanded record-keeping
and reporting requirements. A new section of the statute imposes
significant record-keeping requirements on solicitors. 6  For each
solicitation campaign conducted, solicitors must maintain detailed
affiliates of a charitable organization or sponsor.").
100. Id. § 131F-7. The new statute allows individual chapters or branches of an
organization to file the required application information with the parent organization. IdL
The parent organization then files a consolidated application for the parent organization
and its chapters or branches throughout the state. Id In addition, "[i]f all contributions
received ... are remitted directly into the parent organization's centralized accounting
system from which all disbursements are made," the parent organization may also'file a
consolidated financial statement as part of its application. I& § 131F-7(b).
101. License fees for professional fund-raisers are now $200 per year. Id. 8 131F-15(c),
-16(c).
102. Id. § 131F-8(a). Under the new statutory scheme, the license fee is $50 if the
contributions received were less than $100,000; $100 if the contributions received were
between $100,000 and $200,000; and $200 if the contributions received totaled more than
$200,000. I& A charitable organization that received less than $5,000 in contributions
over the last fiscal year is not required to pay a license fee. Id. § 131F-8(b).
103. Id. § 131F-8(c). Under this provision, the fee is $100 per year for a parent
organization and 5 or fewer chapters; $200 for a parent organization and 6 to 10 chapters;
$250 for a parent organization and 11 to 15 chapters; and $400 for a parent organization
and 16 or more chapters. Id.
104. Id. § 131F-16(d). At the time of application, a solicitor must have "a bond with
a surety authorized to do business in [North Carolina] and to which the solicitor is the
principal obligor." IM If the solicitor received contributions of less than $100,000 in the
last fiscal year, the amount of the bond is $20,000; if the contributions received were
between $100,000 and $200,000, the amount of the bond is $30,000; and if the contributions
totalled more than $200,000, the amount of the bond is $50,000. IM
105. Telephone Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 3. The General Assembly
believed that these bonding requirements would not unduly burden most professional
fund-raisers, because the requirements will affect only the 25% of all professional fund-
raisers licensed in North Carolina who "receive, handle, and control" contributions. Id.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-16(j) (1994).
CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
information on each contributor, each employee involved in the
solicitation, all solicitation expenses, all contributions at any time in
the solicitor's custody, and every bank account into which
contributions are deposited." 7 This information must be made
available to the Department of Human Resources upon request by
the state 38'
The most significant new reporting requirements concern
contracts between charitable organizations and fund-raising consul-
tants or solicitors. First, the statute specifically prohibits charities
from entering into any contract or agreement with a fund-raising
consultant or solicitor who is not licensed by the Department. °9
The statute then specifies which officers of these groups must sign the
written contract1 and requires that all such contracts be filed with
the Department at least five days prior to performance of any fund-
raising service.' The statute also requires solicitors to file a
solicitation notice at least five days before beginning each solicitation
campaign." The solicitation notice must describe the solicitation
campaign, state the charitable purpose of the solicitation, identify the
fund-raising techniques to be used, and list the account numbers and
location of each bank where the contributions will be deposited."
107. Id. The statute contains similar requirements for ticket-sale promotions. Id. §
131F-16(k).
108. Id. § 131F-16(l).
109. Id. § 131F-20(3) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to ... [e]nter into any
contract or agreement with or employ a fund-raising consultant or solicitor unless that
fund-raising consultant or solicitor is licensed by the Department.").
110. Id. § 131F-15(d). "Every contract between a fund-raising consultant [and] a
charitable organization or sponsor shall be in writing and signed by two authorized officials
of the charitable organization or sponsor." Id. Likewise:
Each contract or agreement between a solicitor and a charitable organization or
sponsor for each solicitation campaign shall be in writing, shall be signed by two
authorized officials of the charitable organization or sponsor, one of whom shall
be a member of the organization's governing body and one of whom shall be the
authorized contracting officer for the solicitor.
Id. § 131F-16(g).
111. Id. §§ 131F-15(d), -16(f).
112. Id. § 131F-16(f) ("No less than five days before commencing any solicitation
campaign or event, the solicitor shall file with the Department a solicitation notice on a
form provided by the Department. The notice shall be signed and sworn to by the
contracting officer of the solicitor .... ").
113. Id- § 131F-16(f). The statute now specifies how solicitors must handle the
contributions that they collect:
Each contribution collected by or in the custody of the solicitor shall be solely in
the name of the charitable organization or sponsor on whose behalf the
contribution was solicited. Not later than two days after receipt of each
contribution, the solicitor shall deposit the entire amount of the contribution in
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The new statute also employs expanded disclosure requirements
to discourage fraud. In Riley,"4 the Supreme Court struck down the
mandatory disclosure requirements of the 1986 North Carolina
charitable solicitation statute as an unconstitutional restriction on free
speech." Nevertheless, since Riley, lower courts have upheld
various other disclosure requirements as narrowly tailored to protect
a state's interest in preventing fraud,"6 and the North Carolina
General Assembly took notice of these decisions when it enacted the
new statute."7 For example, before solicitation begins, a solicitor
now must disclose the name of the soliciting organization and the fact
that he is paid."' Similarly, a charity must disclose, at the point of
solicitation, the name of the charitable organization, its principal state
of business, and the purpose of the solicitation." 9 The statute
requires that the charitable organization solicit contributions only for
the purpose stated in its licensing application and apply contributions
only "in a manner substantially consistent with that purpose.""
The new statute also expands the disclosures that charitable
organizations and solicitors must make if the potential donor requests
them to do so. If asked, a charity must reveal what percentage of a
contribution is tax deductible and where the donor may obtain the
charity's written financial disclosure statements. 2 1  Upon request,
an account at a bank or other federally insured financial institution, which
account shall be in the name of that charitable organization or sponsor. The
charitable organization or sponsor shall have sole control of all withdrawals from
the account and the solicitor shall not be given the authority to withdraw any
deposited funds from the account.
Id § 131F-16(i).
114. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
115. Id. at 803; see supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-17(a)(1) (1994) ("Prior to orally requesting a contribution
or along with a written request for a contribution, a solicitor shall clearly disclose: The
name of the solicitor as on file with the Department... [and] [t]hat the caller is a paid
solicitor."). If the individual acting on behalf of the solicitor identifies himself by name,
he must also disclose his legal name. Id § 131F-17(a)(1)(b).
119. I& § 131F-9(b)(1), (2). The texts of § 131F-9(b)(1) and (2) state that:
A charitable organization or sponsor soliciting in [North Carolina] shall include
all of the following disclosures at the point of solicitation: The name of the
charitable organization and state of the principal place of business of the
charitable organization ... [and a] description of the purpose for which the
solicitation is being made ....
Id
120. Id § 131F-9(a).
121. Id. § 131F-9(b)(4). According to the Internal Revenue Code, although many
groups qualify as tax-exempt organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c) (CCH 1993), see supra
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a solicitor must disclose the fixed percentage of gross revenue that the
charitable organization will receive and the percentage of any
donation that would be tax deductible."z  However, because the
Supreme Court has held that states may not mandate words that
would substantially burden free speech, solicitors do not have to
provide this information immediately, but must provide it in writing
within fourteen days of the request.' Finally, both charitable
organizations and solicitors must include a conspicuous disclosure
statement on any written confirmation, request, receipt, or reminder
of contribution.'2 4
Under the new statute, fund-raising consultants and solicitors may
not begin work for a charitable organization before receiving a
solicitation license.' At first glance, this resembles the mandatory
note 85, only contributions to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) charitable organizations are fully
deductible by the contributor. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (CCH 1993). In addition, upon request
the charitable organization must provide the name and either the address or telephone
number of a representative to whom further inquiries could be addressed. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 131F-9(b)(3) (1994).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131F-17(a)(4), (5) (1994). The new statute provides:
If requested by the person being solicited, the solicitor shall inform that person,
in writing, within 14 days of the request, of the fixed percentage of the gross
revenue of the reasonable estimate of the percentage of the gross revenue that
the charitable organization or sponsor will receive as a benefit from the
solicitation campaign. If requested by the person being solicited, the solicitor
shall inform that person, in writing, within 14 days of the request, of the
percentage of the contribution which may be deducted as a charitable
contribution under federal income tax laws.
Id
123. Id
124. Id §§ 131F-9(c), -17(a)(3). This written disclosure statement must be printed in
at least ten-point type and must state: "A COPY OF THE LICENSE TO SOLICIT
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AS A CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION OR
SPONSOR AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, SOLICITATION LICENSING BRANCH,
BY CALLING (919) 733-4510. REGISTRATION DOES NOT IMPLY ENDOR-
SEMENT, APPROVAL, OR RECOMMENDATION BYTHE STATE," id. § 131F-9(c);
or "A COPY OF THE LICENSE AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION OF THE
SOLICITOR MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, SOLICITATION LICENSING BRANCH, BY CALLING (919) 733-4510.
REGISTRATION DOES NOT IMPLY ENDORSEMENT, APPROVAL, OR
RECOMMENDATION BY THE STATE." Id § 131F-17(a)(3).
125. Id. § 131F-15(a) ("Unless exempted under G.S. 131F-3, a person shall not act as
a fund-raising consultant in [North Carolina] unless that person has obtained a license
*from the Department."); Id. § 131F-16(a) ("Unless exempted under G.S. 131F-3, a person
shall not act as a solicitor in [North Carolina] unless that person has obtained a license
from the Department and paid the applicable fees.").
1995] 2519
2320 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
licensing provision struck down by the Supreme Court in Riley.126
However, since the Riley decision, a lower federal court has defined
the minimum due process requirements applicable to licensing
charitable solicitation.l" The new North Carolina statute carefully
incorporates these stringent due process requirements." In fact,
126. The provision struck down in Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781,
802 (1988) read:
A person other than a professional solicitor or professional fund-raising counsel
may solicit contributions after filing the application until the Department notifies
him that the application has been denied .... Any person who acts as a
professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor shall apply for and
obtain an annual license from the Department, and shall not act as a professional
fund-raising counsel or a professional solicitor until after obtaining such license.
Act of June 28, 1985, ch. 497, §§ 3-4, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 551, 551 (repealed 1989)
(emphasis added).
127. Famine Relief Fund v. West Virginia, 905 F.2d 747, 753 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that West Virginia's charitable solicitation act violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process). The Fourth Circuit found that the requirement that a license
be obtained prior to conducting charitable solicitation constituted a prior restraint on a
charity's speech. Ld. The court then noted that the Supreme Court had previously
articulated the due process protections required for any prior restraint on speech. Id.
(citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965) (invalidating state requirement
that a license be acquired prior to publicly screening films)). Specifically, these
requirements include:
First, the state must initiate judicial action to restrict a person's first amendment
right, and the state must have the burden of proof in the action. Second, any
regulatory act must provide assurance that the free exercise of protected speech
will not be delayed while the state seeks judicial review. Third, judicial review
must be prompt.
ld. The court invalidated the West Virginia statute at issue in Famine Relief Fund because
it allowed the state to prohibit solicitation activities without bringing judicial action and
did not specify which party bears the burden of proof once such action was brought. Id.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-16(e) (1994). For example, the new statute provides:
The Department shall examine each application filed by a solicitor. If the
Department determines that the requirements are not satisfied, the Department
shall notify the solicitor within 10 days after its receipt of the application. If the
Department does not respond within 10 days, the license is deemed approved.
Within seven days after receipt of a notification that the requirements are not
satisfied, the applicant may request a hearing. The state shall bear the burden
of proof at such hearing. The hearing shall be held within seven days after
receipt of the request. Any recommended order, if one is issued, shall be
rendered within three days after the hearing. The final order shall then be issued
within two days after the recommended order. If there is no recommended
order, the final order shall be issued within five days after the hearing. The
proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with Chapter 150B of the General
Statutes, except that the time limits and provision set forth in this subsection
prevail to the extent of any conflict. The applicant shall be permitted to continue
to operate or continue operations pending judicial review of the Department's
denial of the application. The Department shall make rules regarding the
custody and control of any funds collected during the review period and disposal
of such funds in the event the denial of the application is affirmed on appeal.
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the review requirements for the department and its role in contested
case hearings are more arduous than those of any other state
government agency. 29  Under the 1994 statute, the Department
must make a determination on each application within ten days of its
submission." If the Department notifies the applicant within those
ten days that the application is incomplete, the applicant then has
seven days to file a petition for a contested case.' At that
contested case hearing, which must be heard within seven days, the
state bears the burden of proving that the application does not satisfy
the statutory requirements.' These provisions are designed to
balance the state's interest in preventing fraud with the applicant's
free speech rights. The balance is achieved by allowing the state a
brief opportunity to review the application. The statute also provides
that the applicant may "continue operation pending judicial review of
the Department's denial of the application."' 3 However, the
Department is authorized to make rules regarding the custody and
disposition of any funds collected during the review period in the
event that the application denial is affirmed on appeal."
The new charitable solicitation statute was enacted to provide
North Carolinians greater protection from charity fraud. The
statute singles out solicitors-those professional fund-raisers who
receive, handle, and control the money contributed to charity. To this
group, it applies very stringent licensing, record-keeping, reporting,
and bonding requirements. 6  The statute also provides the public
with greater disclosure rights,'37 a potentially powerful tool in the
public's effort to track the ultimate disposition of its contributions.
However, neither of these protections is very effective without strong
state enforcement. Whether the new charitable solicitation statute
it Similar provisions appear in § 131F-5(b) (regarding charitable organizations) and §
131F-15(e) (regarding fund-raising consultants).
129. Telephone Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 3. These stringent
procedures are part of the General Assembly's efforts to ensure that the new statute would
prevail against any future constitutional challenge. IAL
130. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 131F-5(b), -15(e), -16(e) (1994). If the Department does not
respond within 10 days, the license is deemed approved. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 131F-1 ("It is the intent of the General Assembly to prohibit deception,
fraud, and misrepresentation in the solicitation and reporting of contributions.").
136. See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
1995] 2321
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
achieves its full potential may depend on the resources committed to
enforcement.
The new statute imposes a substantial administrative burden on
all solicitors through its extensive record-keeping and reporting
requirements." Some solicitors must now bear the additional burden
of maintaininga much larger surety bond. 9 This burden is particu-
larly heavy if the bonding company requires-as such companies often
do-that the surety bond be capitalized."' The General Assembly
believed the requirements were justified by the fact that solicitors
receive, handle and control monetary contributions, and therefore the
potential for fraud or misrepresentation is great among solicitors.""
To avoid these burdensome requirements, some solicitors may
elect to stop handling contributions. They would thereby become
fund-raising consultants142 with a correspondingly lower ad-
ministrative burden and freedom from bonding requirements.143 If
a significant portion of the charity fraud in North Carolina is in fact
due to professional solicitors, a decrease in the number of solicitors
should result in less charity fraud.
A fundamental premise of the new statute is that informed
consumers are better able to protect themselves from misrepresen-
tation and fraud.' To that end, the statute provides potential
charitable donors with the full range of disclosure rights allowed
under the Constitution.45 By exercising the right to request
detailed financial information, a consumer could discover, for
example, that the charity will receive only twenty-five cents of every
dollar donated and that no part of the contribution will be tax
138. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
140. Telephone Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 3. However, one of the
most difficult frauds for the Department to detect is the use of falsified bonds. Id.
Therefore, the Department is concerned that unscrupulous solicitors might successfully
minimize the burden of the new bonding requirements by presenting falsified bonds from
out-of-state bonding companies. IM
141. Id. Under the former statute, solicitors as a group were less compliant with the
regulatory requirements than were other fund-raisers or charities. I.
142. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-1 (1994) ("It is the intent of the General Assembly to
protect the public by requiring full disclosure by persons who solicit contributions from the
public of the purposes for which the contributions are solicited and how the contributions
are actually used.").
145. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
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deductible.' However, these rights are of little use if the potential
donor does not know they exist.147 The new statute instructs the
Department to develop a public information program "to help the
public recognize unlawful, misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent
solicitations and to make knowledgeable, informed decisions
concerning contributions."' 4  Unfortunately, this program is likely
to be a very low priority for the Department.'49 The highest priority
task for the two-person Solicitation Licensing Branch is meeting the
statute's very tight deadlines for processing the approximately 1,500
solicitation license applications each year.' ° Therefore, because the
public is likely to remain unaware of its rights under the new statute,
the expanded disclosure requirements will not prevent fraud as
effectively as they could were the public fully informed.
Finally, enforcing the new statute will likely be difficult for
several reasons. First, because the general public will be unaware of
its right to demand increased disclosure, much misrepresentation will
likely go undetected and therefore unreported. In addition, con-
sumers who do register complaints with the Department about
146. Contributions solicited by Telecom would fit this description. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text. Telecom solicited money for two Police Benevolent Societies which
are unions, not charities, according to Internal Revenue Service classifications. Telephone
Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 3. Therefore, no money donated to either
group is tax-deductible. Id
147. Interview with Lionel Randolph, Solicitation Licensing Branch, North Carolina
Department of Human Resources, in Raleigh, N.C. (Jan. 31, 1995). The state does not
currently conduct a public education program to alert consumers to the dangers of charity
fraud. I
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-25(a) (1994). The statute also calls for the Department
to prepare an annual report summarizing the information filed under the new statute. Id
§ 131F-25(c). This report must include a list of violations discovered and investigations
undertaken. Id § 131F-25(c)(1), (2). However, for the last several years, the Department
has prepared a report linking solicitors to their charity clients and revealing, for each
solicitor, what percentage of the funds solicited was actually delivered to the charity. See,
e.g., 1993 Detailed Summary, supra note 1. Because this report reveals the track record
of solicitors who actively solicit contributions, it is potentially more useful to the consumer
deciding whether to make a contribution than a list of violations. The Department's report
is distributed to Better Business Bureaus and news agencies throughout the state.
Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 147. These groups then make their own
decisions as to how to disseminate the information to the public. Id
149. Telephone Interview with Darlene Graham, supra note 77.
150. IM Currently in North Carolina, there are 243 licensed professional fund-raisers,
75% of which are fund-raising consultants, and 1,292 licensed non-profits, the majority of
which are charities. Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra, note 147. The Solicitation
Licensing Branch staff must also respond to inquires from the regulated community,
address consumer complaints, investigate charges of fraud or misrepresentation, and
prepare documents for contested case hearings. Id
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charitable solicitations are often unwilling to sign a statement detailing
the incident, which is necessary for the Department to begin an inves-
tigation." Finally, it is exceptionally difficult for the Department
to gather the evidence necessary to bring a civil or criminal case 52
against a charity or fund-raiser. Because fund-raisers do not have to
notify the Department of whom they intend to solicit, it is extremely
difficult for the Department to detect solicitation fraud in progress.
If a consumer does happen to record the solicitation call, such
evidence is often not admissible in court.53 Therefore, as in the
past, the Department is more likely to negotiate a consent order with
the fund-raiser than to bring civil or criminal charges."a  Although
the new statute appears to give the state stronger enforcement tools,
the fact that the state is rarely able to bring a civil or criminal case
means that these tools will really have little effect on fraud preven-
tion.
Seven years ago, the United States Supreme Court declared
significant portions of North Carolina's charitable solicitation statute
unconstitutional. 55 Last summer, the General Assembly acted to
reassert its substantial interest in protecting North Carolinians from
fraudulent solicitations.'56 This new charitable solicitation statute
steers well clear of constitutional challenges: It "recognizes the right
of persons or organizations to conduct solicitation activities"'57 and
151. Telephone Interview with Darlene Graham, supra note 77.
152. The statute defines violation of any provision as "an unfair trade practice." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 131F-21 (1994). The statute also provides that "any person who willfully and
knowingly violates a provision... commits a Class I misdemeanor." Id. § 131F- 22. As
originally drafted, the statute provided that a willful violation constituted a Class J felony.
Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 147. The felony provision was significant
because a felony conviction for solicitation fraud in any state is enough to prevent that
fund-raiser from obtaining a solicitation license in any other state. ICE However, the
General Assembly, citing concern for small charitable organizations, deleted the felony
provision from the final statute. Id.
The statute also provides that "[i]n addition to other remedies authorized by law, the
Attorney General may bring a civil action in superior court to enforce" the statute. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 131F-24(a) (1994). Upon finding a violation, a court may impose civil
penalties of up to $10,000 per violation. Id.
153. Federal wiretapping laws generally exclude such tapes made without a proper
court order. Interview with Lionel Randolph, supra note 147.
154. Id. Unfortunately, in the Department's experience, fund-raisers often ignore the
terms of such consent agreements. IM
155. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 803 (1988); see supra notes 46-
62 and accompanying text.
156. Act of June 15, 1994, ch. 759, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 594 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 131F-1 to -28 (1994)).
157. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131F-1 (1994).
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limits solicitation only in ways that have been upheld by lower
courts.'58 However, the statute's most significant protections-the
disclosure requirements-will be ineffective without a program of
consumer education. Because enforcement of a statute of this nature
relies on consumers to demand information about solicitors and
charities, an informed public will be the state's best defense against
charity fraud.
MARTHA ALLEN GODIN
158. See supra notes 69-76, 94-134 and accompanying text.
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State v. Daniels: Chief Justice Exum's Quantum Theory of
Expert Psychiatric Testimony
Dr. Cynthia White, a psychiatric expert, had never even met John
Daniels.' What she told a Mecklenburg County jury about him,
though, may have put him on death row.2 TWo expert witnesses, a
psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist, had already testified at
Daniels's trial Based on their clinical examinations of Daniels and
other information, each concluded that, at the time Daniels attacked
his wife and killed his aunt, he suffered from serious and chronic
mental problems, was under the influence of drugs and alcohol, lacked
specific intent to kill,4 and had since demonstrated remorse.5
Nevertheless, after Dr. White told the jury that Daniels was someone
who felt justified in harming others, who had built up a resistance to
the effects of drugs and alcohol, and who probably could not be
treated, the jury sentenced Daniels to death.6
In State v. Daniels,7 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
expert psychiatric testimony at a capital sentencing hearing could be
based on review of the reports of other doctors, a discussion with the
doctor supervising the accused, and interviews with the accused's
friends, former employers, and family-even though the expert
conducted no in-person tests or evaluations!
This Note first summarizes the facts and trial developments of the
Daniels case,9 and then discusses the North Carolina Supreme Court's
analysis in Daniels of whether a clinical interview should be a
prerequisite to competent psychiatric testimony.'0 The Note next
considers the United States Supreme Court's treatment of the
constitutional aspects of psychiatric testimony, as well as two of North
1. See State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243,269,446 S.E.2d 298,314 (1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 953 (1995).
2. Id. at 297, 446 S.E.2d at 331-32 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
3. See id. at 255, 446 S.E.2d at 306.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 291, 446 S.E.2d at 327-28 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
6. See id. at 297, 446 S.E.2d at 331-32 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
7. 337 N.C. 243, 446 SYE-2d 298 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 953 (1995).
8. Id. at 268-71, 446 S.E.2d at 314-15.
9. See infra notes 15-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 37-53 and accompanying text.
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Carolina's doctrines governing bases of expert testimony." Finally,
after examining Chief Justice Exum's dissenting opinion in Danie' 2
calling for an examination requirement,' the Note concludes that
the court majority reached the proper conclusion, given the state of
the law.'4
On January 17, 1990, John Dennis Daniels was arrested after an
altercation in which he physically attacked his wife and son,
threatened to kill a neighbor, and set fire to his home." Daniels had
a history of drug and alcohol abuse, and on the day of his arrest, had
consumed alcoholic beverages and used cocaine.' 6 En route to the
police station, he told the officers that he believed he might have
killed his elderly aunt, Isabelle Crawford, earlier that day.'7 He
directed them to her residence, where they discovered her strangled
body.'" Later, at the police station, Daniels wrote a letter to the
governor asserting that he was "not crazy."' 9 Shortly thereafter, he
made an apparent suicide attempt, but was unharmed.' Even
11. See infra notes 54-105 and accompanying text.
12. Chief Justice Exun concurred with the majority about several issues raised by the
defendant regarding the guilt phase of the trial, but dissented from the holding that the
admission of Dr. White's testimony was not in error. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 288-89, 446
S.E.2d at 326 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. See infra notes 110-82 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
15. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 252-53, 446 S.E.2d at 304-05. After ingesting a quantity of
cocaine, Daniels used a hammer, a kerosene heater, and a rock from an aquarium to beat
his wife and son. Id. When they escaped from the house, he used a knife to threaten a
neighbor who had come to investigate the commotion. Id. at 253, 446 S.E2d at 305.
Sometime during the incident, a fire broke out in Daniels's house. Id. Firefighters soon
arrived and retrieved him from the burning house, whereupon he was placed under arrest
by police. Id.
16. Id at 252, 446 S.E.2d at 304; see id. at 255, 466 S.E.2d at 306.
17. Id. at 253, 446 S.E.2d at 305.
18. Id. Daniels had not yet consumed any cocaine when he strangled his aunt. Id. at
252, 446 S.E.2d at 304. He had gone to his aunt's house earlier in the day to ask if she
would give him money and take in his wife and son. When she refused, Daniels struck her
in the face and then strangled her with a cord. After dragging the body to the back of the
house, he found her purse and took $70 to $80 from it, which he used to purchase cocaine.
He then returned to his house and smoked the cocaine. Id.
19. I at 254, 446 S.E.2d at 305.
20. Id. After hearing a noise, an officer in an adjoining room entered the room where
Daniels had been detained. He found Daniels, unhurt, lying on the floor with a drawstring
from his pants tied around his neck; another drawstring was attached to a filing cabinet
four feet, three inches high. Id At trial, the State's expert witness expressed doubt that
Daniels had seriously intended to take his own life either in this incident or when, earlier,
he had gone inside his burning house. Id at 289, 446 S.E.2d at 326-27 (Exum, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 15.
1995] 2327
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
though he had been advised of his Miranda rights, Daniels confessed
to killing his aunt.2'
At trial, two expert witnesses testified for the defense on the
issue of Daniels's mental capacity z Both relied on their personal
interviews and testing of Daniels, as well as other information, Dr.
Tyson, a clinical psychologist, testified that Daniels suffered from
chronic and pervasive mixed personality disorder, substance depen-
dencies, and impaired emotional and social development.' In Dr.
'Iyson's estimation, Daniels would have had little or no capacity to
evaluate his behavior on the day of the killing.' Dr. Bolinsky, a
psychiatrist, diagnosed Daniels with an "unspecified personality
disorder" and chronic depression? He further noted that Daniels
had shown remorse and probably would not have killed his aunt but
for his chronic depression and his chronic and acute substance
abuse2 Dr. Bolinsky testified that Daniels's capacity to form
specific intent to kill was profoundly impaired, if not absent al-
together.28
In spite of the expert testimony, the jury convicted Daniels of
first degree murder, various assault charges, and attempting to burn
a dwelling house. 9 At the sentencing hearing, the state presented
one expert witness.3 Dr. White, an expert in psychiatry, diagnosed
Daniels as having antisocial personality disorder (APD)?' Dr. White
21. Id. at 254, 446 S.E.2d at 305.
22. Id at 254-55, 446 S.E.2d at 306.
23. IM. at 255, 446 S.E.2d at 306. Dr. Tyson interviewed Daniels between 90 minutes
and two hours, conducted psychological tests, and reviewed previous evaluations by other
doctors. Id. Dr. Bolinsky conducted two interviews with Daniels and reviewed his medical
records. Id.
24. Id. Dr. Tyson noted that Daniels had a history of drug abuse that would have
aggravated his mental condition. Id. He found Daniels's emotional and social
development comparable to that of "an eleven- or twelve-year-old child." IM.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 291, 446 S.E.2d at 327 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
28. Id. at 255, 446 S.E.2d at 306.
29. Id. at 251-52, 446 S.E.2d at 304. The murder conviction rested on both felony
murder and premeditation and deliberation theories. IlL at 252, 446 S.E.2d at 304.
30. Id. at 268, 446 S.E.2d at 314.
31. Id at 289, 446 S.E.2d at 326 (Exum, C.L, concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Antisocial personality disorder "reflects continuous and chronic antisocial behavior
involving many aspects of the patient's adolescent and adult adjustment." HAROLD I.
KAPLAN ET AL., COMPRBHENSrVE TXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 975 (4th ed. 1985). It "can
be distinguished from illegal behavior per se because antisocial personality disorder
involves many areas of the person's life." Id. at 978:
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testified that persons with APD feel justified in harming others and
may feign remorse or suicide to gain sympathy." She added that
there is generally no effective treatment for APD. 3  Dr. White
based her opinion on reports prepared by other doctors who had
interviewed Daniels, a discussion with his supervising doctor, and
interviews with his friends, employers, and family.3 4 Daniels ob-
jected to the admission of Dr. White's testimony because she had not
personally interviewed him, but the trial court overruled the objec-
tion. 5 Daniels received a death sentence for the murder, plus thirty
years for the arson and assault charges?6
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the murder conviction
and death penalty. 7 Justice Meyer, writing for the majority, rejected
Daniels's contention that the trial court erred in overruling his
objection to Dr. White's testimony.38 He concluded that under Rule
702 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence,39 a personal interview
with the subject is not a prerequisite to competent expert psychiatric
32. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 289,446 S.E.2d at 326-27 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Dr. White also noted that Daniels's chronic drug and alcohol abuse
would have led to a high drug and alcohol tolerance, substantially reducing the impairing
effect of the substances he ingested on the day of the killings. Id at 290, 446 S.E.2d at 327
(Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Dr. Bolinsky disagreed; in his
opinion, Daniels's substance abuse was of an episodic type that did not lead to tolerance.
Id. at 291, 446 S.E.2d at 327 (Exurn, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. Id. at 289, 446 S.E.2d at 326 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
34. Id. at 269, 446 S.E.2d at 314.
35. Ld. at 268, 446 S.E.2d at 314.
36. Id. at 252, 446 S.E.2d at 304.
37. Id. The conviction and sentence for attempting to burn a dwelling house were
affirmed also, but the court ordered a resentencing on the three assault convictions. Id.
at 288, 446 S.E.2d at 326.
38. Id. at 268, 446 S.E.2d at 314. Daniels also alleged several other errors relating to
his conviction and sentencing: matters of evidence, id. at 260-66,446 S.E.2d at 309-13, jury
instruction, id. at 266-67, 446 S.E.2d at 312-13, permissible scope of final argument, id. at
275-78, 446 S.E.2d at 318-20, the defendant's right to be present at the proceedings, id. at
256-58, 446 S.E.2d at 306-09, and the constitutionality of the death penalty, id. at 281, 446
S.E.2d at 322. All were found to be either without merit or harmless error. Id. at 256-81,
446 S.E.2d at 306-22. As required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1988), the court
also reviewed the proportionality of Daniels's death sentence with respect to similar North
Carolina death penalty cases. Id. at 281, 446 S.E2d at 322. The court held that the
sentence was proportionate. Id. at 281-87, 446 S.E.2d at 322-25. The court did uncover
a sentencing error with respect to the assault convictions and remanded for resentencing
on those counts, id. at 288, 446 S.E.2d at 326, but it found no error affecting the validity
of the murder conviction or death sentence. Id. at 252, 446 S.E.2d at 304.
39. The North Carolina Rules of Evidence are codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1
(1992).
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testimony.' The issue, Justice Meyer noted, was not whether
testimony based on personal interviews is more reliable, but whether
Dr. White's conclusions in this case were derived from "entirely
unreliable" bases.4' Justice Meyer found "no evidence that opinions
based upon extensive research of psychiatric files of a defendant,
written evaluations of defendant by other doctors, and interviews with
defendant's friends and family are inherently unreliable."'42 Justice
Meyer added that psychiatric authorities emphasized the importance
of historical data in making a diagnosis of APD.43 Furthermore, he
reasoned, Dr. White's bases were at least as reliable as a hypothetical
question, the use of which was permitted under the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence." Therefore, Justice Meyer concluded, Dr.
White's bases were adequate.4 Finally, the majority expressed
confidence that any deficiencies in Dr. White's diagnosis could have
been brought out through cross-examination and other trial proces-
ses.
4 6
Chief Justice Exum dissented in part from the majority opinion,
maintaining that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. White's tes-
timony.47 He emphasized that the issue in this case was not whether
the types of materials relied upon by Dr. White might properly form
the basis of an expert opinion, but whether there was a sufficient
amount of information underlying Dr. White's diagnosis' If the
foundation for the expert testimony is inadequate, then the testimony
itself is not sufficiently reliable and should be excluded.49 The Chief
Justice emphasized that psychiatric authorities were unanimously of
the view that, without a personal interview and examination,
40. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 269,446 S.E.2d at 314. North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702
provides: "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion." N.C. R. EvID. 702.
41. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 269, 446 S.E2d at 314.
42. Id
43. Id. at 269-70,446 S.E.2d at 315 (citing 3 HAROLD I. KAPLAN ET AL:, COMPREHEN-
SIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 2822-24 (3d ed. 1980)).
44. Id at 270, 446 S.E.2d at 315 (citing N.C. R. Evm. 703 official commentary).
45. See id
46. Id at 271, 446 S.E.2d at 315.
47. Id at 288-89, 446 S.E.2d at 326 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
48. Id at 291-92, 446 S.E.2d at 328 (Exum, C.I, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
49. Id (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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diagnoses of a defendant's mental condition were unreliable.50 He
also referred to decisions in other jurisdictions, to the North Carolina
Supreme Court's own decisions, and to other legal authority empha-
sizing the importance of personal examinations."' Chief Justice
Exum then described the ways in which Dr. White's failure to
interview Daniels in the instant case undermined the reliability of her
testimony.52 Finally, the Chief Justice argued that ascribing deficien-
cies in the reliability of evidence to that evidence's weight, and not to
its admissibility, is inappropriate if "[its] reliability falls below a
judicially acceptable level. '5 3
The United States Supreme Court addressed the necessity of
conducting personal examinations in reaching reliable psychiatric
diagnoses in Barefoot v. Estelle. 4 Barefoot had been convicted of
capital murder;55 under Texas law, at the sentencing proceeding the
jury was to determine whether his conduct had been deliberate, with
a reasonable expectation of causing death, and whether it was
probable that he would commit violent criminal acts in the future.56
The State presented two psychiatric experts who, on the basis of
hypothetical questions, and without having personally interviewed the
defendant, stated that Barefoot probably would continue to commit
similar crimes5 7 Barefoot challenged the resulting death sentence
on two theories.58 First, he contended that psychiatrists as a class
were incompetent to predict future dangerousness with any "acce-
ptable degree of reliability., 59  Second, he argued that, even if
50. Id. at 293, 446 S.E.2d at 329 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
51. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 293-96, 446 S.E.2d at 329-31 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 296 n.6, 446 S.E.2d at 331 n.6 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see infra notes 125-54 and accompanying text.
52. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 295-96, 446 S.E.2d at 330 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 297, 446 S.E.2d at 331 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
54. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
55. Barefoot fatally shot a police officer who had stopped him for questioning in
connection with an arson investigation. Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). Apparently, Barefoot set fire to a night club
earlier and told acquaintances that he intended to commit a series of robberies. Id. at 878-
79.
56. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 883-84.
57. Id. at 884.
58. Id, at 896. Barefoot also asserted a third claim-that the psychiatrist's testimony
in his particular case was unreliable, which the Court also rejected. Id. at 904-05.
59. Id. Indeed, one study suggested that psychiatrists' predictions of future dangerous-
ness were wrong in two out of three cases. Id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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psychiatrists were to be permitted to testify as to future dangerous-
ness, a personal examination was a necessary prerequisite to a
credible evaluation.' The American Psychiatric Association (APA),
as amicus curiae, supported both propositions.61
The Supreme Court rejected each of Barefoot's contentions.62
It noted that established law permitted lay persons to assess the
likelihood that a defendant would commit dangerous acts in the
future.' It would thus be inconsistent to find extensively trained
psychiatric experts incompetent to make similar determinations. 4
Generally, the Court noted, relevant non-privileged information
should be submitted to the finder of fact to be considered in light of
cross-examination and contrary evidence.' The Court was "not per-
suaded that [expert] testimony [relating to future dangerousness] is
almost entirely unreliable and that the factfinder and the adversary
60. Id. at 896.
61. Id at 899. The APA explained:
[Miedical knowledge has simply not advanced to the point where long-term
predictions-the type of testimony at issue in this case-may be made with even
reasonable accuracy. The large body of research in this area indicates that, even
under the best of conditions, psychiatric predictions of long-term future
dangerousness are wrong in at least two out of every three cases.
The forecast of future violent conduct on the part of a defendant in a capital
case is, at bottom, a lay determination, not an expert psychiatric determination.
To the extent such predictions have any validity, they can only be made on the
basis of essentially actuarial data to which psychiatrists, qua psychiatrists, can
bring no special interpretative skills....
It is evident from the testimony in this case that the key clinical deter-
mination relied upon by both psychiatrists was their diagnosis of "sociopathy" or
"antisocial personality disorder." However, such a diagnosis simply cannot be
made on the basis of a hypothetical question. Absent an in-depth psychiatric
examination and evaluation, the psychiatrist cannot exclude alternative diagnoses;
nor can he assure that the necessary criteria for making the diagnosis in question
are met.
Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 8-9, Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
62. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
63. Id at 896-98 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 264-76 (1976)). In Jurek, the
Court upheld the Texas capital sentencing statute that called for the jury to assess whether,
among other things, there was a "probability" that the defendant would commit future
crimes of violence. 428 U.S. 262, 269, 274-76 (1976). It stated: "The task that a Texas
jury must perform in answering the statutory question in issue is thus basically no different
from the task performed countless times each day throughout the American system of
criminal justice." Id at 275-76; see also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 (1981)
(clarifying that Jurek in no way disapproved of the use of psychiatric testimony bearing on
future dangerousness).
64. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896-97. But see infra note 128 (explaining that widespread
use of a scientific technique does not necessarily dictate the validity of the technique).
65. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898.
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system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due
account of its shortcomings."' ' The Court endorsed hypothetical
question examination as a basis for such opinions, noting that those
opinions had long been recognized as acceptable when they might be
helpful to the trier of fact.67 This was so, the Court held, even in the
context of capital sentencing.'
Addressing Barefoot's second argument, the Supreme Court held
that, as a constitutional matter, a personal examination was not
necessary in order for psychiatric testimony to be admissible.
69
Whether a particular state's law of evidence requires such an
examination, however, is a separate question. North Carolina Rule
of Evidence 703 states that expert witnesses may base opinion
testimony on "facts or data.., perceived by or made known to [the
66. Id. at 899. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun sharply questioned this
conclusion. He noted that members of the public tend to have an exaggerated opinion of
the accuracy of scientific testimony, id. at 926-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and that a
scientific conclusion that a defendant would pose a danger in the future would be difficult
to assail because a "reputable" defense expert would be unable to state with certainty that
the defendant would not be dangerous, id. at 934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). At best, the
defense expert could insist that such determinations cannot be made. Id (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. at 903.
68. Id. at 904. The Court has previously held that Fifth Amendment concerns might
be implicated in psychiatric examinations by experts testifying for the prosecution in
certain cases. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,464-65 (1981). In Smith, the Court found
the privilege against self-incrimination "directly involved ... because the State used as
evidence against [Smith] the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric
examination." Id. The Court held:
A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts
to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a
psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing
proceeding. Because [Smith] did not voluntarily consent to the pretrial
psychiatric examination after being informed of his right to remain silent and the
possible use of his statements, the State could not rely on what he said to Dr.
Grigson to establish his future dangerousness.
Id, at 468. Moreover, Smith had a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel
before submitting to such an interview. Id. at 469; see also Christopher Slobogin, Estelle
v. Smith.. The Constitutional Contours of the Forensic Evaluation, 31 EMORY L.J. 71,135-
38 (1982) (summarizing indigent defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to clinical
evaluations in three different trial stages). Six years later, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, the
Court clarified that if the defendant requests a psychiatric evaluation or presents
psychiatric evidence, the prosecution may "at the very least" use the requested reports to
rebut the defendant's presentation. 483 U.S. 402, 422-23 (1987); see also Brock Mehler,
The Supreme Court and State Psychiatric Examinations of Capital Defendants: Stuck Inside
of Jurek with the Barefoot Blues Again, 59 UMKC L. REV. 107, 117-18 (1990) (discussing
Buchanan and related cases).
69. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 904.
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expert] at or before the hearing."70 The official commentary to Rule
703 lists personal observation, hypothetical questions, and the
presentation of data outside of court as possible bases of expert
testimony' Since personal observation is listed as merely one
possible basis, it appears that the legislature did not intend an
absolute requirement of personal observation.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has supported this
interpretation.' In State v. Smith,3 the court held that personal
observation was not an essential foundation of expert testimony.4
Smith was convicted of engaging in sexual intercourse and other
sexual misconduct with two young girls who lived with him in a
mobile home.' He argued on appeal that the trial court erred in
admitting expert testimony that it was likely that intercourse had
occurred, because the opinion was not based on a personal examina-
tion, but on a review of medical reports and consultations with other
doctors. 6 The court disagreed, stating that the correct basis of
expert testimony was not personal observation, but knowledge. 7
Rule 703, the court held, permits an expert to arrive at his opinion by
applying his experience and training to a body of information "of the
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field." 87
70. N.C. R. EVID. 703.
71. Id
72. See infra notes 73-106 and accompanying text.
73. 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985).
74. Id at 100-01, 337 S.E2d at 849.
75. Id. at 79, 337 S.E.2d at 836-37.
76. Id. at 100, 337 S.E.2d at 849.
77. Id. at 101, 337 S.E.2d at 849 (citing State v. Bright, 301 N.C. 243, 271 S.E2d 368
(1980)).
78. Id; accord State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 406,410-11,368 S.E.2d 844, 846 (1988) ("This
Court also has held that Rule 703 permits an expert witness to base an opinion on the out-
of-court opinion of an expert who does not testify.") (citations omitted); State v. Bright,
320 N.C. 491, 499, 358 S.E2d 498, 502 (1987) (finding no abuse of discretion where the
trial court permitted an expert to testify to an opinion based on records of a state agency,
where such records were reasonably relied upon by those in the field). The court has
recognized that a conversation between a defendant and a trained professional is
"undoubtedly superior to any other method the courts have for gaining access to an
allegedly insane defendant's mind," State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454,463,251 S.E2d 407,412
(1979), but to endorse a particular technique is not to require its use. See Daniels, 337
N.C. at 271, 446 S.E.2d at 315 ("While it may be better practice to actually interview a
defendant before reaching a decision on his mental capacity, a personal interview is not
required by our case law... or our Rules of Evidence for an opinion of a psychiatrist to
be reliable and admissible.")
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On the other hand, although experts are normally deemed
competent to judge the adequacy of the bases of their own
opinions, 9 North Carolina courts have held that expert testimony
may be excluded if the trial judge determines that its basis is
inadequate. In Service Co. v. Sales Co.,s the court stated: "If the
opinion of an expert witness 'is based on obviously inadequate data,
the trial judge may properly refuse to allow it to go to the jury.' 81
In that case, the court sustained the exclusion of testimony that was
based on an experiment when the trial court record did not disclose
crucial information affecting the relevance of the result.'
The same principle was applied to expert medical testimony in
Branch v. Dempsey.' Branch involved a wrongful death suit
resulting from a collision between a car and a truck.' 4 The trial
court excluded the testimony of a physician who had conducted what
the physician himself described as a " 'purely superficial
examination' " of the body at the hospital.' Such a limited inves-
tigation, the court held, "did not qualify him to express an opinion as
to the cause of death upon the basis of his own findings," and the
questions asked "were not in the proper form to permit him to do so
on the basis of an hypothesis. 8
6
In Donavant v. Hudspeth' the North Carolina Supreme Court
distinguished between an expert opinion based on "facts and data"
collected from other professionals in the field and one based on "a
79. McCORIMCK ON EVIDENCE § 15 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1994).
80. 259 N.C. 400, 131 S.E2d 9 (1963).
81. 1& at 411, 131 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting DALE F. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 136, at 270 (1946)).
82. Id. at 411, 131 S.E.2d at 18. The plaintiff had arranged to manufacture a certain
automotive part for the defendant and was suing for breach of contract. Id. at 404-05, 131
S.E.2d at 13-14. After the devices were actually installed in cars, problems arose; each
party blamed the other. ld. at 405-07, 131 S.E.2d at 14-16. The defendant attempted to
introduce the results of "experiments" conducted by an expert. The experiments tended
to show that the defect was in the manufacture rather than the installation. See id at 408-
09, 131 S.E,2d at 16-17. The court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony
as to four of the tests because the record did not disclose what opinions the expert formed
as a result of the tests. Id. at 411, 131 S.E.2d at 18. The expert's opinion about the
remaining test was excluded "because the data was inadequate for opinion purposes." Id.
For example, it was not clear whether the test was conducted with initial test units or with
a sample from the final deliveries. Id
83. 265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E2d 395 (1965).
84. Id at 735, 145 S.E.2d at 397.
85. Id at 747, 145 S.E.2d at 405 (quoting the examining physician).
86. Id
87. 318 N.C. 1, 347 S.E2d 797 (1986).
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mere statement of a conclusion" relayed by another expert.88
Donavant involved a medical malpractice suit brought by a patient
who had undergone coronary bypass surgery.89 The testifying expert
was a medical doctor who had been informed by another doctor by
telephone that the initial operation had been flawed.90 The plaintiff
sought to introduce the expert's testimony about the opinion he had
formed at that point as a result of the telephone call.91 The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the testimony.' Because
the witness had, at the time, "merely adopted an opinion allegedly
formed by another cardiologist," without any further information
about the operation, the court held that his opinion did not meet the
requirement that "the opinion be one formed by the physician relying
'on his personal knowledge and expertise.' "'
Although the North Carolina Rules of Evidence do not directly
address whether an expert psychiatric witness must base his testimony
on personal examinations,94 Rule 702 appears to buttress the case
law framework.95  It provides: "If scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion."96  Logically, expert
testimony based on an unreliable foundation would not assist the trier
of fact; it would therefore be irrelevant,97 and should be excluded.98
.88. Id. at 24, 347 S.E.2d at 811.
89. l. at 3, 347 S.E2d at 799.
90. Id. at 4, 347 S.E2d at 800.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 24, 347 S.E.2d at 811.
93. Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 101, 337 S.E.2d 833, 849 (1985)). The
court was not condemning consultation with other experts in the field as a diagnostic tool;
rather, it held that an expert could not present a purported expert "opinion" where the
sole source of information was the conclusion of another expert. See id.
94. Rule 702 governs the circumstances in which the admission of expert testimony is
appropriate; Rule 703 addresses the sources of the information constituting the expert
opinion's foundation. See N.C. R. EvID. 702, 703 and official commentary.
95. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 292,446 S.E.2d at 328 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding the principle that expert opinion not supported by an adequate
foundation should be excluded to be "implicit" in Rule 703).
96. N.C. R. EVID. 702.
97. Professor McCormick described the two elements of relevance as materiality and
probative value. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1994).
Evidence is material if it tends to resolve a matter in issue. Id. The probative value of
evidence is its tendency to establish the matter it is offered to prove. Id. Thus, the
inadequately based opinion of an expert witness as to a defendant's mental capacity at the
time of the offense may be material because, if true, it tends to resolve a matter in issue
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Since the adoption of the Rules, the court has not expressly
woven Rule 702 into its decisions on the adequacy of foundations for
expert testimony.9 However, it appears clear that Rule 702 has not
altered the analysis. In State v. Rogers,10 the defendant claimed
error in his conviction on two counts of murder because the trial court
excluded the testimony of his medical expert.1"' After testifying
about the defendant's history of chemical dependency and the amount
of alcohol the defendant had consumed on the day in question, the
expert had been asked to estimate the defendant's blood alcohol
content at the time of the killings."° The trial court sustained the
State's objection that the expert was " 'guessing at too many
things.' ""0 The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, finding
the data inadequate to support an opinion for the purpose of
testifying."t 4 "Opinion testimony based on inadequate data," it
reiterated, "should be excluded. '11a5
TWo themes have emerged from the court's past decisions. First,
an expert opinion need not be based on information gathered through
(such as mens rea). However, such an opinion may be irrelevant and therefore excludable
because the probative value is poor-that is, because the testimony does not tend to
establish the matter it is offered to prove.
98. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 291-92,446 S.E2d at 328 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
99. The North Carolina Rules of Evidence became effective July 1, 1984. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-1 editor's note. Chief Justice Exum's dissent in Daniels suggests that the court
had in fact considered this implication of Rule 702 in State v. Clark, 324 N.C. 146,160,377
S.E.2d 54, 62 (1989). See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 292, 446 S.E.2d at 328 (Exum, CJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Clark, the defendant was convicted of capital
murder and conspiracy in the planned killing of her abusive estranged husband. 324 N.C.
at 149, 377 S.E.2d at 57. The trial court excluded the testimony of a defense expert on the
ground that it expressed an opinion on the ultimate issue to be decided and thereby
intruded on the jury's role. Id. at 159, 377 S.E.2d at 62. The court found that, while
exclusion on those grounds was improper, see id. (citing N.C. R. EvID. 704), the testimony
nevertheless should have been excluded because it was "liberally laced with equivocation,"
and thus "would not have 'assist[ed] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.' " Id at 160, 377 S.E.2d at 62-63 (citing N.C. R. EVID. 702)
(alteration in original). Rule 702 was invoked in Clark not because of the inadequacy of
the expert's foundation, but because of the quality and form of the opinion itself. The
court did not reach the question of whether the underlying basis of the equivocal opinion
was adequate. An equivocal opinion may not be of assistance to the trier of fact just as
an inadequately founded opinion may not be, but they are different (although potentially
related) problems.
100. 323 N.C. 658, 374 S.E.2d 852 (1989).
101. Ie at 664, 374 S.E.2d at 856.
102. It
103. Id.
104. Id at 664-65, 374 S.E.2d at 856.
105. Id at 664, 374 S.E.2d at 856.
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personal observation; and second, if the basis of the opinion does not
meet a minimum threshold of adequacy, the opinion may be exclud-
ed."°6 In State v. Daniels, the majority emphasized the first point:
Justice Meyer noted that the materials relied upon by Dr. White,
including reports prepared by other experts and interviews with those
who knew Daniels, were proper sources of information to consider in
arriving at an expert opinion." 7 In fact, he observed, psychiatric
authority emphasized the importance of such sources in accurately
diagnosing APD.l"n The fact that Dr. White did not personally
interview Daniels should have been considered in weighing her
testimony, but not in deciding its admissibility."l
However, the individual validity of Dr. White's sources was not
the central issue in Daniels. As Chief Justice Exum's dissent made
clear, there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative aspect to
establishing a proper foundation for expert testimony."1 The Chief
Justice observed that "expert opinion may be inadmissible due to the
inadequacy of its foundation even though the individual components
of that foundation are not themselves improper under Rule 702."111
While the reliability of specific elements of the foundation can affect
its adequacy, and thus the admissibility of the expert opinion resting
upon it, the critical issue is whether there is a sufficient amount of
reliable data to constitute an adequate foundation." For Chief
Justice Exum, a personal examination of the subject by the testifying
expert is the indispensable core for the foundation of a psychiatric
diagnosis, and constitutes a threshold requirement for the admissibility
of the opinion itself"
106. See supra notes 73-105 and accompanying text.
107. 337 N.C. at 268, 446 S.E.2d at 314.
108. Itt at 269-70, 446 S.E2d at 315; see supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
109. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 268-69,446 S.E.2d at 314 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880 (1983)).
110. I& at 291-92,446 S.E.2d at 328 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
111. I& at 292,446 S.E.2d at 328; see also State v. Rogers, 323 N.C. 658,664,374 S.E.2d
852, 856 (1989) (affirming the exclusion of expert opinion as to blood alcohol content at
a particular point based only on knowledge of subject's chemical dependency history and
quantity of alcohol ingested that day).
112. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 291-92,446 S.E2d at 328 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
113. Id at 291-93, 446 S.E.2d at 328-29 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that death is qualitatively
different from other punishments, and therefore that an unusually high degree of
constitutional scrutiny of its application is warranted. See, ag., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the qualitative difference
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The majority opinion did not directly address the overall
adequacy of the basis for Dr. White's testimony,"4 but its position
was clear: A psychiatric expert may develop a basis for an opinion
that is sufficiently reliable to be of assistance to the trier of fact, and
thus admissible, without a personal examination." 5 Justice Meyer
advanced several arguments in support of the admissibility of Dr.
White's testimony that implicitly support this broader proposition. He
observed that the use of hypothetical questions as a basis for expert
testimony is permitted by the North Carolina Rules of Evidence" 6
and, as a constitutional matter, by the United States Supreme
Court."7 Because it is clear that an expert opinion based on the
sorts of materials relied upon by Dr. White is "as reliable as any
opinion reached as a result of one hypothetical question," Justice
Meyer stated, it followed that Dr. White's testimony rested upon an
adequate foundation."' Justice Meyer also maintained that, given
the range of sources consulted by Dr. White, her diagnostic method
may have been more thorough than that of at least one of the defense
experts."
9
between execution and imprisonment requires "extraordinary measures ' to "guarantee,
as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence [is] not imposed out of whim, passion,
prejudice, or mistake"). However, Chief Justice Exum did not emphasize the fact that Dr.
White's testimony was received in a capital sentencing proceeding. Presumably this is
because both the Chief Justice and the majority regarded the issue as a matter of state
evidence law generally applicable to all proceedings, see Daniels, 337 N.C. at 268, 446
S.E.2d at 314; id at 291-92, 446 S.E.2d at 328 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), and because the United States Supreme Court has addressed the
constitutionality of presenting expert psychiatric testimony not based on a personal
examination against defendants in capital proceedings, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
896-97 (1983); see also supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text. But see William S.
Geimer, Death at Any CosL A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from its
Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 760-65 (1985) (criticizing Barefoot
as part of a trend toward abandonment of heightened constitutional sensitivity in the
application of the death penalty). Nevertheless, at least one court has found that capital
proceedings are an unusually compelling context in which to evaluate the bases of expert
psychiatric testimony. See Hill v. State, 339 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (Miss. 1976). For a
discussion of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of expert psychiatric testimony
in capital proceedings, see Mehler, supra note 68, passim.
114. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 291-92, 446 S.E.2d at 328 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (finding the principle that opinion testimony based on inadequate
data should be excluded "wholly absent from the majority opinion").
115. Id, at 270, 446 S.E.2d at 315.
116. Id. (citing N.C. R. EVID. 703 official commentary).
117. Id. (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)); see supra notes 54-69 and
accompanying text.
118. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 270, 446 S.E.2d at 315.
119. Id, Justice Meyer was apparently referring to Dr. Tyson, who conducted one
interview with Daniels lasting "one and a half to two hours," see id, at 255,270,446 S.E.2d
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Several further considerations support the majority's position.
First, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that "the trial judge
is afforded wide latitude of discretion when making a determination
about the admissibility of expert testimony."'" The court has never
held that a personal interview with the subject is a prerequisite to the
admission of competent expert testimony;' nor do the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence impose such a requirement. Indeed, as
Justice Meyer emphasized, a single hypothetical question can furnish
an adequate basis for expert testimony.Y Furthermore, there are
psychiatrists, recognized as experts in their field for purposes of trial
testimony, who are willing to make diagnoses without a personal
interview," It is hardly a novel situation for a jury to be exposed
to conflicting expert testimony and be required to choose from among
the opinions. By insisting on a personal examination, the Chief
Justice would essentially have the court establish standards for
psychiatric testimony not applicable to other varieties of expert
testimony."2
Chief Justice Exum attempted to justify such a distinction by
referring to commentary from psychiatric and legal authorities, by
citing decisions from other jurisdictions, and by specifying how Dr.
White's failure to interview Daniels tainted the sentencing
at 306, 315, although it appears that neither defense expert interviewed Daniels's wife,
military supervisor, or former classmates. See id.
120. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 140, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984); cf. Service Co. v.
Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 411, 131 S.E.2d 9, 18 (holding that expert testimony may be
excluded if the trial judge determines that it is based on inadequate data).
121. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 271, 446 S.E.2d at 315.
122. See N.C. R. EvID. 702 official commentary; Daniels, 337 N.C. at 270, 446 S.E.2d
at 315. But cf. Bernard L. Diamond & David W. Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert
Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1346 (1965) ("[N]o
hypothetical question can ever be formulated which would contain sufficient facts to justify
a really valid psychiatric inference.").
123. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,899 (1983); cf. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 15 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1994) (noting that experts are generally presumed
competent to assess the adequacy of the bases for their opinions). The fact that psychiatric
experts such as Dr. Grigson (in Barefoot) and Dr. White (in Daniels) were willing to testify
in court about mental diagnoses, without having conducted personal interviews, indicates
that the APA's stated position is not universally accepted by psychiatric professionals. See
supra note 61.
124. Cf. KENNETH S. BROUN, BRANDIS & BROUN ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§ 188 n.302 (4th ed. 1993) (noting that the qualifications of medical experts, including
psychiatric experts, are judged in the same manner as the qualifications of experts in
general).
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hearing."z  He observed that the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) has declared:
Absent an in-depth psychiatric examination and evaluation,
the psychiatrist cannot exclude alternative diagnoses; nor can
he assure that the necessary criteria for making the diagnosis
in question are met. As a result, he is unable to render a
medical opinion with a reasonable degree of certainty."
Moreover, the APA has suggested that it is unethical for a psychiatrist
to offer a diagnosis at trial or in other public or official contexts
without having conducted an examination." 7  The official APA
position does not represent the universal view of the profession, of
course, given the existence of psychiatrists such as Dr. White who do
make diagnoses without personal examinations." Nevertheless, at
125. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 292-96, 446 S.E.2d at 328-30 (Exum, CJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
126. Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 9, Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080). Indeed, the APA has specifically criticized
diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder based on hypothetical questions when no
personal examination had been conducted. Id at 14.
127. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS WITH
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PsYCHIATRY § 7 annot. 3 (1985) ("It is
unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he/she has conducted an
examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement."). But see
ALAN A. STONE, M.D., LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 70 (1984) ("[A]nnotation 3
of section 7... clearly is not aimed at courtroom testimony."). Dr. Stone noted that this
provision was enacted by the Association in the wake of the 1964 presidential elections,
when it was embarrassed by the fact that "[h]undreds of psychiatrists were willing to fill
out questionnaires and diagnose Barry Goldwater as mentally ill." Id
128. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983). The Barefoot Court contended
that it was anomalous to hold that psychiatric professionals were unqualified to make such
diagnoses when, as a matter of law, lay jurors were required to make the same deter-
minations. Id. at 896-97 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976)); see supra
notes 63-66 and accompanying text. One response to this point is that judicial approval
of a technique in a legal context does not necessarily imply the scientific validity of the
technique. The fact that the law is to be applied to a particular issue or goal does not
establish that there is an underlying scientific basis for the determination, even though the
issue might appear to lie within a particular area of scientific expertise. In other words,
the fact that the law requires jurors to assess a convicted murderer's future dangerousness
does not mean that there is any scientific basis for making the determination. In such
situations, soliciting testimony from experts in the field may not assist in a proper
resolution of the issue, for the only experts who will have anything conclusive to tell the
jury may be those who are unscrupulous or overconfident enough to overlook the
impossibility of making a reliable determination. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 934 & n.12
(Blacknun, J., dissenting) (commenting on the inadequacy of rebuttal testimony in such
situations). Identifying those areas of inquiry in which expert opinion is of no assistance
is a different matter, as is the wisdom of requiring a lay determination in particular areas.
If such a lay determination is to be made, given the exaggerated opinion of accuracy often
accorded scientific testimony by jurors, see id at 926-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Daniel
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least one study found psychiatric diagnoses based on patient inter-
views empirically more reliable than those based on case summaries
prepared according to a standard format.129
A number of legal commentators, the American Bar Association
among them, have echoed the APA's position.' However, the
ABA acknowledged that requiring a personal interview as a prere-
quisite to offering expert opinion about a person's mental condition
"would work a major departure from existing practice."13'
For additional support, Chief Justice Exum turned to other
jurisdictions that "have held psychiatric diagnoses inadmissible in the
absence of a personal clinical interview of the subject. '13'  However,
while the decisions cited do lend some support, they are not as
germane as the Chief Justice suggests. In the Texas case Holloway v.
State,' the State's expert failed to interview the defendant, but the
court did not explicitly require such interviews.M Rather, the court
required that the information constituting the basis for an expert's
opinion "be either within his personal knowledge, or assumed from
common or judicial knowledge, or established by evidence."'135
Furthermore, the expert in Holloway had a weaker basis than did Dr.
S. Goodman, Demographic Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REv. 499, 524
(1987), it might be argued that expert testimony should not be admitted. See generally
Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) (arguing that psychiatric assessments of future dangerous-
ness are notoriously inaccurate); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 17 (John W. Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1994) (observing that the adversary system of presenting expert testimony tends
to produce the best witnesses rather than the best scientists).
129. Steven E. Hyler et al., Reliability in the DSM-Im Field Trials, 39 ARCHIvES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 1275, 1276 (1982). It should be noted, however, that the reliability of the
diagnoses based on case summaries was judged "fair." Id.
130. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH
STANDARDS § 7-3.11(a)(iii) (1989) (providing that no expert should testify to another
person's mental condition without, among other things, conducting a personal interview
with the subject); Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Standards
Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 375,400 (1985) ("[I]t has
become tautological to state that an evaluating [psychiatrist] should base his opinion on
a sufficient data base that must include an interview."); cf. James W. Ellis & Ruth A.
Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414, 487
(1985) ("Competent, professional assessment [of mental retardation] requires personal
observation and interaction with the allegedly mentally retarded defendant.").
131. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 130, commentary at 136.
132. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 296, 446 S.E.2d at 330.
133. 613 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (en bane).
134. Id. at 502-03.
135. Id. at 503.
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White in that he apparently had consulted no medical sources of any
kind before arriving at his diagnosis. 36
Chief Justice Exum also found support in a New York court's
declaration in People v. Wilson' 7 that the basis relied on by the
expert had not "attained any measure of scientific recognition as a
reliable substitute for a clinically derived evaluation of a subject's
mental processes."'"8 In that case, the court concluded that the trial
judge erred in permitting a psychologist to testify for the prosecution
on the basis of her courtroom observation of the defendant. 9
However, the court was criticizing the particular form of basis
primarily relied upon by the expert-courtroom observation.' The
court did not explain what it meant by a "clinically-derived
evaluation," although it appears that the key inquiry under New York
law was whether the diagnostic method was in accord with "accepted
standards of reliability within the field."'' The North Carolina
Supreme Court has articulated a similar requirement without
demanding personal examinations.42 Thus, while Wilson lends
some support to Chief Justice Exum's objections, its reasoning is not
incompatible with that of the Daniels majority.'43 Wilson stands not
so much for the necessity of a personal interview in rendering expert
psychiatric opinions as for the requirement that the bases actually
relied upon be qualitatively sufficient.'
Finally, in Hill v. State,'45 also cited by Chief Justice Exum,'1
the Mississippi Supreme Court held an expert's testimony inadmissible
not because there was no personal examination, but because the
136. Id. at 500. The court observed that the psychiatrist "had never examined
[Holloway] and knew nothing of his psychiatric history." I& at 502. Apparently, the
expert's diagnosis was based only on conversations with Holloway's co-defendant, the co-
defendant's mother, a victim, and the arresting and interrogating officers. Id. at 503 n.17.
137. 518 N.Y.S.2d 690 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); see Daniels, 337 N.C. at 296, 446 S.E.2d
at 330-31 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Wilson, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
139. Id. at 692-93. The court also criticized the expert's reliance on various unidentified
documents not entered into evidence. Id. at 693.
140. I& at 693.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., State v. Bright, 320 N.C. 491, 499, 358 S.E.2d 498, 502 (1987) (holding
that experts may base their opinions on information reasonably relied upon by those in
the field) (citing State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974)).
143. See Wilson, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 693; Daniels, 337 N.C. at 268, 446 S.E.2d at 314.
144. See Wilson, 518 N.Y.S2d at 693.
145. 339 So. 2d 1382 (Miss. 1976).
146. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 296, 446 S.E.2d at 331.
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examination had been inadequate.147 The psychiatrist had con-
ducted a seventy-five minute interview with Hill in which he found
" 'no psychiatric illness,' "4 but he also reported his opinion that
more psychological testing should be undertaken. 149 The Mississippi
court stated that before Hill could be tried again, he must be sent to
the state mental hospital for a thorough examination, of "otherwise
afforded appropriate and adequate determination of his sanity."'50
While there is considerable language in the decision suggesting the
importance of thorough psychiatric examinations, the fact that the
examining expert himself acknowledged the insufficiency of the
interview was significant."5 Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme
Court was clearly not establishing the rule that a personal interview
was necessary to the admission of psychiatric testimony, given that an
interview had in fact been conducted. 52 Some jurisdictions have
147. Hill, 339 So. 2d at 1385. The relevant examination in Hill was ordered by the trial
court in order to establish the defendant's competency to stand trial. Id. at 1384-85.
148. I& at 1384.
149. I
150. Id. at 1385.
151. Id ("[T]he examination ... was inadequate as demonstrated by the fact that the
examining psychiatrist himself testified that further examination of the defendant was
needed."). Although there is a tendency to speak of a "psychiatric examination" as if it
had a clearly defined meaning, Hill illustrates the contrary. If Chief Justice Exum's
position were adopted, the sufficiency of any given psychiatric examination would remain
an issue. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 296-97,446 S.E.2d at 330-31 (Exum, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
152. Hill, 339 So. 2d at 1384. Several cases cited by Chief Justice Exum in a footnote
do provide further support for his position by recognizing the importance of the personal
interview in making "reliable psychological diagnos[es]." Daniels, 337 N.C. at 296 n.6, 446
S.E.2d at 331 n.6 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing, inter alia,
United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719,725 (4th Cir. 1968); Rollerson v. United States, 343
F2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1964); People v. Bassett, 443 P.2d 777, 788-90 (Cal. 1968); Zirt v.
Pollock, 270 N.Y.S.2d 85, 87 (1966); State v. Edmon, 621 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Wash. Ct. App.
1981)). Nevertheless, of these courts only the Washington Court of Appeals, in State v.
Edmon, appears to require a personal examination before a psychiatric expert will be
permitted to offer an opinion about whether a defendant could form specific intent. 621
P.2d at 1313. Moreover, in most of these cases the bases for the offered opinions appear
to have been substantially weaker than Dr. White's basis in Daniels. The exception is
Rollerson, where the testifying doctors appears to have relied upon standardized personal
interviews and physical examinations. 343 P.2d at 273-74. The Rollerson decision suggests
a basis requirement so great that it would, if adopted by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, find the interviews conducted by Dr. Tyson and Dr. Bolinsky inadequate. Id. at
274 ("More than three or four hours are necessary to assemble a picture of a man.").
Moreover, the Rollerson court cited the "collateral study of those close to the subject" of
the kind undertaken by Dr. White, but not Dr. Tyson or Dr. Bolinsky, as another "basic
tool" of psychiatric diagnosis. Id at 274-75; cf. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 270,446 S.E.2d at 315
(suggesting that Dr. White's method of diagnosis may have been more thorough than that
of Dr. Tyson).
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expressly approved of the introduction of psychiatric or other medical
expert testimony not founded on a personal examination.'
However, not all of these courts would have admitted Dr. White's
testimony in the Daniels case. For example, some jurisdictions
confine the permissible bases to personal examination, hypothetical
question, or courtroom observation."5  Nevertheless, like the
Daniels majority, these courts do not require expert psychiatric
witnesses to interview the subject personally before testifying.
In addition to citing psychiatric and legal authorities that under-
scored the significance of the personal examination, Chief Justice
Exum argued that the lack of a personal interview demonstrably
undermined the value of Dr. White's testimony in the present
case."5 He found several specific flaws. The Chief Justice stated
that an in-person assessment would have revealed an abnormal
mental condition, which would tend to contradict Dr. White's
153. See, e.g., Peteet v. Dow Chemical, 868 F.2d 1428,1432 (5th Cir. 1989) ("A personal
examination of the person or object of the expert's testimony is not required under Fed.
R. Evid. 703."); Sweet v. United States, 687 F.2d 246,249 (8th Cir. 1982) (upholding trial
court's admission of expert testimony, not based on personal examination, about possible
effects of LSD on defendant); Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451,460 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(holding that failure to conduct a personal examination does not render expert psychiatric
testimony inadmissible); Nash v. Cosby, 574 So. 2d 700,705 (Ala. 1990) (finding no bar to
the admission of expert medical testimony based on a hypothetical question incorporating
a report prepared by others); In re Estate of Hoover, 615 N.E2d 736, 744 (Ill. 1993)
("Illinois law does not require an expert witness to physically examine or personally know
the patient in order to render an expert opinion in the case."); Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d
1189, 1193 (Ind. 1989) ("That the expert [psychiatrist] did not personally interview the
victim bears on the weight of the evidence not on its admissibility .... "); Turner v. State,
573 So. 2d 657, 673 (Miss. 1990) (finding courtroom observation of the subject and review
of opposing expert's reports sufficient basis to allow forensic psychologist to rebut
testimony of another psychologist expert witness); State v. Franklin, 456 S.E.2d 357,362-63
(S.C. 1995) (holding that psychiatric expert may testify to a defendant's mental state
without conducting a personal examination); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 852-54 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991) (upholding the use of hypothetical questions as a basis for expert
psychiatric testimony); cf In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717,762 (3d Cir.
1994) ("[E]valuation of the patient's medical records, like performance of a physical
examination, is a reliable method of concluding that a patient is ill even in the absence of
a physical examination."); Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, 813 F.2d 1196, 1200-01
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (permitting testimony of expert who had not personally examined the
allegedly defective device).
154. E.g., Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. 1974) (holding that, as alternatives
to personal examination, hypothetical questions or courtroom observation may form the
basis of an expert's testimony about a defendant's mental state); State V. Solomon, 570
N.E.2d 1118, 1119-20 (Ohio 1991) (holding that expert opinions may be based on personal
perceptions or facts and data admitted into evidence).
155. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 294-96,446 S.E.2d 329-30 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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diagnosis of APD.u6 Furthermore, Dr. White was apparently
unaware of certain facts revealed to Dr. Bolinsky in the course of his
interviews, including Daniels's previous suicide attempts and the
episodic nature of his substance abuse.157 Had Dr. White been
aware of this information, Chief Justice Exum suggested, it "might
have caused her to make the same diagnosis as Dr. Bolinsky.'W58
The Chief Justice also emphasized the importance of the personal
clinical interview in making a proper diagnosis of depression, and in
reliably distinguishing alternate diagnoses from a final diagnosis of
APD.159
Chief Justice Exum's conclusions raise several concerns, however.
There is reason to question whether a personal interview would have
affected Dr. White's diagnosis."6 She had reviewed 'the reports
prepared by the defense experts (Dr. Bolinsky and Dr. Tyson), as well
as an evaluation prepared by another psychiatrist.161  Thus she
knew, for example, of Dr. Bolinsky's findings that had led him to
diagnose Daniels with "chronic depression."' 62 Yet, Dr. Bolinsky's
findings did not affect her confidence in her own diagnosis enough to
dissuade her from testifying in court that Daniels suffered from
APD.1' Additionally, the Chief Justice's argument proceeds on the
unstated assumption that the defense experts-Dr. Bolinsky in
particular-correctly diagnosed Daniels and that Dr. White misdiag-
nosed him."6 Such an assumption may have been necessary given
156. Id. at 294, 446 S.E.2d at 329 (Exum, C.L, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
157. See id. at 294,446 S.E.2d at 329-30 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
158. Id. at 294, 446 S.E.2d at 330 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
159. Id. at 294-96, 446 S.E.2d at 330 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
160. See id. at 270, 446 S.E.2d at 315.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 290, 446 S.E.2d at 327 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
163. See id. at 268-69, 446 S.E.2d at 314-15.
164. See id. at 294-96, 446 S.E.2d 329-30 (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). It should be noted that the jury may have questioned the diagnoses of both
defense experts in deciding to convict Daniels, before Dr. White ever testified. Dr. Tyson
had testified that Daniels's "ability to think or evaluate his behavior would have been
compromised to the point of being 'inconsequential' "at the time of the killing. Id. at 255,
446 S.E.2d at 306. Similarly, Dr. Bolinsky concluded that Daniels's "ability to form
specific intent to kill his aunt 'would have been profoundly impaired, if not in essence
absent.' " Id. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Daniels of first degree murder under a
premeditation and deliberation theory, as well as the felony murder rule. IM. at 252, 446
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the nature of the argument, and it may well have been accurate, but
there was no special information before the court that required it.'s
It may indeed be the case that the best practice in making
psychiatric diagnoses is to conduct a personal interview at some
point."s Considerable authority supports that proposition. 67 The
clinical interview, or lack thereof, should in any event be a highly
significant consideration when the jury weighs the competing diagno-
ses. However, it does not necessarily follow that opinions founded on
other sources of information do not meet the legal standard of
admissibility. Traditionally, the law has presumed that other bases
could support psychiatric and other forms of expert testimony."
With one exception, 69 the dissent in Daniels did not convincingly
identify other courts which have held that a psychiatric evaluation
without a clinical examination necessarily cannot be of assistance to
the trier of fact.' It is true that the North Carolina Supreme Court
has held that evidence resting on a particularly weak foundation may
be excluded. 7 ' As the Chief Justice observed, that doctrine is
implicit in the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.Y However, the
rules also establish that the appropriate standard for admitting expert
testimony is whether the testimony would "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."'173 Chief
Justice Exum and the APA are of the position that a diagnosis
without a personal examination is necessarily too unreliable to be of
S.E.2d at 304. Dr. White did not testify until the sentencing proceeding, after the jury had
already convicted Daniels. Id. at 251-52, 258, 446 S.E2d at 304, 314.
165. See iU. at 270, 446 S.E.2d at 315 (suggesting that Dr. White's determination of
diagnosis might have been more thorough than Dr. Tyson's).
166. Id. at 293, 446 S.E.2d at 329 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Meyer's majority opinion essentially conceded as much. See id. at 271, 446
S.E.2d at 315 ("[I]t may be better practice to actually interview a defendant before
reaching a decision on his mental capacity.. ").
167. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 100-01, 337 S.E.2d 883, 849 (1985) (expert
medical opinion must be based on facts within the expert's knowledge-not necessarily on
personal observation).
169. See supra note 152.
170. See supra notes 132-53 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the Chief
Justice did not seek to require a personal interview in all cases. Id at 296, 446 S.E.2d at
330 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[The] failure to conduct a
personal clinical interview may not be fatal to the admission of all expert mental health
testimony in all cases ....").
171. See supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
172. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 292, 446 S.E.2d at 328 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
173. N.C. R. EVID. 702.
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any assistance.' The Daniels majority and the Rules themselves
take the contrary position.' 5 Given that the Rules sanction the use
of hypothetical questions in offering expert testimony of any kind,
including psychiatric diagnoses, the majority's position is sensible. 6
Having established a minimum threshold of reliability and
decided that the basis for Dr. White's opinion failed to reach it, Chief
Justice Exum found it unnecessary to explore whether the adversary
process itself could bring the potential defects of the testimony to the
jury's attention.' He observed: "[T]he general principle that
deficiencies in a particular piece of evidence affect the weight of that
174. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
175. See N.C. R. EVID. 703 official commentary; Daniels, 337 N.C. at 271, 446 S.E.2d
at 315.
176. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 270, 446 S.E.2d at 315.
Daniel Goodman has offered a theory of evidence in capital sentencing that, although
not relied upon by Chief Justice Exum, would strongly support his position. See
Goodman, supra note 128, at 523-27. Goodman's thesis is that the reliance on
demographic evidence (i.e., conclusions about individuals based on group tendencies and
characteristics) in capital sentencing "is improper because it embodies and invites
excessively generalized judgments, rather than individualized ones." Id. at 522. Applying
this principle to psychiatric testimony, Goodman identifies two "predictive techniques"
relied upon by psychiatrists-clinical and statistical. lMi at 525. The statistical technique
involves the application of predetermined rules to an identified set of factors; no personal
contact between psychiatrist and subject is required in order to undertake the analysis.
Id By contrast, the clinical technique, which Goodman closely associates with the
personal interview, "is largely a subjective, individualized assessment" in which the
psychiatrist applies her "accumulated expertise" to those individual qualities she identifies
in the subject. Id Under Goodman's theory, it is the clinical element which renders
psychiatric testimony legitimate in capital cases because the clinical examination affords
the defendant the opportunity to "demonstrate his nonconformity to a statistical
stereotype." Id. When, as in Daniels's case, there is no personal examination, the
defendant's individual qualities are lost, and with them the legitimacy of the diagnosis.
However, as Goodman acknowledges, the distinction between clinical and statistical
techniques is somewhat artificial in that all assessments "are to some extent relational."
Id at 527. That is, when the psychiatrist or psychologist forms impressions during the
clinical interview, in order to draw conclusions she must place that information within
some framework, make some comparisons, and generalize based on unstated assumptions.
See id Whether the psychiatrist derives an opinion through clinical or statistical techni-
ques, factors are identified and fed into some model, be it a relatively formalized external
structure or a highly personal one based on the psychiatrist's ovn experiences.
Furthermore, while Goodman's theory does not challenge the Supreme Court's
conclusion in Barefoot that psychiatric evidence is admissible in capital sentencing hearings,
id. at 524, it is difficult to reconcile the theory with the Court's approval of psychiatric
testimony not based on a personal exam, id at 524 n.124; see supra notes 63-69 and
accompanying text. It is beyond the scope of this Note to judge Barefoot's correctness; it
is sufficient to note that the Daniels majority relied upon Barefoot and that the dissent did
not question its validity.
177. See Daniels, 337 N.C. at 297, 446 S.E.2d at 331 (Exum, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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evidence and not its admissibility... has no applicability where the
reliability falls below a judicially acceptable level."'78 Nevertheless,
the question of whether the adversary process itself might alleviate
the concerns underlying Chief Justice Exum's position merits
consideration. Expert witnesses are permitted to criticize one
another's methodologyY9 In Daniels, the majority observed that,
in fact, "Dr. Bolinsky was highly critical of Dr. White's failure to
conduct a personal examination of [the] defendant in reaching her
decision."" Thus, the jury was aware of the potential defects in
Dr. White's technique. It is the jury's fundamental role to decide
what evidence should be given weight and what should be discounted.
Although it might be difficult in some cases, particularly where the
jury must consider scientific matters unfamiliar to them, this task is
entrusted to them with respect to expert testimony no less than with
other forms of evidence. Inevitably, there is a risk that witnesses,
including expert witnesses, may mislead the jury through honest
mistake, recklessness, or conscious deception; but that risk is inherent
in the adversarial trial process. Similarly, although parties may vary
with respect to their ability to retain expert witnesses,'8' the court
has never found a constitutional requirement of financial parity
between the state and the criminal defendant or between indigent and
non-indigent defendants. It is not clear what would distinguish
psychiatrists from other experts when it comes to jury evaluation of
the bases of their opinions."
The Daniels majority decided the stated issue correctly, although
its opinion did not clearly address the underlying issue of reliability.
The majority emphasized the fact that the materials relied upon by
Dr. White were of a kind deemed to be appropriate." If the
majority intended to suggest that once a witness is accepted as
qualified by the trial court, and the bases of her opinion are shown to
have come from acceptable sources, her testimony must be admitted,
178. Id. (Exum, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179. See State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 72-73, 405 S.E.2d 145, 151-52 (1991); State v.
Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 154, 322 S.E.2d 370, 384-85 (1984).
180. Daniels, 337 N.C. at 271, 446 SE2d at 315.
181. See Geimer, supra note 113, at 765 (commenting on the insufficiency of resources
allotted indigent criminal defendants for "investigation and... securing expert testimony"
in Texas).
182. But see Diamond & Louisell, supra note 122, at 1337 (stating that modem
psychiatric testimony involves much more complex issues than other types of testimony).
183. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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then such a holding would be incompatible with past decisions."S
As Chief Justice Exum emphasized, there is a threshold of reliability
above which the basis must rise before the opinion resting on it may
properly be admitted; at some point, there is simply too little
information for the diagnosis to "assist the trier of fact."1 The
court appears to have properly, if only implicitly, concluded that Dr.
White's basis did not fall below such a threshold. For the most part,
the cases that Chief Justice Exum relied on, from North Carolina and
from other jurisdictions, represent more egregious situations than
Daniels.1  Furthermore, if the expert witness has been properly
qualified, it should be the rare case in which his insight and opinion
would not be of at least some assistance to the trier of fact and thus
fail to satisfy the standard of Rule 702."s Finally, it has not been
proved that the adversary process is inadequate to place the trier of
fact in a position to gauge the sufficiency of the bases of psychiatric
evaluations as effectively as the bases of other varieties of expert
testimony." Although the majority may have failed to place its
decision in the appropriate framework, the court properly resisted
adopting an unwarranted limitation on the admission of expert
psychiatric testimony.
JOHN CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON
184. See, e.g., State v. Rogers, 323 N.C. 658, 664-65, 374 S.E.2d 852, 856 (1989)
(upholding exclusion of expert testimony on the ground that "the data upon which the
witness' opinion was based was inadequate for him to form an opinion").
185. N.C. R. EVID. 702; see also supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text.
187. See N.C. R. EvID. 702.
188. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983); Daniels, 337 N.C. at 271, 446
S.E.2d at 315; supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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It is better that ten guilty men should go free rather than one
innocent man be condemned.1
The Old Testament commands that "[w]hoso sheddeth man's
blood, by man shall his blood be shed."2  Debate has raged for
decades over the applicability of this ancient passage to our civilized
society in light of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments'
prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment."3 But while the
death penalty debate may never end, both the advocates and
opponents of the death penalty agree on one point: If we as a society
are going to shed a person's blood, we must at least ensure that we
are not shedding innocent blood-we must get it right But there
the congruity ends abruptly. What does it mean to get it right? How
certain must we be?5 Competing with the desire to get it right are
"finality, federalism, and comity."" At some point, further
proceedings inhibit the achievement of a deterrent effect.7 Federal
1. United States ex reL Reck v. Ragen, 172 F. Supp. 734,745 (N.D. IlL 1959); see also
Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 866 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)) (stating that a " 'fundamental value determination of our society
[is] that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.' ");
THOMAS STARKIE, EVIDENCE 757 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1860) ("The
maxim of the law is, that it is better that ninety-nine ... offenders should escape, than that
one innocent man should be condemned.").
2. Genesis 9:6 (King James).
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
5. See Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt", 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979,980-81
(1993) (arguing that while "it is better to acquit some number of guilty persons than to
convict one innocent person," there is a lack of agreement as to "the appropriate ratio of
guilty persons acquitted to innocent persons convicted").
6. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 (1989). Federalism describes the "relationship
between the states and the federal government" in the American system of government.
BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990); see also infra notes 269-83 and
accompanying text (discussing the concept of federalism and its application to habeas
corpus). Comity refers to geference and respect among separate sovereigns (e.g. state and
federal governments). Id, at 267.
7. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (arguing
that the infrequent imposition of the death penalty has inhibited any deterrent effect);
Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment A Critique of the Political and Philosophical
Thought Supporting the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.. 1, 96-97 (1992) (arguing that
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habeas corpus courts have the burden of balancing these competing
concerns.
In Smith v. Dixon,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals faced
two issues that required such a balancing. First, the court evaluated
whether Kermit Smith, a criminal defendant, had procedurally
defaulted his federal claims or if the claims were reviewable by a
federal habeas court.9 Second, the court decided the unique issue of
whether a federal court may conduct a harmless error analysis in the
capital sentencing context when the state court failed to do so.' ° Ul-
timately, the only question firmly answered was whether a clearly
guilty Kermit Smith could be executed in the face of an admitted
constitutional violation in the sentencing phase of his trial. The
answer to that question was resoundingly affirmative."
After briefly summarizing the Smith case," this Note outlines
the development of both the procedural bar doctrine in federal habeas
corpus' and the concept of constitutional harmless error analysis. 4
the deterrent effect of the death penalty is minimal given the extensive delays in its
administration).
8. 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 129 (1994) (mem.).
9. The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, split evenly on the issue of whether Smith's
claims were procedurally barred. Id. at 982 n.16. Judge Wilkins wrote what appears to
be the majority opinion even though it represents only half of the court on the procedural
bar issue. Id. at 962-74. Circuit Judges Russell, Widener, Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Luttig,
and Williams joined Judge Wilkins on this issue. See id. at 959.
Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse, writing in dissent, concluded that Smith's claims were
not procedurally barred. Id. at 983-88 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). Circuit Judges Hall and
Hamilton expressed their agreement with Sprouse in a concurring opinion. Id. at 982-83
(Hall, J., concurring). Chief Judge Ervin, Circuit Judges Phillips and Murnaghan, as well
as Senior Circuit Judge Butzner also joined Judge Sprouse on this issue. Ashe v. Styles,
39 F.3d 80, 86 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining which judges joined the "dissent" on the
procedural bar issue in Smith). For purposes of the procedural bar discussion the two
halves of the court will be identified by reference to either Judge Wilkins or Judge
Sprouse.
10. See Smith 14 F.3d at 974. For purposes of the harmless error discussion, the
traditional terms of "majority" and "dissent" will be used as the court split evenly only on
the procedural bar issue.
11. See id. at 982. Kermit Smith was executed in Raleigh, North Carolina's Central
Prison on Tuesday, January 24, 1995, at 2:12 a.m. Estes Thompson (AP), N.C. Executes
Killer of Cheerleeder, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 24 1995, at 12. Prior to his execution,
Smith requested that the mother of the woman he killed be allowed to operate the
machine that would kill him in order "to atone for the crime." Joseph Neff, Killers btzare
execution request denied, TIm NEWS & OBSERVER, (Raleigh, NC) Jan. 21, 1995, at A3.
Smith's execution drew national attention as he was only the second white person executed
for killing a black person since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976. White Man Is
Executed for Killing Black Woman, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 25, 1995, at A8.
12. See infra notes 18-73 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 74-160 and accompanying text.
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Then, after analyzing the Smith majority and dissent opinions in
detail,"5 this Note concludes that the court correctly undertook
harmless error analysis, but may have applied an incorrect harmless
error standard. 6 Finally, this Note argues that in the case of
defaulted claims, the inconsistent results produced by the procedural
bar doctrine exemplify the need for a bright-line rule rather than a
variable standard for making the default determination. 7
In December of 1980, Kermit Smith was convicted of the rape,
robbery, and first-degree murder of Whelette Collins.'" The jury
sentenced Smith to death, based in part on a finding that the murder
was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."' 9 On direct appeal, the
North Carolina Supreme Court examined the sufficiency of the
evidence and affirmed Smith's convictions and sentence.' In this
direct appeal, Smith failed to challenge the "heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" aggravating factor sentencing instruction as unconstitutionally
vague 2'
14. See infra notes 161-207 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 208-83 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 285-302 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 303-421 and accompanying text.
18. Smith, 14 F.3d at 959.
19. Id, at 960. In support of the death sentence, the jury found as an aggravating
factor that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Id. Also the fact that
the murder was committed during the robbery, rape, and kidnapping of Collins constituted
three additional aggravating factors. Id. As a mitigating factor, the jury found that the
murder was committed "while 'under the influence of [a] mental or emotional distur-
bance.' " Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (1988)). The jury then
concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, and recommended
the death penalty for Smith. Id. The aggravating factors that will support a death
sentence in North Carolina are set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1988).
20. State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691,711-12,292 S.E.2d 264,276-77, cert denied, 459 U.S.
1056 (1982). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Smith v. North
Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). At the time, Justices William Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall, both vocal opponents of the death penalty, were sitting on the Court. See id. at
1058. They both dissented from the denial of certiorari, believing "that the death penalty
is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
21. Smith, 14 F.3d at 960. The trial court's jury instruction as to the "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor was:
[E]very murder is not especially heinous, it is not atrocious nor cruel. While
every murder, if it results from an unlawful killing, of course, is a violation of the
law,... it does not necessarily mean that there is anything aggravated about it
or that it was especially heinous or atrocious or cruel. And our Supreme Court
has said that the words "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" means [sic]
extremely or especially or particularly heinous or atrocious or cruel. Heinous
means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious means marked by or given
to extreme wickedness, brutality or cruelty, marked by extreme violence or
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In June 1983, Kermit Smith began a collateral attack of his
conviction by filing a motion for appropriate relief in the Superior
Court of Halifax County, North Carolina, raising fifty-seven separate
grounds for relief.' In this motion, Smith, for the first time, raised
a federal constitutional vagueness challenge to the "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor instruction.24 Smith also
savagely fierce. It means outrageously wicked or violent. Cruel means designed
to inflict a high degree of pain, utterly indifferent to or [evidencing] the
enjoyment of the suffering of others.
Smith, 14 F.3d at 959-60; see also infra note 24 (discussing the development of the doctrine
surrounding a claim of unconstitutional vagueness in the context of a capital sentencing
instruction).
22. The "motion for appropriate relief" provides a statutory remedy for "errors
committed in the trial division" of the North Carolina state courts. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1411 (1988). The motion's procedure and form are prescribed by statute. Id.
§ 15A-1420. As a general rule, most motions must be raised within 10 days of the entry
of judgment. Ld. § 15A-1414(a). However, motions raising claims of constitutional error
may be made at any time after entry of judgment. Id § 15A-1415(b)(3), (4), (5). To
obtain relief, a defendant must show both "the existence of the asserted ground for relief"
and "prejudice." Id. § 15A-1420(c)(6). However, even given the existence of a
meritorious claim, a court may deny relief if the defendant failed to raise the claim in a
previous motion, the claim was previously decided on the merits on direct appeal, or the
claim was not raised (though it could have been) on a prior appeal. Id. § 15A-1419(a).
The court need not deny the motion on one of these grounds if "good cause" is shown and
it would be "in the interest of justice" to grant relief. Id. § 15A-1419(b). If the court
hearing the motion decides to grant relief, it may provide it in the form of a new trial, a
dismissal of the charges, or any other appropriate relief. Id. § 15A-1417(a).
23. Smith, 14 F.3d at 960.
24. Id. The doctrine of vagueness in the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating
factor instruction context was laid out in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). In
Maynard, the Court explained that vagueness claims generally assert that the challenged
instruction "fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death
penalty and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended
discretion which was held invalid in Furman." Id. at 361-62 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (reversing death sentences in three cases)).
According to the Maynard Court, "the capital punishment statute [in Furman] was being
applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner; there was no principled means provided to
distinguish those individuals that received the penalty from those that did not." Id. at 362.
The Court then compared the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor to
Oklahoma's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" aggravating factor that
the Court had struck down as unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980). Id. at 363. From this comparison the Court concluded that the "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor "gave no more guidance than the
'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman' " language that the Court had struck
down in Godfrey. Id. at 363-64. The Court rejected the notion that the "addition of the
word 'especially' somehow guides the jury's discretion, even if the term 'heinous' does
not." Id. at 364.
In Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam), the United States Supreme
Court held that a jury instruction could provide sufficient guidance to cure an otherwise
vague aggravating factor. See id. at 1. The Court then considered whether the jury
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claimed that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance both at trial
and on direct appeal.' Before the State could respond to these
claims, the superior court summarily denied the challenge to the
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" instruction without a hearing.2
However, as to the ineffective assistance claim, the court ordered a
response by the State.27 The court then conducted a hearing, made
extensive factual findings, and subsequently denied Smith's ineffective
assistance claim.' Both the North Carolina and United States
Supreme Courts denied requests to review the superior court's ruling
on this first motion for appropriate relief29 In 1987, Smith again
instruction given in Shell's case cured the unconstitutional vagueness of the "heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor. See id. The instruction defined the words
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" as follows: "[H]einous means extreniely wicked or
shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed
to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of the suffering of
others." Id at 2 (Marshall, J. concurring) (quoting Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887, 905-06
(Miss. 1989)). The Court concluded that these definitions were insufficient to cure the
vagueness problem. Ld. at 1.
Applying Shell to Kermit Smith's virtually identical "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" jury
instruction, see supra note 21, a federal district court judge found the instruction
constitutionally infirm. Smith v. Dixon, 766 F. Supp. 1370, 1383 (E.D.N.C. 1991). The
State conceded on appeal to the Fourth Circuit that Smith's jury instruction on the
"heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague. Smith, 14
F.3d at 974.
25. Smith, 14 F.3d at 960. Specifically, Smith argued that his attorney failed to raise
the heinousness claim on direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, justifying
a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 973.
The United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the ight... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CoNST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to counsel means
more than merely the right to have an attorney, but requires the "effective assistance" of
that attorney. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). Strickland v.
Washington established the standard governing claims of ineffectiveness. 466 U.S. 668,687
(1984). In Strickland, the Court laid out the two elements of an ineffectiveness claim. Id.
First, a defendant must show "that counsel's performance was deficient," and second, that
"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense," meaning that the errors were so
serious that the defendant was deprived of a "fair" (i.e., reliable) trial. Id In judging
whether counsel's assistance was deficient, a court assesses "whether counsel's assistance
was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id at 688. The Court warned,
however, that the review should be "highly deferential" and should not involve extensive
second-guessing. Id. at 689. This right to effective assistance of counsel also applies to
direct appeals. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985).
26. Smith, 14 F.3d at 960.
27. Id. at 961.
28. Id.
29. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary review. State v.
Smith, 314 N.C. 546, 333 S.E.2d 495 (1985). Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Smith v. North Carolina, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985). Again, Justices
Brennan and Marshall dissented from the denial of certiorari. Id. at 1026 (Brennan and
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raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a second motion
for appropriate relief in North Carolina Superior Court." This
second motion and subsequent request for review were also denied. 1
After exhausting his state remedies, 32 Smith filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus33 in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina.34 In his petition, Smith raised all
the claims previously denied in his first motion for appropriate relief,
including his challenge to the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" instruction
and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.3 The State
contended that all of Smith's claims, other than ineffective assistance
of counsel, were barred from consideration by the federal district
court.36 The district court, however, rejected the State's argument
and addressed Smith's claims on the merits.37 The court concluded
that Smith's unconstitutionally vague jury instruction challenge was
sufficient to support granting habeas relief3" Finding the instruction
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
30. Smith, 14 F.3d at 961 n.2. This second motion came four years after the superior
court reviewed and rejected the first motion for appropriate relief containing the same
claims. Id. at 961. See generally Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex
Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1993) (exploring the federal
habeas process and arguing that the review procedure should be altered to achieve finality,
efficiency, and fairness); Andrew H. Malcolm, The Wait on Death Row, Legal Delays
Thwart Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at Al (quoting an attorney who
characterized the federal habeas review process as a "legal game" designed to cause
"delay, delay, delay"). Local newscasts quoted Smith as boasting that he viewed his
remaining alive on death row for almost 14 years as quite an accomplishment. Evening
News (Raleigh, N.C. News Channel 11 television broadcast, Jan. 21, 1995).
31. Smith, 14 F.3d at 961 n.2. The North Carolina Supreme Court again denied
discretionary review. State v. Smith, 321 N.C. 478, 364 S.E.2d 668 (1988). The United
States Supreme Court again followed suit denying certiorari in Smith v. North Carolina,
485 U.S. 1030 (1988), with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting. Id. at. 1030 (Brennan
and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
32. For a discussion of the exhaustion doctrine of federal habeas relief for state
prisoners, see Amos E. Hartson & Jay Gonzalez, Note, Habeas Relief for State Prisoners,
83 GEO. L. 1392, 1404-08 (1995).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). Pursuant to this statute, a person in state custody may
seek habeas relief from a federal judge by challenging the constitutionality of his custody.
Id. § 2254(a).
34. Smith v. Dixon, 766 F. Supp. 1370, 1373 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (mem.), affid, 996 F.2d
667 (4th Cir. 1993), reh'g granted and rev'd, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 129 (1994) (mem.).
35. Id. at 1376.
36. Id. The State argued that Smith's claims were barred from consideration under
the procedural bar doctrine, because they were not raised on direct appeal. Id.
37. Id. at 1376-77.
38. See id. at 1395-96. The court noted that Smith's petition raised "numerous" issues
but the opinion only addressed those issues "raised in the brief, as they [were] the most
substantial." Id. at 1375.
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infirm, the district court requested that the North Carolina Supreme
Court rehear the case and conduct a harmless error analysis?' When
the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review,4 the district court
ordered its previous decision into effect.4' On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.42 Subsequently, the
Fourth Circuit granted the State's motion to reconsider the case en
banc and vacated the earlier ruling of the panel.43
In Smith v. Dixon,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, split evenly45 on the issue of whether Kermit Smith's claims
of constitutional error, other than his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim,4 were procedurally barred from federal habeas court con-
sideration because Smith failed to raise such claims in his previous
state court proceedings.47 Seven judges believed that Smith's claims
39. Id.
40. State v. Smith, 330 N.C. 617,617,412 S.E.2d 68,68 (1991). The order stated that,
"believing that this Court has already fully addressed all the issues it can properly address
within the limits of its appellate jurisdiction, the petition of the State is denied without
prejudice to the State's right to seek appellate review in the federal system of the order
of the U.S. District Court." Id.
41. Smith, 14 F.3d at 961-62 (citing Smith v. Dixon, No. 88-337 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 2,
1991)). The district court's opinion was handed down before the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). Smith, 14 F.3d at 961.
The Coleman Court explained that in habeas proceedings, if the state court order "fairly
appears" to rest on federal law, then a "plain statement" that the state court order rested
on state law grounds was necessary to find a procedural bar under Harris v. Reed, 489
U.S. 255 (1989). Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2557; see infra notes 85-113 and accompanying
text.
In federal district court, the judge ruled that Smith's claims were not procedurally
barred because there was no "plain statement" that the state court order rested on an
"independent and adequate state law ground." See Smith v. Dixon, 776 F. Supp. 1370,
1376 (E.D.N.C. 1991). However, the district court judge failed to inquire first whether the
state court order "fairly appeared" to rest on federal law, as required by Coleman, before
requiring such a "plain statement." Id.
42. Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1993), reh'g granted and rev'd, 14 F.3d 956
(4th. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 129 (1994) (mem.).
43. Smith, 14 F.3d at 959.
44. 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 129 (1994) (mem.).
45. Id. at 982 n.16; see supra note 9.
46. North Carolina courts have recognized that ineffectiveness claims are most
properly raised in a collateral proceeding given the factfinding necessary to make such a
ruling. See, e.g., State v. Dockery, 78 N.C. App. 190, 192, 336 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1985).
Smith raised his ineffectiveness claim in his first state motion for appropriate relief. Smith,
14 F.3d at 960. Thus, even if the procedural bar doctrine does apply to federal habeas
review of Smith's claims, the ineffectiveness claim was raised at the proper time and may
be reviewed by a federal habeas court.
47. Smith, 14 F.3d at 982. The procedural bar doctrine, in sum, holds that when a
claim of error is not raised properly on appeal in state court proceedings, a federal habeas
court will not consider the merits of such claim if the state court also refused to reach the
1995] 2357
2358 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
were procedurally barred from consideration.' Writing only for
those seven judges, Judge Wilkins found it "extremely significant"
that the superior court order failed to make any mention of federal
law.49 Judge Wilkins then analyzed North Carolina's procedural bar
statute, concluding that though "phrased in permissive language," the
construction of the statute "makes plain that [it] is a mandatory
provision."' Given the "mandatory" nature of the procedural bar
under state law, Judge Wilkins concluded that the state court order
must have been based on a finding of procedural default."' The
Wilkins half of the court found that the superior court's summary
dismissal of all but the ineffectiveness claim without a hearing
evidenced consideration on the merits of the ineffectiveness claim and
dismissal of the other claims on procedural grounds.52 Despite a
procedurally similar Fourth Circuit case finding no procedural bar,53
merits of the claim because of the procedural deficiency. See infra notes 81-131 and
accompanying text.
48. Smith, 14 F.3d at 973. The court recognized, and the State conceded, that there
had been constitutional error in the sentencing phase of Smith's capital murder trial. lit
at 974 (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988)); see also supra note 24
(discussing the Maynard doctrine). However, even given the existence of a meritorious
claim of constitutional error, the claim would be barred from consideration by the habeas
court if it had been procedurally defaulted in state court proceedings. See infra notes 78-
113 and accompanying text.
49. Smith, 14 F.3d at 964. Smith argued first that the state court's summary order
appeared to rest on federal law because it lacked a plain statement that it was based on
state law and should not bar federal habeas review. Id. at 963-64. Judge Wilkins, relying
on Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), rejected this argument. Smith, 14 F.3d
at 963-64. Under Coleman, Judge Wilkins believed that federal habeas courts were
prohibited from reviewing claims previously raised in state court proceedings merely
because a plain statement of an adequate state law basis for the order was absent. Id. at
964. Rather, Judge Wilkins believed that Coleman required a habeas court to first
determine that the state court decision rested "primarily on federal law" before reviewing
the claims. Id. at 964. It was for this reason that Judge Wilkins found the lack of any
reference to federal law to be "extremely significant." Id.
50. Id. at 965. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419(a) (1988) sets forth three possible grounds
(other than lack of merit) upon which a court entertaining a motion for appropriate relief
may deny the motion, including failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. The statute
provides that while the court "may" deny the motion for any of the three reasons, "in the
interest of justice and for good cause shown" the court may grant the motion if "it is
otherwise meritorious." Id, § 15A-1419(b).
51. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 965.
52. Id. at 967-69. If, in fact, the state court had denied Smith's motion solely on the
merits, rather than on procedural grounds, then the federal habeas court would not be
barred from reconsidering those claims. See infra notes 78-113 and accompanying text.
53. Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993); see
Smith, 14 F.3d at 970 n.9. Smith asserted that language in the superior court order
denying all but his ineffectiveness claim, stating that the court had "considered the
arguments in support of his claims," was evidence that the state court considered the
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Judge Wilkins dismissed the similarity as insufficient "to override the
surrounding circumstances tending to show that the summary order
was based on the procedural bar."'54 Accordingly, Judge Wilkins
concluded that Smith's claims other than ineffectiveness were
procedurally barred from consideration by a federal court.55
The dissent took a markedly different view of the case. Judge
Sprouse, writing for the other half of the court on the procedural bar
issue,56 argued that Smith's claims were not procedurally barred from
merits. Smith, 14 F.3d at 969. The court distinguished Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct.
2546,2561 (1991), and Nickerson (which had applied Coleman) concluding that neither the
precedent nor the circumstances supported Smith's contention. Smith, 14 F.3d at 969.
Smith also argued that the state court had "denied" all but his ineffectiveness claim
rather than "dismissed" them, demonstrating that the decision was on the merits. Id. at
970. In response, the court noted that the statutory language allows for "denial" of a
motion for appropriate relief and thus "denial of Smith's motion was equally compatible
with a denial on the merits or a denial pursuant to [the state procedural bar doctrines]."
Id. at 970.
54. Smith, 14 F.3d at 970. The Smith court implied that had the State raised the
statutory construction argument in the Nickerson appeal, that decision may have been
different. See id. at 970 n.9 ("Moreover, the State did not present the Nickerson panel
with many of the grounds that support the conclusion that the superior court order did not
fairly appear to rest principally on federal grounds.").
55. 1d. at 973. Smith asserted that even if the claims were procedurally barred, the
North Carolina state courts do not apply the bar "consistently and regularly" as required
by Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988). Smith, 14 F.3d at 972. Specifically, Smith
noted that the North Carolina Supreme Court has previously reached the merits of
procedurally defaulted issues on direct review. Id. Under Johnson, if a state fails to apply
its procedural bar statute "consistently and regularly," it will be ineffective to bar federal
habeas review when it is invoked by the state court. See Johnson, 486 U.S. at 587; see
infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
In response to Smith's claim, the court noted that different statutes govern the
procedural default of claims on direct review as opposed to those on motions for
appropriate relief. Smith, 14 F.3d at 972. The statute guiding consideration of defaulted
claims on direct review is N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1446 (1988), which provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), error may not be asserted upon
appellate review unless the error has been brought to the attention of the trial
court by appropriate and timely objection or motion....
(b) Failure to make an appropriate and timely motion or objection constitutes
a waiver of the right to assert the alleged error upon appeal, but the appellate
court may review such errors affecting substantial rights in the interest of justice
if it determines it appropriate to do so.
In essence, Judge Wilkins reasoned that although the North Carolina Supreme Court
considered on direct review even improperly preserved errors, this did not constitute a
reason to consider such claims again upon a motion for appropriate relief. Smith, 14 F.3d
at 972. Thus, Judge Wilkins thought that improperly preserved claims would not be
treated the same on both direct and collateral review. Id.
56. See supra note 9. The presentation of the procedural bar issue in the court's
opinion appears somewhat deceptive. While the court split seven to seven on this issue,
there is no such indication until a footnote on the last page of the majority opinion. Smith,
14 F.3d at 982 n.16. The footnote, however, fails to detail the votes of the individual
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consideration by a habeas court.57 To support this claim, Judge
Sprouse compared the Wilkins reasoning with the Fourth Circuit's
finding of no procedural bar in Nickerson v. Lee.58
Having divided over the procedural bar issue, the court was
compelled to determine whether a federal habeas court could apply
harmless error analysis to an unconstitutionally vague capital
sentencing instruction. 9 A majority of the court held that even if
Smith's claims were not procedurally barred, habeas relief was
unwarranted.' Initially, the court noted the Supreme Court's
approval of harmless error analysis performed by federal habeas
courts as to errors occurring in capital proceedings,6 including
constitutional errors.62 In fact, federal courts are not to grant habeas
relief absent "actual prejudice."'  Then, the majority pointed out
that the Supreme Court has never drawn Smith's proposed distinction
between harmless error analysis generally-which Smith contended a
federal habeas court could perform-and harmless error analysis as
to the "jury's weighing of an unconstitutionally vague" capital
sentencing instruction-which Smith contended must be performed in
the first instance by a state court.' Rather, the Supreme Court has
decided which errors could be subject to harmless error analysis based
judges. The Wilkins opinion stated that "we hold" that Kermit Smith's claims were
procedurally barred. Smith, 14 F.3d at 982. Furthermore, the inclusion of a concurrence
by Judge Hall, and apparently joined only by Judge Hamilton, indicated that he disagreed
with the Wilkins side on the procedural bar issue, but concurred on the harmless error
issue, which added to the confusion. Id. at 982-83 (Hall, J., concurring).
The opinion is so unclear on the procedural bar issue that it has been listed in the
North Carolina annotated statutes as establishing the position that North Carolina's
procedural bar statute is mandatory. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419 annot. (Supp.
1994). In fact, an affirmance by an equally divided court carries no precedential weight.
See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942) (concluding that judgment in a
case by an equally divided court was not authoritative precedent). The Pink Court stated
that "while [the judgment] was conclusive and binding upon the parties as respects that
controversy the lack of agreement by a majority of the Court on the principles of law
involved prevents it from being an authoritative determination for other cases." Id.
(citations omitted).
57. Smith, 14 F.3d at 984-88 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (citing Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F2d 1125, 1126-30 (4th Cir. 1992) (Sprouse, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993).
59. Smith, F.3d at 974.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 975 (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-58 (1988)).
62. Id. at 975 (citing Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 391 n.6 (1986)).
63. Id (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993)).
64. Id.
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on their classification as either "trial" or "structural" in nature.'
Because the error occasioned by the consideration of an un-
constitutionally vague capital sentencing instruction has been deemed
by the Supreme Court to be a "trial" error,66 the court concluded
that it could conduct harmless error analysis as to the un-
constitutionally vague instruction.67 The court then discussed the
values of comity and federalism as common themes justifying harmless
error analysis in federal habeas cases. 6 Having concluded that a
federal habeas court could perform the required harmless error
analysis, the court found the error in Smith's trial to be harmless
because it did not have "a substantial and injurious influence in
determining the jury's verdict., 69
In dissent and representing half of the court finding no
procedural bar, Judge Sprouse concluded that harmless error analysis
in the death penalty instruction context could be performed only by
a state court on appellate review.7' He reasoned that harmless error
analysis is merely another method that the Supreme Court has
recognized as sufficient for a state to "reshape its sentencing laws so
as to bring them in line with the federal Constitution."' According
to the dissent, a federal court could no more perform such "reshap-
ing" than it could "rewrite state legislation in order to shape it to fit
it to the federal Constitution."7" Thus, unless the state court would
retake the case and perform a harmless error analysis, the dissent
contended that the writ of habeas corpus must be granted to the
defendant. 3
The United States Constitution provides for "[t]he privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus."'74 As originally understood, the writ
65. Id. See infra notes 180-207 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between a "trial" and a "structural" error in the harmless error context).
66. Smith, 14 F.3d at 976. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 (1990)
(concluding that harmless error analysis is constitutionally permissible in reviewing an
error caused by a vague jury instruction concerning aggravating factors).
67. Smith, 14 F.3d at 976.
68. Id.; see supra note 6 (defining federalism and comity).
69. Smith, 14 F.3d at 981. This harmless error standard applied by the court was the
one laid down for habeas review by the United States Supreme Court in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710,1722 (1993); see Smith, 14 F.3d at 975; infra notes 173-79 and
accompanying text.
70. Smith, 14 F.3d at 988 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 990 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 993 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
73. See id at 962, 993 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The phrase "habeas corpus" encompasses several
different writs used "to ascertain whether [a prisoner] is restrained of his liberty by due
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was solely a means of challenging the jurisdiction of the state court
rendering the judgment.75 Over time, judicial opinions have ex-
panded the scope of habeas review to include all constitutional errors
occurring in criminal proceedings.76 The federal statutes now
governing habeas review restrict the jurisdiction of federal habeas
courts to petitions alleging some violation of federal law.77
As a general rule-even outside the habeas context-"a state
decision resting on an adequate foundation of state substantive law is
immune from review in the federal courts. 78 In Wainwright v.
Sykes,79 the Supreme Court extended this doctrine to include state
court decisions resting entirely on a violation of state procedural
rules.' This limitation on federal court jurisdiction, most commonly
referred to as the procedural bar doctrine, prohibits federal habeas
review of those claims that a petitioner defaulted in state court
proceedings by failing to comply with the state's rules of procedure.8 '
However, in Caldwell v. Mississippi,' the Court made clear that it
is insufficient that a state court could have invoked procedural default
process of law." 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (1968). When used alone, the phrase
generally refers to habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. Id § 2. This is the writ referred to in
the United States Constitution. Id. § 2; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709, 710 (6th ed.
1990). Habeas corpus is a form of a collateral attack on a judgment. 39 AM. JUR. 2D
Habeas Corpus § 3 (1968); BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990). Because of the
equitable purpose of the writ of habeas corpus, habeas statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of the prisoner's liberty interests. 39 AM. JUR.. 2D Habeas Corpus § 4
(1968). But see Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 581,582 (1989-90) (arguing that courts should attempt to interpret
statutes correctly rather than liberally or conservatively).
75. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 11 (1968) (stating that the inquiry of a
habeas court ordinarily "involves no questions other than those that pertain to
jurisdiction").
76. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,414 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Coleman
v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988). A federal judge "shall entertain an application for a
writ of habeas corpus... only on the ground that [a prisoner] is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States." Id.; see Barclay v. Florida, 463
U.S. 939, 957-58 (1983) ("[M]ere errors of state law are not the concern of [the Supreme
Court] unless they rise ... to the level of a denial of rights protected by the [U.S.]
Constitution.") (citation omitted).
78. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,81 (1977) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
79. 433 U.S, 72 (1977).
80. Id. at 87.
81. Id. at 90-91. The procedural bar doctrine may be overcome only by a showing of
"cause and prejudice" or that a "miscarriage of justice" would result from failing to
consider the claim on federal habeas review. Id. For a recent Supreme Court discussion
of the "miscarriage of justice" exception, see Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 862-69 (1995).
82. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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as a basis for its order.' Rather, the state court order "must
actually have relied on the procedural bar as an independent basis for
its disposition of the case" in order to bar reconsideration of the
claims by a federal habeas court."
Unfortunately, ambiguity in the state court's opinion often
impedes the task of determining when a state court decision has relied
upon such an "adequate" state law ground. In response to this
dilemma and the resulting variations in lower court judgments, the
Supreme Court developed a presumption in Michigan v. Long."
The Long Court held that in those cases where the state court
decision "fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law," federal habeas review would be
barred only if there was a "plain statement" that the decision rested
on "independent and adequate state [law] grounds."86  Long,
however, was a direct review case.'
Six years later, in Harris v. Reed,8 the Supreme Court addressed
the treatment by federal habeas courts of ambiguity as to the basis
(state or federal law) of the state court decision. In Harris, an eight-
member majority 9 chose to extend the direct review "plain
statement" rule of Long to collateral review in a federal habeas
proceeding." In support of its holding, the Court reasoned that
requiring such a "plain statement" would place little, if any, burden
on the values of "finality, federalism, and comity."9' State courts
were already accustomed to the "plain statement" requirement after
Long.92 Furthermore, states were not forbidden from invoking their
procedural default rules; they just needed to state clearly that they
were doing so.93 Finally, the majority felt that the "plain statement"
83. Id. at 327.
84. ld.
85. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in Long. Id.
at 1034.
86. Id. at 104041.
87. See id. at 1036-37.
88. 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
89. The majority opinion in Harris was written by Justice Blacknun and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, and
Scalia. Id at 256. Justice Kennedy was the lone dissenter. Id.; see infra note 96.
90. Harris, 489 U.S. at 265.
91. Id. at 264.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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requirement would save federal courts from the burden of parsing the
facts surrounding the opinion of a state court to determine its basis.94
Scarcely two years had elapsed since Harris when the Court, in
Coleman v. Thompson,95 appeared to dramatically refine the Harris
holding,96 explaining that the "plain statement" rule should be
limited to those cases in which the state court opinion first "fairly
appears to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with
federal law."'  It would be the duty of the federal courts "to
determine the scope of the relevant state court judgment.""8 If the
judgment did not first "appear to rest primarily on federal law," then
review would be barred by the presence of an "independent and
adequate state law ground" for the order, even absent a plain
statement.99 In the Court's view, the values of federalism were
paramount,"° and placing a plain statement requirement on state
courts would be an excessive burden to their systems with few
corresponding benefits. 1' The Court felt it had "no power to tell
state courts how they must write their opinions."'"
Applying the rule it had just laid down, the Coleman majority
suggested that several factors indicated that the Virginia state court's
judgment at issue was in fact based on procedural default."3 First,
the Virginia Supreme Court stated that it was granting the State's
motion to dismiss.3" An examination of the State's motion revealed
that it was based on a procedural deficiency-the failure of the
94. lId at 264-65.
95. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
96. Interestingly enough, four of the Justices from the Harris Court majority, along
with two new Justices, formed the Coleman majority. This time, Justice O'Connor wrote
for the majority and was joined by fellow Harris majority members Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. I. at 2552; see supra note 89 (discussing
membership of Harris majority). Also joining the Coleman majority opinion were Justices
Kennedy and Souter. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2552; see supra note 89. Justice Blackmun,
who had written the majority opinion in Harris, dissented, believing that the Court was
boldly disregarding the Harris holding. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2571 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). It was Justice Blackmun's contention that the Coleman holding was the result
of "exasperation" with the expansive relief available to criminal defendants upon habeas
review. Id. at 2569 (Blakmnun, J., dissenting).
97. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2557.
98. Id. at 2559.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 2552. As Justice O'Connor wrote in the opening sentence of the
majority opinion, "[t]his is a case about federalism." Id.
101. Id. at 2558-59.
102. Id. at 2559.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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petitioner to comply with the state time limits for appeals. 5 In
addition, the state court had "dismissed" rather than "denied" the
motion' 6 Finally, the Virginia Supreme Court's dismissal order
made no mention of federal law °7
However, there was some evidence that the state supreme court
had considered the merits of Coleman's claims. Initially, Coleman
argued that previous Virginia Supreme Court precedent established
that appeal time limit requirements would be waived by that court in
cases where constitutional claims were raised."° The Court dis-
missed this precedent, noting that while the Virginia Supreme Court
had considered claims raised in an appeal filed several years late, the
Virginia Supreme court had "explicitly declined to announce such a
practice."'"3 9 More problematic to the United States Supreme Court
was the fact that the state court order dismissing Coleman's claims
stated that it was "issued '[u]pon consideration' of all the filed
papers," which included Coleman's petition for appeal and the State's
brief in opposition." Each of these documents filed with the court
contained discussion of the merits of Coleman's federal claims."'
Conceding that such language in the state court order caused some
ambiguity as to its basis, the Court concluded that, on balance, the
state court order, rather than appearing to rest on federal law, "fairly
appear[ed]" to rest on state law grounds." Therefore, the Court
held that Coleman's claims were procedurally barred from con-
sideration by federal courts even absent a plain statement of basis in
the state court order."3
While the procedural bar doctrine is simple to articulate, it has
proven much more difficult to apply. Since Coleman, the Supreme
Court has apparently not taken another case where it was necessary
to apply the Coleman doctrine to an ambiguous state court decision
to ascertain whether a claim was procedurally barred from federal
habeas court consideration."4 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has
105. Id.
106. See id.; see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker, Ill S. Ct. 2590,2594 (1991) (explaining that
one of the factors in Coleman was the fact that the order "dismissed" rather than denied
the motion, the latter suggesting a decision based on the merits).
107. Coleman, Ill S. Ct. at 2559.
108. Id. at 2560-61.
109. Id. at 2561.
110. I&
111. Id
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Search of Westlaw, Shepardization of Coleman v. Thompson (May 7, 1995).
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undertaken a Coleman analysis in only eleven cases other than
Smith," and in seven of those cases, the state court order explicitly
indicated that its decision was based on a procedural default by the
petitioner.116 Due to this lack of precedent, the decision-maker
faces a difficult task in determining the basis of a state court order.
The most comprehensive analysis and application of the Coleman
doctrine by the Fourth Circuit prior to Smith occurred in Nickerson
v. Lee."7 In Nickerson, the petitioner had been convicted in North
Carolina state court of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life
in prison."' In his motion for appropriate relief, Nickerson raised
several claims that had not been advanced on direct appeal.'19 The
Person County Superior Court "denied" the motion without a
hearing," stating that "upon review of the motion and the file in
the case"'' the court "finds that the petitioner has set forth no
grounds for ... appropriate relief."'' The Nickerson court found
that this language signified that the court had reached and examined
the merits." The court further noted that the State had not
responded to Nickerson's motion, and thus there were no pleadings
115. Id.
116. Those Fourth Circuit cases finding a procedural bar due to an explicit invocation
of procedural default by the state court include Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920, 924 (4th
Cir. 1994); Ashe v. Styles, 39 F.3d 80,86-87 (4th Cir. 1994); Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758,
761 (4th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1208 (1994); Wise v. Williams, 982 F.2d 142,
143-44 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2940 (1993); Bush v. Legursky, 966 F.2d 897,
900 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 626 (1992); Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354,
1362-63 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3056 (1992); Fitzgerald v. Thompson, 943
F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1112 (1992).
Other Fourth Circuit cases applying the Coleman doctrine include Nickerson v. Lee,
971 F.2d 1125, 1127-30 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993) (providing the
most extensive discussion and application of the Coleman doctrine by the Fourth Circuit
prior to Smith); Adams v. Aiken, 965 F2d 1306, 1314 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying Coleman
with no discussion of the facts), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2966 (1993), and cert. granted and
vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1365 (1994); Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106, 1116 n.7 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973 (1992) (finding a probable procedural bar under Coleman, but
choosing to review the claims anyway).
117. 971 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993). Judge Luttig
wrote the opinion and was joined by Judge Hall and Senior United States District Judge
Kellam. Nickerson, 971 F.2d at 1126. While finding no procedural bar in Nickerson,
Judge Luttig joined in Judge Wilkins's opinion in Smith finding a procedural bar. See
supra note 9.
118. Nickerson, 971 F.2d at 1126.
119. Id. at 1127.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1128 (quoting the Person County Superior Court order).
122. Id. (quoting the Person County Superior Court order).
123. Id at 1128-29.
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by which to determine the basis of the denial." Therefore, the
court concluded that it did not "fairly appear" that the Superior
Court's order rested on a finding of state law procedural default, and
thus the defendant's claims were not barred from federal habeas
review.'2'
On the same day the Coleman opinion was handed down, the
Supreme Court, in Ylst v. Nunnemaker,' further developed the
procedural bar doctrine. The Ylst Court held that state procedural
bars may "expire" if "the last state court to be presented with a
particular claim reaches the merits."'" However, the Court noted
that later unexplained orders do not presumptively rest on federal
law."2  Rather, a federal court must look to the "last explained
state-court judgment." 29  After determining the basis of that
judgment, any later unexplained state orders reaching the same result
would be presumed to rest on the same ground.' However, this
presumption is rebuttable by "strong evidence" to the contrary. 3'
Prior to both Coleman and Ylst, the Court had qualified its
procedural bar doctrine by holding in Johnson v. Mississippi" that
even the most clearly stated invocation of procedural default by the
state court will not foreclose federal habeas review if the state's
procedural default rules are not applied "consistently or regularly" by
the state's courts." In Johnson, the defendant had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to death by a Mississippi state court.'"
One of the aggravating factors supporting the defendant's death
sentence was a prior violent felony conviction in New York state."5
After the defendant's death sentence had been affirmed by the
Mississippi Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals
overturned the defendant's prior felony conviction." 6 Based on this
reversal, the defendant then sought post-conviction relief from the
124. Id. at 1129; see supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
125. Nickerson, 971 F.2d at 1130.
126. 111 S. Ct. 2590 (1991).
127. Id. at 2593.
128. See id. at 2594.
129. IM at 2595.
130. Id. at 2594.
131. I at 2595.
132. 486 U.S. 578 (1988).
133. See id at 587.
134. Id at 580.
135. Id at 581.
136. Id at 580.
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Mississippi Supreme Court.' Despite the reversal of the New York
conviction, the Mississippi Supreme Court denied relief, finding that
such a claim had been waived for failure to raise it on direct
appeal. 8 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the
majority held that the state procedural bar did not prevent federal
habeas review because the Mississippi Supreme Court did not apply
its bar "consistently or regularly."'39 In support of this finding, the
Court could point to only two cases where the Mississippi Supreme
Court had indicated that it would not invoke a procedural bar against
certain types of claims raised for the first time on collateral appeal of
a capital case.' 40
In North Carolina, a collateral attack on a conviction is pursued
by a motion for appropriate relief'' Only three grounds (other
than lack of merit) 42 justify the denial of such a motion: (1) The
defendant's failure to raise the issue in a previous motion,4 (2) the
issue's previous determination on the merits,' or (3) the defen-
dant's failure to raise the issue in a previous appeal.'45 The statute's
wording is somewhat ambiguous in that it provides that a court "may
deny the motion" for any of the listed reasons,' thus making the
denial appear optional. However, the statute provides an exception
to this permissibly phrased statute by stating that "in the interest of
justice and for good cause shown" the court "may in its discretion
grant the motion if it is otherwise meritorious. 4"' In deciding a
motion on the merits, a defendant "is entitled to a hearing... unless
the court determines that the motion is without merit."'14
State v. Price49 illustrates the North Carolina Supreme Court's
application of the state's procedural bar statutes. In Price, the
defendant had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death,"
137. Id. at 583.
138. Id.
139. Im at 588-89.
140. Id. at 587-88.
141. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419 (1988).
142. Id. § 15A-1420(c)(6).
143. Id. § 15A-1419(a)(1).
144. Id. § 15A-1419(a)(2).
145. Id. § 15A-1419(a)(3).
146. Id. § 15A-1419(b) (emphasis added).
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. § 15A-1420(c)(1) (emphasis added).
149. 331 N.C. 620, 418 S.E.2d 169 (1992), vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 955
(1993).
150. Id. at 622, 418 S.E.2d at 170.
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but on direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the North Carolina Supreme
Court to conduct harmless error analysis. 1 Following remand, the
defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief, raising issues not
originally raised on direct appeal."5 The. motion reached the North
Carolina Supreme Court at the same time that the direct appeal, on
remand from the United States Supreme Court, was being recon-
sidered.' 3 The new claims raised in the motion for appropriate
relief could have been raised in the original direct appeal.'
5 4
Nevertheless, the defendant argued that his new claims should not be
barred because he was still in the process of pursuing his initial direct
appeal. 5 The court found this argument "unpersuasive,"' 6 stat-
ing that "[m]otions for appropriate relief may not be used to add to
an appeal new arguments which could have been raised in the briefs
originally filed."' 7 Recognizing that the motion was thus "subject
to" dismissal," the court nonetheless elected to address the claims
"in the interests of both judicial economy and thorough scrutiny" of
capital cases. 59 The court further announced that this was its policy
"'in every case in which a death sentence' " had been imposed.'
6
Even if a claim is not procedurally barred, not all errors will
suffice to warrant federal habeas relief, Errors are inevitable. With
the tens and sometimes hundreds of motions filed and objections
raised by both parties in the average criminal prosecution, no judge
can be expected to be infallible. Both the state and federal systems
have long recognized this principle by adopting harmless error
rules.'6' The federal harmless error statute provides that "[o]n the
151. Id. at 623, 418 S.E.2d at 170.
152. Id at 629, 418 S.E.2d at 174.
153. See id. at 629, 418 S.E.2d at 174.
154. Id. at 630, 418 S.E.2d at 174.
155. Idt
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id
159. Id. at 630, 418 S.E.2d at 174-75.
160. Id at 630, 418 S.E.2d at 175 (quoting State v. Fowler, 270 N.C. 468, 469, 155
S.E.2d 83, 84 (1967)) (emphasis added).
161. Every state, as well as the federal court system, has rules that make reversal
unnecessary for errors that "do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18,22 (1967) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111). In North Carolina, the
rules of evidence provide that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8C-1, Rule 103(a) (1992). California has a virtually identical provision which provides
that "[a]fter hearing the appeal, the Court must give judgment without regard to technical
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hearing of any.appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall
give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties."'" In Chapman v. California,"6  the United States
Supreme Court, on direct review of a death sentence,"6 first faced
the question whether the federal harmless error statute should be
applied to a violation of federal constitutional rights."6 Rejecting
the argument that constitutional errors must always warrant rever-
sal,"6 the Court instead chose to adopt a high harmless error
threshold in the constitutional context, inquiring whether the state had
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the error "did not
contribute to the verdict obtained. 167
The Chapman test amounted to an "impact on the outcome" test
by which appellate courts assessed the gravity of the violation and the
degree it affected jury deliberations."6 The shortcoming of the test
was that the Court offered no criteria by which to judge the effect of
the error on the jury deliberations. 69 Perhaps out of a recognition
that the Chapman test would be impossible to administer in any
principled fashion, the focus of the test shifted over the next decade
from the effect on jury deliberations to the factual accuracy of the
errors or defects, or to exceptions, which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1258 (West 1982). In Florida, "[n]o judgment shall be
reversed unless the appellate court is of the opinion, after an examination of all the appeal
papers, that error was committed that injuriously affected the substantial rights of the
appellant." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.33 (West 1985).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988) (emphasis added).
163. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
164. Iam at 19-20.
165. Id. at 20. In Chapman, the specific constitutional context was the violation of the
right against self-incrimination. Id at 19-20. As the prosecutor requested, the judge
instructed the jurors that they could consider the failure of the defendant to testify as
evidence of guilt. Id. at 19.
166. Id. at 21-22. But see Jason S. Marks, Harmless Constitutional Error: Fundamental
Fairness and Constitutional Integrity, 1993 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. available in
WESTLAW, in AMBAR-TP library at 8-SPG Crimjust 2 (arguing that the harmless error
doctrine was never intended to extend to violations of a criminal defendant's constitutional
rights).
167. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. North Carolina codified the requirements of Chapman
in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1443(b) (1988), which states that "[a] violation of the
defendant's rights under the Constitution of the United States is prejudicial unless the
appellate court finds that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden is upon
the State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless." Id.;
see also id. § 15A-1443 (1988) (official commentary) (explaining that the statute is a
codification of the standard laid down in Chapman).
168. Marks, supra note 166, at 4.
169. Id.
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outcome.'70 Finally, in 1986, the Court made this shift explicit by
holding that "[w]here a reviewing court can find that the record
developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be
affirmed.'' Though this outcome-oriented approach had been
rejected in Chapman, it was now adopted by the Court under the
guise of adhering to Chapman."
While it appeared that this watered-down Chapman standard
would at least be utilized on federal habeas review,3 in Brecht v.
Abrahamson'74 the Supreme Court held that an even less deman-
ding standard should apply: "[W]hether the error 'had substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' "1
The Court stressed that habeas relief is an "extraordinary
remedy"'76 requiring a more egregious error than would justify
reversal on direct review.' Appreciating the "finality and legality"
attaching to judgments upon the completion of direct review,'78 the
Court believed it would be illogical to "require federal habeas courts
to engage in the identical approach to harmless error review that
Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct review."' 79
Though the Chapman Court recognized that some errors could
never be found harmless, it was there that the guidance ended. Not
until Arizona v. Fulminante8 0 did the Supreme Court provide some
framework in which to determine what types of constitutional error
could be subjected to harmless error analysis. Identification of an
error as either the "trial" or "structural" variety proved the
touchstone of the Fulminante test. 1' A "trial error" is one that
170. Id. at 6. Though Chapman has never been overruled, only two years after it was
issued the Supreme Court had already retreated to applying an "overwhelming evidence"
test to constitutional violations. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,254 (1968).
171. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986).
172. Note, Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 100, 114 (1986).
173. See, ag., Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 402-03 (1991) (applying the Chapman
harmless error standard to a habeas review of an unconstitutional burden shifting in the
state trial court jury instructions); Rose, 478 U.S. at 582 (same); Milton v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371,372-73 (1972) (applying the Chapman harmless error standard to a habeas review
of a confession allegedly obtained in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
174. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
175. Id. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
176. Id. at 1719.
177. Id. at 1719-20.
178. Id. at 1719.
179. Id, at 1721.
180. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
181. Id. at 1264-65.
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occurs "during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."'" A "structural" error, by contrast,
affects the "framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than
[being] simply an error in the trial process itself.'" Structural
errors inhibit the reliability a criminal trial is designed to achieve, and
thus "defy analysis by 'harmless error' standards."' 4 Those errors
classified as "structural" include the total deprivation of the right to
trial counsel,"s the right to an impartial trial judge,"'6 the right to
self-representation at trial,"s the right to a public trial," and the
unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand
jury-'89
An unconstitutionally vague jury instruction at the sentencing
phase of a capital case is an error of the "trial" variety.90 As such,
the Court held, in Clemons v. Mississippi,'9' such an error is subject
to harmless-error analysis."9 However, in Clemons, the harmless-
error analysis was to be performed by the state court.'9 The
Clemons Court never specified whether federal habeas courts could
conduct harmless-error analysis on direct review, but neither did they
so forbid. 4 At least one case since Clemons has spoken in dicta to
the effect that harmless-error analysis must be performed by state
courts alone. 95
182. Id. at 1264.
183. Id. at 1265.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1264-65 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (involving
the total deprivation of the right to counsel)).
186. Id. at 1265 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,511 (1927) (involving a biased trial
judge)).
187. Id. (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170 (1984) (involving the denial of
the right to self-representation at trial)).
188. Id. (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1984) (involving the denial of the
right to a public trial)).
189. Id. (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,256-57 (1986) (involving the unlawful
exclusion of members of the defendant's race from the grand jury)).
190. Id. at 1263-64 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990)). In Clemons,
the jury was instructed that one of the aggravating factors to be considered was whether
the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Clemons, 494 U.S. at 743 n.1.
No definition of these terms was provided. Id. at 742-43.
191. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
192. Id. at 752.
193. Id. at 752-53.
194. See id
195. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 535 (1992).
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In Cabana v. Bullock,'96 the Court considered a claim
somewhat similar to that raised by Kermit Smith, to the effect that a
state court alone could perform the requisite appellate review. In
Cabana, the defendant argued that the state courts alone could
perform an Enmund analysis in the first instance."9  After
explaining that the performance of an Enmund analysis on appellate
review would not violate the defendant's right to a jury trial,' the
Cabana Court then considered what was "the appropriate course of
action for a federal court faced with a petition for habeas corpus
raising an Enmund claim when the state courts have failed to make
any finding regarding the Enmund criteria."'" Two possibilities
existed: The federal court could itself make the factual determination
required by Enmund, ° or the court could "take steps to require the
State's own judicial system to make the factual findings in the first
instance."i'
Recognizing that either of these alternatives "would, in theory,
be adequate to remedy an hypothesized Eighth Amendment
violation," the Court concluded the latter "course of action [was] the
sounder one" for two reasons.' First, the defendant has an interest
in having the state courts make the Enmund determination.'
According to the Cabana majority, given the Enmund Court's
recognition of a defendant's right to not be executed absent a
"particular factual predicate," there is the implication that the State's
judicial process must at some point make such a finding.' The
Court also recognized an interest of the State in being afforded the
first opportunity in having its own courts apply federal constitutional
criteria in administering its criminal laws.' Therefore, the Court
concluded that the sounder course of action was to "allow] the [state]
courts an opportunity to carry out in the first instance the factual
196. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
197. See id. at 390. The Enmund Court had held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the execution of "one... who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is
committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing
take place or that lethal force will be employed." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797
(1982).
198. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 385.
199. IL at 390.
200. Id.
201. Id
202. Id.
203. See id. at 390-91.
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 391.
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inquiry called for by Enmund."' The Court went on to recognize
that in some situations, remanding the case to the state court would
be useless, and that the federal court could itself find the error
harmless.
Against this precedential backdrop, the Fourth Circuit considered
Kermit Smith's claims of constitutional error. The threshold issue in
Smith v. Dixon?' was whether the federal courts were permitted to
consider Kermit Smith's claims given his failure to raise the issues on
direct appeal as required by the North Carolina procedural rules.'
The entire court recognized that a federal court reviewing a state
court judgment must determine whether that judgment "fairly appears
to rest primarily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal
law.""21 If the judgment so appeared, then Smith's claims would not
be procedurally barred absent a "plain statement" that the ruling was
alternatively based on "adequate and independent state grounds"
(e.g., failure to follow the state's procedural rules).2 On the other
hand, if the judgment did not fairly appear to rest primarily on federal
law, then the claims would automatically be barred?' Because no
"plain statement" was even arguably present in the state court
opinion,2 3 this threshold determination was of paramount sig-
nificance.
While the entire Smith court agreed on the law as laid down in
the Harris-Coleman line of cases,21 the court severely fractured on
its application. Applying a Harris-Coleman type analysis, the Wilkins
half of the court" first found it "extremely significant" that the
state court opinion had failed to make any mention of federal law.2 6
206. Id. at 390-91.
207. Id. at 391 n.6.
208. 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 129 (1994) (mem.).
209. Id. at 962.
210. Id. at 963; see supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
211. See id. at 962 (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261 (1989)); see supra note
99 and accompanying text.
212. See id. at 962-63; see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
213. Id. at 960 n.1. The order dismissing all but Smith's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim stated that "[t]he court has read the paperwriting and considered the arguments in
support of the claims set out therein. The court finds as a fact that [the first 43 issues] set
forth no probable grounds for relief." Id.
214. See supra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 9, 56.
216. Smith, 14 F.3d at 964. In finding the state judgment to be based on state
procedural rules, the Coleman court pointed to the fact that "[tihere is no mention of
federal law in the" Virginia court's dismissal. Coleman v. Thompson, Ill S. Ct. 2546,2559
(1991); see supra text accompanying note 107.
HARMLESS ERROR
With the scale already tipping toward a finding of procedural default,
the Wilkins opinion examined North Carolina's collateral relief
statutory scheme.217  The Wilkins side, in finding Smith's claims
barred, relied heavily on its interpretation of the state's procedural
bar rule 8 as mandatory.219 While conceding that the statute was
"phrased in permissive language,"'  the Wilkins half of the court
thought it "plain[ly]" compulsory?' They reasoned that if the
procedural bar provisions were elective, there would be no reason to
provide explicitly for statutory factors justifying a deviation.m
The Sprouse half of the court, however, suggested that while such
an interpretation of the statute is arguably correct, the North Carolina
Supreme Court had addressed the issue in State v. Price 3 The
Wilkins half dismissed Price as a case that had "relied on the fact that
the petitioner's direct appeal was still pending."' The Price court,
however, explicitly rejected this argument.' The Wilkins side at-
tempted to distinguish Price further by characterizing it as relying on
the exception in section 15A-1419(b) of the general statutes that
allows for review of "otherwise meritorious" defaulted claims "in the
interest of justice and for good cause shown."' The Price court,
however, granted review for "judicial economy" and because of the
capital nature of the case.' No mention was made of "merit,"
"justice," or "good cause." The Price court's statement that such
review would be performed in "every" death penalty case further
belies the Wilkins opinion's contention that review was based on the
statutory exception? 9 Not every defendant would be able to show
217. Smith, F.3d at 964-68.
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419 (1988).
219. Smith, 14 F.3d at 965.
220. Id. at 965. The statute provides that a court "may deny the motion [for
appropriate relief] under any of the circumstances specified" in that section of the statute.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419(b) (1988).
221. Smith, 14 F.3d at 965.
222. Id.; see supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
223. Smith, 14 F.3d at 986. See State v. Price, 331 N.C. 620, 418 S.E.2d 169 (1992),
vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 955 (1993); see supra notes 149-60 and accompanying
text.
224. Smith, 14 F.3d at 972 n.10.
225. Price, 331 N.C. at 630, 418 S.E.2d at 174; see supra text accompanying notes 149-
60.
226. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1419(b) (1988).
227. Price, 331 N.C. at 630, 418 S.E.2d at 174-75; see supra text accompanying notes
158-60.
228. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
229. Price, 331 N.C. at 630, 418 S.E2d at 174-75; see supra text accompanying notes
158-60.
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"good cause." Finally, after the Price court determined that the
defendant had defaulted his claims on direct appeal, the court
concluded that the claims were only "subject to being dismissed."''z0
There is no indication that dismissal was compulsory.
Putting aside the Wilkins opinion's questionable interpretation of
Price, its reliance on statutory interpretation to support a finding of
procedural bar seems especially misplaced given the Supreme Court's
holding in Caldwell v. Mississippi.231 In Caldwell, the Court rejected
an argument that the defendant's claims were procedurally barred
because the state court "could have" found them defaulted.' 2 The
Court made plain that "could have" was not enough; the state court
"must have" based its decision on procedural default if the claims
were to be barred from habeas reviewP 3 Yet, the Wilkins opinion,
while avoiding a "could have" argument, essentially made a "should
have" argument in support of its finding of procedural bar.' The
Wilkins side argued that because the state court "should have" denied
the motion under the state's statutory scheme, the state court "must
have" done so. 5 Such an argument misses the holding of Caldwell,
which requires that the court actually base its order on the procedural
default in order to bar the claim from federal habeas review? 6 The
Wilkins argument assumes without discussion that North Carolina trial
court judges interpreted the procedural bar statute in the same
manner as did the Fourth Circuit in Smith. 7 Absent any indication
to the contrary, it would be reasonable for the Fourth Circuit to
assume that the North Carolina courts interpret their statutes in a
logical manner. However, State v. Price' indicates that the state
court's interpretation of the procedural bar statutes is not so
strict 39 As a result, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the statutory
interpretation argument to justify a finding of procedural default is
misplaced.
230. Price, 331 N.C. at 630, 418 S.E.2d at 174-75; see supra text accompanying notes
158-59.
231. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
232. 1d, at 327; see supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
233. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 327.
234. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 964-65.
235. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 964-65.
236. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 327.
237. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 964-65.
238. 331 N.C. 620, 418 S.E.2d 169 (1992), vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 955
(1993).
239. See supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps most troubling about the Smith majority's statutory
interpretation argument is that it was the keystone to their finding of
procedural bar.' It would be one thing if the argument was used
to bolster an already strong case finding a procedural bar. However,
the facts of Smith were strikingly similar to Nickerson, a prior Fourth
Circuit case finding no bar.24' The court all but admits that this
statutory interpretation argument is the basis of the Smith opinion and
the only factor distinguishing it from Nickerson.24'
Continuing its statutory interpretation, the Wilkins opinion noted
that the superior court summarily denied Smith's first forty-three
claims, but ordered a hearing before denying Smith's ineffectiveness
claim.243 Under North Carolina statutory law, a superior court must
conduct a hearing on a motion for appropriate relief "unless the court
determines that the motion is without merit."2' Yet in order to
invoke the statutory procedural bar exception, a claim must be
"otherwise meritorious." 5  As the majority pointed out, it is
difficult to understand how a motion could be "without merit," thus
justifying the denial of a hearing, and at the same time be "otherwise
meritorious," thus justifying invocation of the exception to the
procedural default rule. This reasoning established stronger
evidence that the state court order was based on a finding of
procedural bar, but the Wilkins side still assumed that the superior
court carefully interpreted and followed the procedural bar statutes.
The Sprouse side asserted a weak response to the Wilkins
opinion's reasoning. According to Judge Sprouse, a "reviewing court
[could] certainly consider an issue 'on the merits' and decide, without
a hearing, that it [was] meritless."'247 While this assertion is undoub-
tedly true, it fails to address the Wilkins side's argument. The statutes
say nothing about deciding issues "on the merits;" they speak of
addressing issues that are "without merit" or are "otherwise
meritorious. '  Plugging the statutory language into Judge
Sprouse's equation, it is difficult to see how a court could conclude
that an issue was "otherwise meritorious," yet also conclude that it
240. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 970 n.9.
241. See Nickerson, 971 F.2d at 1130.
242. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 970 n.9.
243. Id. at 960-61.
244. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1420(c)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
245. Id. § 15A-1419(b).
246. Smith, 14 F.3d at 968.
247. Id. at 986 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
248. See supra notes 22, 50.
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was "without merit" so as not to require a hearing. Perhaps a more
sound line of attack by the Sprouse supporters would have been to
challenge the majority's assumption that the state court interpreted
the procedural bar statutes in the same manner as did the Wilkins
opinion in Smith.
Having reached a deadlock on the procedural bar issue, the court
was forced to turn to the only issue actually decided in the Smith
case-whether the admitted constitutional error that had occurred in
the sentencing phase of Kermit Smith's trial was harmless.249 To
make this determination, the court initially addressed the issue of
whether a federal court possessed the capacity to perform harmless
error analysis in the narrow context of an unconstitutionally vague
capital sentencing instruction.
The State conceded that the "heinous, atrocious, or cruel"
sentencing instruction at Smith's trial was unconstitutionally vague'
under Maynard v. Cartwright.2 Furthermore, it was undisputed
that such an error could have been cured with a Chapman
constitutional harmless error analysis 3 performed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court.' The sticking point was whether the
federal courts were also competent to perform the harmless error
analysis given the state supreme court's failure to do so. This
argument had never previously been squarely addressed by the
United States Supreme Court, and was thus a matter of first impres-
sion to be determined by the Fourth Circuit. 5
Judge Sprouse, writing in dissent, argued that federal habeas
courts may not perform harmless error analysis in the case of an
unconstitutionally vague capital sentencing instruction. 6 The
dissent, adopting the argument proffered by Smith, reasoned that in
the discrete area of capital punishment, the Supreme Court has distin-
guished the review of "the procedures by which defendants are
singled out for the death penalty and reviewing other criminal
proceedings,"' and has "left to the states the development of
specific procedures and rules that will guide [their] capital sentencing
249. Smith, 14 F.3d at 974-81.
250. Id. at 974-79.
251. Id. at 974; see supra note 24.
252. 486 U.S. 356 (1988); see supra note 24.
253. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
254. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 974.
255. IM at 975.
256. Id. at 988 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
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scheme[s]."" 8 In support of this position, the dissent cited several
habeas cases decided by the United States Supreme Court with
language to the effect that harmless error analysis in the death penalty
context must be performed at the state levelY 9 Perhaps the most
persuasive of these cases is Richmond v. Lewis.m In Richmond, a
habeas case, the Court stated that "the state appellate court or some
other state sentencer must actually perform a new sentencing calculus
if the sentence is to stand."'" However, the majority provides some
important insights into interpreting the language of the Richmond
opinion. First, the Smith majority notes that, on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the State of Arizona argued not that any error
was harmless, but that the Arizona Supreme Court had reweighed the
evidence, thus curing any error. 2 The issue in Richmond was the
certainty with which a state court must speak in articulating the basis
for its ruling.' Thus, according to the Wilkins opinion, the critical
language in the quote cited above is not the reference to the state
court, but the requirement that the sentencing calculus "actually" be
performed.' 4 Read in this light, Richmond provides little insight
into the question of whether a habeas court may perform the harmless
error analysis. Furthermore, even if Richmond supports Smith's
position, language exists in Cabana v. Bullock 5 to support the
contrary position.2 According to the Cabana Court, either allow-
ing a state court to perform the analysis or having the habeas court
undertake it "would, in theory, be adequate to remedy" the constitu-
tional violation.2 67
To resolve this dilemma with no guidance from the Supreme
Court, the themes underlying habeas jurisprudence must be examined.
Two common themes resounding throughout the Supreme Court's
habeas jurisprudence are comity and federalism.' Federalism
involves the division of power between the state and federal
258. Id. at 989 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 991-92 (Sprouse, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
260. 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992).
261. Id. at 535.
262. Id. (citing Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 534-35 (1992)).
263. Richmond, 113 S. Ct. at 535.
264. Smith, 14 F.3d at 977-78.
265. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
266. See supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
268. See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,264 (1989) (citing comity and federalism as
principles guiding the Court's decisions in the habeas context); see supra note 6.
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governments.2 9  But as Justice Blackmun has so aptly stated,
federalism has no inherent valueY Rather, the value of federalism
derives from what it produces.
Several advantages of federalism are frequently espoused.
Federalism encourages experimentation z ' and efficiency,2' enhan-
ces individual choice z3 and promotes democracy.274 But the
benefit most applicable to the habeas context is that federalism can
operate to prevent tyranny.275 As one commentator noted, the
paradox of Constitutional law is that in order to check power you
must create power.276  The choice in creating a system of
government is not one between individual freedom and government
coercion, but between alternate distributions of power with more or
less danger of tyranny.2' While states have primary responsibility
for administering criminal laws in a constitutional manner,278 in our
system we have also designated to the federal court system-by way
of the writ of habeas corpus-the role of protector of constitutional
rights.279  Yet to the modem-day Court, federalism has come to
signify an attitude of deference by federal courts to state court
convictions.' In essence, the Court has adopted the arguments of
the anti-federalists-opposition to a large federal government-as the
underlying theory of the Constitution.2 '
269. BLAcK'S LAW DICEIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
270. Coleman v. Thompson, Ill S. Ct. 2546,2569-70 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
271. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134 (2nd ed. 1990).
272. Id. at 135. Efficiency is promoted by recognizing that different solutions to specific
problems are appropriate in different areas. Id.
273. Id. Federalism allows people to choose the bundle of services they most prefer.
Id.; see generally Charles Teibout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL.
EcOM. 416, 417 (1956) (applying this theory of federalism to the school choice context).
274. STONE, supra note 271, at 135. Federalism makes it easier to get involved in the
government process. Id.
275. The Federalist No. 51 (Madison).
276. STONE, supra note 271, at 481.
277. It.
278. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
279. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993) (reasoning that
federalism weighs against intruding into state criminal trials because is frustrates each
sovereign state's good faith attempt to honor constitutional rights).
281. See generally Martin H. Redish, Doing it With Mirrors: New York v. United States
and Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Require Legislation, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 593 (1994).
2380 [Vol. 73
HARMLESS ERROR
Also underlying the Court's habeas jurisprudence is the
implication that there is not theoretical, as opposed to practical8
value to our constitutional rights that must be protected.* According
to the Court, the mere violation of a constitutional right does not
justify setting aside an otherwise factually accurate conviction.'
For the Fourth Circuit to recognize a narrow class of cases in
which harmless error analysis could not be performed, as urged by
Smith, would require the court to vacate the death penalty of a guilty
man who lost his constitutional claim because he failed to raise it on
appeal. Such a result would show little deference to the state of
North Carolina and its procedural rules and would require the
granting of relief to an individual who had suffered no legal wrong of
any practical significance.'
Having concluded that a federal court may apply harmless error
analysis to an unconstitutionally vague capital sentencing instruction,
the Fourth Circuit then confronted the question of which harmless
error standard to apply-Brecht or Chapman.' A majority of the
court adopted the Brecht approach.8 6  So sure was the Fourth
Circuit majority that the Brecht standard applied that the court
dedicated only a scant paragraph to a discussion of the issue.8 The
282. In this Note, "practical" value refers to the ability of constitutionally guaranteed
rights to ensure factually accurate verdicts. In contrast, "theoretical" value is used here
to refer to the notion that our constitutional right represent more than a desire to achieve
factually correct results. Rather, constitutional rights can be viewed as an agreement
among American citizens that in our civilized society which values freedom, we will not
treat one another in a certain manner, even though such actions would further factually
accurate outcomes. For example, the Fourth Amendment protects us from "unreasonable
searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. If the purpose of the Constitution were
to protect factually accurate verdicts, this amendment would be misplaced, for surely
"unreasonable" searches would better enable the State to gather evidence in the search
for truth. Nevertheless, we prohibit unreasonable searches out of a respect for the privacy
of others in our society. We are willing to tolerate fewer convictions on the hope that we
will all feel more secure in our daily lives.
283. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
284. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text (explaining the shift in the harmless
error standard to the present day focus on factual accuracy rather than a recognition of
any inherent value of our constitutional rights aside from the protections that they provide
from wrongful convictions). See supra note 282 (defining "practical" significance).
285. Smith, 14 F.3d at 979; see supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
286. Smith, 14 F.3d at 980. Other federal courts have failed to see the answer as clearly
as did the Fourth Circuit. See Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529, 1540-41 (8th Cir. 1994)
(applying Chapman); Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1292 (8th Cir.) (same), cert denied,
115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
287. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 979-80. In reality, the majority may not have been certain
that the Brecht standard was the correct one to apply. In the event the conclusion to
apply Brecht was wrong, the court indicated that it would reach the same result under the
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Smith majority simply invoked the words from the Brecht opinion
without examining the policies underlying the Brecht court's hol-
ding.
In Brecht z  the Supreme Court developed a supplementary
harmless error standard to be applied in federal habeas cases on the
ground that having both federal and state courts perform the same
analysis would defy logic.2 °  The Eighth Circuit relied on this
reasoning in Orndorff v. Lockhart,29' concluding that the Chapman
rather than the Brecht standard should apply in federal habeas review
only when a state court fails to perform harmless error analysis in the
first instance.2' The Orndorff court reasoned that the Brecht
standard was based in large part on the notion that repetition of the
Chapman standard is unnecessary given the ability of state courts to
apply it correctly.' 9s However, when a federal habeas court is
applying harmless error analysis in the first instance, there is no need
to avoid repetition 94 Thus, the Orndorff court believed that the
Chapman standard should apply.
295
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's assertions, the Brecht standard
was based on more than merely avoiding repetition. The Brecht
majority also relied on the presumption of "finality and legality" that
attaches to convictions and sentencing once direct review comes to an
end.296 Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that "an error
that may justify reversal on direct review will not necessarily support
a collateral attack on a final judgment."'" While not mentioned in
the opinion, this language may have caused the Smith majority to
conclude that the Brecht standard should apply.
298
In Smith, the reason a Chapman analysis never took place in the
North Carolina courts was the petitioner's failure to raise the
Chapman standard. Id. at 980 n.13.
288. Smith, 14 F.3d at 979-80.
289. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
290. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993).
291. 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280, 1292 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) (applying the rule announced in Orndorffi.
292. Orndorff, 998 F.2d at 1430.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993).
297. Id. at 1720 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).
298. While recognizing this language in Brecht, the court in Orndorff nevertheless
concluded that the primary basis for the holding in Brecht was the fact that the state court
had already applied the Chapman harmless error standard. Orndorff, 998 F.2d at 1430.
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issue.299  This is in stark contrast to the situation in Omdorff in
which the harmless error analysis had not been performed by the state
supreme court because that court concluded that no error had
occurred.3 °  In Omdorff, if the Eighth Circuit had applied the
Brecht standard, the petitioner would have been penalized for an
occurrence out of his control-the fact that the state supreme court
found no error.30' In contrast, if Chapman had been applied to
Kermit Smith's claim, he would have benefited from its less onerous
standard even though his own failure to raise the claim was the reason
it was not originally considered in the North Carolina courts. In sum,
though Smith and Orndorff seem facially inapposite, they actually
highlight a dual harmless error standard for federal habeas review as
established by the Supreme Court in Brecht and Chapman. For this
reason Smith did not conclusively answer the harmless error standard
of review question?'
The split over the procedural bar issue in Smith demonstrates the
problems caused by the Supreme Court's refusal in Coleman to create
a true "plain statement" rule. The Smith opinion highlights the need
for rules over standards in fashioning a procedural bar doctrine."°3
Rules are directives that "bind[] a decision maker to respond in a
299. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 960.
300. Orndorff, 998 F.2d at 1430.
301. See id.
302. If Smith and Orndorff are not read together as depicting a dual harmless error
standard for federal habeas review, the Supreme Court will ultimately need to take a case
to determine which standard is to be applied. The following are the Supreme Court's
considerations in deciding whether to grant certiorari:
(a) When a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same matter,
or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with a state court of last
resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an
exercise of this Court's power of supervision.
(c) When a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court, or has decided a federal question in a way that conflicts with
applicable decisions of this Court.
Sup. Cr. P, 10.1.
303. Justice Antonin Scalia is probably the leading advocate of "rules over standards."
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV.
22, 65 (1992) ("The leading contemporary proponent of the rules ... argument happens
to be sitting on the [Supreme] Court."); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law
of Rules, 56 U. COH. L. REV. 1175, 1185-87 (1989) (arguing that balancing tests should be
avoided whenever possible and rules should be established as often as the Court is able).
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determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts."3 °4
Standards, on the other hand, are directives that tend "to collapse
decision making back into the direct application of the background
principle or policy to a fact situation."3 5 This is not to say that, in
their adoption, rules are any less arbitrary than standards;3 the
advantage of rules lies in their future effects."
It is important at the outset of this "rules vs. standards"
discussion to realize that the Court, in fact, did not lay down a "rule"
in Harris, as interpretted by Coleman. A careful examination reveals
that in reality Harris was just another standard. Prior to Harris-
Coleman a federal habeas court was required to determine whether
a state court order rested on "an independent and adequate state law
ground"-a standard-and if so, review was barred. After Harris-
Coleman a court's role was to determine whether the decision "fairly
appeared to rest on federal law"-a standard-and if so, review was
not barred absent a "plain statement" to the contrary. Thus, what
Harris provided was not a "rule," but an escape from the result of the
standard. The key to obtaining the benefits of a rule is not to
establish an escape mechanism from the standard's result, but to place
a rule in the gap where the standard now guides-in the deter-
mination of the basis of the state court order. Perhaps the "rule"
could read as follows: Where a defendant has raised (a) federal
constitutional claim(s) in his most recent state court petition, a federal
habeas court will presume that the merits of such claim(s) were
reached by the last reviewing state court absent a "plain statement"
that the case was disposed of on an "adequate and independent state
law ground."3"
Several advantages of rules over standards are particularly
applicable to the "plain statement" debate. One of the primary
304. Sullivan, supra note 303, at 58.
305. Id. But see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.. 557, 559-60 (1992) (stating that the difference between rules and standards is
whether the "law is given content ex ante or ex post").
306. Unless a rule can be drawn from the text of the Constitution itself, it presents the
danger that its development is not out in the open. The court reveals a standard in some
opinion without revealing the hocus-pocus from which the rule emerged.
307. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 305, at 612-14 (discussing the time delay in establishing
rules by way of precedent and the harm to those committing acts before the rule is
established).
308. Federal court jurisdiction depends on either diversity (not existent in death penalty
appeals) or the existence of a federal question. See U.S. CONST. art. HII,§ 2, cl. 1. The
first part of the proposed rule would alleviate any concern that the court was deciding a
case lacking a federal question and thus causing the court to lack jurisdiction.
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advantages of rules is fairness. Rules "reduce the danger of official
arbitrariness or bias by preventing decision-makers from factoring the
parties' particular attractive or unattractive qualities in the decision-
making calculus."3" Second, rules minimize the "elaborate, time-
consuming, and repetitive" search for and application of background
principles, thus promoting judicial efficiency 10  Finally, rules
promote federalism by "allocat[ing] roles and power among competing
decision-makers. 311
With these principles in mind, the advantage of a rule in the
procedural bar arena becomes immediately apparent. First and
foremost, the application of a rule in the procedural bar doctrine
would result in fairness not necessarily afforded by the present
Coleman system of "standards." Given the extremely fact-sensitive
nature of the procedural bar determination propounded in
Coleman,3"  a heinous crime could distort a court's decision.313
Requiring state courts to include an additional sentence in their
opinions clarifying the basis for their decisions would greatly diminish
subjectivity in the procedural bar decision-making of federal habeas
review, thus resulting in a fairer system for all 14
309. Sullivan, supra note 303, at 62. In response, the advocates of standards argue that
rules are "arbitrary at the border." Id.
310. Id. at 63. The response to this purported advantage is that legal decision-makers,
discontent with a rule's arbitrariness in a specific instance, will attempt end-runs around
the rule by constructing complex and time-consuming arguments. Ld. Two other
arguments often raised favoring rules over standards include the "certainty and
predictability" afforded to private actors, fi at 62-63, and the related concept of liberty
resulting from an awareness of how government will utilize its coercive power in advance
of a particular situation, id at 63-64. However, these arguments are not particularly
applicable to the facts of this case.
311. Cf. id. at 64 (arguing that rules promote democracy). For iules to perform their
power-allocating function, the roles of each decision-maker must be delineated. Id.
312. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
313. After raping Collins in sub-freezing temperatures, Kermit Smith then bludgeoned
her with a cinder block. Smith, 14 F.3d at 959. Smith then dragged Collins to a nearby
lake where he threw her body, weighted with a cinder block, into the water. Id. See also
Stephen Reinhardt, The Supreme CouM the Death Penalty, and the Harris Case, 102 YALE
L.J. 205, 207 (1992) (arguing that calm, objective, reasoned dispositions may not be
occurring in a substantial number of death penalty appeals). Perhaps the strongest
evidence of the distorting effect of the facts of the murder on the decision-making of
appellate court judges are the first three paragraphs of the Smith opinion. The majority
believed that a discussion of the facts of the murder Smith committed was necessary "in
order to fully appreciate how the procedural bar ... principles.., apply" to the case.
Smith, 14 F.3d at 959. But the issues in Smith were legal issues having no relation to the
actual facts of the murder. The facts were not discussed again.
314. Compare Smith, 14 F.3d 956,982 (splitting evenly over whether petitioner's claims
were barred) with Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125, 1127-30 (4th Cir. 1992), cert denied,
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Second, a "plain statement" requirement even in cases that do
not first "fairly appear to rest on federal law" would simplify habeas
review in the federal courts. Habeas courts would be relieved of the
burden of conducting the fact-sensitive inquiries like the one
performed in Smith.3P While the advantage of a bright-line rule in
was recognized in adopting a Harris "plain statement" re-
quirement,316 the Court refused to extend this rule to bring more
certainty and uniformity to federal habeas cases.317
Finally, federalism would be promoted by the "plain statement"
requirement. To recognize this benefit, it is first necessary to define
the roles of the decision-makers at issue3 -- the state and federal
courts. The role of the federal habeas courts is generally to ensure
the factual accuracy of a conviction.31 9 The primary authority for
defining and enforcing criminal laws lies with the states.3 ' State
courts "also hold initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional
rights" in criminal trials.32' Under the "plain statement" rule, states
could still operate their criminal justice systems as they see fit within
constitutional constraints. Federal courts would not be able to
inadvertently interfere with those claims clearly defaulted, thus
promoting state autonomy. Finally, there is no real burden placed on
state courts by requiring them to put one more sentence in their
opinions.
The Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence highlights the
problems associated with the application of standards in such high-
stakes situations. The Smith court was required to engage in a
complex and fact sensitive inquiry to determine whether Kermit
Smith's claims were procedurally defaulted in state court. While the
result reached by the Smith court may have been correct, there is
113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993) (finding, on facts strikingly similar those of Smith, that the
petitioner's claims were not procedurally barred from consideration).
Further, any arbitrariness would be avoided by the fact that a "plain statement"
requirement would not be applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316
(1989) (holding that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applied
retroactively to cases that have become final before the new rules were announced).
315. See Smith, 14 F.3d at 963-73.
316. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). But see i at 277 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that this justification was a make-weight given the fact that federal
courts must also examine the procedural bar to determine if the state applied it regularly
under Johnson).
317. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2557 (1991).
318. See Sullivan, supra note 303, at 64.
319. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719-20 (1993).
320. Id. at 1720.
321. Id.
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reason to believe that another court performing such an analysis may
be swayed by the heinous nature of the petitioner's crime, rather than
by an objective view of the merits of the claims. Without an objective
analysis of a habeas petitioner's claims, the competing interests
present in the habeas context cannot be effectively balanced. When
life is at stake, such a lack of objectivity is unacceptable.
MATrHEw THEODORE MARTENS
Carved in Sand: Actual Innocence in United States v.
Maybeck
In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, it would be patently
false "to say that our habeas [corpus] jurisprudence casts a blind eye
towards innocence."' To say, however, that the Court has abandoned
procedural constraints altogether is to make quite a different
assertion; for even defendants wrongly convicted or sentenced must
assert their innocence through the proper technical channels. At
times, the Supreme Court has appeared to elevate form over
substance, barring defendants whose procedural defaults were minor,
or even inadvertent, from asserting apparently meritorious
constitutional claims.2 Faced with a similar situation, however, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Maybeck,3
rejected such a bar.
The Maybeck case presented the court with the question of
whether a non-capital federal defendant, having procedurally
defaulted by failing to raise a challenge to sentencing at his sentencing
hearing or through direct appeal, might nevertheless assert a claim in
a collateral proceeding, even without showing cause for the default or
prejudice flowing from the alleged error.4 The court unanimously
held that, although the appeal was governed by the Frady rule,5 the
defendant could properly assert his claim under the "actual in-
nocence" exception6 to the cause and prejudice standard, effectively
excusing the defendant's default.7
Following a summary of the Maybeck case,' this Note examines
the Supreme Court's application of the "actual innocence" exception
1. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993).
2. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 497 (1986) (dismissing habeas corpus review
of a procedurally defaulted discovery claim for failure to establish cause for the default);
see infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
3. 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994).
4. Id at 891. The requirement of a showing of fault and prejudice was espoused in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). See infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
5. In order to proceed on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
a sentence "based on trial error to which no contemporaneous objection was made, a
convicted defendant must show both (1) 'cause' excusing his double procedural default,
and (2) 'actual prejudice' resulting from the error of which he complains." United States
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).
6. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893. See infra note 27 for a definition of "actual innocence."
7. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 890, 894-95.
8. See infra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
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in capital federal habeas corpus cases9 and the divergence among the
federal circuit courts in applying the exception in non-capital cases.'0
The Note then studies the Maybeck decision in greater depth" and
concludes that the Fourth Circuit has significantly extended the
Supreme Court decisions to protect the rights of the criminal
defendant by extending federal habeas relief to non-capital defen-
dants.12 It is possible that Maybeck may indicate a future trend in
the court's treatment of "actual innocence" and the federal habeas
writ.'3
In 1989, Thomas Maybeck was charged in the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina with several
bank robbery offenses stemming from two separate robberies of a
Charlotte savings and loan. 4 Pursuant to a plea agreement labeling
him a career offender, Maybeck pled guilty to two counts of robbery
and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm.' In a subsequent
meeting with a parole officer, Maybeck pointed out, for the first time,
that a 1973 armed burglary conviction in the state of New York had
not been included in his record. 6 In that meeting, however, he
erroneously characterized the crime as armed burglary rather than
third degree burglary, the offense for which he had actually been
convicted.' Using the 1988 version of the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual ("Guidelines")," the parole officer
determined that Maybeck would fall under Criminal History Category
V for the Charlotte robbery. Because Maybeck was designated a
9. See infra notes 32-77 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 105-121 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 122-50 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 136-48 and accompanying text. The federal writ of habeas corpus
encompasses numerous issues of criminal procedure. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD
H. ISRAEL, CRIMiNAL PROCEDURE § 28.3 (2d ed. 1992). The writ may be sought, for
example, to challenge jurisdictional defects at trial, see Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101,
104-05 (1942), or to demand an opportunity for "full and fair" litigation, see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465,486 (1976). Such issues, however, are beyond the scope of this Note,
which discusses only the availability of habeas review to defendants who commit a
procedural default.
14. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 890.
15. Id.
16. Id
17. Id Under New York law, this crime does not include the element of being armed
with a deadly weapon. Id. at 890-91 n.4. An armed burglary would have subjected
Maybeck to the more serious offense of burglary in the second degree. Id.
18. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (1993) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
19. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 890 & n.2.
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career offender under his pleading agreement, however, the officer
placed Maybeck in Category VI-pursuant to Guidelines
procedure-and accordingly sentenced him to 198 months.'
Maybeck did not object to his sentence at his sentencing hearing,
nor did he appeal his sentence directly.2 He later filed a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on
the grounds that his designation as a career offender had been
erroneous and that he had not entered his guilty plea knowingly
and voluntarily'z A hearing was held in district court, and the court
subsequently dismissed Maybeck's motion, holding that both
Maybeck's failure to raise the claim of incorrect sentencing at his
sentencing hearing and his failure to appeal the issue directly
constituted a double procedural default for which he had failed to
show cause under the "cause and prejudice" standard of United States
v. Frady.' Maybeck appealed the dismissal.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while
holding that Frady's cause and prejudice standard was applicable to
collateral challenges to unappealed guilty pleas such as Maybeck's,2 6
recognized that Maybeck was actually innocent of being a career
offender.27 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's treatment
of "actual innocence" in federal habeas corpus cases involving capital
sentencing, the Fourth Circuit held that procedural defaults by a
criminal defendant should not automatically present a bar to
20. I& at 890-91. Had Maybeck been placed correctly into Category V, he would have
been eligible for a maximum sentence of 165 months. Id, at 894. In Category VI, the
applicable sentencing range is 168-210 months. Id. at 891.
21. Id. at 891.
22. Under the Guidelines, a career offender is one who "has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." GUIDELINES,
supra note 18, at § B1.1. Maybeck had only one prior conviction for a crime of
violence-exclusive of his mischaracterized 1973 offense-and had no convictions for
controlled substance offenses. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 892.
23. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 891.
24. Id.; see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). For a discussion of the "cause
and prejudice" standard and the Frady case, see infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
25. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 890.
26. Id. at 891.
27. Id at 892. The concept of "actual innocence" addressed by this Note deals not
with that "legal" innocence or guilt determined by a jury of one's peers, but rather the
subjection of a defendant to a wrongful conviction, usually based upon procedural trial
error denying constitutional protections. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986)
(noting that "legal" and "actual" innocence are distinct). Once a defendant is convicted
of an offense after a fair trial, "the presumption of [the defendant's legal] innocence
disappears," Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 860 (1993), but the possibility of actual
innocence remains.
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assertions of actual innocence.28 The Fourth Circuit rejected the
government's contention that the actual innocence exception is limited
to death penalty habeas challenges, stating that it saw "little dif-
ference" in applying the exception's rationale to non-capital cases as
well.29 Thus exempted from showing cause for his procedural
defaults, the court found Maybeck had been prejudiced by the
erroneous characterization as a career offender.30 The court re-
versed the lower court's ruling and remanded for resentencing or, at
the district court's discretion, an order that Maybeck and the
government enter into a new pleading agreement.31
The decision in Maybeck represents the logical extension of
actual innocence as an exception to the cause and prejudice standard
for procedural default-a standard established in Wainwright v.
Sykes.32 In Wainwright, a state criminal defendant found guilty of
third-degree murder sought to challenge in federal court the admis-
sibility of inculpatory statements he had made to police prior to his
arrest, and to which he had not objected at trial.33 The United
States Supreme Court, noting an applicable state "contemporaneous
28. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 892-93.
29. l& at 893. The court noted that defendants in both capital and non-capital cases
would suffer the same consequence of an enhanced sentence unless exempted from the
cause and prejudice standard by the actual innocence exception. Id Indeed, two federal
circuits, in Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F2d 375 (8th Cir. 1991) and Mills v. Jordan, 979 F.2d
1273 (7th Cir. 1992), had already applied the exception to non-capital sentencing cases.
Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893. See also infra notes 78-104 and accompanying text (discussing
these two circuit court cases).
30. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 894. See supra notes 17,20,22 and accompanying text.
31. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 894-95.
32. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The cause and prejudice standard was first expounded in
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 240, 245 (1973). In Davis, a defendant seeking to
challenge the composition of his grand jury for the first time in a petition for federal
habeas relief argued that his claim should be precluded only by a showing that he
"deliberately bypassed" prescribed trial procedure. Davis, 411 U.S. at 236 (citing Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). The Supreme Court,
however, rejected this argument and applied Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2)
by analogy, holding that failure to raise defenses or objections at trial constituted a waiver
for which habeas relief may be granted only upon a showing of cause for-and actual
prejudice from-the default. Id. at 245. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) states that "the court
for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver."
33. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 74-75. The defendant directly appealed his conviction in
state court but failed to challenge the admissibility of the statements. Id at 75. The issue
was first raised in a subsequent state petition for habeas corpus, which was denied. Id.
The defendant next filed a motion to vacate his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the
state-defendant analog to the habeas statute used in the Maybeck case. See Maybeck, 23
F.3d at 890. The state appealed the district court's decision favoring the defendant, but
the state appeals court affirmed the lower court's ruling. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 76.
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objection rule" that barred consideration of the defendant's claim in
state court,' undertook the "somewhat tortuous" task of reconciling
the issues of federalism and comity with adequate review of federal
claims?5  Although recognizing that the defendant's default
amounted to an "independent and adequate state procedural
ground"'36 that would bar consideration of the claim by the federal
courts, the Supreme Court held that a showing of cause for the
default, as well as prejudice attendant to the alleged error, would
nevertheless allow the claim to be heard.37 The defendant made no
such showing, however, and his habeas petition was dismissed 8 In
language quoted in numerous subsequent opinions,39 the Court
stated that the "cause and actual prejudice" standard "would not
prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the
federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such
an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice."'
Five years later, the cause and prejudice standard found
application in United States v. Frady."1 In Frady, a federal district
court found the defendant guilty of capital murder.a2 Under 28
34. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 76.
35. Id. at 81-82. Although federalism and comity are recurrent considerations in the
Court's habeas jurisprudence, they remain somewhat elusive concepts. More than mere
recognition of the constitutionally defined jurisdictional boundaries of federal and state
courts, they represent
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in
their separate ways.... [T]he National Government, anxious though it may be
to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, [must] always
endeavoro to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the, legitimate
activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971). When, as in Wainwright, a defendant would be
barred by procedural default from bringing a constitutional claim in state court, the Court
must determine whether respect for the state's autonomy demands that the federal remedy
of habeas review should likewise be foreclosed by the default. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 81-
87.
36. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 91.
39. See, e.g., Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 853 (1995); Herrara v. Collins, 113 S. Ct.
853, 862 (1993); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 724 (1991).
40. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 91. This language was to become the hallmark inquiry
into issues of actual innocence. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992).
Stephen Saltzburg criticized the Wainwright Court for assuming that the "political question
of the proper breadth of habeas corpus review was the Court's to answer," rather than
leaving such a decision to Congress. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme
Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.. 367, 388 (1983).
41. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
42. Id. at 156.
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U.S.C. § 2255, the federal habeas statute, the defendant sought to
challenge a jury instruction given at trial.43 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review whether the court of appeals, in con-
sidering the defendant's "belated collateral attack," properly invoked
the "plain error" standard."'  Although freed from the constraints
of comity present in Wainwright, the Court still applied the "cause
and actual prejudice" standard, holding that a defendant, "to obtain
collateral relief based on trial error to which no contemporaneous
objection was made ... must show both (1) 'cause' excusing his
double procedural default, and (2) 'actual prejudice' resulting from
the errors of which he complains."'45 The Court stated that "a final
judgment commands respect" without regard to whether the judgment
comes from a federal or state court.' In Frady, the Court found it
unnecessary to search for cause for the defendant's default because
his showing of prejudice from the allegedly erroneous jury instruction
was insufficient.47
Having thus settled that the cause and prejudice standard was
equally applicable to state and federal cases of procedural default, the
Court next embarked upon a line of jurisprudence that sought to
demarcate the boundaries of an exception to this standard-the actual
innocence exception. In Murray v. Carrier,8 counsel for a rape
defendant twice moved for discovery of statements made by the
alleged victim, only to be denied on the ground that the judge did not
find that the statements contained exculpatory evidence.49 The
43. Id. at 156, 157. The challenged jury instruction allegedly compelled the jury to
assume malice, thus making a verdict of manslaughter impossible. Id. at 157-58. The
defendant had directly appealed his conviction but failed to raise the challenge to the jury
instructions at that time. Id. at 158. The conviction was upheld by the court of appeals,
but the capital sentence was, by a bare majority, set aside on the premise that the "plain
error" standard, rather than the "cause and actual prejudice" standard, "govern[ed] relief
on direct appeals from errors not objected to at trial." Id. at 158-59.
44. Id. at 159.
45. Id. at 167-68.
46. Id, at 165.
47. Id. at 168, 169-71. The Court noted that the case would have been qualitatively
different if the defendant had offered "affirmative evidence indicating that he had been
convicted wrongly of a crime of which he was innocent," id. at 171, thus recognizing the
"miscarriage of justice" exception noted in Wainwright's dicta, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 91 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 40. Despite this concession,
however, Justice Brennan decried Frady as an "emasculation" of collateral review, and a
sign that the Court would "strain to subordinate a prisoner's interest in substantial justice
to a supposed government interest in finality." Frady, 456 U.S. at 178, 186 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
48. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
49. Id. at 482.
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defendant was convicted, and in his appeal, counsel inadvertently
failed to include these denials as error." The appeal was subse-
quently denied by the Virginia Supreme Court 1 The defendant,
proceeding pro se, was denied state habeas relief for failure to raise
the claim on direct appeal. 2 He then sought habeas corpus relief in
federal court 3  The Supreme Court, relying explicitly upon its
holding in Engle v. Isaac,5' held that the mere fact that counsel failed
to raise a recognized claim on appeal was insufficient to show cause
for the failure 5 The defendant, in effect, was held to bear the cost
of his counsel's failure. 6 Again recognizing an exception to the
general rule requiring a showing of cause and prejudice,57 however,
the Court noted that" '[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity
and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incar-
ceration,' "58 such as the "extraordinary case... where a constitu-
tional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent."5 9 Applying this exception to the instant case, the
Court stated that, should the statements withheld by the prosecution
establish the defendant's actual innocence, he would not be required
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 482-83.
53. Id. at 483. The defendant claimed that the judge's denial of the motion for
discovery with respect to the victim's statements denied the defendant due process of law.
Id. at 482, 483. When the court of appeals found cause for the procedural default in
counsel's unintentional mistake and granted the habeas petition, i at 483-84, attorneys
general for no less than 44 states filed amicus curiae briefs urging reversal, Ia at 480-881,
480 n.*.
54. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). In Engle, the defendants chose not to raise a particular
constitutional claim through a state court appeal, believing that contrary precedent would
foreclose its assertion. IA at 130. The Court held that this reasoning failed to establish
cause for the defendants' procedural default and that intentional bypassing of the state
court would prevent federal review of the claim. Id.
55. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 486-87, 490-92 (1986).
56. I& at 488. The Court stated that, had the defendant presented an independent
claim to the state court for ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, such a claim would have established cause for the default. Id. at 488-89.
57. Id. at 494.
58. Id. at 495-96.
59. Id. at 495, 496 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). Although several prior cases had noted an exception to the
"cause and prejudice" standard, see supra notes 40, 47 and accompanying text, Murray v.
Carrier was the first to couch this exception in terms of a defendant's "actual innocence."
See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496. The Court's failure to explicate this dictum, however, may
have led to later confusion of the exception with concepts of "legal" innocence, namely,
factual questions of guilt or innocence. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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to show cause and prejudice for his default6 The Court therefore
remanded the case to the trial court for determination of the content
of the withheld statements.6'
The Court's decision in Murray v. Carrier was the explicit basis
for the holding in Smith v. Murray,62 decided the same day. In
Smith, statements concerning a prior sexual assault made to a
psychiatrist by a rape defendant were admitted in the sentencing
phase of the defendant's state trial.' The defendant was later
sentenced to death.' 4 Although the defendant did not raise the
admissibility of the statements as error in his direct state appeal,' he
pressed the issue in subsequent unsuccessful state and federal habeas
petitions.' Relying upon its decision in Murray v. Carrier, the Court
held that the failure of the defendant's counsel to recognize the
admissibility issue as a basis for a meritable legal claim did not
constitute cause for the state procedural default.67
Recognizing that this finding did not end its inquiry, the Smith
Court turned to an evaluation of the defendant's claim of actual
innocence.' Acknowledging that the concept of "actual"-as
opposed to "legal"-innocence is difficult to apply in the context of
error during a capital sentencing phase,69 the Court held that
60. Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
61. Id. at 497. Despite this partial victory for the defendant, though, some members
of the Court bristled at the majority's adherence to the cause and prejudice standard.
Justice Stevens, for example, voiced his opinion that " 'it is never too late for courts in
habeas corpus proceedings to look straight through procedural screens in order to prevent
forfeiture of life or liberty in flagrant defiance of the Constitution.' " Id. at 509 (Stevens,
J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 554 (1953)). Likewise,
Justice Brennan found it "cruelly unfair to bind a defendant" to his counsel's unintentional
mistake, especially in a capital case. I& at 525-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
63. Id. at 529-30.
64. Id. at 530. Prior to the psychiatric examination, the defendant's counsel had
instructed him to make no statements about prior offenses since such statements might be
admissible at trial. Id. at 529.
65. Counsel for the defendant made a conscious decision not to raise the issue,
deciding that state case law would not support the claim. Id at 531. It was this strategic
"trial tactic" which led both the state and federal courts to deny the petition for habeas
corpus. Id. at 531-32; cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83 (1977) (holding that
intentional state procedural default bars federal review).
66. Smith, 477 U.S. at 532-33.
67. Id. at 535.
68. Id. at 537.
69. Id. The Court has on at least one other occasion declined to specify what "actual
innocence" would involve in the context of a capital sentence. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S.
401, 412 n.6 (1989). The Court's statement in Smith v. Murray, however, indicates the
challenge it faces in articulating a distinction between the procedural questions of law
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admission of the psychiatrist's testimony did not represent a " 'fun-
damental miscarriage of justice.' 70
While the concept of actual innocence seemed to find growing
application in the Court's habeas jurisprudence, the Court, in Sawyer
v. Whitley,71 took an unexpected step by significantly limiting the
doctrine's application. Ostensibly "further amplify[ing]"7  the
doctrine, the Court held that a showing of actual innocence could be
made only by proving "by clear and convincing evidence that but for
a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the
petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state
law."'73 In Sawyer, a capital murder and rape defendant sought
habeas relief to challenge the withholding of several pieces of
evidence from the jury during the sentencing phase of his trial.74
The Court unanimously held that the actual innocence exception did
involved in "actual" innocence from the questions of fact entailed in "legal" innocence.
Arguably, for a defendant to be "actually innocent" of a capital sentence, the jury must
have wrongly considered one or more aggravating factors in the sentencing phase of the
trial, or must have been improperly prevented from considering one or more mitigating
factors. Cf. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893 (noting that a defendant may be innocent of the acts
required to enhance a death sentence and therefore be "actually innocent" of the
sentence). This interpretation, however, has not been explicitly adopted by the Court,
which continues to use the "problematic term ['actually innocent of a death sentence']
without any clarification of its meaning." Dugger, 489 U.S. at 424 n.15 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
70. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537-38 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)
(quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977))). The statements admitted for the
purpose of determining whether the defendant posed a continuing threat to society, id at
530, were held not to have unduly prejudiced the jury's determination of this "aggravating
factor" issue. Id. at 530, 538-39. The Smith decision was strongly criticized by the
dissenting members of the Court. Justice Stevens, for example, challenged the majority's
implicit holding that only claims involving actual innocence "rise[] to the level of a
miscarriage of justice." Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" principle has thus been closely aligned with the "actual innocence"
exception, see Dugger, 489 U.S. at 414-15, 415 n.4 (noting the applicability of the principle
to assertions of actual innocence in capital sentencing), it is unclear from the Court's
jurisprudence whether an allegation of the latter must rise to the level of a "fundamental
miscarriage" to prevail.
71. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
72. Id. at 2519.
73. Id. at 2517. A fair reading of this statement by Chief Justice Rehnquist would
seem to limit the doctrine of actual innocence to the sentencing phases of capital trials.
In a prior decision, however, the Court implied that the exception should also be available
to non-capital defendants. See Smith, 477 U.S. at 538 ("We reject the suggestion that the
principles of Wainwright v. Sykes apply differently depending on the nature of the penalty
a State imposes for the violation of its criminal laws.").
74. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2518, 2524.
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not apply to the defendant75 but several Justices were unable to
support Chief Justice Rehnquist's "unduly cramped"7 6 view of the
doctrine.
77
These cases illustrate the Supreme Court's examination of actual
innocence only in the context of capital crimes and sentencing. As
the Fourth Circuit noted in Maybeck," however, two federal circuits
have placed the doctrine within the reach of non-capital defendants,
as well.79 The Eighth Circuit was the first to do so, in Jones v.
Arkansas."° In a case factually similar to Maybeck, the Jones
defendant was found guilty of aggravated robbery and burglary in
Arkansas state court and sentenced under state statutes as a habitual
offender.8' The defendant would not have qualified as a habitual
offender but for the trial judge's erroneous application of an amended
version of the classification statute." The defendant, denied state
appellate relief,' filed a federal habeas petition in which he argued
for the first time that the application of the amended statute was a
75. i at 2516-17. The majority held that the defendant had not met the "clear and
convincing" standard. Id. at 2525.
76. Id. at 2525 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
77. Justice Stevens argued in favor of a standard requiring a defendant to show that
"an alleged error more likely than not created a manifest miscarriage of justice." Id. at
2532 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). "[T]here is no basis," he stated, "for requiring
a federal court to be virtually certain that the defendant is actually [innocent] .... before
merely entertaining his claim." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). A recent decision
suggests that the view expounded by Justice Stevens now commands a majority on the
Court. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 853 (1995) (holding that the standard of Mur-
ray-requiring a showing that a violation has" 'probably' resulted in the conviction of one
who is actually innocent"-rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard, applies to a
miscarriage of justice inquiry when a capital defendant raises an actual innocence claim to
avoid a procedural bar to assertion of constitutional claims).
78. See Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893.
79. See Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 & n.16 (8th Cir. 1991); Mills v. Jordan,
979 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
80. 929 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1991).
81. Id. at 376-77.
82. Id. at 377. Jones was found guilty of an offense committed in May, 1983, but was
sentenced under the amended statute which was to apply only to a "defendant who is
convicted of a felony committed after June 30, 1983." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(1)
(Supp. 1983). The statute under which Jones should have been sentenced required a
defendant to possess at least three prior felony convictions before being characterized as
a habitual offender. Jones, 929 F.2d at 377; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-901 (Supp. 1981). The
amended version applied habitual offender status to defendants with "more than one...
but fewer than four... [prior] felonies." Jones, 929 F.2d at 377; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-
1001(1) (Supp. 1983). The defendant possessed only two prior felonies. Jones, 929 F.2d
at 377. Apparently, none of the defendant's appointed attorneys had recognized this
improper application of the statute. Id. at 380 n.15.
83. Jones, 929 F2d at 377.
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violation of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution," denying
him due process of law." The Eighth Circuit, rejecting the state's
argument that the defendant had not been prejudiced, 6 addressed
the merits of his argument--despite his procedural default-by
application of the actual innocence exception.' "It would be
difficult to think of one who is more 'innocent' of a sentence," the
court stated, "than a defendant sentenced under a statute that by its
very terms does not even apply to the defendant."8  The court
ordered the writ of habeas corpus to be granted unless the state
retried or resentenced the defendant. 9
One year later, in Mills v. Jordan,0 the Seventh Circuit joined
the Jones court in its application of actual innocence to non-capital
defendants. The defendant in Mills received a two-year sentence in
state court for auto theft; the sentence was increased to thirty years
under a state habitual offender statute.91 Ten years after his arrest,
the defendant filed for habeas relief in federal court, claiming that a
1965 conviction that had been used to calculate his habitual offender
status was invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel.' The
Seventh Circuit, noting a lack of cause for his procedural default,
stated that the defendant could prevail only upon a showing that
denial of the writ would work a miscarriage of justice.93 Noting
84. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
85. Jones, 929 F.2d at 378.
86. The sentence that the defendant actually received, life imprisonment plus thirty
years, was within the range contemplated by the statute the judge should have used to
issue the jury instructions. Id at 378. The court, however, noted that the defendant was
not a member of the class-habitual offenders-that the statute intended to punish, and
that the jury may have been influenced by the difference in penalties, information and
instructions provided to it as a result of the habitual offender classification. Id. at 379.
87. lId at 380.
88. lId at 381. The case, according to the court, fell within that narrow exception to
the cause and prejudice rule by which federal habeas courts could grant relief to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. Id.
89. Id Two years later, the Eighth Circuit, in Higgins v. Smith, 991 F.2d 440 (8th Cir.
1993), questioned the validity of Jones's application of actual innocence" to non-capital
cases, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514
(1992). Higgins, 991 F2d at 441 ("It is not clear to us that Jones is still good law in the
context of a noncapital case."). Although the Sawyer decision apparently has been limited
in its application, see supra note 77, the strength of Higgins as precedent in the Eighth
Circuit remains an unsettled issue.
90. 979 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1992).
91. Id at 1275.
92. Id The district court found that the defendant had procedurally defaulted by
failing either to appeal or attack this conviction collaterally, and dismissed his petition.
Id at 1275-76. The defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 1276.
93. Id at 1277.
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several similarities between the facts of Mills and the Supreme Court's
decision in Sawyer,94 the court applied an actual innocence analysis
despite the non-capital nature of the case. 5 Upon determining that
the defendant had failed to show that he was indeed actually innocent
of being a habitual offender, however, the dismissal of the petition
was affirmed.
The Jones and Mills cases in no way indicate an overwhelming
trend among the circuit courts to apply the actual innocence exception
to non-capital cases. Prior to the decision in Maybeck, only one other
federal circuit had directly confronted the issue. 7 In United States
v. Richards,98 the Tenth Circuit held that non-capital defendants
could not avail themselves of the exception.99 After pleading guilty
in federal district court to possession of a controlled substance, the
defendant in Richards later claimed that sentencing guidelines had
been misapplied at his sentencing hearing through the erroneous
calculation of the weight of the drugs.1°° The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals noted that, because the defendant had not raised the issue
in his first post-conviction motion, he was now barred from doing so
absent a showing of cause and resulting prejudice or a" 'fundamental
miscarriage of justice.' "'0' Dismissing the cause prong of the
analysis,"° the court refused to apply the "fundamental miscarriage"
94. In both cases, the sentencing decision "resembled a factual determination of guilt
or innocence," and the defendants in both cases argued that they were actually innocent
of an aggravating factor contributing to the enhancement of their sentence. Id. at 1278-79.
95. Id, at 1278-79.
96. Id, at 1279-80. The defendant had at least two prior uncontested felony
convictions, as required by the statute, and had admitted guilt for these offenses on cross-
examination at trial. Id. at 1279. The court held that the defendant's claim was one of
legal, rather than actual, innocence and thus had "no application in the miscarriage of
justice context." Id.
97. In Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 97 (1993),
the Fifth Circuit assumed arguendo, but did not explicitly hold, that the actual innocence
exception could be extended to non-capital sentencing cases. Id. at 959. Even though the
defendant had not raised an argument of actual innocence, the court determined that he
was not entitled to relief on the grounds of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id.
98. 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993).
99. Id. at 1371-72.
100. Id. at 1370. It was not until the defendant filed a second motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 that he claimed unusable waste water had been improperly included in calculating
the physical weight of the drugs, a mistake that subsequently affected the length of his
sentence. Id. at 1370.
101. Id. at 1370 (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991)).
102. The defendant claimed that there was a lack of reasonable basis for his claim until,
some time after his first motion was filed, several circuits held that waste water products
should not be included in the weight calculation of controlled substances. Id. at 1370-71.
Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the
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test, holding that "[a] person cannot be actually innocent of a non-
capital sentence,"' 3 and the reinstated the defendant's original 188-
month sentence.') 4
Viewed against this background, it becomes clear that the Fourth
Circuit, in Maybeck, joined those few federal courts that have chosen
to extend the actual innocence exception to non-capital defendants-a
step not yet taken by the Supreme Court. Since both capital and non-
capital defendants could be innocent of the particular acts necessary
to increase their sentences, the Maybeck court reasoned that the
actual innocence remedy should be available to both. 5 Although
the Supreme Court's greatest concession to the application of actual
innocence in non-capital cases has been to recognize the
"prototypical" case in which the wrong person is convicted of a
crime, 6 the Fourth Circuit declined to limit its application of the
exception.'Y7
The logical analog relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in its
expansion of the actual innocence exception in Maybeck found accord
among the decisions of those circuits that have also extended the
doctrine to non-capital cases. In Jones, the Eighth Circuit found
implied authority for its holding in the same passage from Smith v.
Murray,tu as did the Maybeck court.0 9 However, the Jones court
court held that the claim was nevertheless "available" to the defendant at the time of the
default. Richards, 5 F.3d at 1371.
103. Richards, 5 F.3d at 1371 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514,2519-20 (1992)).
The defendant did not claim that he was actually innocent of the crime of possession of
a controlled substance, but only, in the words of the court, "that he should have received
a lesser sentence." Id. Such a remedy was held not to be available to a non-capital
defendant through the actual innocence exception. Id.
104. IL at 1370, 1372.
105. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893.
106. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514,2519 (1992). Utilizing this example of actual
innocence in its "colloquial sense," id. at 2519, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that actual
innocence is an abstraction "easy to grasp" in the non-capital context, id. at 2520. This
example, however, may have confused issues of "legal" innocence with "actual" innocence.
A defendant protesting his conviction on the grounds that he did not, in fact, commit the
crime challenges the factual validity of his guilt rather than the procedure under which this
determination was made. Such a defendant might be deemed "actually innocent" in
common parlance, but to avail himself of the actual innocence exception he must point to
some constitutional violation at trial beyond a bare allegation of mistaken identity. See
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993).
107. The court expressly relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986), in which the Court rejected the argument that the standard of
cause and prejudice should apply differently "depending on the nature of the penalty," as
implied authority for the application of actual innocence to non-capital cases. Maybeck,
23 F.3d at 893.
108. Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 n.16 (8th Cir. 1991).
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placed greater weight upon the broad dictates of the "miscarriage of
justice" analysis"0 than upon the relatively narrow exception for
actual innocence."' The Seventh Circuit, in Mills, also relied on
logic similar to that of the Fourth Circuit, noting that the actual
innocence analysis in both capital and non-capital sentencing cases
applied not to the crimes themselves but to the defendant's innocence
of the aggravating factors upon which the sentence was based."
Unlike the Fourth or Eighth Circuits, however, the Mills court noted
the stringent standard for a showing of actual innocence set forth by
the Supreme Court in Sawyer." This might explain, at least in part,
why the defendant in Mills was unable to make such a showing."4
The ease with which the court in Maybeck chose to employ the
actual innocence exception, however, may best be explained by the
purely federal nature of the case. Because the case originated in
federal district court," the Maybeck court was freed from many of
the issues of comity and federalism that have given the Supreme
Court pause." 6 Indeed, it is the Court's circumspection in addres-
sing these very considerations that has drawn severe criticism, from
scholars and members of the Court alike, for attaching too much
importance to comity and too little to the primacy of defendants'
109. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 893 n.9. Both the Maybeck and Jones courts relied on the
Supreme Court's assertion in Murray that the principles of Wainwright v. Sykes do not rely
"on the nature of the penalty." Murray, 477 U.S. at 538.
110. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1981) (holding that " 'cause' and 'actual
prejudice' are not rigid concepts ... [and] in appropriate cases ... must yield to the
imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration").
111. The Eighth Circuit recognized that the actual innocence doctrine represents an
extremely narrow exception to the cause and prejudice standard. Jones, 929 F.2d at 380-
81. Just as the Supreme Court had intentionally refrained from setting forth a substantive
definition of the term "actual innocence," see Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6
(1989), the Eighth Circuit likewise found it unnecessary to paint its non-capital application
in broad strokes. Jones, 929 F.2d at 381 n.16.
112. Mills v. Jordan, 979 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
113. Id. The requisite standard was held to be a showing by "clear and convincing
evidence." Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992); see supra notes 71-77.
114. The record in Mills was allegedly replete with evidence of prior convictions
sufficient to qualify the defendant as a habitual offender, Mills, 979 F.2d at 1279, but such
a demanding burden of proof would certainly result in the denial of relief to many
defendants.
115. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 890. In this respect, the Maybeck decision is factually closest
to United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982), in which the federal defendant also sought
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Frady, at 156, 157.
116. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,485-87 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 81-82 (1977); see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rights.11 7 Because the Fourth Circuit's decision might
be "directed back to the same court""' that first heard the case
without impinging upon any concerns of federalism, the traditional
balancing of need for collateral review against finality of the trial
decision might have weighed heavily in favor of finding the actual
innocence exception applicable." 9
Liberated from the constraints of comity, the Maybeck court was
free to confront the heart of much of the Supreme Court's actual
innocence jurisprudence-the conflict between concern for judicial
economy and certainty and for protection of the criminal defendant's
right to constitutional review."2 For the Fourth Circuit, the latter
was clearly held in higher esteem; not even the significant government
interest in protecting "society at large from demonstrated criminal
activity" could outweigh the objective of "protecting defendants from
sentencing based on elements of crimes for which they are
conclusively innocent."'' The ease with which this evaluation was
made, however, is far from the norm among actual innocence cases
heard by the Supreme Court.
117. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[U]ndue deference to
local procedure can serve only to undermine the ready access to a federal court to which
a state defendant otherwise is entitled."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About
Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748,776 (1987) ("[A]voiding friction with state
judiciaries deserves little weight in defining the appropriate scope of habeas review.");
Saltzburg, supra note 40, at 390 (recognizing that many state judges are viewed as
susceptible to political pressures, but arguing that skepticism regarding their commitment
to constitutional rights is no longer valid); Kris Teena Daniel, Note, Sawyer v. Whitley:
The Deadly Game of Procedures in Death Penalty Cases, 61 UMKC L. REV. 599, 617
(1993) ("The present Supreme Court is apparently more concerned with respecting the
finality of state court judgments than with correcting an unjust and unconstitutional
sentence."); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 246 (1986)
(noting that the Court's decisions in Carrier and Smith placed great emphasis on comity
and finality at the expense of constitutional claims).
118. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 184 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Although noting that federal courts possess an interest in the finality of decisions,
Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 891 (citing United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968, 979 (3d Cir. 1993)),
the court found that this concern yielded in the face of the defendant's actual innocence.
I1d at 892, 894.
120. See, e.g., Frady, 456 U.S. at 186 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Even in the teeth of
clear congressional direction to the contrary, this Court will strain to subordinate a
prisoner's interest in substantial justice to a supposed government interest in finality.").
121. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 894. This result could not even be compromised, according
to the court, by the fact that the defendant himself was responsible for his erroneous
characterization as a career offender. Id But cf Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 540
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihis Court concludes that petitioner's presumably
meritorious constitutional claim is procedurally barred and that petitioner must therefore
be executed.").
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Disputes over the application of the actual innocence exception
to the cause and prejudice standard expose a significant divergence of
opinion among members of the Court-a divergence as to the very
nature of federal jurisdiction and the writ of habeas corpus. Faced
with a conflict between a defendant's procedural default and a
possibly meritorious constitutional claim, some members of the Court
have pointed to the "profound societal costs"'" attendant to the
exercise of habeas review as justification for its refusal.' In these
Justices' opinion, federal review and relief should be reserved for
"extraordinarily high"' demonstrations of actual innocence. A
more liberal policy would open the proverbial floodgates, loosing the
tides of frivolous litigation upon the federal courts."z
Such judicial restraint has evoked severe criticism from other
members of the Court. Justice Brennan, for example, argued that the
withholding of habeas review because of procedural default represent-
ed an atypical abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction-
" 'the exception, not the rule.' "'u Like-minded Justices conceptu-
alize "the Great Writ"'" as a tool of justice which must not be
hampered by the "form of procedures,"'" much less defer to them.29
122. Smith, 477 U.S. at 539. When the default in question involves a state trial, such
costs may include a reduction of litigation finality and "the frustration of 'both the States'
sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights.' " Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 128 (1982)).
123. Smith, 477 U.S. at 539. Indeed, Justice O'Connor argued that the exercise of
habeas jurisdiction" 'carries a serious burden of justification' "in light of such costs. Id.
(quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. Cmn. L. REV. 142,146 (1970)). Justice O'Connor was joined in the Smith
decision by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Id at 528.
124. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 874 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
the majority opinion at 868).
125. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 518 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)).
127. Id. at 500 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
128. Id. (Stevens, 3., concurring in judgment).
129. This divergence among the Justices as to the nature of habeas corpus echoes the
divergence also apparent among legal scholars. Erwin Chemerinsky stated: "Conserva-
tives view habeas corpus as the vehicle that guilty people use to escape convictions and
sentences.... Liberals see habeas corpus as an essential protection against individuals
being held in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States." Chemerinsky,
supra note 117, at 750; see also Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on
the U.S. Supreme Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death
Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817, 834 (1993) (noting the disruptions that habeas petitions have
caused to the administration of the death penalty); Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L.
Krotoski, Forum: Public Policy Lessons from the Robert Alton Harris Case, 40 UCLA L.
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This tension between competing perceptions of federal review has
manifested itself in the Court's ever-tightening application of the
actual innocence exception."3 Although finding its genesis in the
broad direction in Wainwright to avoid a "miscarriage of justice,"'3
the exception for actual innocence has apparently evolved to become
the only claim rising to the level of such a miscarriage.' Likewise,
the Court's choice to avoid a qualitative definition of actual innocence
in its earliest applications' has given way to the requirement that
showings be more specific.'" The resulting shift in the Court's
inquiry has been, according to Justice Blackmun, away from concern
for a defendant's constitutional rights and toward a fact-based inquiry
into guilt and innocence."3
Although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence may indicate an
unwillingness to return to more liberal standards of assessing the
merits of an actual innocence claim-whether couched in terms of
"miscarriage of justice" or "fundamental fairness" 36-- the Maybeck
decision illustrates that the Fourth Circuit harbors no such hesitation.
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's admonition that a claim of actual
innocence must be accompanied by some independent constitutional
REv. 295, 312-13 (1992) (arguing for the requirement of " 'a colorable showing of
innocence' " before allowing successive habeas petitions and the assertion of all habeas
claims in initial state and federal post-conviction review); Paul C. Weick, Apportionment
of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus be Eliminated?, 21
DEPAUL L. REV. 740, 748-52 (1972) (arguing for the amendment of habeas statutes in
order to decrease the number of federal habeas petitions).
130. Compare Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,496 (1986) (noting that the habeas writ
may be granted where constitutional violation probably resulted in conviction of one
actually innocent) with Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992) (requiring a
showing by clear and convincing evidence to establish actual innocence).
131. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977).
132. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 542 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989). This unwillingness may have
been due to divergent opinions among the Justices as to the showing sufficient to meet this
exception. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
134. Indeed, the Court's decision in Herrera stated that actual innocence is not ipso
facto a constitutional claim, but merely a gateway through which a petitioner must pass in
order to make a "truly persuasive" demonstration of his or her innocence. Herrera v.
Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862, 869 (1993). For a thorough analysis of Herrera, see Kathleen
Cava Boyd, Note, The Paradox of "Actual Innocence" in Federal Habeas Corpus After
Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C. L. REV. 479, 493-98 (1994).
135. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2526 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
judgment).
136. Justice Stevens implied that the principles of Wainwright v. Sykes and the actual
innocence exception should be applied when a constitutional violation is alleged to have
produced a "lack of fundamental fairness" at trial. Smith, 477 U.S. 527, 542-43 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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violation, 7 no such violation was explicitly identified in Maybeck.
The defendant's claim was based not upon a violation of due process
or ineffective assistance of counsel, but upon an argument that he had
not "knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea" as a result of
his erroneous classification as a career offender.us This procedure-
based argument, the validity of which was never disputed by the
court,139 appears to be a much more permissive ground for claims
than the Supreme Court would be willing to entertain."4  The
explanation for this leniency may perhaps lie in two crucial facts: the
concerns for federalism and comity which ordinarily plague such cases
were absent here,'" and Maybeck's case is factually close to the
paradigmatic case of actual innocence.'42
Aside from the novelty of its reasoning, Maybeck is also notable
for the far-reaching implications it may have for Fourth Circuit
defendants. Foremost is an expansion of remedies available to the
federal criminal defendant. One who is actually innocent of a non-
capital crime for which he has been convicted, or of a sentence which
has been imposed upon him, need not be prejudiced from presenting
this defense by procedural default.'43 The significance of this
expansion is not to be underestimated, as the remedy is presently
available to non-capital defendants in only three federal circuits."M
Further, Maybeck contains the tacit assumption that a defendant need
not point to an express constitutional violation in order to avail
137. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 862.
138. Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 891; see supra text accompanying notes 22-23. In Jones, the
defendant made a claim similar to Maybeck's, but framed his argument as a violation of
due process. Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1991); see supra notes 80-89
and accompanying text.
139. "There is no question," stated the court, that "Maybeck is actually innocent of
being a career offender." Maybeck, 23 F.3d at 892.
140. Though the Court has noted that actual innocence in the non-capital context is
"easy to grasp," Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992), it is doubtful that such
a case would be heard absent some independent constitutional violation.
141. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text.
142. Although Maybeck was not the "wrong person" convicted of a crime, see Sawyer,
112 S. Ct. at 2519, his erroneous classification as a habitual offender was readily apparent,
and simply an honest mistake. Maybeck, 23 F3d at 890-91, 892. Accord Jones v.
Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 (8th Cir. 1991) ("It would be difficult to think of one who is
more 'innocent' of a sentence than a defendant sentenced under a statute that by its very
terms does not even apply to the defendant.").
143. Even the degree to which the defendant himself was responsible for the error
seems irrelevant. See supra note 121.
144. See supra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
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himself of this remedy, particularly when his claim of innocence is
strong.1 45
There are, though, possible deleterious effects of the Maybeck
decision. With yet another forum for collateral review open to them,
attorneys may be less likely to adhere to contemporaneous objection
and direct appeal procedures in those cases where constitutional
violations occur. Rather than object to such violations, counsel may
gamble upon a verdict of not guilty for their client, mindful that their
constitutional claims might be raised in federal habeas court should
the gamble fail.1" Also, federal defendants themselves may soon
make use of this remedial procedure to fie frivolous appeals, thereby
straining judicial resources in yet another quarter.147 A deluge of
such meritless petitions might result in a "judicial predisposition
toward dismissal" for habeas petitions in general, increasing the
obstacles between worthy defendants and essential relief."4
Although the Fourth Circuit handed down a clear decision, given
the dispute among the circuits as to the application of the actual
innocence exception to non-capital cases, Maybeck might best be
viewed as precedent carved in sand. At some point in the future, the
availability of the remedy to criminal defendants in only particular
circuits may lead the Supreme Court to settle decisively whether
actual innocence in the non-capital context is indeed "easy to
145. But see Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758, 765 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing the proposition
of Herrera that petitioner must assert an otherwise barred constitutional claim under the
actual innocence exception). Spencer may be distinguished, however, in that it dealt with
an assertion of actual, rather than legal, innocence. Spencer, 5 F.3d at 765; see supra note
69.
146. Discouraging such "sandbagging" tactics was a primary consideration in the
adoption of Wainwright's "cause and prejudice" standard. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
72, 89-90 (1977); see also LAFAvE AND ISRAEL, supra note 13, § 28.4, at 1203-04
(discussing the tactic of "sandbagging" by trial attorneys).
147. Under Justice O'Connor's logic, the potential for such abuse demands a higher
threshold for showings of actual innocence. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 874 (1993).
Several scholars have noted the ever-increasing number of habeas petitions filed by
prisoners. In 1961, state prisoners filed 1,020 federal habeas petitions, while federal
prisoners filed 868. By 1971, the numbers had risen to 8,372 and 1,671, respectively.
Weick, supra note 129, at 745; see also Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 950
(1984) (noting that habeas cases constituted nearly five percent of federal district court
civil dockets in 1983).
148. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrIoN § 15.1, at 783 (2d ed. 1994). In
the words of Justice Jackson, "It must prejudice the occasional meritorious [habeas]
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for
a needle is unlikely to end up with the attitude that the needle is worth the search."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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grasp.' 149 In balancing the governmental interest in judicial finality
and economy against the non-capital defendant's interest in presenting
a constitutional claim, the Court might easily ascribe greater weight
to the former. When the consequence of denying a habeas petition
for procedural default is not a death sentence but merely incar-
ceration, a substantial, historic mitigating factor in the defendant's
favor is hereby removed. Whether this loss to the federal defendant
may be offset through the assertion of actual innocence currently
depends on whether the conviction is rendered in Raleigh, or Atlanta;
in Richmond, or Philadelphia; in Columbia, or Tallahassee. Until the
Court grants certiorari to address this conflict, the availability of the
actual innocence exception to non-capital federal defendants is best
described in the words of the Eighth Circuit: "The question is by no
means settled.""5
SEAN L. DALTON
149. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2520 (1992).
150. Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 n.16 (8th Cir. 1991).
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"No Equal Justice": The Court Reins in the Right to
Appointed Appellate Counsel in Austin v. United States
For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a
man enjoys "depends on the amount of money he has."1
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to the assistance of counsel in criminal
prosecutions.2 However, not until 1932 did the Court guarantee the
availability of counsel to indigent defendants in capital trials by
incorporating the Sixth Amendment guarantee into the Fourteenth
Amendment due process requirement of a fair hearing In subse-
quent holdings, the Court gradually extended the indigent defendant's
right to appointed counsel beyond capital trials to all federal criminal
prosecutions4 and state criminal trials.5 Finally, the Court held that
appointed counsel must be available to indigent appellants for a first
appeal as of right.6
As for the quality of assistance constitutionally required of
appointed appellate counsel, the Court has held that an indigent
appellant is entitled to "effective assistance"7 and to an "active
advocate," even when the basis for appeal is arguably frivolous.' To
1. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,355 (1963) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 19 (1956)).
2. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall.., have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932); see also infra note 47 and
accompanying text. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); see also infra note 47 and accom-
panying text.
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); see also infra note 47 and
accompanying text.
6. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963); see also infra notes 49-54 and
accompanying text. An appeal as of right is one that procedural rules require the
appellate court to hear, most commonly, it is an initial appeal from a trial court to an
intermediate appellate court. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 96 (6th ed. 1990). In contrast,
a discretionary appeal receives a hearing only at the appellate court's discretion; for
example, an appeal to the United States Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. IL
7. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985); see also infra notes 71-80 and
accompanying text.
8. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also infra notes 62-70 and
accompanying text. A frivolous appeal is one that "lacks any basis in law or fact." McCoy
APPOINTED APPELLATE COUNSEL
extend the availability of the constitutional provision for appointed
counsel to first appeals as of right, and to establish the quality of
assistance required of appointed appellate counsel, the Court has
consistently invoked the Fourteenth Amendment principles of due
process and equal protection; as applied to criminal proceedings, due
process demands fairness while equal protection mandates equal
justice.9 Drawing the line at discretionary appeals, the Court has
refused to extend the constitutional guarantee of appointed appellate
counsel beyond the first appeal as of right in either state or federal
courts.10
In Austin v. United States," the Court issued a per curiam
opinion reining in the right to appointed appellate counsel, reasserting
that its availability "does not extend to forums for discretionary
review,"' 2 and advising the circuit courts to revise their rules to
relieve "lawyer[s] of the duty to file a petition for certiorari if the
petition would present only frivolous claims."'3 To accomplish this
revision, the Court recommended that the circuits adopt a rule
requiring counsel to apply to the circuit court, rather than the
Supreme Court, for permission to withdraw when counsel determines
that to continue would result in the filing of a flivolous appeal.'4
With this recommendation, the Court sought to extricate appointed
appellate counsel from the dilemma posed by the requirements of
conflicting rules: on the one hand, a circuit rule requiring preparation
of a petition for certiorari even when the grounds are arguably
frivolous; and on the other, a Supreme Court rule threatening
sanctions for the submission of a frivolous petition.' Moreover, the
Court indicated that the revision of circuit rules will serve the
additional purpose of lightening the Court's workload by stemming
v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988).
9. See infra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
10. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 605 (1974); see also infra notes 55-61 and
accompanying text. While denying that the constitutional principles of due process and
equal protection require such an extension, the Court has nonetheless allowed the states
to provide appointed counsel for discretionary appeals. Ross, 417 U.S. at 618. Moreover,
prior to Austin v. United States, the Court had tolerated the adoption and implementation
by most federal circuits of procedural rules that instruct appointed appellate counsel to
prepare certiorari petitions for indigents seeking discretionary review by the Court, even
when the basis for review is arguably frivolous. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381.
11. 115 S. Ct. 380 (1994) (per curiam).
12. Id. at 381 (citing Ross, 417 U.S. at 616-17).
13. Id
14. Id. at 382.
15. Id. at 381.
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the rising tide of petitions for certiorari filed by indigents.16 Under
the recommended rule, those indigent appellants to whom the circuit
courts deny the assistance of appointed counsel for filing certiorari
petitions will face the daunting task of filing pro se, and thus will be
discouraged from filing frivolous claims." Finally, the recommended
rule change will further streamline the Supreme Court's docket by
relieving the Court of responsibility for evaluating requests by
appointed appellate counsel to withdraw at the certiorari stage;
instead, the appellate court that affirmed the would-be petitioner's
conviction will determine whether counsel may withdraw and leave
the indigent appellant without assistance of counsel in petitioning for
certiorari."
This Note begins by surveying the history and holding of the
Austin decision." Then the Note reviews the Court's delineation of
the constitutional right of an indigent appellant to the assistance of
appointed counsel, and examines the Court's grounding of this right
in the due process and equal protection requirements of the Four-
teenth Amendment, as well as in the Sixth Amendment provision for
assistance of counsel.' The Note gives particular attention to the
Court's development of the Anders procedure2' used in the context
of arguably frivolous appeals to protect both the indigent appellant's
right to effective advocacy and the appointed attorney's ethical
16. Id. at 381-82. The Court speculated that the current rules "may explain, in part,
the dramatically increased number of petitions for certiorari on direct appeal from federal
courts of appeals filed by persons in forma pauperis." Id. at 381. The Court noted that
the number of petitions for certiorari submitted by indigent federal court appellants
quadrupled from 1983 to 1993; however, during the same period the number of petitions
from criminal appellants on direct review from state courts increased by only 50%. Id. at
381 n.3; see also ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 8.1, at 406 n.3,
407 n.5 (7th ed. 1993) (citing annual statistics for 1985-91 comparing the total number of
paid and in forma pauperis cases docketed and acted upon by the Court).
17. In 1991 the Court granted plenary review of only 17 in forma pauperis certiorari
petitions, 0.4% of the 4307 submitted. Stern, supra note 16, § 8.1, at 406 n.3, 407 n.5.
18. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 382.
19. See infra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
21. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The Anders procedure
provides that when appointed counsel finds an appeal frivolous and seeks to withdraw,
counsel must submit to the court and to the indigent defendant a brief noting any
conceivable grounds for appeal. Id. After allowing the indigent defendant to supplement
the brief with any additional points, the court then decides whether the appeal is in fact
frivolous. Id. Finally, if the court finds that the appeal has merit, it must grant the
defendant assistance of counsel for the appeal. Id.; see also infra notes 62-70 and
accompanying text. A brief submitted according to this procedure is called an "Anders
brief."
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integrity' The Note then analyzes the Court's opinion in Austin,
finding that in its advice to the circuit courts the Court ignored the
contradictory implications of the constitutional principles that have
guided its past determination of the availability and quality of the
right to appointed appellate counsel? Finally, this Note argues that
appointed appellate counsel should be available even in potentially
frivolous discretionary appeals, and proposes an extension of the
Anders procedure as a more appropriate way to balance the Court's
concern with protecting the ethical integrity of appointed counsel and
discouraging frivolous appeals against the constitutional concern of
ensuring equal justice through effective advocacy for indigent
appellants.24
After Anthony Austin, an indigent client, pleaded guilty to drug
charges and was sentenced, court-appointed counsel Thomas Cochran
submitted an Anders brief to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals;
Cochran raised the issue of sentence computation, but concluded that
he knew of no meritorious basis for appeal When the Fourth
Circuit affirmed.' Cochran followed the procedures for withdrawal
of appointed counsel prescribed by the Fourth Circuit's procedural
rules Pursuant to those rules, Cochran advised Austin of his right
22. See infra notes 62-94 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 95-131 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 132-49 and accompanying text.
25. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 380; United States v. Austin, No. 93-5889, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10809, at *1-*2 (4th Cir. May 16, 1994) (per curiam).
26. United States v. Austin, No. 93-5889,1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10809, at *2 (4th Cir.
May 16, 1994) (per curiam).
27. The pertinent rule, which sets forth the duration of service required of appointed
appellate counsel, is part of the plan devised by the Fourth Circuit to comply with the
mandates of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964. The Act requires each district court to
devise "a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain
adequate representation," and to approve the plan and "supplement the plan with
provisions for representation on appeal." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1988). The Fourth
Circuit rule promulgated under this mandate states:
2. Appellate Counsel. Every attorney, including retained counsel, who represents
a defendant in this court shall continue to represent his client after termination
of the appeal unless relieved of further responsibility by the Supreme Court.
Where counsel has not been relieved: If the judgment of this court is adverse to
the defendant, counsel shall inform the defendant, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. If the defendant, in writing,
so requests, counsel shall prepare and file a timely petition for such a writ and
transmit a copy to the defendant. Thereafter, unless otherwise instructed by the
Supreme Court or its clerk, or unless any applicable rule, order or plan of the
Supreme Court shall otherwise provide, counsel shall take whatever further steps
are necessary to protect the rights of the defendant, until the petition is granted
or denied.
1995] 2411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari, but when Austin asked
Cochran to file the petition, Cochran applied to the Supreme Court
for permission to withdraw as counsel.' In his motion, Cochran
argued that unless the Court allowed him to withdraw, he would be
required by the Fourth Circuit rule to file a frivolous petition for
certiorari in violation of a rule of the Supreme Court, leaving himself
subject to an assessment of damages or costs. 29 The Court granted
Cochran's motion for leave to withdraw"0 and accepted his
interpretation of the rules, noting that the Fourth Circuit rule requires
appointed counsel to comport with Supreme Court rules, "but only
after the filing of a petition for certiorari." '31
The Court criticized the Fourth Circuit rule-and similar rules
promulgated in compliance with the Criminal Justice Act by most of
the other federal circuits32-- for "mandating representation through
the certiorari process" even when this requires appointed counsel to
fie frivolous petitions that offend Supreme Court rules.33 The Court
recognized that the Fourth Circuit rule provides a means whereby an
attorney may attempt to escape such a dilemma by seeking the
Court's permission to withdraw 4 Noting, however, that Cochran
was the first to utilize this provision, the majority concluded that
appointed appellate counsel in the Fourth Circuit "feel encouraged or
perhaps bound by these Rules to file petitions that rest on frivolous
claims." ' Thus the Fourth Circuit rule and those like it in other
circuits had the additional negative effect of contributing to the
significant increase in the filing of certiorari petitions by indigent
federal appellants. 6
The Court held that while the constitutional right to the assis-
tance of appointed appellate counsel includes the preparation of a
4TH CIR. R APP. II, K. V 2.
28. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 380.
29. Id. at 381 (citing SUP. Cr. R. 42.2).
30. Id. at 380.
31. Id. at 381.
32. Id. at 381 n.1 (citing D.C. CIR. R. APP. VIII, R. IV; 3D CIR. R. ADD. B, R. 111.6;
5TH CIR. R. APP. C, R. 4; 7TH CIR. R. APP. II, R. V.3; 8TH CIR. R. APP. C, R. V; 9TH CIR.
R. APP. A, § 4(c); 10T- CIR. R. ADD. I. R. II.D; ITH CIR. R. ADD. 4(0(4)).
33. Id. at 381.
34. Id. The Fourth Circuit rule provides in pertinent part: "Every attorney, including
retained counsel, who represents a defendant in this court shall continue to represent his
client after termination of the appeal unless relieved of further responsibility by the
Supreme Court." 4TH CIR. R. APP. II, R. V 2 (emphasis added).
35. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381.
36. Id.; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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brief for appeals as of right,37 "that right does not extend to forums
for discretionary review. '3' The Court insisted that "nothing in the
Criminal Justice Act compels counsel to file papers in contravention
of this Court's Rules against frivolous filings. ' 39  Therefore, the
Court directed the circuits to revise their rules to avoid conflict with
the Court's rules by allowing "for relieving a lawyer of the duty to file
a petition for certiorari if the petition would present only frivolous
claims."'  The Court commended as a model a First Circuit
procedural rule that instructs appointed counsel to continue represen-
tation at the Supreme Court level only if "the person requests it and
there are reasonable grounds for counsel properly to do so."'" If
appointed counsel considers the request frivolous, the rule requires
the attorney to apply to the First Circuit, not the Supreme Court, for
permission to withdraw.4 - The Court also noted favorably a Sixth
Circuit rule that allows appointed counsel to withdraw without
securing permission from either the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme
Court ift in counsel's best professional judgment, a petition for
certiorari would be frivolous.43 However, "[fjrom an administrative
point of view,"44 the Court clearly preferred the First Circuit rule,
concluding that "attorneys are more likely to avail themselves of this
avenue for relief if they have the endorsement of the court to back up
their own judgment."'45
The Court's decision in Austin reflects a change in judicial
emphasis. Over sixty years ago, when the Court began to delineate
the availability and quality of the right to assistance of appointed
37. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381 (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,744 (1967)); see
also infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing Anders).
38. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1974)).
However, the Court acknowledged that its own rules, in conformance with the Criminal
Justice Act, extend one aspect of the right to assistance of appointed counsel into the
discretionary stage of review- The rules provide for the appointment of counsel to
represent an indigent appellant whose petition for certiorari has already been granted. Id.
(citing SUP. Cr. R. 39.7, which states that "[i]n a case in which certiorari has been granted
or jurisdiction has been noted or postponed, this Court may appoint counsel to represent
a party financially unable to afford an attorney to the extent authorized by the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 3006A").
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing 1ST CIR. R. 46.5(c)).
42. See 1sT Cm. R. 46.5(c)). The Court found 2D CIR. R. APP. A, R. 111.5 similar to
the First Circuit rule and therefore also acceptable. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 382.
43. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 382 (citing 6TH CR. R. 12(f)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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counsel, the Court focused on the historical constitutional concern
that indigent criminal defendants receive fair trials and equal
justice-not the contemporary judicial concern for administrative
efficiency so conspicuous in the Austin opinion.46 In the early cases,
in which the Court established the right to appointed counsel at the
trial level, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process
figured most prominently among the relevant constitutional bases.47
The Court added the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
principle to its rationale when it extended the right to appointed
counsel to an indigent appellant's first appeal as of right.4 ' For
example, in the landmark case of Douglas v. California,49 the Court
struck down a state rule instructing appellate courts to appoint
counsel only if a preliminary review of the trial record convinced the
court that appointed counsel would benefit either the defendant or
the court5 ° Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, reasoned that
46. See generally Mary R. True, The Constitutional Basis of the Indigent Appellant's
Right to Appointed Counse" Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. CL 346 (1988), 58 U. CIN. L. REV.
1137, 1140-53 (1990) (reviewing the role of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection
in the Court's holdings on the right to appointed counsel).
47. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that a trial court has a
constitutional imperative to appoint counsel for an indigent capital defendant "as a
necessary requisite of due process of law"); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,462-63 (1938)
(finding on Sixth Amendment grounds that the right to appointed counsel is available to
indigent defendants in all federal criminal trials, but justifying that right in due process
terms as "one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure
fundamental human rights of life and liberty"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963) (extending the right to appointed counsel to indigent defendants in state criminal
trials on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds in recognition of the "obvious
truth" that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him").
48. In Griffin v. Illinois, the Court held that a state that provides a right to appellate
review may not deny that right to an appellant unable to pay transcript fees required by
the appellate court. 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). The Court noted that there is no federal
constitutional right to appeal. Id. at 18 (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88
(1894)). The Court refused to distinguish between the state's duty to ensure fair and equal
treatment of indigents at the trial level and in appeals granted by the state, toncluding that
the Constitution guarantees due process and equal protection to indigents "at all stages
of the proceedings." Id. at 18. Moreover, the Court did not clearly distinguish between
the due process and equal protection bases for its holding; instead, the Court simply
merged the principles in its conclusion that "to deny adequate review to the poor means
that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions
which appellate courts would set aside" and "[s]uch a denial is a misfit in a country
dedicated to affording equal justice to all." Id. at 19.
49. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
50. Id. at 354-55.
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under the California rule the quality of appeal depended on the
appellant's ability to pay: The nonindigent's case was fully briefed
and argued before the court judged on the merits, while the indigent's
case was prejudged before the court even determined whether to
appoint counsel.5' Justice Douglas concluded that, in equal protec-
tion terms, "where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent
has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, ... an un-
constitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor" so that the
rich receive a "meaningful appeal" while the poor get only a
"meaningless ritual."'52 Invoking due process concerns as well,
Justice Douglas added that the requirement that an indigent make a
preliminary showing of merit before receiving appointed appellant
counsel "does not comport with fair procedure."'53 Moreover, Justice
Douglas stated that federal appellate courts must appoint counsel to
51. Id. at 355-56.
52. IM. at 357-58. The Court expressly stated that it was not addressing the question
of a right to assistance of appointed counsel in preparing a petition for discretionary
appeal. Id. at 356-57.
Justice Harlan argued vigorously in dissent against the appropriateness of the Douglas
majority's equal protection rationale, which he characterized as the substitution of
"resounding phrases for analysis." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He pointed out that
the Equal Protection Clause was not violated by generally applicable state laws, such as
those providing for a sales tax, university tuition, or uniform charges for municipal services,
all of which affect the poor more harshly than the rich, because states are "not required
by the Equal Protection Clause to give to some whatever others can afford." Id. at 361-62
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Thus Justice Harlan concluded that the California rule did not
discriminate between rich and poor by granting all defendants the right to appeal and to
retain appellate counsel while denying appointed counsel to some indigent appellants;
instead, such a rule only discriminated between appeals deemed meritorious and those
found frivolous because it denied appointed counsel only to indigents whose appeals the
reviewing court found frivolous. Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan pointed
to the similarities between the state scheme under review and the Court's own procedure
for considering petitions for certiorari filed by indigents, and contended that indigent
petitioners were even more disadvantaged by the Supreme Court's rules. Id at 365-66
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Further, sarcastically assailing the Court for demanding more
fairness to indigents from the state appellate courts than it was willing to provide them
itself, Justice Harlan asserted:
But as conscientiously committed as this Court is to the great principle of "Equal
Justice Under the Law," it has never deemed itself constitutionally required to
appoint counsel to assist in the preparation of each of the more than 1,000 pro
se petitions for certiorari currently being filed each Term.
IM at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Harlan criticized the Court's distinction
between first appeals as of right and discretionary appeals, contending that the Court could
offer no justification for ending its concern for due process fairness with an indigent's first
appeal rather than extending that concern, and its mandate of appointed counsel, to
discretionary appeals. Id. (Harlan, J. dissenting).
53. Id at 357.
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an indigent without prejudging the merits of the appeal, and" 'repre-
sentation in the role of an advocate is required.' "'
In Ross v. Moffi s the Court squarely addressed the controver-
sial question left unanswered by the Douglas Court: whether an
indigent's constitutional right to appointed appellate counsel extends
to discretionary appeals.56 Writing for the majority in Ross, Justice
Rehnquist examined the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment
due process and equal protection principles to the question of the
extent of the constitutional right to appointed appellate counsel.5 7
He insisted that the denial of appointed counsel on appeal does not
rise to the level of a violation of due process fairness because "[t]he
defendant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him
against being 'haled into court' by the State and stripped of his
presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the prior
determination of guilt."5 8 To frame his equal protection analysis,
Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[t]he question is not one of absolutes,
but one of degrees."59  He then concluded that indigents denied
appointed counsel were not thereby denied "meaningful access" to the
North Carolina Supreme Court because by that point an indigent
would be able to present a trial transcript, an appellate brief for his
appeal as of right, and often a Court of Appeals opinion, thus
providing sufficient information for the state supreme court to make
a fair determination of whether a review was in order.' Justice
54. Id. (quoting Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 674-75 (1958) (per curiam)).
55. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
56. Id. at 602-03. The Ross Court reviewed a Fourth Circuit Couirt of Appeals
decision which held that an indigent appellant must be granted state-funded assistance of
appointed counsel to apply for discretionary review by the North Carolina Supreme Court
and to prepare a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 604
(citing Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 654-55 (1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)).
Extrapolating from the Fourteenth Amendment bases of the Douglas Court's decision, the
Fourth Circuit had reasoned that "[t]he same concepts of fairness and equality, which
require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and'subsequent appeals"
and found this reasoning applicable in both the state and federal contexts. Id. at 605
(citing Moffitt, 483 F.2d at 655). However, the Ross Court expressly rejected this
reasoning and reversed. I&. at 605.
57. I& at 609-18.
58. Id. at 610-11.
59. Id. at 612.
60. Id. at 615. Justice Rehnquist noted, however, that the Court's holding left the
states free, "as a matter of legislative choice," to provide appointed counsel "at all stages
of judicial review." Id. at 618. Likewise, Justice Rehnquist surmised, indigents seeking
certiorari from the United States Supreme Court would not be denied meaningful access
even in the absence of provisions for appointed counsel because such indigent appellants
would be able to provide the Court appellate briefs and appeals court opinions to inform
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Rehnquist acknowledged that an appellant would benefit greatly from
the assistance of "a skilled lawyer, particularly one trained in the
somewhat arcane art of preparing petitions for discretionary review,"
but he reasoned that because Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion does not require absolute equality, the constitutional requirement
is "not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by
a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his conviction,
but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to
present his claims fairly" on appeal.6'
The Court turned from considering the extent of the right to
assistance of appointed counsel to the quality of assistance required
by the Constitution in the case Anders v. California.62 The Anders
Court held that the constitutional principles of equal protection and
due process require appointed counsel to serve "in the role of an
active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus
curiae" even after counsel makes a conscientious determination that
an indigent's appeal lacks merit.' On this basis the Court struck
down a California rule that allowed appointed counsel, upon
determining that an indigent's appeal was frivolous, to request leave
to withdraw by submitting a "no-merit letter."'  The Court recog-
nized the legitimate need for an appropriate procedure to facilitate
withdrawal by appointed counsel who makes a "conscientious
examination" of an appeal and finds it "wholly frivolous." 65 The
the certiorari decision. Id. at 616.
61. Id. at 616. Justice Douglas wrote a persuasive dissent, in which he concluded that
the Fourth Circuit correctly adjudged that fairness and equality both require the extension
of the right to appointed appellate counsel to the discretionary stage. Id. at 619-21
(Douglas, J., dissenting); see also infra note 119 and accompanying text.
62. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
63. Id. at 744. An amicus curiae is a "friend of the court" who, as a non-party, files
a brief with the court to express personal views. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed.
1990). In Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958), the Court found that indigent
appellants are entitled to appointed attorneys who do more than "perform] essentially the
role of amici curiae." Id. at 675. Rather, "representation in the role of an advocate is
required," meaning that appointed counsel must "diligently investigate[] the possible
grounds of appeal" before concluding that the indigent client's appeal is frivolous and
seeking to withdraw. Id. Employing the Ellis Court's distinction, the Court in Anders
found that appointed counsel failed to provide the requisite advocacy because counsel did
not perform "in any greater capacity than merely as amicus curiae which was condemned
in Ellis." Anders, 386 U.S. at 743 (citing Ellis, 356 U.S. at 675).
64. Anders, 386 U.S. at 73941. A "no-merit letter," under the California scheme as
the Anders Court characterized it, was simply a terse statement, filed without an
accompanying brief, presenting "counsel's bare conclusion" that an indigent client's appeal
lacked merit. Id. at 742-43.
65. Id at 744.
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Court held that under such circumstances appointed counsel should
submit, along with the request to withdraw, "a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." 66
Additionally, counsel should provide a copy of the brief to the
indigent, who should be given time to present to the court any
additional points.67  The court should then examine all the
proceedings and determine whether the appeal is in fact "wholly
frivolous."'  If the court finds that the appeal is not frivolous, it
must then provide assistance of counsel to the indigent to pursue the
appeal.69 The Anders Court concluded that this procedure would
maximize fair treatment of the indigent appellant, protect appointed
counsel from the charge of ineffective assistance, and provide the
reviewing court the benefit of counsel's best presentation of the
case.70
66. I&
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id, at 745. The Court expressed confidence that the procedure met the
requirements of constitutional equal protection in providing for assistance of appointed
appellate counsel: "This procedure will assure penniless defendants the same rights and
opportunities on appeal-as nearly as is practicable-as are enjoyed by those persons who
are in a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel." Id.
In dissent, however, Justice Stewart characterized the Anders procedure as a "quixotic
requirement" that is understandable only as an indication of the Court's mistrust of the
professional judgment of appointed counsel. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart disavowed this attitude: "I cannot believe that lawyers appointed to represent
indigents are so likely to be lacking in diligence, competence, or professional honesty."
Id. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Commentators have expressed diverse opinions on the merits of the Anders
procedure. See; eg., Michael R. Conner, WithdrawalofAppointed Counsel From Frivolous
Indigent Appeals, 49 IND. LJ. 740, 746-47 (1974) (criticizing the Anders procedure for
providing neither effective advocacy for indigents nor useful guidance to the court that
finds the appeal meritorious); Frederick D. Junkin, The Right to Counsel in "Frivolous"
Criminal Appeals: A Reevaluation of the Guarantees of Anders v. California, 67 TEx. L.
REv. 181, 187 (1988) ("The Anders procedure reconciles the conflicting interests of
indigent appellants in zealous representation and of the judicial system in the efficient
disposition of litigation and, if properly enforced, is an equitable mechanism for handling
frivolous criminal appeals."); Arthur Mendelson, Frivolous CriminalAppeals: The Anders
Brief or the Idaho Rule? 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 22, 22 (1983) (favoring the "Idaho Rule,"
followed by four states, which prohibits withdrawal by appointed counsel, because the
Anders procedure "is burdensome for the court, difficult for the attorney, and deprives the
defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel"); Charles Pengilly, Never
Cry Anders: The Ethical Dilemma of Counsel Appointed to Pursue a Frivolous Criminal
Appeal, 9 CRIM. JuST. J. 45,52 (1986) (finding that "the brief required by the Anders court
is impossible to write and that if it were not, it would necessarily constitute a direct
violation of the author's obligation to the client").
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In Evitts v. Lucey7' the Court returned to the question of the
constitutionally required quality of assistance of appellate counsel, and
held that Fourteenth Amendment due process dictates that an
appellant is due "the effective assistance of an attorney" for a first
appeal as of right, whether counsel is appointed or retained.72 Evitts
involved a nonindigent appellant whose retained counsel failed to
meet a state filing requirement, resulting in the dismissal of the
appeal.73 The Court built its holding on the "intersection of two
lines of cases":74 (1) Griffin v. Illinois75 and its progeny, in which
the Court found that due process requires minimum safeguards,
including the right to counsel, to ensure that first appeals as of right
are " 'adequate and effective' ";76 and (2) the Gideon v. Wain-
wright line of cases, in which the Court discerned that the Sixth
Amendment right to trial counsel applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process, and that this right
"comprehends effective assistance of counsel."' The Court then
reasoned that because an unrepresented defendant at trial and an
unrepresented appellant at a first appeal as of right both face the loss
of liberty without the skill necessary to protect themselves, due
process fairness could not tolerate mere nominal representation in
either stage.79 Therefore, the Court concluded, "the promise of
71. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
72. Id. at 395-96.
73. I& at 389-90. The Court noted that the parties had stipulated to the absence of
an equal protection issue. Id. at 391.
74. Id. at 392.
75. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
76. Evits, 469 U.S. at 392 (quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20, and citing Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)); see also supra notes 48-61.
77. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
78. Evits, 469 U.S. at 392 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,344 (1980); Gideon,
372 U.S. at 344). The Evitts Court summarized this line of cases as follows: The right to
counsel is founded on the "obvious truth" that attorneys are "necessities, not luxuries,"
id. at 994 (quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344), a defendant is entitled to representation by
"an attorney, whether appointed or retained, who plays the role necessary to ensure that
the trial is fair," id. at 395 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984)),
and "the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel," id. (citing
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344).
79. IA at 396. The Court explained that
[i]n bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant is
attempting to demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of
liberty, is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant must face an
adversary proceeding that-like a trial-is governed by intricate rules that to a
layperson would be hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant-like an
unrepresented defendant at trial-is unable to protect the vital interests at stake.
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Douglas that a criminal defendant has the right to counsel on
appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a
right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel."8
The scope of the applicability of the Anders procedure as a
guarantor of appointed counsel's effective advocacy faced the Court
in Pennsylvania v. Finley.8 ' The Court held that appointed counsel
in post-conviction proceedings need not follow the Anders procedure
because it is a "prophylactic framework" relevant "when, and only
when, a litigant has a previously established constitutional right to
counsel."'  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
asserted that the right to appointed counsel for post-conviction
hearings was a state provision with no federal constitutional man-
date.' He reasoned that in post-conviction proceedings neither
Fourteenth Amendment due process nor fundamental fairness require
the state to provide assistance of counsel or safeguards such as the
Anders procedure because: (1) post-conviction proceedings are more
distant from the trial stage than discretionary appeals which the Court
found in Ross to lack a constitutional basis; (2) post-conviction
proceedings are in fact civil, not criminal, proceedings; and (3) states
are under no obligation to provide post-conviction proceedings. 5
80. Id. at 397. Justice Rehnquist dissented, denying the existence of a Fourteenth
Amendment due process basis for a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. Id
at 406-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Rehnquist contended that, in
deciding issues of appellate review, the Court had uniformly relied on equal protection
principles to the exclusion of due process. L at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Further,
contrary to the Court's view, Justice Rehnquist distinguished the demands of fairness for
defendants at trial and on appeal, pointing out that appellants have already been found
guilty and are thus subject already to deprivation of liberty because the Constitution does
not require that there be an opportunity for appeal. I& at 409 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Therefore, Justice Rehnquist insisted, due process concerns for the effectiveness of counsel
at the appellate stage are misplaced because the failure of an appeal simply represents an
unsuccessful attack on a prior conviction-it does not effect a loss of liberty. Id. at 410
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. 481 U.S. 551, 554-55 (1987).
82. l at 555. Post-conviction proceedings are state-granted hearings, not required
by the United States Constitution, at which a prisoner may make a collateral claim of
alleged constitutional deficiencies in a prior, fully-litigated conviction. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1166 (6th ed. 1990).
83. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556.
84. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
85. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57. Chief Justice Rehnquist added that the state's appellate
procedures presented no equal protection violations because they provided the
" 'meaningful access' "required by Ross v. Moffitt. IM at 557 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 615 (1970)).
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To distinguish Evitts v. Lucey, 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
in Evitts effective assistance was required because a constitutionally
guaranteed first appeal as of right was at issue; however, in Finley, the
quality of assistance of counsel was properly determined by the state
because it provides the right to a post-conviction hearing at its
option.' Thus Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the view that when
the state provides appointed counsel for discretionary appeals it must
meet federal constitutional standards of effective assistance of counsel;
he concluded instead that "[i]n this context, the Constitution does not
put the State to the difficult choice between affording no counsel
whatsoever or following the strict procedural guidelines annunciated
in Anders.""8
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, 9 found support in Evitts for his
assertion that even when granting a right to counsel that exceeds the
mandate of the federal Constitution, the state may not withdraw that
right in a way that violates Fourteenth Amendment due process and
equal protection guarantees. 0 Justice Brennan argued first that
constitutional due process requires the state to safeguard fundamental
fairness whenever it grants the right to counsel by ensuring that
appointed counsel provide effective assistance.91  According to
Justice Brennan, the Anders procedure should have been considered
the constitutionally mandated means to ensure such fundamental
fairness.92 In addition, Justice Brennan contended that when state-
appointed counsel provide indigents less effective representation than
the Anders procedure requires, the state violates the equal protection
principle.9' "Otherwise," Justice Brennan concluded, " '[t]he
indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has
only the right to a meaningless ritual,' while a person who can afford
it obtains meaningful review."94
86. 469 U.S. 387 (1985); see also supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
87. Finley, 481 U.S. at 558.
88. Id. at 559.
89. Id. at 559-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in the dissent. Id.
at 559.
90. Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, the Evitts Court held that "when
a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must
nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution-and, in particular, in
accord with the Due Process Clause." Evitts, 469 U.S. at 401.
91. Finley, 481 U.S. at 566-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 569 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358
(1963)). The Court has addressed the implications of the Anders procedure in several
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Justice Brennan's dissent in Finley provides a good basis for a
critique of the Austin Court's decision, which instructed the federal
circuit courts to repeal provisions giving indigent appellants the
assistance of appointed counsel in preparing petitions for certiorari.95
Specifically, that dissent supports the view that the rule recommended
by the Austin Court violates due process and equal protection by
other cases. For example, in McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429 (1988), the Court
held that a state rule adding to the Anders procedure a requirement that counsel provide
an explanation for a determination that an appeal is frivolous did not violate the indigent
client's constitutional rights. Id. at 430-31. The McCoy Court reasoned that "[b]ecause
counsel may discover previously unrecognized aspects of the law in the process of
preparing a written explanation for his or her conclusion, the discussion requirement
provides an additional safeguard against mistaken conclusions by counsel that the strongest
arguments he or she can find are frivolous." Id. at 442. Justice Brennan, in a dissent
joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, countered that by requiring more than a simple
conclusory statement of frivolity, the rule at issue required appointed counsel to brief the
case against the indigent client, upsetting the "delicate balance" achieved by the Anders
procedure between the appointed attorney's dual duties of behaving ethically with respect
to the court while providing zealous advocacy on behalf of the indigent client. Id. at 447
(Brennan, J., dissenting). For commentary on McCoy, see Eduardo I. Sanchez, The Right
to Counsel and Frivolous Appeals: Assistance to the Court or Advocacy for the Indigent
Client-Which is the Real McCoy?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 921,926 (1989) (finding that the
discussion requirement threatens to deny constitutionally guaranteed advocacy to
indigents).
The Court again addressed the implications of the Anders procedure in Penson v.
Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988). The Penson Court considered the action of a state court that
ruled that because it found no resultant prejudicial effect, an indigent appellant was not
entitled to a replacement after appointed counsel withdrew without complying with the
Anders procedure. Id. at 78-79. The Court held that the indigent appellant was denied
"constitutionally adequate representation" because the state appellate court allowed
appointed counsel to withdraw without filing an Anders brief and failed to appoint a new
counsel after finding meritorious arguments to support the appeal. Id- at 81-83. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, agreed that in the Griffin line of cases "[t]here is
undoubtedly an equal protection component," but he criticized the Court for ignoring its
holding in Ross that the state's sole duty toward indigent appellants is to guarantee an
adequate appeal. Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S.
600, 616 (1974)). As a result of this oversight, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, the Court
improperly added to the Anders decision "a presumption of prejudice," when appointed
appellate counsel fails to comply fully with the Anders procedure, in a futile attempt to
provide indigents the same level of legal assistance that nonindigents receive from retained
counsel. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Instead of evaluating appointed counsel's
representation by compliance with the particulars of Anders, the Chief Justice concluded
that "the basic constitutional guarantee of effective assistance" should be the standard.
Id. at 91 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For commentary on Penson, see True, supra note
46, at 1160 (contending that the Penson Court, relying on the faulty reasoning in Evitts,
erroneously implied that an appeal is a "critical stage of a criminal proceeding" to which
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel attaches, and that as a result "the
Court has opened a Pandora's box of ever-expanding rights for the indigent appellant
which could bring the orderly administration of the criminal justice system to a standstill").
95. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381.
APPOINTED APPELLATE COUNSEL
permitting the withdrawal of appointed counsel merely upon
agreement between counsel and the circuit court-the very court that
just affirmed the appellant's conviction-that a petition for certiorari
would be frivolous. 6  As Justice Brennan insisted in Finley, the
effective advocacy required of appointed counsel by the Anders
procedure is essential to assure due process for indigent appellants;
moreover, when the state provides indigent appellants anything less
than the Anders safeguards, it denies them equal protection. 8
Had the Austin Court followed this reasoning, it would have
instructed the circuits to follow the Anders procedure because the
effective advocacy required by Anders ensures constitutionally
mandated fundamental fairness and equal protection for indigent
appellants, thereby guaranteeing that their efforts to petition the court
for certiorari amount to more than a meaningless ritual.99 The
Finley Court rejected Justice Brennan's position because it found that
the Anders procedure applied only to the exercise of a constitutionally
mandated right to appointed counsel and that, according to Ross v.
Moffitt," this right did not extend to discretionary appeals. 1
The Austin Court was likewise unreceptive to Justice Brennan's
argument in Finley because it also based its holding on Ross."°
The Ross decision, however, was arguably a departure from a
clear progression of holdings spanning more than forty years. In
these cases, the Court, guided by the Fourteenth Amendment
principles of due process and equal protection, appeared to be
steadily expanding the constitutional guarantee of appointed counsel
for indigent defendants and appellants to all the stages of criminal
proceedings."° By its own terms, however, the Ross holding did not
completely halt the expanding availability of the right to appointed
counsel at the level of a first appeal as of right: The Ross Court
explicitly stated that it did not intend to discourage the states from
extending the right to discretionary appeals." Additionally, for two
96. Finley, 481 U.S. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 89-94 and
accompanying text.
97. Finley, 481 U.S. at 566-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. IM at 569 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. IM at 566-69 (Brennan J., dissenting).
100. 417 U.S. 600 (1974); see also supra notes 55-61.
101. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57; see also supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
102. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381 (citing Ross, 417 U.S. at 616-17); see also supra notes 11-
13 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
104. Ross, 417 U.S. at 618; see also supra note 60.
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decades after Ross, the Court tolerated the implementation of circuit
court rules providing appointed counsel for preparation of certiorari
briefs even for appellants whose claims were arguably frivolous. 5
However, by invoking Ross as the justification for its decision in
Austin, the Court has now conspicuously reined in the right to
appointed appellate counsel. 6
Austin's reaffirmation of Ross notwithstanding, the Court's pre-
Ross reasoning on the right to appointed counsel contains persuasive
arguments that the constitutional concerns of fairness and equal
justice mandate the extension of the right to appointed counsel to
forums for discretionary review." Recognition of the
constitutionality of this extension of the right to appointed appellant
counsel requires, in turn, the applicability of the Anders procedure to
indigent appellants at the discretionary level."° Indeed, in contrast
to the Austin Court's recommendation, the Anders procedure would
better serve the needs of indigent appellants, attorneys confronted
with an ethical dilemma such as the one in Austin, and the Court
itself.'09
Had it carefully reexamined Ross in view of the line of cases
preceding it, the Austin Court might have found that constitutional
concerns for due process and equal protection called for an overtur-
ning of Ross and an extension of the right to appointed counsel to
discretionary appeals. In the cases leading up to Ross, the language
used by the Court to characterize the due process and equal protec-
tion bases for the emerging right to appointed counsel suggests a
scope that extends far beyond the limited question at issue. For
instance, the Powell Court only examined the constitutionality of the
right to appointed counsel in capital trials. 0 However, to stress
that the right to counsel was essential to the effectiveness of the due
process right to be heard, the Court asserted that a defendant
"requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
105. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381.
106. Id (citing Ross, 417 U.S. at 616-17); see also supra notes 48-61 and accompanying
text.
107. See infra notes 110-38 and accompanying text. See also Fourth Circuit Chief Judge
Haynesworth's well-reasoned opinion in Moffit v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (1973), rev'd, 417
U.S. 600 (1974), on which Justice Douglas based his Ross dissent. Ross, 417 U.S. at 619-21
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Moffitt, 483 F.2d at 653).
108. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
110. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); see also supra note "47 and accom-
panying text.
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against him.""' Similarly, the Griffin Court characterized the scope
of the right to appointed counsel in expansive terms that pointed to
applications beyond the issue before the Court, holding that indigent
appellants must receive the protection of constitutional due process
and equal justice "at all stages of the proceedings. ' ' " The issue
presented in Douglas prevented the Court from considering extension
of the right to appointed counsel beyond the first appeal as of
right," but the language the Court used to express its constitutional
grounds for extending the right to the first appeal-that indigent
appellants deserve a "meaningful appeal" rather than a "meaningless
ritual""a-clearly is capable of broader application.
If the Austin Court had looked beyond Ross to Douglas, it would
have found strong arguments for extending the right to appointed
counsel to discretionary appeals in both the majority opinion and,
ironically, the dissent. The Douglas majority, in extending the right
to appointed counsel to a first appeal as of right, reasoned that due
process is violated when an indigent appellant must make a
preliminary pro se showing of merit before receiving appointed
counsel." 5 This reasoning would seem to condemn, on due process
grounds, a procedure at the discretionary level like the one called for
in Austin, whereby an indigent seeking certiorari must petition the
Court pro se when the circuit court denies assistance of counsel for
preparation of the petition."6 Justice Harlan, dissenting in Douglas,
noted that the majority's rationale, followed to its logical conclusion,
supported the extension of the constitutional guarantee of appointed
counsel to discretionary appeals:
Surely, it cannot be contended that the requirements of fair
procedure are exhausted once an indigent has been given
one appellate review. Nor can it well be suggested that
having appointed counsel is more necessary to the fair
administration of justice in an initial appeal taken as a
matter of right, which the reviewing court on the full record
has already determined to be frivolous, than in a petition
111. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
112. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); see also supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
113. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963); see also supra notes 49-54 and
accompanying text.
114. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
115. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
116. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381; see also supra notes 14-18, 41-45 and accompanying text.
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asking a higher appellate court to exercise its discretion to
consider what may be a substantial constitutional claim." 7
Thus, the Austin Court, had it been searching for one, could have
found a strong argument for extending the right to appointed counsel
to discretionary appeals in Justice Harlan's argument against the
Douglas Court's grant of the right to appointed counsel for first
appeals as of right.
Finally, if the Austin Court had carefully considered the Ross
dissent, it would have found strong arguments there for extending the
right to appointed counsel at least to the preparation of certiorari
petitions. It might also have noted weaknesses in the Ross Court's
rationale for refusing to make this extension. In his dissent in
Ross,"' Justice Douglas relied heavily on the lower court opinion
written by Fourth Circuit Chief Judge Haynesworth." 9  Chief Judge
Haynesworth, with conspicuous irony, incorporated Justice Harlan's
remarks from his Douglas dissent on the similarities between the
levels of appeal into a comprehensive endorsement of the extension
117. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
118. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,619-21 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 61.
119. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); see also
supra note 56. Following Chief Judge Haynesworth's reasoning, Justice Douglas justified
extension of the right to appointed counsel to discretionary appeals first by underscoring
the critical importance to indigent appellants of securing a permissive review from the
highest court: A discretionary appeal before the "ultimate arbiter" of one's rights may be
an appellant's most meaningful review because appellate courts are constrained by the
precedents of the highest court, especially when constitutional issues are present. Ross,
417 U.S. at 619-20 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Moffitt, 483 F.2d at 653). Next, Justice
Douglas contended that an indigent appellant proceeding pro se in a quest for
discretionary review faces not a minimal handicap, but a "substantial disadvantage" as
compared with nonindigents with retained counsel because of the sophistication required
to prepare an effective petition for certiorari. ld. at 620-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing
Moffiftt, 483 F.2d at 653). Specifically, Justice Douglas argued: "'Certiorari proceedings
[practice] constitute[s] a highly specialized aspect of appellant work. The factors which [a
court] deems important in connection with deciding whether to grant certiorari are
certainly not within the normal knowledge of an indigent appellant.' " Id. at 620-21
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moffitt, 483 F.2d at 653 (misquoting Bennett Boskey, The
Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REV. 783,797 (1961), which refers
to "practice," not "proceedings")). Finally, Justice Douglas pointed out the ease and
efficiency with which counsel appointed for the first appeal as of right could expertly
prepare a petition for certiorari, or at least knowledgeably advise an indigent appellant
that such a petition would not likely succeed. Id. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thus
Justice Douglas forcefully concluded that Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal
protection require this extension of the right to appointed counsel because "[t]he right to
seek discretionary review is a substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of significant
assistance to an indigent defendant." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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of the right to counsel to discretionary appeals."') Chief Judge
Haynesworth stressed the importance of discretionary appeals,
particularly to the highest state or federal court, by noting that "the
highest court remains the ultimate arbiter of the rights of its citizens,"
and consequently that a review by that court may often be "the most
meaningful review the conviction will receive."'' He did acknow-
ledge that the highest court should have the prerogative, for the sake
of efficient administration, to decide in which cases it will afford the
parties a discretionary hearing; however, he also declared that the
right to petition for such a hearing is of such importance that due
process should guarantee assistance of counsel to an indigent in
making the petition."z  Moreover, Chief Judge Haynesworth
reasoned that equal protection is offended if the court denies
indig~nts the assistance of counsel in appellate courts, whether the
appeal is discretionary or of right, if the court provides access to these
forums to other convicted felons who can retain counsel.Y Finally,
because of the difficulty of preparing an effective petition for
certiorari, Chief Judge Haynesworth reasoned that indigent appellants
face at least as great a need for assistance of counsel at this stage as
at a first appeal." Therefore, Chief Judge Haynesworth concluded
that because fairness and equal justice concerns are just as applicable
for discretionary review as for the first appeal as of right, extension
of the right to appointed appellate counsel to discretionary appeals
was implicit in the Douglas decision.'
Writing for the majority in Ross, Justice Rehnquist rejected Chief
Judge Haynesworth's reasoning, finding instead that although the
denial of appointed counsel for discretionary review may disadvantage
an indigent appellant to some extent, the deprivation does not rise to
the level of a due process or equal protection violation.' However,
Justice Rehnquist's assessment of the differing circumstances of a
defendant and an appellant is subject to dispute. According to Justice
Rehnquist, a defendant needs an attorney as a "shield" at trial for
protection against the state's effort to secure a conviction; but an
120. Moffitt, 483 F.2d at 654 (citing Douglas, 372 U.S. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting));
see also supra note 52.
121. Moffit, 483 F.2d at 653.
122. Id
123. Id at 654.
124. Id. at 653.
125. Id. at 655.
126. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-12 (1974); see also supra notes 55-61 and
accompanying text.
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appellant needs counsel only as a "sword" to attack the former
conviction."z In contrast, the Court earlier held in Griffin that an
indigent faced the loss of life and liberty in an appeal just as at trial,
and thus an adequate review by the appellate court, which is
empowered to set aside unjust convictions, is constitutionally
mandated." Moreover, if Chief Judge Haynesworth's assessment
of the critical nature of the need for counsel to obtain adequate
discretionary review has merit, then the assistance of appointed
counsel likewise should be constitutionally mandated.'29 Because
Justice Rehnquist admitted that the preparation of a certiorari
petition was an "arcane art," one in which an indigent appellant
would greatly benefit from the appointment of counsel, his conclusion
that the indigent's need for counsel under these circumstances does
not merit equal protection3 is all the more surprising. Even if as
Justice Rehnquist insisted, equal protection does not require the
duplication of the best legal assistance the wealthy can afford,'31 a
rule providing effective assistance of counsel to enable indigents to
prepare certiorari petitions would seem to be a reasonable equal
protection guarantee.
The Court's own reasoning in the "appointed counsel" line of
cases amply supports an extension of that right to the discretionary
level of appeals. In spite of its decision in Ross to limit the extent of
the right to first appeals, the Court has allowed the states3 . and the
circuit courts, at least until Austin,'3 to extend the right further. In
addition, the Court itself has provided appointed counsel for
discretionary appeals."' In fact, in the federal court system, ap-
pointed counsel is available for trial in the district courts, for appeal
in the circuit courts, for discretionary appeal-once certiorari is
granted-in the Supreme Court, and in most circuits, even after the
rule revision required by Austin," for the preparation of certiorari
briefs. Although the provisions for certiorari are not recognized as
127. Ross, 417 U.S. at 610-11; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
128. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956); see also supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
129. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 653; see also supra notes 122-23 and accompanying
text.
130. Ross, 417 U.S. at 616.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 618.
133. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381; see also supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
134. Austin, 115 S. Ct. at 381 (citing SUP. Cr. R. 39.7).
135. Id.
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constitutionally guaranteed, they are nonetheless still available,
leaving only one gap: After Austin there is no provision for assistance
of counsel for indigent appellants whose grounds for seeking certiorari
have been deemed frivolous by an appellate attorney and the circuit
court that affirmed their conviction."a Such appellants can only
approach the Supreme Court pro se, making their best efforts to
produce an effective petition in spite of their abject lack of training
in the "arcane art"' of preparing them. Surely some indigent
appellants with meritorious claims will be refused appointed counsel
under the revised rule, and the resulting denial of due process and
equal protection to these indigent appellants arguably rises to the
level of constitutional violation. 8
The Court can cure this constitutional deprivation by following
the inexorable logic of its pre-Ross cases 139 and extending the
constitutional right to appointed counsel to discretionary appeals. If
it did so, the Anders procedure would be implicated, and the process
followed by indigents seeking certiorari would be the same as that
now required by Anders at the circuit court level. As a consequence,
an indigent appellant would have the benefits secured by Anders of
(1) an "active advocate" who would submit to the Court any
arguments which might conceivably support the appellant's petition
and (2) a fresh review of the grounds for appeal by the highest court,
rather than a mere second look from the circuit court that previously
affirmed the conviction.' Further, appointed counsel would have
the benefit of a resolution of the ethical dilemma posed by conflicting
duties to the court and to their clients because the Anders procedure
provides a workable compromise between those duties.14' Finally,
the Court would have the benefit of a professionally prepared brief,
rather than a pro se indigent appellant's amateur effort, upon which
to base a responsible decision on the merits of the appellant's
case.
142
While Attorney Thomas Cochran was waiting for a ruling from
the Court on the withdrawal request he submitted pursuant to Fourth
136. Id. at 381-82.
137. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,616 (1974); see also supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
138. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
140. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also supra notes 62-70 and
accompanying text.
141. Anders, 386 U.S. at 745; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
142. Anders, 386 U.S. at 745; see also supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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Circuit rules, he prepared a petition for certiorari on behalf of his
client and lodged it with the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court
for filing in the event the filing deadline arrived without word on
whether his request for withdrawal had been granted. Cochran's
petition was never filed, however, because shortly before the deadline
the Court granted his request to withdraw.1" If the Court had done
otherwise, prompting Cochran to submit the brief, the Court could
have faced the following questions:
1. Whether appointed counsel, operating under the man-
dates of the Plan of the Judicial Council of the Fourth
Circuit in implementation of the Criminal Justice Act,
must file, absent leave to withdraw granted by the
Supreme Court, what counsel believes to be a frivolous
petition for writ of certiorari.
2. If Question 1, above, is answered in the affirmative,
what is the most ethical and economic manner for so
proceeding in this Court?
3. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in affirming the
Petitioner's conviction.'45
In the petition, Cochran noted that the requirement that ap-
pointed counsel submit an arguably frivolous brief not only creates an
ethical difficulty for the attorney and an adverse economic impact on
the Court, but also provides a benefit to the indigent appellant (that
is, the opportunity for a review by the highest court to determine the
existence of any errors overlooked by appointed counsel and the
appellate court).' Cochran then stated that the Court's adoption
of the Anders procedure for first appeals illustrates the Court's
commitment to the right of indigents to counsel.'1 Finally, Cochran
proposed that the Court extend the Anders procedure to the certiorari
stage as the best way to protect the interests of indigent appellants,
appointed attorneys, and the Court itself."
Unfortunately, the Court did not have occasion to rule on
Cochran's petition, so the decision of Austin v. United States to rein
in the right to appointed appellate counsel stands. As a result of the
143. Interview with Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greensboro, N.C., in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 7, 1995).
144. 1d.
145. Draft Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Austin v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 380
(1994) (per curiam) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id. at 5-6.
148. Id. at 6-7.
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Austin holding, nonindigents who can retain counsel to petition the
Court for certiorari will receive a meaningful appeal, while indigent
appellants forced to petition the court pro se will likely receive no
more than a meaningless ritual. Arguably, therefore, the Austin
Court denied such indigent appellants the cherished constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection: "For there can be no
equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on
the amount of money he has.' ,149
WELTON 0. SEAL, JR.
149. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,355 (1963) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12,19 (1956)).
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Termination of Lump Sum Alimony upon the Remarriage of
a Dependent Spouse: Potts v. Tutterow
Divorce usually results in two types of financial settlement
between the divorcing parties: property division and alimony.1 The
various rationales underlying these two aspects of divorce have
produced the general principle that courts may modify awards of
alimony in some circumstances, but may not change awards of
property division.2 Most states have an exception to this principle for
lump sum alimony awards,3 as opposed to periodic alimony.' The
exception presumes that lump sum alimony vests when awarded and,
therefore, is not subject to court modification or termination.5
Recently, however, North Carolina joined the few states which hold
that awards of lump sum alimony terminate upon the remarriage of
the dependent spouse.6
1. Divorce also frequently involves a third type of financial settlement-child sup-
port-which clearly affects more than just the divorcing spouses. Because the focal case
of this Note, Potts v. Tutterow, 114 N.C. App. 360, 442 S.E.2d 90 (1994), did not involve
questions of child support, this Note will not address the child support aspects of North
Carolina law.
2. See 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 17.6, at 275-76 (2d ed. 1987).
3. A lump sum alimony award permits a fixed total amount to be paid either in one
large payment or in any number of installments. See Whitesell v. Whitesell, 59 N.C. App.
552, 552-53, 297 S.E.2d 172, 172-73 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 583, 299 S.E.2d 653
(1983). In contrast, periodic alimony is a continuing obligation to make payments of a
certain amount for an indefinite period of time. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174,
179, 261 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1980) (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(1)). For a more
thorough explanation of the different types of alimony, see infra notes 59-69 and
accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 234 N.E.2d 372,376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967) (upholding
the 1949 Illinois Divorce Act, 1949 Ill. Laws 729, § 1 (repealed 1977), which prevented
termination of payments of lump sum alimony upon recipient spouse's remarriage);
Kutchai v. Kutchai, 207 N.W. 818, 820 (Mich. 1926) ("Where a gross or lump sum in
money or in property is awarded as alimony to the wife, the power of the court is at an
end, and there then is no power to modify it later."); Oknaian v. Oknaian, 282 N.W.2d
230, 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (applying the rule from Kutchai); Cunningham v. Lanier,
589 So. 2d 133,137 (Miss. 1991); East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927,931 (Miss. 1986) ("[A]Iimony
awarded in a lump sum, or in gross constitutes a fixed liability of the husband and his
estate and cannot be modified."); Kishner v. Kishner, 562 P.2d 493, 495-96 (Nev. 1977)
(holding that termination of lump sum alimony by remarriage of recipient "would
undermine the nature and contravene the purpose of" lump sum alimony).
5. CLARK, supra note 2, § 17.5, at 270 (stating that lump sum awards of alimony are
"final and non-modifiable").
6. Potts v. Tutterow, 114 N.C. App. 360,365,442 S.E.2d 90,93 (1994); see, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327(B) (1991) (terminating alimony obligations upon death of either
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In Potts v. Tutterow,7 the original divorce decree ordered plaintiff
husband to pay to defendant wife, inter alia, "lump sum alimony of
$54,240, payable in semi-monthly installments of $452, beginning
August 15, 1991, and continuing until the sum of $54,240 is paid."'
The husband complied with the order until August 1992, when his
former wife remarried.' She filed a motion to hold him in contempt
for failure to follow the order, but the district court found that the
plaintiff's obligations for "periodic payments of alimony ... were
terminated by the remarriage of Defendant."'10 In an opinion by
Judge Wynn, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that "the supporting spouse's obligation to pay any alimony is
terminated by the dependent spouse's remarriage," regardless of
whether the obligation was for lump sum or periodic alimony."
Judge Greene dissented on the grounds that a dependent spouse's
right to payment of lump sum alimony vests when the order is entered
and, having vested, cannot be modified. 2
Because the North Carolina Court of Appeals decision in Potts
concerned the interpretation of the trial court's original order of
alimony,3 this Note first discusses that order and the district court's
subsequent construction of its terms.'4 After a brief summary of the
court of appeals opinion in Potts,5 the Note examines previous
North Carolina law concerning alimony and its termination, and the
alternative laws of other states.'6 The Note then compares the court
of appeals opinion in Potts to the established law,'7 and concludes
that the decision unnecessarily changes previous North Carolina law
and removes a valuable tool for negotiating fair divorce set-
tlements.18
spouse or remarriage of spouse receiving payments); Raley v. Wilber, 594 P.2d 1032, 1033
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (applying § 25-327(B) to lump sum alimony award); Gates v. Cates,
819 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Mo. 1991) (holding that alimony recipient's remarriage raises
presumption that payor's obligation is thereby terminated).
7. 114 N.C. App. 360, 442 S.E.2d 90 (1994).
8. Record at 21, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
9. Id at 24.
10. Id. at 25.
11. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93.
12. Id. at 367, 442 S.E.2d at 94 (Greene, J., dissenting).
13. See Brief for Appellee at 11-13, Potts (No. 9322DC196); Defendant-Appellant's
Brief at 6-8, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
14. See infra notes 19-41 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 59-98 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 99-149 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
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Kenneth Potts and Susan Tutterow married in 1979.19 They had
two children, both of whom were minors, when the husband filed for
divorce in 1988.0o Potts was a pilot for a commercial airline and was
earning over $127,000 per year; Tutterow had been out of the work
force for several years, but had a college education and some retail
experience.2' The parties arrived at a partial settlement with respect
to custody and temporary child support, which the trial court
incorporated into a consent order.' They left the issue of alimony
for resolution by the court.'
The trial court based its alimony order on the parties' stipulations
and on detailed findings of fact gathered from five days of evidence
presentation. 4 The parties stipulated that there were "no assets
from which any equitable distribution claim [could] be funded" and
that the court should take the absence of property division into
account in setting alimony.z Because marital property division was
impossible26 and the wife could earn a minimal initial salary,27 the
trial court found that "Defendant is not entitled to permanent
alimony, but is entitled to rehabilitative alimony in the amount of
$54,240 and an award of the marital residence."'
The trial court's statement of the defendant's right to
rehabilitative alimony was contained in its findings of fact.29 In its
conclusions of law, the court used slightly different language, stating
that the "Defendant is entitled to an order awarding her alimony in
a fixed amount."3 Based on that conclusion, the court declared that
the "Plaintiff shall pay... lump-sum alimony of $54,240, payable in
semi-monthly installments of $452, beginning August 15, 1991 and
19. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 361, 442 S.E.2d at 91.
20. Record at 16, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
21. Id. at 20.
22. See id. at 16-18.
23. Id. at 19.
24. IM.
25. IM. The parties also stipulated that the defendant was entitled to alimony. Id at
19-20. Without this stipulation, North Carolina law requires the trial court to find a
statutory fault basis to award alimony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987) (stating 10
fault grounds for alimony).
26. Although the parties owned joint assets, such as the marital residence, the court
found that extensive debt reduced the value of their joint property to zero. Record at 20,
Potts (No. 9322DC196).
27. The court found that she could earn "at least the sum of twelve thousand dollars
per year." Id.
28. Id (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 19-21.
30. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
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continuing until the sum of $54,240 is paid. This sum, together with
the equity in the house and lot shall be the only and entire alimony
obligation of Plaintiff."'
Approximately eleven months after the award, the wife remar-
ried.32  Her ex-husband stopped payment of further alimony
installments, and she filed a motion to hold him in contempt of court
for failure to obey the court's ruling.33 The same district court judge
who had entered the original alimony order also heard the contempt
motion.34 Based on the record of the previous order, with no further
evidence presented, the court stated in its findings of fact that the
"Defendant was entitled to alimony in gross by transfer of the marital
residence and relabilitative [sic] alimony in the amount of $54,240....
The rehabilitative alimony was ordered to be paid in periodic
payments."35  The court then concluded that the "Plaintiffs
obligations to pay the periodic payments of alimony ... were
terminated by the remarriage of Defendant.
36
The ambiguity of the original order is evident from the trial
court's use of so many different descriptions of -the award. The
original order characterized the award as "rehabilitative alimony,"
"alimony in a fixed amount," and "lump-sum alimony."37  The
subsequent order, clarifying the first, granted the wife "alimony in
gross," "rehabilitative alimony," and "periodic payments of
alimony., 38  Since the award of alimony in gross referred to the
transfer of the marital residence,39 and North Carolina does not
recognize rehabilitative alimony,4 the court likely based its
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 24.
33. Id. at 22.
34. See U4. at 21, 25.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id. In keeping with the confusing nature of its previous statements, the court
ordered that "the Motion by Defendant to enforce further periodic payments of aimony
[sic] by Plaintiff be [sic] and the dame [sic] is hereby DISMISSED." Id.
37. Id. at 20-21; see also supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
38. Record at 25, Potts (No. 9322DC196); see also supra notes 35-36 and accompanying
text.
39. Record at 25, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
40. Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722, 730, 436 S.E.2d 856, 861 (1993). Even in the
jurisdictions that do recognize it, rehabilitative alimony generally does not automatically
terminate upon remarriage of the recipient spouse. In most rehabilitative alimony
jurisdictions, such alimony terminates when the rehabilitative purpose of the alimony has
been accomplished and the support is no longer necessary. Remarriage might, in fact,
make the need for further payments unnecessary, but courts generally require evidence to
that effect rather than summarily terminating the payments. See infra note 52.
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conclusion on the theory that the original award was one of periodic
alimony, which terminates as a matter of law when the dependent
spouse remarries. 41
The defendant appealed the case, arguing that the terms of the
original order did not support the district court's denial of her
motion.' In her brief the defendant argued that the trial court's
construction of the previous order presented a question of law that
the appellate court must answer by considering the record as a
whole 3 f That record, she contended, showed that the trial court
intended the award to be lump sum alimonyM f The defendant also
argued that the lump sum award vested when ordered, that this
construction benefited both parties, and that the appellate court
should uphold her vested interest as a matter of policy.45
The plaintiff responded that "[t]he trial court's findings of fact
are conclusive if they are supported by competent evidence, even
though there may be evidence to the contrary in the record. 46 The
plaintiff also stressed that the same judge who had entered the
original decree also entered the subsequent contempt ruling
interpreting the order,47 so the judge's interpretation of the order as
requiring rehabilitative alimony "did not amount to one judge
substituting his judgment for that of another judge of the same
court."'  The plaintiff then argued that "[i]t would be incongruous,
given the Court's consideration of rehabilitative alimony, to enable
the Defendant to continue to collect such payments subsequent to her
remarriage. Upon her remarriage, the Defendant was no longer in
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (1987). This was the "likely" theory because the
court did not find that the plaintiff's obligation had been to pay "periodic alimony," but
rather "periodic payments of alimony." Record at 25, Potts (No. 9322DC196). This
statement logically includes installments of a lump sum award. However, the court's
language is consistent with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(a) (1987), which states that
"[a]lmony... shall be paid by lump sum payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of
title or possession of personal property." IM
42. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
43. Id. at 6-7.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id. at 7-9. The defendant asserted that the lump sum award benefited the plaintiff
because: (1) it limited the award to a relatively small amount, at least compared to the
potentially ongoing obligation of a permanent award, and (2) it allowed him to spread
payments over four years. Id. at 8-9. The reciprocal advantage to defendant was that the
award was fixed in amount and not dependent on future events. IM at 9.
46. Brief for Appellee at 10, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
47. Id. at 12.
48. Id.
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need of rehabilitative alimony."4 9 The plaintiff cited no support for
these assertions,'0 and they are misleading in two respects. First, the
plaintiff assumed the validity of the rehabilitative theory, which North
Carolina courts do not accept.5 ' Second, to continue payments even
after the dependent spouse has remarried would be entirely consistent
with the rehabilitative alimony theory developed by other jurisdic-
tions5 2
The North Carolina Court of Appeals avoided the issue of
rehabilitative theory altogether by never identifying the award as one
of rehabilitative alimony. Instead, the court stated the issue as
"whether a lump sum alimony award payable in semi-monthly
installments survives [D]efendant's remarriage."53 By framing the
issue in this way, the majority had to answer two related questions:
first, whether the total amount of the lump sum vested when
awarded;-4 and second, whether North Carolina General Statute
49. Id. at 13.
50. See id.
51. See infra note 71. The rehabilitative theory of alimony generally requires that
support be awarded only for a specific purpose: to enable the dependent spouse, often
through education or training, to become financially self-supporting. See, eg., Richmond
v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211,1215 (Alaska 1989) ("Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded
for a specific purpose and a short duration even with an adequate property division ...
but is limited to job training or other means directly related to entry or advancement
within the work force.") (citations omitted); Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1280 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) ("Rehabilitative alimony may be defined as alimony payable for
a short, but specific and terminable period of time, which will cease when the recipient is,
in the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a position of self-support."). For a general
discussion of the social policy reasons for providing the option of rehabilitative alimony,
see Richter v. Richter, 344 So. 2d 889, 890 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (Dauksch, J.,
concurring specially).
52. See, eg., Musgrove v. Musgrove, 821 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Alaska 1991)
("Rehabilitative alimony is modifiable only when there is a material and substantial change
in circumstances related to its purpose. ... '[-]owever, achievement or cessation of
rehabilitative efforts cannot be presumed by the fact of remarriage.' " (quoting Marcia
O'Kelly, Entitlements to Spousal Support After Divorce, 61 N.D. L. REV. 225, 259-60
(1985)); Vaccato v. Pustizzi, 648 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (en banc)
(following the rule of Florida's other four district courts of appeals that "[rlemarriage
alone should not be determinative of whether rehabilitative alimony should terminate");
Bentzoni v. Bentzoni, 442 So. 2d 235, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("[B]ecause
rehabilitative alimony is paid for a specific purpose not necessarily related to the recipient
spouse's support or remarriage, such an award should not necessarily terminate upon such
remarriage."); Gerlach v. Gerlach, 1988 WL 102744, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1988)
(interpreting alimony statute to hold that rehabilitative alimony does not necessarily
terminate upon remarriage). But see Smith v. Smith, 540 A.2d 1348, 1350 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1988) (holding that New Jersey statute "requires the termination of rehabilitative
alimony upon the remarriage of the recipient spouse").
53. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92.
54. Id.
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section 50-16.9(b) terminated any continuing obligation.55 The court
found that the lump sum amount did not vest when awarded.56 The
defendant was not entitled to the full lump sum, but only the
individual installments as they became due. 7 The court also held
that section 50-16.9(b), which does not distinguish between periodic
and lump sum alimony, applies to both types and thus terminates any
continuing entitlement to alimony upon remarriage of the dependent
spouse.55
The North Carolina statutes are somewhat ambiguous in their
treatment of different types of alimony. "Alimony" is defined as
"payment for the support and maintenance of a spouse, either in lump
sum or on a continuing basis."59 It is to be paid "by lump sum
payment, periodic payments, or by transfer of title or possession of
personal property or any interest therein ... as the court may
order."' These sections clearly establish the power of a trial court
to order alimony payments in lump sum, but nowhere in the statutes
is the term "lump sum" specifically defined. The legislature ap-
parently left the interpretation of the term to common understanding,
supplemented by usage in the case law. While a strictly literal
interpretation of the statutes might restrict "lump sum" to instances
of a single payment,' cases both in North Carolina and elsewhere
have applied the term to installment payments of a fixed amount over
a period of time.62
In contrast to the explicit enumeration of different methods of
alimony payment in section 50-16.7(a), the statute dealing with
modification of alimony orders makes no distinctions. It provides that
"[ilf a dependent spouse who is receiving alimony under a judgment
55. 1d at 364-65, 442 S.E2d at 93; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b) (1987).
56. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92-93.
57. i,
58. Id, at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93. Under North Carolina law, "[ilf a dependent spouse
who is receiving alimony under a judgment or order of a court of this State shall remarry,
said alimony shall terminate." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(1).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7(a).
61. Supporting this interpretation is the fact that § 50-16.7(a) refers to "lump sum
payment" in the singular, as opposed to the plural "periodic payments." In addition, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(3) (1987), discussing distributive awards of property, contrasts two
methods of payment: "either in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed amounts."
Id.
62. See, eg., Grundy v. Grundy, 605 P.2d 162, 163-64 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); McKee
v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 766 (Miss. 1982); Kishner v. Kishner, 562 P.2d 493, 495 (Nev.
1977); Whitesell v. Whitesell, 59 N.C. App. 552,553,297 S.E.2d 172, 173 (1982), disc. rev.
denied, 307 N.C. 583, 299 S.E2d 653 (1983).
2438 [Vol. 73
1995] TERMINATION OF LUMP SUM ALIMONY
or order of a court of this State shall remarry, said alimony shall
terminate."'  The key question addressed by the court of appeals
opinion in Potts was whether the state legislature intended that
section to apply to all types of alimony.'
The general purpose of alimony is to provide support for a
dependent spouse.6' Awards of alimony in North Carolina are
"permanent," rather than "rehabilitative."'  In an award of per-
manent alimony, the payments continue indefinitely until either a
statutorily prescribed event occurs (such as remarriage of the
dependent spouse67), or the court modifies the award under a
showing of changed circumstances.' In the states that recognize it,
rehabilitative alimony is awarded for a limited period of time with the
* intent that the dependent spouse will use the money to increase his
earning potential and become self-supporting.69 Rehabilitative
alimony, preferred in many jurisdictions to permanent alimony,70 is
not recognized in North Carolina.7'
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b). Subsections (a) and (c) of that section also use the
term "alimony" without further specification. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(a), (c).
64. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364-65, 442 S.E.2d at 93. Prior to Potts, North
Carolina courts had not addressed specifically the application of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.9(b) to lump sum alimony. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
65. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(1), (3); Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174,
182-85,261 S.E.2d 849, 855-57 (1980); Taylor v. Taylor, 46 N.C. App. 438, 444,265 S.E.2d
626, 630 (1980).
66. Williams, 299 N.C. at 179,261 S.E.2d at 853 ("While the word 'permanent' is not
included, the [statutory] definition obviously contemplates what is commonly referred to
as 'permanent alimony.' "). See also infra note 71.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9(b). See generally C.S. Parnell, Amnotation, Alimony as
Affected by Wife's Remarriage, in Absence of Controlling Specific Statute, 48 A.L.R.2d 270,
278 (1956) (discussing possible termination of alimony by remarriage in various circumstan-
ces, including when alimony is awarded in lump sum).
68. See CLARK, supra note 2, § 17.6.
69. David H. Relsey & Patrick P. Fry, The Relationship Between Permanent and
Rehabilitative Alimony, 4 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1, 1 (1988); Lash v. Lash, 307
So. 2d 241, 242-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
70. See Relsey & Fry, supra note 69, at 1 (citing studies showing that awards of
permanent alimony are declining and are being replaced by awards of rehabilitative
alimony).
71. Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. App. 722, 730, 436 S.E.2d 856, 861 (1993) (stating that
"North Carolina law does not embrace the concept of 'rehabilitative alimony' "); cf.
Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174,188-89,261 S.E.2d 849,859 (1980) (declining to follow
jurisdictions that have based alimony awards on a rehabilitative doctrine). Although
rehabilitative alimony is not accepted by the North Carolina Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals, it still is sometimes awarded in North Carolina district courts. See, e.g., Potts, 114
N.C. App. at 362, 442 S.E.2d at 91; Edwards v. Edwards, 102 N.C. App. 706, 708, 403
S.E.2d 530, 531, disc rev. denied, 329 N.C. 787, 408 S.E2d 518 (1991).
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Because North Carolina courts may not officially use
rehabilitative alimony to limit awards to a specified period of time,
other methods are available to accomplish the same result. One such
method is weighing the property division in favor of the dependent
spouse. While a court may not explicitly use property division to
accomplish the goals of rehabilitative alimony, consideration of
statutory factors gives the court substantial leeway in compensating a
dependent spouse.72 It is not always possible or desirable, however,
to use this type of property division. Frequently the marital assets are
insufficient to cover the rehabilitation expenses of the dependent
spouse.73 In addition, under current IRS regulations, transferring
assets in the form of property division rather than alimony results in
undesirable tax consequences for both spouses.74 Both parties would
72. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1987) (listing 12 factors for the court to consider
in deciding what division of property is equitable, the last factor being "[a]ny other factor
which the court finds to be just and proper").
73. A partial solution to this problem in the context of property division is the
distributive award, whereby payments may be "either in a lump sum or over a period of
time in fixed amounts." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(3).
74. Upon divorce, property or wealth transfers fitting the IRS definition of "alimony"
are deducted by the payor and included by the recipient. See I.R.C. § 1041 (CCH 1993).
The tax code effectively shifts the amount of the alimony payments from the payor's
income to the recipient's income. If the payor is in a higher tax bracket than the recipient,
as is common in alimony situations, then this shift means that the money is taxed at the
recipient's lower rate. There is a loss for the IRS, but a gain for the parties. For example,
if the payor's marginal tax rate is 30%, the recipient's is 15%, and the amount of the
payment is $500, then the payor's after-tax loss upon payment is $350 while the recipient's
after-tax gain is $425.
On the other hand, payments classified as "property division" are transferred without
tax consequences: The payor does not deduct the amount, and the recipient does not
include it. See id. Thus, under the circumstances of the previous example, a $500 property
division payment results in a $500 loss to the payor and a $500 gain for the recipient.
If the parties are in significantly different tax brackets, as in the example above, it
clearly benefits both parties if they can classify any divorce-related transfers as "alimony"
rather than "property divisions." Rather than pay a $500 property division, the payor
would rather pay $650 in alimony (resulting in an after-tax loss of $405). The recipient,
too, would benefit from this arrangement, receiving $552.50 after taxes. There is ample
reason, then, for the parties to agree to structure the payments to fit the IRS definitions.
If the parties cannot reach such an agreement and must turn to the court to resolve
the matter, the court also might want to minimize the burden on the payor and maximize
the benefit to the recipient. One easy way to do this is to structure the payments as
alimony. If the circumstances do not merit an award of permanent alimony, but allow for
some wealth transfer (either in the context of property distribution or rehabilitative
payments), the court would likely use lump sum alimony to accomplish all of its desired
goals.
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benefit if the court could structure payments to fit the IRS definition
of alimony.
In addition to property division, North Carolina courts have used
statutory lump sum alimony to create a specific, finite alimony
obligation.76 Lump sum alimony payable in installments has all the
advantages of rehabilitative alimony and is provided for in North
Carolina statutes.7 7 It allows the court to limit the award to a
definite amount, it provides a tax savings for the parties, and courts
may use it even when there are no significant marital assets to be
divided. Courts, therefore, are likely to award lump sum alimony
even in cases that do not closely fit the requirements of lump sum
alimony theory.
As many courts and commentators have noted, the line between
alimony and property division is often blurred' Parties frequently
negotiate separation agreements as a package, with reciprocal
tradeoffs between provisions of support and property division. Such
an agreement is said to be integrated.79 The distinction between
integrated and nonintegrated agreements is important because
"[c]ourt-ordered support payments which are part of an integrated
agreement are not subject to modification by the trial court nor do
they terminate as a matter of law upon remarriage of the dependent
spouse."' On the other hand, a court may modify alimony orders
contained in nonintegrated agreements, absent any other restric-
tions.81
75. See supra note 74. Of course, if the parties are able to agree on the amount of
payments then they may structure specific and limited payments as alimony, so as to take
advantage of the tax rules. This problem arises when the parties cannot agree and the
court must order statutory forms of property division, alimony, or both.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the implications of the tax code
in divorce cases and the court has approved of trial court consideration of tax consequen-
ces as a "factor" in deciding awards of alimony. Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 133, 271
S.E.2d 58, 66 (1980).
76. See, e.g., Whitesell v. Whitesell, 59 N.C. App. 552,553,297 S.E.2d 172, 173 (1982),
disc rev. denied, 307 N.C. 583, 299 S.E.2d 653 (1983).
77. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
78. CLARK, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 180-83; see; e.g., White v. White, 296 N.C. 661,
666, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979); Hayes v. Hayes, 100 N.C. App. 138, 146, 394 S.E.2d 675,
679 (1990).
79. Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447,454-55,342 S.E.2d 859,864 (1986); White, 296 N.C.
at 671, 252 S.E.2d at 704; Hayes, 100 N.C. App. at 146, 394 S.E.2d at 679.
80. Hayes, 100 N.C. App. at 146,394 S.E.2d at 679 (citing Marks, 316 N.C. at 455,342
S.E.2d at 864).
81. White, 296 N.C. at 671-72, 252 S.E.2d at 704.
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In an award of permanent alimony, there is no predetermined
total amount to be paid; instead, the payor must make individual
payments (usually monthly or semi-monthly) of a certain amount for
an indefinite period of time.' In Lambeth v. Lambeth,' the North
Carolina Supreme Court addressed whether the superior court had
the power to secure a wife's right to permanent alimony through the
attachment of her husband's property' 4 The court held that a wife's
right to alimony made her a creditor of her husband, and that the
court thus had the authority to ensure her rights, if necessary, through
the attachment and sale of the debtor's property'5 The Lambeth
court also found that "the decree operates to cause an indebtedness
to arise in [the recipient's] favor as each installment of alimony falls
due.,8 6 Because the obligation of each payment arises individually,
so does the corresponding right to the payment. In a case of per-
manent alimony, therefore, there is no right to future payments until
they each separately become due.'
The North Carolina Court of Appeals restated this doctrine in
Faught v. Faught.9 The Faught court wrote that "execution would
only be available ... for past due installments of alimony; with
respect to the payment of alimony in futuro, no indebtedness would
arise upon which execution could issue until each installment became
due."9 The alimony payments in futuro mentioned by the Faught
court were future periodic payments of permanent alimony.9
Lambeth, cited by the Faught court as the basis for its assertion,'
also involved permanent alimony.9'
82. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 179, 261 S.E.2d 849, 853 (1980).
83. 249 N.C. 315, 106 S.E.2d 491 (1959).
84. Id. at 319, 106 S.E.2d at 493.
85. Id. at 321, 106 S.E.2d at 495.
86. Id. at 320, 106 S.E.2d at 494.
87. Id.
88. Faught v. Faught, 50 N.C. App. 635, 639, 274 S.E.2d 883, 886-87 (1981) (citing
Lambeth, 249 N.C. at 320-21, 106 S.E.2d at 494). The Lambeth court, finding that the
husband's debt obligation extended no further than each payment individually, nonetheless
held that the court could attach and sell his property to guarantee future payments.
Lambeth, 249 N.C. at 321, 106 S.E2d at 495. In that practical sense, then, the court
recognized the wife's "inchoate" right to future payments, her legal right to which had not
yet arisen. Id at 321,106 S.E.2d at 495 (citing Walton v. Walton, 178 N.C. 73,76, 100 S.E.
176, 178 (1919)).
89. 50 N.C. App. 635, 274 SE.2d 883 (1981).
90. Id. at 639, 274 S.E.2d at 886-87 (citing Lambeth, 249 N.C. at 320-21, 106 S.E.2d at
494; Barber v. Barber, 217 N.C. 422, 427, 8 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1940)).
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Lambeth, 249 N.C. at 317, 106 S.E.2d at 492.
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In McCall v. Harris,94 the trial court granted the wife a lump
sum alimony award of $20,000 without divorce.9 Before she had
received the full amount of the award, the wife fied for absolute
divorce.96 Her husband argued that the divorce action terminated her
right to receive any unpaid amounts,97 but the court of appeals found
that "the alimony award here had accrued upon judgment and was
unaffected by the subsequent divorce decree.""8
The court of appeals opinion in Potts, written by Judge Wynn,
first quoted portions of the alimony order and the trial court's
subsequent interpretation of that order.99  After deciding a
procedural question,"° Judge Wynn began with a brief analysis of the
statutory basis for alimony awards.'0' He then distinguished McCall
v. Harris,"° cited by the defendant for the proposition that lump
sum awards accrue when granted,"m on the grounds that McCall
dealt with the effect of a subsequent divorce decree on lump sum
alimony, whereas Potts addressed the effect of a subsequent remar-
riage °4
94. 55 N.C. App. 390, 285 S.E.2d 335, disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 301,.290 S.E2d'703
(1982).
95. Id. at 390, 285 S.E.2d at 335-36.
96. Id. at 391, 285 S.E.2d at 336.
97. Before North Carolina accepted the doctrine of permanent alimony in 1967,
obtaining a divorce "terminated all rights of the dependent spouse to receive alimony
arising out of the marriage" unless alimony already had accrued. Id.
98. Id. at 392, 285 S.E.2d at 337.
99. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 361, 442 S.E.2d at 91.
100. The plaintiff had requested that the court dismiss the defendant's appeal for failure
to give notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of judgment, as required by N.C. R. APP.
P. 3(c). Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 362, 442 S.E.2d at 91. This issue arose because the trial
court announced its decision on October 13, 1992, but did not file the written order until
November 13, 1992, and the defendant filed her notice of appeal on December 11, 1992.
Id. The court of appeals held that entry of judgment occurred upon filing, so the
defendant's appeal was timely. Id.
101. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 363, 442 S.E.2d at 91-92.
102. 55 N.C. App. 390, 285 S.E.2d 335, disc rev. denied, 305 N.C. 301, 290 S.E.2d 703
(1982).
103. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 363, 442 S.E.2d at 92; Defendant-Appellant's Brief at
9-10, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
104. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364,442 S.E.2d at 92. Judge Wynn did not explicitly state
that the McCall rule-that lump sum alimony accrues upon judgment, McCall, 55 N.C.
App. at 392, 285 S.E.2d at 337; see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text-should not
apply in the case of subsequent remarriage, but that was his implication. Potts, 114 N.C.
App. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92. Ironically, Judge Wynn cited McCall a few sentences later
for the proposition that "a lump sum alimony award that has vested prior to the dependent
spouse's remarriage survives the remarriage." Id. at 364,442 S.E.2d at 92 (citing McCall,
55 N.C. App. at 392, 285 S.E.2d at 337) (emphasis added).
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Judge Wynn next restated the issue of the case as whether "the
lump sum award in the subject case vest[ed] prior to the defendant's
remarriage."'" To resolve the issue, the court relied on
Faught's0 6 holding that a party can obtain execution only on
presently due payments of alimony, not on future paymentsW
From this precedent, the Potts court reasoned that the defendant
could have executed on each installment of the lump sum only as it
became due; she could not have sued immediately after the date of
the award to recover the full amount." The court therefore
reached the conclusion-crucial to the holding in Potts-that the full
lump sum did not vest when awarded. 9
Faught, however, involved periodic payments of permanent
alimony."0 Because the future payments in Potts were installments
of a lump sum, not periodic payments of permanent alimony, the case
appears distinguishable from both Faught and Lambeth. It is well
settled that periodic payments of permanent alimony do not vest until
each individual payment becomes due,' but it does not necessarily
follow that the same rule applies to lump sum installments. To apply
the rule of periodic alimony to lump sum alimony without explanation
seems to ignore completely the distinction between the two types of
awards. The Potts court did not address this distinction in the context
of Faught, but did so in its subsequent discussion of the relevant
North Carolina statute."'
Perhaps with the understanding that the distinction between lump
sum and periodic payments undermined its previous argument
regarding execution, the court attacked the validity of that distinction:
Whether the alimony award is in the form of a "lump sum"
or "periodic payments" is irrelevant since N.C. Gen. Stat.
105. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92.
106. 50 N.C. App. 635, 274 S.E2d 883 (1981).
107. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92-93 (citing Faught, 50 N.C. App.
at 635, 274 S.E.2d at 886-87 (1981)).
108. See i
109. Id
110. Faught, 50 N.C. App. at 635, 274 S.E.2d at 884. In addition to a large award of
permanent alimony, the trial court in Faught awarded a small amount of lump sum
alimony. Id. at 636, 274 S.E.2d at 885. However, the issue raised on appeal-and the
discussion cited by the Potts court-related to a court-ordered bond required to secure the
plaintiff's interest in the total award, consisting primarily of permanent alimony. Id. at 638,
274 S.E.2d at 885-86.
111. See, eg., Lambeth v. Lambeth, 249 N.C. 315, 320, 106 S.E.2d 491, 494 (1959);
Faught, 50 N.C. App. at 639, 274 S.E.2d at 886-87.
112. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364-65,442 S.E.2d at 93 (addressing N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-16.9(b) (1987)).
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§ 50-16.9(b) clearly provides that the supporting spouse's
obligation to pay any alimony is terminated by the depen-
dent spouse's remarriage and the statute does not distinguish
between the method[s] of payment.'
This "plain language" argument strongly supports the majority's
position. It is clear that the statute does not distinguish between
permanent and lump sum alimony awards. The remaining question
is whether the North Carolina legislature, by declining to distinguish
between types of alimony, intended to bring all forms of alimony
under the language of the statute.
Even accepting arguendo the court's declaration that section 50-
16.9(b) terminates all alimony obligation upon remarriage, the issue
of previously vested alimony remains. If the defendant's right to
receive the full $54,420 vested at the time of judgment, as defendant
argued, then section 50-16.9(b) would not erase plaintiff's pre-existing
debt, but would only prevent new debt from accruing."4 Section 50-
16.9(b) does not distinguish between lump sum and periodic alimony
for purposes of terminating awards, but this does not necessarily mean
that the distinction is invalid in all other contexts. In fact, since
section 50-16.1 does explicitly distinguish between the two forms,"u
it seems clear that the legislature intended the distinction to have
meaning in some contexts. Judge Wynn's statutory argument applies
to termination only, and does not specifically prove that lump sum
and periodic awards are indistinguishable in the manner in which they
vest.
Once again, the court faced the issue of when the defendant's
right to the award vested."6 While the court's previous treatment
of this issue relied on the defendant's ability to execute on the
debt,"7 the court here focused on the relationship between alimony
and property division."' The court noted that the two are " 'im-
113. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364-65, 442 S.E.2d at 93. The actual language of § 50-
16.9(b) is: "If a dependent spouse who is receiving alimony under a judgment or order
of a court of this State shall remarry, said alimony shall terminate." N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50-16.9(b).
114. The Potts court itself stated this corollary just after first mentioning § 50-16.9(b):
"The supporting spouse is relieved of the obligation to pay any alimony which accrued
subsequent to the dependent spouse's remarriage.... Any alimony payments which have
accrued and are unpaid at the time of the remarriage can still be recovered from the
former supporting spouse." Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92.
115. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
116. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93.
117. See id- at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92-93; supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
118. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93.
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possible to distinguish ... where [property division] is to be ac-
complished by cash payments.' "" North Carolina cases have long
recognized this difficulty and thus have established the rule that
"support payments which constitute reciprocal consideration for a
property settlement are not alimony in the true sense of the word and
are not subject to modification. i'2(
These precedents mandate the conclusion that if an award is part
of a property settlement then it is not alimony and vests when it is
awarded." The Potts court found that there was "no indication of
any such reciprocal consideration" and concluded that the award did
not vest as a property settlement upon judgment.'22 The court
suggested that the award could have vested even though it was not a
property settlement,123 but, without stating reasons," 4 the court
denied that this had occurred125
From the language of the trial court's order, it seems likely that
the trial court was using the lump sum alimony award to carry out the
purposes of rehabilitation and property division, as well as the
traditional support of the dependent spouse." The trial court
clearly did not intend the award to be a traditional one of permanent
periodic alimony.Y However, most awards of lump sum alimony
are paid in a few large installments. Because the Potts award was for
119. Id. (quoting CLARK, supra note 2, § 17.5, at 270).
120. Id. (citing Marks v. Marks, 316 N.C. 447, 454-55, 342 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1986);
Rogers v. Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 606,611,432 S.E.2d 907, 909-10 (1993); Hayes v. Hayes,
100 N.C. App. 138,146,394 S.E.2d 675,679 (1990)); see also supra notes 72-81 and accom-
panying text (discussing property division and reciprocal consideration).
121. The Potts court actually reached the contrary conclusion: "[If a lump sum award
has vested, then the award is not alimony but rather a property settlement." Potts, 114
N.C. App. at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93 (citing CLARK, supra note 2, § 17.5, at 270). Since the
issue in Potts was whether the award had vested-not whether it was a property
settlement-the court's statement of the rule would be of little help, because it assumes
as a premise the very fact the court is trying to decide. The opinion's subsequent
reasoning, however, shows that the court used the correctly stated version of the argument.
See iL
122. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93.
123. The court stated: "There is... no indication of any such reciprocal consideration
in the instant case. Therefore, the alimony award, unless it has vested, terminates upon the
dependent spouse's remarriage." Id& (emphasis added).
124. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
125. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93.
126. Cf. supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing ways to structure alimony
awards to meet the needs of the parties).
127. The trial court specifically stated that "Defendant is not entitled to permanent
alimony." Record at 20, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
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relatively small installments paid regularly over a five-year period,"2
it had the "feel" of periodic, rather than lump sum, alimony. An
order of this type appears to be an obvious effort by the trial court to
award a definite, limited-duration award (like rehabilitative alimony)
within the confines of the North Carolina alimony statutes.
Without discussing or referring to any facts in the record, the
court of appeals stated that there was no reciprocal consideration for
any property settlement. 29 Both parties raised the issue in their
respective briefs,' ° and the trial court also mentioned the issue."
There were insufficient marital assets at divorce from which to effect
an equitable distribution, 2 and the trial court explicitly accounted
for this when setting the amount and type of alimony to be
awarded.' Although its reasoning cannot be ascertained, the trial
court probably used the lump sum award to carry out the purposes of
a property settlement.M For example, if the husband's separate
debts had depleted the marital estate, thereby negating the possibility
of equitable distribution, then the trial court might have wanted to
compensate the wife through the only means available-nominal lump
sum alimony. Furthermore, as the defendant argued in her brief,
because the plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy, the judge might have
called the award alimony to protect the defendant's interest in that
debt."s
If one focuses only on the language of the original trial court
order, then the defendant's argument is strong. The argument loses
force, however, when the judge's later interpretation of his own
128. Semi-monthly payments of $452 would yield $904 per month, $10,848 per year, and
the full $54,240 over five years. The trial court did not make any additional provisions for
interest on the award. See Record at 21, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
129. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 365, 442 S.E.2d at 93.
130. Brief for Appellee at 13, Potts (No. 9322DC196); Defendant-Appellant's Brief at
10-11, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
131. Record at 19-20, Potts (No. 9322DC196); see also supra notes 25-28 and
accompanying text.
132. Record at 19-20, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
133. id
134. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 10-11, Potts (No. 9322DC196). See generally
CLARK, supra note 2, § 16.1, at 180-83 (stating that the purpose or function of an award
is "[o]ne possible basis for making the [often difficult] distinction between property and
alimony").
135. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 10-11, Potts (No. 9322DC196); see 11 U.S.C.A. §
523(a)(5) (West 1993) (stating that a bankrupt debtor is still responsible for any debts
associated with alimony, child support, separation agreements, or divorce decrees); Long
v. Long, 102 N.C. App. 18, 24-26, 401 S.E2d 401, 404-05 (1991) (explaining that, unlike
obligations arising from equitable property distribution, alimony debts are not dischar-
geable in bankruptcy).
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previous order concludes that the order "did not constitute a property
settlement; [was] not ambiguous, and.., clearly provide[d] for
periodic payments of alimony. 1
6
The final paragraph of Judge Wynn's majority opinion criticized
an analogy to pensions made by Judge Greene in his dissenting
opinion.' Judge Greene used the analogy to counter the majority's
reliance on Faught, which the majority cited for the proposition that
if execution is not available for a debt, then it has not vested."3 8 A
pension, according to Judge Greene, is an example of a right that
clearly has vested even though the payment may not be receivable
(and thus execution may not be available) until a later date.139
Judge Greene concluded from this example that "it is immaterial that
immediate execution is not an available remedy with regard to the
payments due in the future because vesting is an issue separate from
execution."' 4
Apart from the analogy to pensions, the dissent's primary
argument rested on the precedent, set by McCall v. Harris4' that
" '[a] lump sum award of alimony "accrues" when it is granted.' 33142
As the majority points out in distinguishing that case, however,
McCall involved a subsequent divorce, not a subsequent remar-
riage.'43 The dissent did not address the effect of that difference on
the precedential value of the case.1" Assuming the relevancy of
McCall, Judge Greene wrote that "[t]he only issue in this case is
whether the award the trial judge made is in the nature of a 'lump
sum payment' or 'periodic payments.' ,, 4 He then cited the trial
court order, which refers to the award as "lump sum," and several
cases which establish that "the fact that the award is payable in
'installments' over a period of time does not alter its character."'
46
136. Record at 25, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
137. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 365-66, 442 S.E.2d at 93; see id. at 367, 442 S.E.2d at 94
(Greene, J., dissenting).
138. See iU. at 364, 442 S.E.2d at 92-93; supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
139. See Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 367, 442 S.E.2d at 94 (Greene, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. 55 N.C. App. 390, 285 S.E.2d 355, disc rev. denied, 305 N.C. 301,290 S.E.2d 703
(1982).
142. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 366, 442 S.E.2d at 93 (Greene, J., dissenting) (quoting
McCall, 55 N.C. App. at 392, 285 S.E.2d at 336); see CLARK, supra note 2, § 17.5, at 270.
143. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
144. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 366, 442 S.E.2d at 93-94 (Greene, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 366,442 S.E.2d at 94 (Greene, J., dissenting) (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 270
N.C. 253, 257,154 S.E.2d 71,74 (1967); Whitesell v. Whitesell, 59 N.C. App. 552,552,297
S.E.2d 172, 173 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 583, 299 S.E.2d 653 (1983); Taylor v.
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Perhaps assuming that a trial court's interpretation of an order is a
question of law reviewable on appeal,'47 Judge Greene did not
address the trial court's later interpretation of the award as
periodic-rather than lump sum-alimony."4 Having found that the
trial court granted the defendant a definite lump sum alimony award,
Judge Greene concluded that the award vested upon judgment, was
not modifiable, and therefore would not terminate when the defen-
dant remarried.'49
One issue not mentioned by the court of appeals was the trial
court's initial characterization of the award as "rehabilitative
alimony."'5 Even though North Carolina does not recognize
rehabilitative theory,' North Carolina courts sometimes award this
type of alimony.' 2 Because the trial court's intended purpose is
important in determining an award's modifiability,' 3 the court of
appeals should have examined the termination of alimony in the
context of a rehabilitation theory. Had that been done, the court
might have followed the majority of jurisdictions that subscribe to the
rehabilitative theory by requiring proof of changed circumstances
instead of automatically terminating rehabilitative alimony upon
remarriage.'-
Moreover, the court's ruling in Potts, that lump sum alimony does
not vest when awarded, removes an important tool for negotiating
and ordering divorce settlements. North Carolina courts no longer
have the ability to order a fixed amount of "alimony" with the
assurance that it will be paid without regard to future events. They
still can use property division to accomplish a similar purpose, but will
be unable to take advantage of certain benefits of alimony."
Taylor, 46 N.C. App. 438, 443-44, 265 S.E.2d 626, 629-30 (1980)).
147. See Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 80, 345 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1986).
148. See Record at 25, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
149. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 367, 442 S.E.2d at 94 (Greene, J., dissenting).
150. Record at 20, 25, Potts (No. 9322DC196).
151. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
152. See, eg., Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 362,442 S.E.2d at 91; Edwards v. Edwards, 102
N.C. App. 706, 708, 403 S.E.2d 530, 531, disc rev. denied, 329 N.C. 789, 408 S.E.2d 518
(1991). Because divorcing parties often agree on alimony provisions and write their own
orders to be approved by the court, the mistaken terminology may be more an expression
of the parties' intentions rather than the court's basis for making the award.
153. See, eg., Reavis v. Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77,80-81,345 S.E.2d 460 at 462-63 (1986);
Allison v. Allison, 51 N.C. App. 622, 627, 277 S.E.2d 551, 555, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C.
543, 281 S.E2d 660 (1981).
154. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
155. As compared to property division, structuring an award as alimony has certain
benefits in the contexts of bankruptcy, see supra note 135, and income tax, see supra note
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Furthermore, the use of property division to accomplish these
purposes will add one more confusing and unnecessary layer to
divorce decrees.
The majority's construction of section 50-16.9(b) 156 and its
rejection of any argument based on reciprocal consideration 5 7 leave
open the possibility that the award vested upon judgment and was not
modifiable."u The majority's analysis ultimately relies on its
interpretation of Faught v. Faught'59 to show that the award did not
vest as a lump sum.16 As Judge Greene's dissent pointed out,
Faught involved periodic alimony, and thus can be easily distin-
guishable from Potts.161
The court should have followed Judge Greene's reasoning. There
was clear North Carolina precedent supporting a reversal of the trial
court,' 62 and the laws and theories of other jurisdictions would have
supported that result."6 Moreover, the court should have dealt with
the issue of rehabilitative alimony and its de facto existence in North
Carolina. While the court of appeals probably would not endorse
such a radical change as accepting the doctrine of rehabilitative
alimony, doing so would end the current North Carolina practice of
using fictional property settlements and extended "lump sum" awards
to effect a clearly rehabilitative purpose.
JOHN GORDON KELSO
74.
156. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 123-25 and accompanying text.
159. 50 N.C. App. 635, 274 S.E.2d 883 (1981).
160. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
161. Potts, 114 N.C. App. at 367, 442 S.E.2d at 94 (Greene, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 366,442 S.E.2d at 93-94 (Greene, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Whitesell
v. Whitesell, 59 N.C. App. 552, 297 S.E2d 172 (1982), disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 583, 299
S.E.2d 653 (1983); McCall v. Harris, 55 N.C. App. 390, 285 S.E.2d 335, disc. rev. denied,
305 N.C. 301, 290 S.E2d 703 (1982)).
163. See supra note 4 for a partial list of jurisdictions that do not automatically
terminate lump sum alimony upon the recipient spouse's remarriage.
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Why the Best Interests Standard Should Survive Petersen v.
Rogers
One can approach a contract case in a purely logical and
reasoned manner. After examining issues of offer, acceptance, and
consideration, the court determines whether the parties had a
"meeting of the minds," and usually distributes a monetary award or
the property at issue. The judge and jury then go home-without
losing much sleep.
Unfortunately, all disputes are not so simple. Some cases, such
as those concerning matters of child custody, are so filled with
emotion and pain that they cannot be resolved through logical
deduction. When adoptive and biological parents are mired in a
heated custody battle, one of the parties is bound to suffer the
deepest of losses. No matter what the court decides, some parent will
lose "their" child.
Because of the serious implications for the children involved in
these custody cases, many courts have recently begun to base their
decisions on the "best interests of the child."' This test considers the
child's bond with the adoptive or biological parents as well as the care
both parties would likely give to the child. Courts hope such a test
will ensure that the child's needs are met, regardless of whether the
biological or adoptive connection is severed. When faced with these
issues in Petersen v. Rogers,3 though, the North Carolina Supreme
Court sidestepped consideration of the child's needs, and instead
based its holding squarely on the rights of the biological parents to
their child.4 The court may have applied the simplest test available,
1. See, e.g., Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 467 A.2d 249, 251 (N.H. 1983); Patzer v.
Glaser, 368 N.W.2d 561, 564 (N.D. 1985). For a thorough discussion of which states apply
the best interests standard, see Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third
Parties: Whose Right to Child Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705,
721-26 (1986).
2. Kirsten Kom, Comment, The Struggle for the Child- Preserving the Family in
Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1279,
1319 (1994). Courts that apply the "best interests" test often give considerable weight to
the "psychological parent," usually defined as the adult whom the child may identify as her
"parent" because the adult provides for her care and interacts wi& her on a day-to-day
basis. Id.
3. 337 N.C. 397, 445 S.E2d 901 (1994).
4. Id. at 403-04, 445 S.E2d 905. The court specifically held that "absent a finding
that parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their children, the
constitutionally-protected paramount right of parents to custody... of their children must
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but in doing so it seemingly elevated the interests of biological parents
over those of the children at the center of these disputes.
After briefly reviewing the facts and holding of Petersen v.
Rogers,' this Note sketches the history of adoption proceedings and
parental rights generally in the United States6 and then provides a
more specific analysis of past and present custody law in North
Carolina.7  The Note then critiques the North Carolina Supreme
Court's approach in Petersen in light of its limited treatment of the
applicable federal and state case law.8 Finally, the Note suggests that
the Petersen test, though seemingly quite rigid, is really only a revived
assertion of common law parental rights presumptions, and does not
eliminate application of the best interests standard in North
Carolina.9
Soon after becoming pregnant in 1987, an unwed Pamela Rogers
became involved with a religious movement known as The Way
International (The Way).10 As Rogers became more involved with
her new religion, she also began to consider giving up her unborn
child for adoption." With help from members of The Way, Rogers
arranged for a couple in North Carolina who were also members of
The Way, the Petersens, to adopt her child.' The final release
forms were signed just after the baby's birth in September 1988."
Although most of the formalities of the adoption had been
completed, Rogers began to regret her decision almost im-
mediately.4 She made arrangements to come to North Carolina to
try to regain custody of her baby, but was dissuaded after speaking
with members of The Way.'" By November 1988, the Petersens had
prevail." Id.
5. See infra notes 10-37 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 38-78 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 79-117 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 118-57 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
10. In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329 N.C. 692, 695, 407 S.E.2d 505, 506 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Petersen v. Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 712,714,433 S.E.2d 770,772 (1993), rev'd, 337
N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
13. P.E.P., 329 N.C. at 696-97,407 S.E.2d at 507-08. With the help of an attorney who
was also a member of The Way, Rogers came to North Carolina for the last several
months of her pregnancy. id at 696, 407 S.E.2d at 507. Because of the prior arran-
gements, Rogers signed the release forms before she had a chance to speak with a hospital
caseworker about the adoption. Id. at 698, 407 S.E.2d at 508.
14. Id. at 698, 407 S.E.2d at 508.
15. Id. By this time, the child's father, William Rowe, who had not been notified of
the plan for adoption, had also begun to look for his child. Ld. When Rogers spoke with
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filed a petition in Orange County, North Carolina, to adopt the child,
and the court had granted an interlocutory decree for the adoption. 6
Rogers and the child's biological father, William Rowe, petitioned the
court in late December to vacate the interlocutory decree. 7 After
two years of litigation, the North Carolina Supreme Court finally
dismissed the Petersens' adoption petition in 1991.13
Following this dismissal, Rogers and Rowe filed their own
complaint in Orange County seeking custody of the child.19 Al-
though the Petersens sought to suppress all evidence about The Way
because they believed their religion was irrelevant to the custody
determination, the district court allowed extensive testimony about
the religion's structure and teachings. 2 At the close of the trial, the
judge ordered the immediate return of the child to Rogers and
Rowe.2' The Petersens then appealed this order because of allegedly
improper consideration of their religious beliefs during the custody
trial."2
The North Carolina Court of Appeals acknowledged that trial
judges have wide discretion in child custody proceedings, and that the
court can consider a child's spiritual welfare as an important factor in
its decision.' However, the court of appeals stated that a court must
members of The Way about going to North Carolina, she was told that" 'something would
happen [to Rowe]' if he continued to search for the baby." Id. After this conversation,
Rogers decided to cancel her trip. Id.
16. In re Adoption of P.E.P., 100 N.C. App. 191,194,395 S.E.2d 133,135 (1990), rev'd,
329 N.C. 692, 407 S.E.2d 505 (1991).
17. Id. at 194,395 S.E.2d at 135. Rogers apparently became convinced that she should
try to stop the adoption after watching a television program that portrayed The Way as
a dangerous cult that brainwashed its members. P.E.P., 329 N.C. at 699,407 S.E.2d at 509.
For a more thorough discussion of the religious beliefs and practices of The Way, see Gary
M. Miller, Note, Balancing the Welfare of Children with the Rights of Parents: Petersen
v. Rogers and the Role of Religion in Custody Disputes, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1272-77
(1995).
18. P.E.P., 329 N.C. at 704, 407 S.E.2d at 511-12. Because the Petersens and the
attorney involved in the adoption had paid for Rogers to come and stay in North Carolina
prior to the birth, the Court concluded that they "may not have purchased Rogers' unborn
child, [but] the evidence would support an inference that this was done." Id. at 701, 407
S.E.2d at 510. The court was also disturbed by numerous statutory violations and
irregularities in the adoption proceeding. Id. at 704, 407 S.E.2d at 511-12.
19. Petersen v. Rogers, 111 N.C. App. 712,714,433 S.E.2d 770,772 (1993), rev'd, 337
N.C. 397, 445 S.E.2d 901 (1994).
20. Id. at 715, 433 S.E.2d at 772-73. The judge allowed general testimony about The
Way by Cynthia S. Kisser, Executive Director of the Cult Awareness Network, and the
Reverend William C. Greene, a minister of The Way. Id. at 715, 433 S.E.2d at 773.
21. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 399, 445 S.E.2d at 902.
22. Petersen, 111 N.C. App. at 714, 433 S.E.2d at 772.
23. Id. at 717, 433 S.E.2d at 774.
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not base its findings on a preference for any particular faith. 4
Therefore, according to the court of appeals, "a limited inquiry into
the religious practices of the parties is permissible if such practices
may adversely affect the physical or mental health or safety of the
child."'  The court's consideration must be limited to the adverse
impact the parties' religious practices might have upon the child.2 6
The court of appeals concluded that many of the questions posed
about The Way at trial had no relevance to the child's interests and
therefore violated "the Petersens' right to freedom of religion
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the North Carolina
Constitution."'  Following this ruling, Rogers and Rowe appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which granted discretionary
review s
Although Rogers and Rowe expected the supreme court to
consider the constitutional questions of religious freedom raised by
the trial, they also argued that the "judgment involved a substantial
question arising under... the North Carolina Constitution in that it
deprived [them] of their right to custody and control of their child., 29
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed that Rogers and Rowe's
constitutionally protected rights to custody were paramount, and ruled
that the inquiry into the Petersens' religious beliefs, if error, was
harmless. 0 Although the "best interests of the child" are central in
custody battles between divorced parents, the court concluded that
this is not the dispositive test in other custody battles, such as those
between adoptive and biological parents?1 Instead, the issue in
these custody battles must be limited to whether the biological parents
are fit to meet the child's needs?2 If the biological parents are found
fit, then their rights to their children'are paramount to any competing
interests. 3
3
The supreme court also determined that the Petersens had no
right to fie an action against the child's biological parents seeking
24. Id. at 718, 433 S.E.2d at 774.
25. Id. at 719, 433 S.E.2d at 775.
26. Id
27. Id. at 725, 433 S.E.2d at 778. For an extensive discussion of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals decision and its impact, see Miller, supra note 17, at 1275-77.
28. Petersen v. Rogers, 335 N.C. 239, 439 S.E.2d 150 (1993).
29. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 400, 445 S.E.2d at 902.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 401-02, 445 S.E.2d at 903-04.
32. See id.
33. Id.
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custody or visitation rights. 4 The Petersens had filed such an action
under the authority of section 50-13.1(a) of the North Carolina
General Statutes, s but the court concluded this statute was never
"intended by the legislature to confer upon strangers the right to
bring custody or visitation actions against the parents of children
unrelated to [them]."36  The court's holding seemingly narrows
previous case law determining what parties may bring a custody or
visitation action, a significant effect of Petersen notwithstanding the
more important ruling on who receives custody. 7
In order to understand the potential impact of Petersen, it is
important to examine the historical development and application of
adoption law and custody determination in the United States and
North Carolina. Early adoption practices in the United States had
their roots in Roman and English practices, most notably in that they
shared the view that children are their parents' property.38 The
34. Id. at 405, 445 S.E.2d at 905-06.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(a) (Supp. 1994).
36. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405-06, 445 S.E.2d at 905-06 (explaining the court's
holding that strangers have no right to bring a custody or visitation rights suit against the
biological parents of a child). The relevant statute provides:
Any parent, relative, or other person, agency, organization or institution
claiming the right to custody of a minor child may institute an action or
proceeding for the custody of such child, as hereinafter provided. Unless a
contrary intent is clear, the word "custody" shall be deemed to include custody
or visitation or both.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1(a) (Supp. 1994). The Petersen case was not an adoption
challenge; an earlier case had already ended the Petersens' efforts to complete the
adoption of Rogers's child. See In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329 N.C. 692, 704, 407 S.E.2d
505, 511-12 (1991); see also supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Petersens filed a petition for adoption that was eventually dismissed by the North Carolina
Supreme Court). Petersen was based on the Petersens' efforts to retain legal physical
custody of the child after the adoption was voided. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 399, 445
S.E.2d at 902. Therefore, the court's ruling suggests that the case should never have been
heard and the Petersens' complaint should have been dismissed. However, the court
remanded the Petersen case to the trial court for reinstatement of the trial court's order,
not a dismissal. Id. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at 906.
37. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405, 445 S.E.2d at 906. In Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790,
407 S.E.2d 592 (1991), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a step-grandmother
could bring a visitation action under the plain language of § 50-13.1(a) as an "other
person". Id. at 793, 407 S.E.2d 593. The Petersen court, however, disavowed Ray's
expansive reading of § 50-13.1(a) and asserted that parents have a "paramount right [to]
control ... their children" and their associations. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at
906. In doing so, the Petersen court may have narrowed Ray's holding so that every party
would be a stranger under § 50-13.1(a), unable to bring a custody or visitation action
unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 406, 445 S.E.2d at
906.
38. See John F. Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332 (1922);
Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the
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colonies soon developed their own unique customs for transferring
children from their biological parents to others, but these practices
allowed for corrupt exploitation that continued well into the
nineteenth century.3 9
Recognizing the need for reform, Massachusetts passed the first
American adoption statute in 1851.4 The new law ensured that the
biological parents released all legal rights to the adopted child in
writing and provided that the judge hearing a petition had to be
satisfied that the adopters were of "sufficient ability to bring up the
child."'" Massachusetts' efforts provided the basis for similar statutes
throughout the United States, 2 including North Carolina's first
adoption laws enacted in 1873.' 3
When an adoption is declared void due to improper procedure,
a custody battle between the biological and adoptive parents may
arise.4' Modem state law tends to reflect one of three approaches
Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMoRY L.. 209,209-10 (1978).
For a brief discussion of Roman customs and laws of adoption, see Robin DuRocher,
Balancing Competing Interests in Post-Placement Adoption Custody Disputes, 15 J. LEGAL
MED. 305, 307-08 (1994). Roman law considered children the father's property and gave
him virtually unlimited power over their lives. Korn, supra note 2, at 1286. English law
gave the father a slightly narrower, but nonetheless similar, right of control over his
children. See id.
39. DuRocher, supra note 38, at 308-09. The colonies developed a curious system that
allowed parents to "put out" their children. Id at 308. See generally Yasuhide
Kawashima, Adoption in Early America, 20 J. FAM. L. 677, 680-86 (1981-82) (discussing
the practice of "putting out" and its justifications); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical
Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443,456-59 (1971) (discussing
early American methods of caring for dependent children). Although children were often
"put out" for service and apprenticeship, Puritan parents also used the system to move
their children to better households. DuRocher, supra note 38, at 308. Rebellious children
were also "put out," and the state of Massachusetts was not above "putting out" unruly
children for any parents failing to see the wisdom of such a decision themselves. Id.
A similar custom soon developed called "binding out" which allowed children to be
adopted by masters for apprenticeships, but some masters were cruel and abusive. Id.; see
also Kawashima, supra, at 685 (noting that some parents of "bound out" children alleged
that masters mistreated their children).
By the nineteenth century, children were often placed in homes far away from their
natural parents without any evaluation of the adoptive home or any protection under the
law. DuRocher, supra note 38, at 308-09. Children were even advertised and sold like
slaves. See id. at 309.
40. Kawashima, supra note 39, at 677.
41. DuRocher, supra note 38, at 309.
42. See id,
43. N.C. PUB. LAWS c. 155 (1872-73); see also Francis H. Fairley, Inheritance Rights
Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N.C. L. REV. 227, 229 (1950) (providing an historical
perspective on adoption laws in North Carolina).
44. Adoption laws are merely procedural rules to facilitate the relinquishment of
biological parents' rights to their children in favor of adoptive parents while ensuring that
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to custody battles between the biological and adoptive parents: (i) a
"parental rights" standard; (ii) a "best interests of the child" standard,
or (iii) a "presumption" standard.4' Although these approaches are
rooted in state custody statutes, judicial interpretation and develop-
ment play at least an equal role in defining the actual standards to be
applied in a jurisdiction's custody law.4
Strong "parental rights" states emphasize the sanctity of the
biological parent-child relationship and are reluctant to sever the
relationship absent abuse or neglect by the biological parents.47 The
parental rights doctrine is based on several theories, among them
natural law,' the existence of an inherent bond between biological
parent and child,49 a derivation of the view that children are property
of their parents,' and more recently, constitutional protection of the
the child will be place in a good home. See, eg., N.C. GEN STAT. § 48-1. (1994). When
the couples involved fail to adhere to all statutory procedures, as was the case in the
Petersens' attempt to adopt P.E.P., the adoption may be challenged and declared void.
See In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329 N.C. 692,701-02, 407 S.E.2d 505, 510 (1991) (explaining
that there were a myriad of procedural violations in the Petersens' attempt to adopt that
led the supreme court to declare the adoption void). When an adoption is declared void,
the child is most often placed in the custody of the director of social services of the county
in which the adoption was filed. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-20(c) (1991). A custody battle
between the adoptive and biological parents may then arise when either files a petition for
custody. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 399-400,445 S.E.2d at 902; see also infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
45. Kom, supra note 2, at 1316-20.
46. See McGough & Shindell, supra note 38, at 214 n.24 (explaining that case law
reflects such a confusing compendium of judicial opinions that determining the standard
each jurisdiction embraces would require "a full tracking of the custody law of every
jurisdiction"). State statutes inevitably recognize both the need to protect parental rights
and the need to look out for the best interests of the child in custody battles, but the
courts often apply the parental rights doctrine when the case involves biological and
adoptive parents. See id. at 213 & n.23. When these two standards compete, a court must
sort out which will be the dominant approach for its jurisdiction. Some courts clearly
choose one standard; others confuse the issue by discussing one standard while applying
the other; still others seem to fluctuate between the standards. See i. at 214 n.24; see also
infra notes 86-102 and accompanying text (discussing the North Carolina courts' apparent
fluctuation between the two standards).
47. Haynie, supra note 1, at 709.
48. See id. at 708-09 (noting that the traditional parental rights standard is premised
on the notion that biological parents have a "natural right to the care and custody of their
children").
49. See Korn, supra note 2, at 1318-19.
50. Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in
Context, 72 TEX. L. Rnv. 967, 994-95 (1994) (explaining that children were historically
considered their parents' property and that some fathers engaged in custody battles today
assert similar parental possessory rights).
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parent-child relationship.51 Although it is very difficult to determine
exactly how many states subscribe to a particular approach at any
given time, one commentator has indicated that at least seven states
currently use this standard.52
Without denying the significance of the biological parents' rights,
the "best interests of the child" standard places primary emphasis on
what is most appropriate for the child. 3 This discretionary standard,
borrowed by legislatures and courts from divorce custody disputes,5 4
allows the court to consider several factors, "including the physical,
emotional, and psychological well-being of the child."55 Because the
paramount concern is the best interests of the child, states applying
this standard can place great weight on the psychological bond
between children and the third party challenging the biological
parents, 6 thereby denying custody to a fit natural parent when the
child is already in the best home situation 7 Approximately twenty
percent of the states currently embrace the best interests standard."
Finally, a state might apply the "presumptions" standard.59 A
hybrid of the parental rights and best interests approaches, this
standard presumes that awarding custody to the biological parents will
be in the "best interests of the child."'  States vary, however, as to
the appropriate level of evidence required to rebut this
presumption.61 While a few jurisdictions require only that some
evidence to overcome the presumption, and others require a
preponderance of the evidence, most states applying this standard
51. Elizabeth A. Sammann, Note, The Reality of Family Preservation Under Norman
v. Johnson, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 675,696 (1992) (explaining that "the Constitution protects
the family primarily by upholding parents' rights to ... their children").
52. Haynie, supra note 1, at 708 n.12 (noting that Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Montana, Oklahoma, and West Virginia clearly apply the parental rights standard).
Haynie noted that Mississippi also uses parental rights doctrine language. Id.
53. See 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 530-32 (2d ed. 1987).
54. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 401,445 S.E2d at 903 (citing Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439,
1448 (1993)).
55. Kom, supra note 2, at 1319.
56. 1& at 1319-20 (discussing the "psychological parent" doctrine).
57. See In re Doe, 627 N.E2d 648,651-52 (Ill. App. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (111.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) ("[Ihe time has long past [sic] when children in our
society were considered the property of their parents.... Richard 'belongs' to no one but
himself.").
58. See Haynie, supra note 1, at 721.
59. Korn, supra note 2, at 1318.
60. Id. at 1319.
61. Id. at 1318 n.316.
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require clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that
the biological parents can best meet the child's needs.62
Although adoption and custody law is primarily a state issue, the
federal courts have considered several important cases that sig-
nificantly affect this area. The most influential of these have
concerned the rights of unwed biological fathers. Because most states
only required the mother's consent for adoption of an illegitimate
child,' the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v.
Illinois 4 affected adoption law throughout the country. In Stanley,
the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois state law presumption that
unwed fathers are unfit to raise children. 65 Although this decision
indicated that "substantial" contact between unwed fathers and their
children is a protected interest,' Stanley did not adequately charac-
terize "substantial" contact, nor did it indicate how to protect this
interest.67 States responded to this ambiguity by enacting statutes
that required some form of notice to biological fathers.' Several
later cases developed Stanley's "substantial" contact rationale69 while
62. Id. For a thorough examination of the various approaches applying the
presumptions standard, see Haynie, supra note 1, at 711-21.
63. Note, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental
Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (1972).
64. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
65. Id. at 658.
66. Id. at 651.
67. DuRocher, supra note 38, at 315.
68. Id. at 316. The Stanley Court recommended notice to biological parents and
service by publication to unknown fathers as ways to protect their rights. Stanley, 405 U.S.
at 645 & n.9. In response, some states passed requirements that known unwed fathers be
notified of a pending adoption by registered mail or personal service, and that service by
publication be attempted in all other cases. DuRocher, supra note 38, at 316.
69. The first of these cases was Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), in which the
Court considered the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that required only the mother's
consent for adoption. Id. at 247. The child's new stepfather wanted to adopt him, but the
unwed biological father claimed that he should be able to stop the adoption unless the
court found him unfit as a parent. Id. The Court ruled that the biological father could
have presented evidence of his fitness as a father at his legitimation hearing and thereby,
perhaps, have gained authority to veto the adoption, id at 253-54; however, as an unwed
father he did not enjoy an automatic constitutional right to veto the adoption as would
married fathers, id. at 254-56. Thus, Quilloin suggested that unmarried fathers can only
gain the rights to veto an adoption found to be in the child's best interests by establishing
significant contact with the child. See id at 256.
In the second of these cases, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the biological
father had been involved with his children and wanted to adopt them. Id at 382-85.
However, applicable New York law, like the Georgia statute in Quilloin, only required the
mother's consent to an adoption. Thus, the child's mother blocked the father's efforts.
Id at 385-86 n.4. The Court invalidated the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause because it did not grant unwed fathers the same right to prevent adoption of their
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confirming its rule that the rights of unwed biological fathers cannot
be ignored in adoption and custody cases.70
Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its support for unwed
fathers' parental rights in the well-known "Baby Jessica" case, DeBoer
v. DeBoer.7' The mother in DeBoer had arranged a private adoption
without notifying the biological father, but when informed of the
adoption, the father asserted his parental rights.7' Courts in Iowa
and Michigan reached the same conclusion: A father's biological ties
to his child prevent his rights from being terminated when he has not
been found to have abandoned his child.73 In denying applications
to stay the decisions of both the Iowa and Michigan supreme courts,
Justice Stevens wrote that "[n]either Iowa law, Michigan law, nor
federal law authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child
whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit."'74 The
DeBoer decision was a strong assertion by the Supreme Court that the
parental right to one's children is strongly supported in the law.75
children as it gave unwed mothers. Id. at 388. The Court was again careful, however, not
to say that unwed fathers could always block an adoption; instead, the majority held that
a father who could not be located or who had simply failed to participate in his child's care
or upbringing could not block an adoption. Id. at 392.
The last of these cases is Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), in which the father
helped ensure that the mother had appropriate prenatal medical care but had very little
contact with the child after birth. Id. at 252. Although the biological father did not
receive notice of the stepfather's adoption petition, id. at 252-53, the Court ruled that he
was not entitled to notice because he had failed to comply with a New York law requiring
unwed fathers to register with the state in order to receive notice, id. at 264. The Court
found the state law constitutional because it provided a reliable means to distinguish
between fathers who have interests in their relationships with their children that are
deserving of consideration and those who do not. See id at 262 n.18.
In the context of adoption and custody proceedings, these cases suggest that an unwed
father's parental right to notice and consent will depend on his efforts to be involved with
his children. Although the Court acknowledged that unmarried fathers have significant
parental rights, the Court did not attempt to delineate the level of parent-child
involvement required before biological fathers may assert these rights. This task has
apparently been left to the states.
70. DuRocher, supra note 38, at 319.
71. 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993).
72. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
73. Id at 246; see also People v. DeBoer, No. 91-056162-FH, 1994 Mich. LEXIS 2881,
at *1 (Mich. Nov. 30, 1994) (explaining that the Supreme Court of Michigan did not
believe it should review the question presented).
74. DeBoer, 114 S.Ct at 2. For a thorough discussion of the procedural journey
DeBoer took to reach the Supreme Court, see Lance Christopher Kassab, Comment, Child
Custody Disputes Litigated on the Jurisdictional Battlefielk Adoptive Parents vs. The
Putative Father, DeBoer v. Schmidt, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 401, 402-08 (1994).
75. Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-30 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that a putative father who had developed a strong relationship with his
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In addition to recognizing the rights of biological parents, the
Supreme Court has extended some level of constitutional protection
to the family unit in general.76 The Court has had difficulty in
defining what family units beyond the biological family should be
protected," but its holdings could provide a framework for an
argument that adoptive family bonds deserve some protection.78
Like the federal courts, North Carolina courts have struggled
with questions about parental rights, seeking to balance them against
the importance of meeting the child's best interests. Nevertheless, the
narrow issues that decide custody battles between biological and
adoptive parents have been examined in many North Carolina cases
over the years. In general, these cases balance the rights of the
natural parents with the child's best interests.
North Carolina courts have recognized the traditional common
law that biological parents have a right to their children.79 The law
presumes that "parents will perform their obligations to their
children,"8 and this presumption has long preserved "their prior
right to custody.",8 ' Despite the strength of this presumption,
though, North Carolina courts have not granted parents an absolute
daughter could not establish paternity under California law and thus should be denied
visitation rights).
76. See EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY:
IDEOLOGY AND ISSUEs 14 (1986).
77. The Supreme Court has even acknowledged that "the task of defining 'family' for
purposes of the Due Process Clause" provides quite a challenge. Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842-43 (1977). The Court has granted constitutional
protection beyond the traditional nuclear family to extended family members in at least
one case. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) ("Ours is by no
means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear
family."). In addition, the Court has acknowledged that emotional and psychological ties
could form the basis for a family even where biological ties do not exist. See Smith, 431
U.S. at 845-47. Nevertheless, in that case the Court did not reach the issue of whether a
foster family could represent a bond deserving constitutional protection. "Id.
78. At least one federal district court has held that prospective adoptive parents have
an interest in their families deserving of some limited level of protection. See Thelen v.
Catholic Social Servs., 691 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (E.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that "in the
context of Wisconsin law, the prospective adoptive couple has a limited, but not wholly
insignificant, constitutionally protected liberty interest in their family unit during the initial
six-month period that a child is placed in their home"); see also Korn, supra note 2, at
1306-10 (discussing the holding in Thelen and the need for protection of liberty interests
of adoptive families).
79. See, eg., Latham v. Ellis, 116 N.C. 30, 33,20 SE. 1012, 1012-13 (1895); Comer v.
Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324, 327-28, 300 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (1983).
80. In re Hughes, 254 N.C. 434, 436, 119 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1961).
81. Id
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right to their children.' Through either misconduct' or neglect,'
parents may relinquish their presumptive rights to custody.8" Despite
definitions of these terms in North Carolina law, judges nevertheless
have discretion to apply a flexible standard on a case-by-case basis.86
As a result of this flexibility, North Carolina courts developed the
"best interests of the child" standard' as a second doctrine of
custody law to flourish alongside the parental rights standard. As
early as 1883, the North Carolina Supreme Court announced its
approval of the general principle that in custody battles between
parents and third parties, the welfare of the child is "the polar star by
which the discretion of the courts is to be guided.""8 Ever since the
"polar star" pronouncement, the "welfare of the child" or best
interests standard has persisted as the paramount consideration in all
custody determinations in North Carolina. 9 According to the North
Carolina Supreme Court in 1957, "a parent's love must yield to
82. See, e.g., id at 436-37, 119 S.E.2d at 191.
83. E.g., In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334, 339, 188 S.E2d 580, 583 (1972).
84. E.g., In re Gibbons, 247 N.C. 273, 278, 101 S.E.2d 16, 20 (1957). Writing for the
majority, Justice Parker stated:
It is an entire mistake to suppose the court is at all events bound to deliver
over a child to his father, or that the latter has an absolute vested right in the
child. Doubtless, parents have a strict legal right to have the custody of their
infant children as against strangers. However, courts will not regard this parental
legal right against strangers as controlling, when circumstances... clearly exist
to overcome it, or when to enforce such legal right will imperil the personal
safety, morals, or health of the child.
Id.
85. In re Hughes, 254 N.C. 434, 437, 119 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1961).
86. Although "wilful abandonment" and "neglect," both of which may lead to a
termination of parental rights, have been defined by case law and statute in North
Carolina, these definitions have not been rigorously applied in child custody battles
between adoptive and biological parents, nor do they seem specific enough to be applied
strictly. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (Supp. 1994) (defining a "neglected juvenile"
as one "who does not-receive proper care, supervision, or discipline... or who has been
abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care ... [or] necessary remedial
care" as recognized under state law); In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322,324,296 S.E.2d 811,813
(1982) (defining "abandonment" as "any wilful or intentional conduct on the part of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child .. .") (citations omitted).
87. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
88. In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31, 34 (1883).
89. See, e.g., In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 645, 290 S.E2d 664, 667-68 (1982); Griffith v.
Griffith, 240 N.C. 271,278,81 S.E.2d 918,923-24 (1954); Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App.
341, 345, 309 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1983); In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334, 339, 188 S.E.2d 580,
583 (1972); Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 162, 167 S.E2d 782, 783 (1969).
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another ift after judicial investigation, it is found that the best interest
of the child is served thereby."'
Alongside the best interests standard and the parental rights
doctrine, North Carolina courts seem to have applied presumptive
rules9 which presumed that awarding custody to the biological
parents was always in the best interests of the child. 2 However, the
courts were careful to note that this presumption could be rebutted
by sufficient evidence that the welfare of the child called for
placement with someone other than the biological parent or
parents. 3 Over the past two decades the presumption supporting
biological parents' rights had fallen out of favor, leading the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in Comer v. Comer94 to acknowledge only
a "traditional preference for biological parents,"'95 subordinate to the
more important consideration of the child's welfare."
The watered-down parental rights language in Comer reflects the
fact that North Carolina courts have leaned heavily toward the best
interests standard since the late 1970s. 7 Despite the parental rights
doctrine's long history in North Carolina, the court of appeals has
repeatedly held that custody could be awarded to a third party even
without a finding that the biological parents were unfit.9" While it
still spoke of balancing parental rights and the best interests of the
90. Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 201, 97 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1957) (per curiam). In
Holmes, the court awarded custody to the grandparents even though the father was "a
person of good reputation... [because] it would be in the best interest of the children."
See Greer, 5 N.C. App. at 162, 167 S.E.2d at 783 (explaining the trial court findings
supported by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Holmes).
91. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
92. Even in cases that placed the best interests standard as the "polar star" by which
the court should be guided, see supra text accompanying note 87, the court sometimes
stated the presumption that awarding custody to the biological parents is in the child's best
interest. See e.g., In re Hughes, 254 N.C. 434, 436-37, 119 S.E.2d 189, 191 (1961); Jones,
14 N.C. App. at 339, 188 S.E.2d at 583.
93. See, eg., Wilson v. Williams, 42 N.C. App. 348, 351, 256 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1979).
94. 61 N.C. App. 324, 300 S.E2d 457 (1983).
95. Id. at 327-28,300 S.E2d at 459-60 (citing Griffith v. Griffith, 240 N.C. 271,278,81
S.E.2d 918, 923 (1954)).
96. Id. at 328, 300 S.E.2d at 460.
97. See, e.g, Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 342, 344 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1986); Comer,
61 N.C. App. at 327,300 S.E.2d at 459; In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364,368,246 S.E.2d
45, 47, disc rev. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).
98. See, ag., In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 688, 315 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1984);
Comer, 61 N.C. App. at 327,300 S.E.2d at 459; Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. at 368,246 S.E.2d
at 47.
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child in Campbell v. Campbell,99 the court did not hesitate to subor-
dinate parental rights to the child's welfare.1" Because of this
strong precedent, the North Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in
Petersen is surprising in that it may have restored the parental rights
doctrine to prominence in North Carolina.01 In fact, in a decision
just before Petersen, the North Carolina Court of Appeals relied on
precedent in declaring that "[a]lthough there is a rebuttable
presumption in favor of a natural parent ... it is not necessary to
prove unfitness in order to overcome the presumption."102  The
court even seemed apologetic for having acknowledged the parental
rights doctrine: "We note that the statute itself imposes no
presumption at all in favor of a natural parent, but find that we are
bound by the decisions of this Court imposing such a
presumption."' 13
The court of appeals was referring to section 50-13.2 of the North
Carolina General Statutes" a which, along with section 50-13.1,105
provides guidelines for North Carolina courts in all custody decisions,
whether they result from divorce, separation, a dismissed adoption
petition, or any other occurrence."°  Section 50-13.1 provides
general authority for bringing a child custody action."° Although
the statute ostensibly authorizes anyone to bring a child custody
action, the courts have not read it so broadly. For example, North
Carolina courts have concluded that section 50-13.1 does not grant
99. 63 N.C. App. 113, 115, 304 S.E.2d 262, 263, disc rev. denied, 309 N.C. 460, 307
SE.2d 362 (1983).
100. See id. In Best, the court of appeals stated that "[tjhe primary conbern of the trial
court in awarding custody is not the rights of the parent(s), but the best interest of the
child. We note that it is not necessary for the natural parent to be found unfit for the
presumption [in favor of the natural parent(s)] to be overcome." 81 N.C. App. at 342,344
S.E.2d at 367 (citations omitted).
101. But see infra text accompanying notes 163-69 (suggesting that the court only
positioned parental rights alongside the best interests standard).
102. Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442, 444, 442 S.E.2d 79, 80 (1994) (citing Best,
81 N.C. App. at 342, 344 S.E.2d at 367).
103. Id (referring to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-132(a) (1987)).
104. N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-13.2 (1987).
105. Id § 50-13.1 (Supp. 1994); see supra note 36 (providing the relevant text of § 50-
13.1).
106. See Oxendine v. Department of Social Servs., 303 N.C. 699,705-06,281 S.E.2d 370,
374 (1981) (explaining that § 50-13.1 was enacted as § 2 of Chapter 1153 of the 1967
Session Laws to eliminate "conflicting and inconsistent custody statutes and to replace
them with a comprehensive act governing all custody disputes").
107. See id. at 705-06, 281 S.E2d at 374. Although § 50-13.1 is found in a chapter
entitled "Divorce and Alimony," the North Carolina Legislature did not intend to limit its
effect to divorce and separation custody disputes. Id.
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standing to foster parents to bring an action for custody."°8 In
Petersen, the Supreme Court narrowed the class of persons who would
have standing under section 50-13.1 even further, declaring that it
"was [n]ever intended by the legislature to confer upon strangers the
right to bring custody or visitation actions against the parents of
children unrelated to [those strangers]."'" After Petersen, in fact,
any person who is not biologically related to the child would be a
"stranger" under section 50-13.1 and have to look elsewhere for
authority to bring any custody action."
Although Petersen may limit the class of persons with standing to
bring custody actions, biological parents will retain their rights to file
for custody of their children against any third party. Section 50-13.2
will continue to provide the guidelines for how the court is to decide
between parties in these cases. In relevant part, section 50-13.2
provides:
An order for custody of a minor child... shall award
the custody of such child to such person, agency, or-
ganization, or institution as will best promote the interest
and welfare of the child. An order for custody must include
findings of fact which support the determination of what is
in the best interest of the child. Between the mother and
father, whether natural or adoptive, no presumption shall
apply as to who will better promote the interest and welfare
of the child."'
In Black v. Glawson," the North Carolina Court of Appeals
examined section 50-13.2(a) in depth." The court -of appeals
concluded that the North Carolina Legislature enacted section 50-
108. Id. at 707, 281 S.E.2d at 375. But cf. Ray v. Ray, 103 N.C. App. 790, 793, 407
S.E.2d 592, 593 (1991) (holding that a step-grandmother in this particular case qualified
as an "other person" under § 50-13.1(a) and was entitled to claim visitation rights); see also
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
109. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 405, 445 S.E2d at 906; see supra note 36 and accompanying
text. The Court pointed out, however, that the legislature has exceptions for biological
and adoptive grandparents to bring actions for visitation rights. Md
110. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze Petersen's holding on
standing, it should be recognized that the court's holding that the adoptive parents did not
have standing to bring a visitation action may, in the future, jeopardize the authority of
adoptive parents to bring cstody actions after their adoption petitions have been denied.
See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1987). The former statute was N.C. GEN. STAT. §
17.39.1 (1965), repealed in 1967. See Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442,444,442 S.E.2d
79, 80 (1994).
112. 114 N.C. App. 442,442 S.E.2d 79 (1994).
113. See id. at 444-45, 442 S.E2d at 80.
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13.2(a) in response to Jolly v. Queen 4 because the former statute
had stated that "a court 'may' award custody based upon the best
interest of the child."" In contrast, the new statute, by using the
term "shall" instead of "may," requires the court to award custody to
whoever will provide for the child's best interests."6 When com-
bined with what seems to be an effort to eliminate any presumptions
in the law as to who will best provide for the child's interests, the
plain language of the statute affirms the best interests standard while
rejecting the parental rights doctrine. 7 The North Carolina
Supreme Court's ruling in Petersen, though, renders the prominence
of the best interests standard questionable."'
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Petersen was not asked to
interpret the meaning of section 50-13.2, nor did it do so. Instead, the
court relied on several United States Supreme Court decisions1 as
well as its own precedents"2 to arrive at a holding in favor of
parental rights.' However, in doing so, the court ignored a vast
array of decisions favoring a best interests standard in North
114. 264 N.C. 711, 715-16, 142 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1965). The court of appeals discussion
of Jolly in Black is significant not only because of its interpretation of § 50-13.2(a), but
also because the Petersen court relied on Jolly as support for its decision. See Petersen, 337
N.C. at 402, 445 S.E.2d at 904; infra notes 135-37. Although Petersen was decided three
months following'Black, it seems unlikely that the opinion was considered since it was not
mentioned in Petersen.
115. Black, 114 N.C. App. at 444, 442 S.E.2d at 80.
116. Id. The majority stated that the Jolly court would have reached a different
conclusion under the new statute. Id However, Judge McCrodden, concurring in a
separate opinion, argued that the new statute did not alter the common law presumption.
Id. at 446, 442 S.E.2d at 81 (McCrodden, J., concurring in the result). Sharing the
concerns of Justice Sharp in Jolly that "a judge might find it to be in the best interest of
a legitimate child of poor but honest.., parents ... that his custody be given to a more
affluent neighbor or relative who had no child and desired him," Judge McCrodden
concluded that the slight change in the statute's wording "in no way abrogates the common
law presumption that, absent parental unfitness, the best interest of the child is that he
remain with his natural parent(s)." Id. at 446,442 S.E2d at 81 (McCrodden, J., concurring
in the result).
117. Although § 50-132 apparently eliminated any presumptions of preference for the
mother or father in divorce or separation custody proceedings, see Westneat v. Westneat,
113 N.C. App. 247, 251, 437 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1994), presumption in favor of biological
parents may in fact have survived in light of Petersen.
118. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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Carolina,"2 and explicitly rejected the court of appeals's adoption
of this approach to custody disputes in Best v. Best."2
To find support for parental rights, the North Carolina Supreme
Court first turned to United States Supreme Court decisions expres-
sing support and constitutional protection for the family unit. 24
After establishing this judicial basis of support for the general rights
of parents to raise their children, the court then turned to Stanley v.
Illinois 's to provide the foundation for a biological father's rights
to custody if he "is shown to be a fit father."' Finally, the court
drew on the more recent decision in Reno v. Flores"7 to show that
the best interests standard, although the proper standard in divorce
proceedings, is not the sole criterion for other decisions involving
child placement."2  In fact, the court clearly indicated that the
interests of a child may be subordinated to the interests of other
children or the parents.29 With such a backdrop, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Petersen justifiably awarded custody to the
biological father and mother conditioned upon a showing of their
fitness.
However, the court may have applied the United States Supreme
Court decisions too hastily. Although the many cases finding
protection for the family unit were indeed strong precedent, the Court
has since admitted that the idea of "family unit" is very hard to define
and may stretch beyond mere biological ties.' Therefore, the same
122. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
124. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 400-01,445 S.E2d at 903 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (finding constitutional protection for the
family in the Ninth Amendment)); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528,533 (1953) (stating that
the rights to raise one's children are "[r]ights far more precious... than property rights");
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (declaring that custody and care of a
child rests first with parents, and the state cannot interfere with their rights to raise their
children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942) (finding constitutional protection
of the family in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (finding constitutional protection of the family unit in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)).
125. 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (discussing
Stanley).
126. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 401, 445 S.E2d at 903 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58).
127. 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
128. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 401-02,445 S.E.2d at 903-04 (citing Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1448).
129. Id- at 402, 445 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Flores, 113 S. Ct. at 1448).
130. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (showing that the United States
Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to offer constitutional protection beyond the
biological family, possibly even to the psychological family). The North Carolina Supreme
Court may have overlooked the fact that the United States Supreme Couit had extended
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decisions that the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on to protect
the integrity of the biological family in Petersen could have been used
to protect the adoptive family as well. 13 ' Because the child in
Petersen had lived with the adoptive parents for three years, theirs
was arguably the "family unit" deserving of greater protection.13 1
Just as the question of which "family" deserved protection may
not have been as clear as the court presumed, the question in Petersen
of which parents' rights may subordinate the child's best interests was
not so clearly defined by Reno v. Fores.' Although Mores ack-
nowledged that parental rights may supersede the best interests of the
child, it also provided that guardians' rights may outweigh the child's
best interests.M Certainly Flores supported the Petersen court's
conclusions about biological parents' rights to their children, but it did
not dictate such an outcome. Moreover, it could have also protected
the rights of the adoptive parents in Petersen.
In addition to drawing from cases of the United States Supreme
Court, the Petersen court turned to North Carolina Supreme Court
precedents for support. Surprisingly, the court placed a great deal of
reliance on Jolly v. Queen, 5 the 1965 North Carolina Supreme
Court case that, according to the court of appeals, led to a revision of
North Carolina's custody law statute to ensure that the best interests
of the child would control custody decisions. 3 6 The court quoted
at length from Justice Sharp's opinion in Jolly to show that a child
will not be taken from his natural parents just because more affluent
parents, able to offer more material things to the child, want to adopt
him.' 7 The Petersen court relied on only one other precedent for
its understanding of "family" beyond the traditional nuclear family, though, because the
North Carolina justices only relied on pre-1965 United States Supreme Court precedent.
See supra note 124.
131. See Korn, supra note 2, at 1306-09 (arguing that adoptive parents should have a
liberty interest in the protection of their family).
132. See id.
133. 113 S. Ct. 1439 (1993).
134. See Ud at 1448.
135. 264 N.C. 711, 142 S.E.2d 592 (1965).
136. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (referencing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-
13.2(a) (1987)).
137. See Petersen, 337 N.C. at 402, 445 SE.2d at 904. The court pointed out that
Justice Sharp wrote for a unanimous court when she explained:
It is well settled law in this State, and it seems to be universally so held, that the
mother of an illegitimate child is its natural guardian, and, as such, has the legal
right to its custody, care and control, if a suitable person, even though others may
offer more material advantages in life for the child.
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its holding that the biological parents have a "paramount right to
custody, care, and control of their child ... [that] outweighed" the
adoptive parents' interests. 8 That case, In re Hughes,3 9 decided
by the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1961, affirmed the
presumption of biological parents' right to custody, but also ack-
nowledged that "[t]he welfare of the child is the crucial test."" °
The Petersen court, however, emphasized the fact that Hughes implied
that parental neglect is a prerequisite to waiving custody rights. 4
The Petersen court's reliance on these North Carolina decisions,
although both were state supreme court cases, is questionable. Jolly
and Hughes both lent support to the presumption of strong parental
rights,'42 but the statutory law had changed since these decisions
were handed down.'43 Moreover, neither of these cases ignored that
the "best interests of the child" was a significant test to be
examined.' In fact, Hughes claimed it was the crucial test, and
arguably only offered "neglect" as one example of how biological
parents could lose priority to their children's custody.'45
More disturbing than the court's questionable application of Jolly
and Hughes, though, is its quick dismissal of the adoptive parents'
argument that the welfare of the child is superior to any preferential
rights of the biological parents.' The court seemed to ignore
numerous cases from the North Carolina Court of Appeals'47 and
Id. (citing Jolly, 264 N.C. at 713-14, 142 S.E.2d at 595). The court also included the
citations of Justice Sharp, but all were cases decided before 1951 or were legal
encyclopedias or treatises published in 1963. See d.
138. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 400, 445 S.E.2d at 903.
139. 254 N.C. 434, 119 S.E2d 189 (1961).
140. Id. at 437, 119 S.E.2d at 191.
141. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403, 445 S.E.2d at 904.
142. See Jolly, 264 N.C. at 715-16, 142 S.E2d at 596; Hughes, 254 N.C. at 436-37, 119
S.E.2d at 191.
143. See Black v. Glawson, 114 N.C. App. 442,444,442 S.E.2d 79,80 (1994) (explaining
that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1987) replaced N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-39.1 (1965)); see
also supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (presenting the argument that § 50-13.2(a)
was intended to ensure that the "best interests of the child" would govern custody
decisions).
144. See Jolly, 264 N.C. at 715, 142 S.E.2d at 596; Hughes, 254 N.C. at 437, 119 S.E.2d
at 191.
145. Hughes, 254 N.C. at 437, 119 S.E2d at 191.
146. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403, 445 S.E.2d at 905. The adoptive parents cited Best v.
Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 342, 344 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1986), for support. Petersen, 337 N.C.
at 403, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
147. See, e.g., Plemmons v. Stiles, 65 N.C. App. 341, 345, 309 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1983);
Greer v. Greer, 5 N.C. App. 160, 162, 167 S.E.2d 782, 783 (1969).
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even its own precedents' that specifically indicated that the best
interests and welfare of the child are the paramount concern in any
custody dispute.149 Moreover, the court's holding is inconsistent
with numerous cases from the North Carolina Court of Appeals
holding that the best interests of the child may cause the court to
override parental rights and award custody to a third party, even
without a showing of unfitness. 5 Finally, the court did not address
section 50-13.2(a) of the General Statutes, which requires that the best
interests of the child standard be applied and seemingly eliminates
any presumptions in favor of either the biological or adoptive
parents.'51
Instead of examining the relevant statutes or the applicable case
law, the court held that, "[i]n light of Flores, Stanley, and the
principles enunciated in Jolly and Hughes,... absent a finding that
parents (i) are unfit or (ii) have neglected the welfare of their
children, the constitutionally-protected paramount right of [biological]
parents to custody, care and control of their children must
prevail."'5 To emphasize this holding, the court went one step
further by stating that language in Best v. Bes' 53 favoring the
primacy of the child's best interests in custody disputes "is hereby
expressly disavowed.""tM
The court's holding in Petersen is striking because of its apparent
definitiveness in an area where so many cases over the last century
have held to the contrary 5 If the court has ushered in a new era
of a strict parental rights doctrine in custody battles with third parties,
its decision is even more disturbing. Not only would such a holding
run contrary to many North Carolina decisions, but it also would
148. See, eg., In re Peal, 305 N.C. 640, 645, 290 S.E.2d 664, 667-68 (1982); Holmes v.
Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 201, 97 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1957) (per curiam); In re Lewis, 88 N.C.
31, 34 (1883).
149. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., In re Gwaltney, 68 N.C. App. 686, 688, 315 S.E2d 750, 752 (1984);
Plemmons, 65 N.C. App. at 345, 309 S.E.2d at 506; Comer v. Comer, 61 N.C. App. 324,
327,300 S.E.2d 457,459 (1983); In re Kowalzek, 37 N.C. App. 364,368,246 S.E.2d 45,47,
disc rev. denied, 295 N.C. 734, 248 S.E.2d 863 (1978).
151. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1987); supra text accompanying note 111.
152. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403-04, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
153. 81 N.C. App. 337, 342, 344 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1986).
154. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 404, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
155. See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text (explaining that following the North
Carolina Supreme Court's announcement in In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31, 34 (1883), that the
best interests of the child will be the paramount concern of the courts, the courts of North
Carolina have consistently considered the welfare of the child as their primary concern);
see also supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Lewis).
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ignore the clear statutory directive to judges to use their discretion to
award custody to the party who "will best promote the interest and
welfare of the child."' 6 If carelessly applied, the Petersen decision
could allow putative fathers who suddenly appear long after an
adoption has taken place to assert their rights and gain custody
without any consideration of the child's best interests. 7 Children,
like the child in Petersen, would be lost in the resulting shuffle
because, while the court concerns itself with the parents' rights, the
child's welfare might be ignored.
The North Carolina Supreme Court intended to reassert the
importance of parental rights in custody disputes between biological
parents and adoptive parents. Such a stance is consistent with a
recent United States Supreme Court decision. 8 However, it is
doubtful that the North Carolina Supreme Court wished to overem-
phasize parental rights at the expense of the child's welfare."
Instead, the court seems to have wanted to reassert the "common law
preferential rights of the parents."' ' In so doing, the court merely
breathed new life into a presumption that had fallen somewhat out of
favor16 1---it did not abandon the rebuttable nature of the
presumption of parental rights to custody 62
Although Petersen reestablishes the need to find that a parent is
unfit or has "neglected the welfare" of the child in order to relinquish
156. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1987).
157. Some would argue that this is what took place recently in two high-profile cases,
"Baby Jessica," DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993), and "Baby Richard," In re Doe,
638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
158. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. at 2 (upholding Iowa and Michigan Supreme Court decisions
that natural parents who had not been found unfit could not have a child taken from them
simply because another home appears more advantageous for the child).
159. Although it is merely speculative, the North Carolina Supreme Court probably
believed its ruling in Petersen would be in the child's best interests. The extraordinary
circumstances surrounding the unlawful adoption by the Petersens let the court to declare
in P.E.P. that "this private adoption [was] totally unacceptable. This case involves more
than the resolution of the issues between the parties .... The integrity of the judicial
system is at stake." In re Adoption of P.E.P., 329 N.C. 692, 703-04, 407 S.E2d 505, 511
(1991). The court's opinion in Petersen may reflect some residual frustration from P.E.P..
160. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
161. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
162. This rebuttable presumption has been maintained throughout the history of North
Carolina custody law, even though the standards to overcome it have shifted over time.
See, e.g., Best v. Best, 81 N.C. App. 337, 342, 344 S.E.2d 363, 367 (1986) (holding that
natural parents need not be found unfit for the presumption in their favor to be
overcome); In re Jones, 14 N.C. App. 334,337-38,188 S.E.2d 580,582 (1972) (holding that
the presumption may be overcome by misconduct or other facts that substantially affect
the child's welfare).
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that parent's parental rights," the court did not attempt to forge
strict definitions for these terms for application in child custody
disputes. Therefore both should be considered somewhat flexible and
at the discretion of the trial judge. For instance, even under Petersen,
a putative father's failure to assert his parental rights within a
reasonable period following notice of the child's existence may
constitute neglect of the child's welfare that forfeits his parental
rights. As the United States Supreme Court observed in Quilloin v.
Walcott, 6' the putative father must be able to show efforts at
"substantial" contact with his child in order to maintain his right to
the parental presumption of custody.'" Petersen may have reas-
serted parental rights, but the decision has not rendered them
impenetrable.
In addition to the inherent flexibility of the Petersen standard, the
court has also left the door open to a potential challenge under the
language of the relevant statute, section 50-13.2(a) of the North
Carolina General Statutes." Such a challenge could bring into
question Petersen's presumption of parental primacy or the denial of
the courts' ability to act in the child's best interest by pointing to the
plain meaning of the statute's language 67 as well as precedent.' 6
In an effort to reconcile the statutory language with Petersen, courts
could simply assume that the North Carolina Supreme Court expects
them to act in the child's best interests, in accordance with the
directives of section 50-13.2(a) when defining what makes a parent
"unfit" or determining whether a parent has "neglected the welfare"
of the child. 69 Such a characterization would preserve the court's
ruling while continuing to protect children's welfare.
Petersen, although it may not be as serious a departure from
North Carolina precedent as first appears, nevertheless reflects a shift
in the law. The Petersen court affirmed biological parents' rights to
their children even after they tried to give up their child for adoption,
but it denied judicial recognition and protection to adoptive parents
who also want "their" child, with whom they have a strong parental
bond. This disparity between parental rights, based solely on blood
163. Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403-04, 445 S.E.2d at 905.
164. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
165. L at 256.
166. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1987); supra note 111 and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying note 111.
168. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
169. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (1987); Petersen, 337 N.C. at 403.04,445 S.E.2d
at 905.
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connection, deserves careful scrutiny in light of the psychological
attachments that can form between children and their adoptive
families. In the future, the North Carolina Legislature and courts
should consider the importance of every emotional bond that might
be broken though a custody dispute. Only then will all parental rights
be protected and the courts' obligation to meet the best interests of
children be satisfied.
JEFFREY THOMAS SKINNER
Reconciling North Carolina's Interpretation of "Legally
Entitled to Recover" with the Spirit of the Uninsured
Motorist Statute: The Lessons of Grimsley v. Nelson
Before the advent of uninsured motorist coverage in the United
States, there was a large gap in insurance protection for victims of
automobile accidents.' A person injured in an accident by a
tortfeasor who either lacked the assets to pay a judgment or lacked
insurance would not be compensated.2 To address this gap in
protection, states have enacted uninsured motorist coverage statutes
(UM statutes) whereby "a person injured by an uninsured motorist
[would] be compensated by his own insurer as he would have been
had the uninsured motorist carried liability insurance."3 Most state
uninsured motorist statutes, including that of North Carolina,4 require
that the insured be "legally entitled to recover"5 from the uninsured
tortfeasor in order to collect against the UM carrier.6 In Grimsley v.
Nelson,7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered whether an
insured was "legally entitled to recover" damages from an uninsured
1. See ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 133(a) (1987).
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Since 1961, North Carolina has required that all automobile insurance policies
contain uninsured motorist coverage unless such coverage is specifically rejected by the
insured. An Act to Amend G.S. 20-279.21, ch. 640, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 831, 831-32
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1961)). North Carolina's
uninsured motorist statute (UM statute) is contained within what is commonly referred to
as the Motor Vehicle Safety & Financial Responsibility Act of 1953, ch. 1300, § 21, 1953
N.C. Sess. Laws 1271,1271-72 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT 20-224 to 20-280 (1953)). The
Financial Responsibility Act of 1953 also requires that basic liability coverage and
underinsured (UJIM) coverage be offered in automobile insurance policies. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) & (4) (1993).
5. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3). The UM statute requires that, unless
rejected by the insured, no policy of automobile insurance shall be issued
unless coverage is provided... for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles . ... The provisions
shall include coverage for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles because of injury to or destruction of the property of such insured ....
Id.
6. JERRY, supra note 1, § 133(b)(1).
7. 117 N.C. App. 329, 451 S.E.2d 336 (1994), disc rev. granted, 340 N.C. 111, 455
S.E.2d 661 (1995).
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motorist carrier (UM carrier)' when the claim against the alleged
tortfeasor had been dismissed due to lack of personal jurisdiction.9
Consistent with previous North Carolina cases," the court agreed
that "legally entitled to recover" means that the UM carrier's liability
is derivative of the tortfeasor's liability, and held that the UM carrier
is entitled to assert any defenses available to the uninsured
motorist.11 The court also held that the UM carrier, although
permitted to raise the tortfeasor's defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction, waived it by failing to raise the defense in its answer.2
Because of this error, the court held that the Grimsleys were entitled
to proceed solely against their UM carrier even though their claim
against the alleged tortfeasor, Nelson, was dismissed due to lack of
personal jurisdiction.'
In Grimsley, therefore, the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed
directly against their UM carrier without an underlying claim against
the tortfeasor,'4 an unusual result given that North Carolina courts
equate "legally entitled to recover" with derivative liability.' Based
on this doctrine of derivative liability, North Carolina courts permit
insurers to assert substantive as well as procedural defenses that the
uninsured tortfeasor would be entitled to raise. 6 North Carolina's
position is directly contrary to that of most jurisdictions, which hold
that insurers are only entitled to assert substantive defenses, not
procedural bars such as lack of personal jurisdiction or statute of
limitations, which are viewed as personal to the tortfeasor.'
This Note explores the nature of the phrase "legally entitled to
recover" in North Carolina's UM statute and its interpretation by the
North Carolina courts. The Note points out that the North Carolina
Supreme Court's literal interpretation of the phrase, which allows
insurers to assert the tortfeasor's substantive and procedural defenses,
frequently leads to curious results that contradict the remedial spirit
8. For an introduction to the concept of uninsured motorist carriers and coverage,
see infra note 26.
9. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 330-33, 451 S.E.2d at 337-40.
10. See infra notes 73-144 and accompanying text.
11. See Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 335, 451 S.E.2d at 339; infra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text.
12. Grinsley, 117 N.C. App. at 335, 451 S.E.2d at 340.
13. Id at 335-36, 451 S.E2d at 340; see infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
14. Grbnsley, 117 N.C. App. at 336, 451 S.E2d at 340; see infra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 73-144 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 145-59 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 160-201 and accompanying text.
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of the state's UM statute."8 First, the Note summarizes the court's
opinion in Grimsley v. Nelson.9 After exploring relevant back-
ground law, the Note compares North Carolina's strict interpreta-
tion of the phrase "legally entitled to recover" with the prevailing
interpretation adopted by most jurisdictions across the United
States,2' which permit an insurer to raise only the tortfeasor's
substantive defenses. The Note then concludes that, although the
North Carolina Court of Appeals was able to decide this particular
case consistent with precedent while still protecting the rights of the
insured, the North Carolina courts' approach to the phrase "legally
entitled to recover" needs reconsideration; the interpretation of
"legally entitled to recover" in UM statutes adopted by most
jurisdictions across the United States better protects insured motorists'
rights and more accurately reflects the remedial purpose of UM
statutes.?
In May of 1992, Marlene and Denny Grimsley filed a complaint
against defendant Leroy Jerome Nelson for personal injuries and loss
of consortium arising out of an automobile accident allegedly caused
by Nelson's negligence.' At the time of the accident, Travelers
Indemnity Company provided the Grimsleys' uninsured motorist
coverage.24  Pursuant to the North Carolina UM statute,'
Travelers, as the Grimsleys' UM carrier, was served a copy of the
summons and complaint against Nelson.26 The following day, a
18. See infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 23-72 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 73-144 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 155-206 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
23. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 331, 451 S.E.2d at 337.
24. Id
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3)(a). This section details the various required
provisions of uninsured motorist coverage in North Carolina, including "[a] provision that
the insurer shall be bound by a final judgment taken by the insured against an uninsured
motorist if the insurer has been served with copy of summons, complaint or other process
in the action against the uninsured motorist." Id. The section also provides that "[t]he
insurer, upon being served as herein provided, shall be a party to the action between the
insured and the uninsured motorist though not named in the caption of the pleadings and
may defend the suit in the name of the uninsured motorist or in its own name." d
26. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 331, 451 S.E.2d at 337. Uninsured motorist statutes
operate on a fault basis, meaning that the UM carrier "can defeat a claim if it can show
that its own insured (who paid it the premium for the UM coverage) was the party at fault
or was at least contributorily negligent." PAUL W. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS 143
(1972). To protect its interests, the UM carrier enters the litigation on the side of the
uninsured tortfeasor, attempting to defend the suit successfully and avoid paying a claim.
See id
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deputy sheriff allegedly personally served a summons on Nelson.'
The plaintiffs and their UM carrier were not aware that Leroy Jerome
Nelson, Jr. of 2005 New Bern Avenue, New Bern, North Carolina was
served with the complaint instead of the proper defendant, Leroy
Jerome Nelson of 1004 New Bern Avenue, New Bern, North
Carolina.O
The next month, June of 1992, an attorney for Travelers wrote
the Grimsleys' counsel acknowledging that if they were unable to
settle with Nelson the company would file an answer to the
complaint.29 In October of 1992, apparently still unaware of the
insufficient service of process upon Nelson, an attorney for Travelers
ified an answer denying the plaintiffs' allegations and further alleging
that Marlene Grimsley was contributorily negligent3 The answer
was signed "Beth M. Bryant Appearing in the name of the Defen-
dant.",31  Upon discovering that Nelson was not properly served,
Travelers attempted to amend its answer in November of 1992 and
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, 2 lack of personal jurisdiction over
defendant, 3 insufficiency of process,' and insufficiency of service of
process?5 The amended answer began by stating that Travelers was
"appearing in the name of Defendant Leroy James Nelson pursuant
to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)." 36
The Grimsleys then moved pursuant to North Carolina Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(f)37 to strike Travelers's amended answer because
"plaintiffs did not consent to the amended answer and leave of court
has not been given., 38 The Grimsleys also moved for an extension
of time in order to serve Nelson properly "on the ground that failure
to act within the time prescribed was due to excusable neglect"'39
27. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 331, 451 S.E.2d at 337.
28. Id. at 337, 451 S.E.2d at 340-41 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 331, 451 S.E.2d at 337.
30. Id.
31. I& at 322, 451 S.E.2d at 337.
32. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (1990).
33. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 332, 451 S.E.2d at 337; see N.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
34. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 332, 451 S.E.2d at 337; see N.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4).
35. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 332, 451 S.E.2d at 337; see N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5).
36. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 331, 451 S.E.2d at 337.
37. N.C. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
38. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 332, 451 S.E.2d at 337.
39. Id. at 332, 451 S.E.2d at 337-38. North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)
allows such a motion: "Upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period,
the judge may permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect." N.C. R. Civ. P. 6(b); see, e.g., Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, 322
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because it was not discovered until later that Leroy Jerome Nelson,
Jr. had been improperly served.' Travelers then filed a motion
requesting leave to amend its answer as it had attempted in Novem-
ber of 1992.4" The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion for an
extension, denied Travelers's December 1992 motion to amend its
answer, and granted the Grimsleys' motion to strike Travelers's
purported amended answer filed in November of 1992.42
In May of 1993, defendant Nelson fied a motion to dismiss the
Grimsleys' complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction due to
insufficient service of process and insufficiency of process.' On
September 21, 1993, the trial court dismissed plaintiffs' action against
Nelson for lack of personal jurisdiction.l Travelers then moved for
judgment on the pleadings "on the grounds that the 21 September
1993 order, dismissing the action as to defendant, resolved all issues
raised by laintiffs' complaint."4 The trial court allowed Travelers's
motion and entered an order on November 1,1993, that dismissed the
plaintiffs' action. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their action
against Travelers.47
The North Carolina Court of Appeals first addressed whether the
trial court correctly dismissed the complaint against Nelson for lack
of personal jurisdiction. To decide this issue, the court examined the
effect of Travelers's original answer, dated October 1992 and signed
"Appearing in the Name of Defendant," which failed to assert any
procedural defenses.' The court considered whether Travelers's
appearance "in the name of Defendant" meant that the company was
also appearing on behalf of defendant Nelson.49 If so, because the
answer failed to raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, both
Nelson and Travelers would be held to have waived the defense
N.C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (holding that Rule 6(b) grants trial courts broad
authority to extend any time period, including that specified for service of summons, upon
a finding of excusable neglect), reh'g denied, 322 N.C. 610, 370 S.E2d 247 (1988).
40. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 332, 451 S.E.2d at 338.
41. Id. Travelers's December 1992 motion to file an amended answer explained that
"because subsequent to receipt of Plaintiff's Reply, Counsel for the Movant learned that
the named Defendant herein, Leroy Jerome Nelson, was never served with Complaint and
Summons, notwithstanding purported service by the Sheriff reflected in the Court file." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 332-33, 451 S.E2d at 338.
44. I. at 333, 451 S.E.2d at 338.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1)." In
light of the North Carolina UM statute, the court concluded that
Travelers's answer of October 1992 raised no presumption that the
UM carrier was also representing the tortfeasor.51 Under the UM
statute, when an insurer is served with a copy of a summons or
complaint, the insurer becomes a party to the action and is allowed
to "defend the suit in the name of the uninsured motorist or in its
own name."'52 The insurer is then permitted "to file an answer in the
name of defendant to protect its interests, not defendant's interests,
without ... identifying itself by name."'53 The court stressed that
Travelers's filing "in the name of the defendant" did not raise a
presumption that it also represented the tortfeasor5 4 Consequently,
Travelers's answer had no effect on Nelson's ability to raise the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in his own answer. In other
words, since the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction was not raised
in Travelers's answer, only Travelers waived the defense. The court
stated: "Because there is no dispute that the defendant was not
served with process, the trial court therefore correctly allowed the
defendant's motion to dismiss [for lack of personal jurisdiction]." 5
With the claim against the tortfeasor dismissed, the court next
considered whether the Grimsleys were entitled to proceed solely
against their UM carrier. The North Carolina UM statute states that
uninsured motorist coverage policies "shall include coverage for the
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles because of injury to or destruction of the property of such
insured."'56 The court, consistent with North Carolina precedent,
held that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" means that an action
by the insured against its UM carrier is one for the tort allegedly
committed by the tortfeasor, with an insurer's liability derived from
the liability of the tortfeasor 7 Since the UM carrier defends from
50. Id& Rule 12(h)(1) provides: "A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person,....
insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived... (ii) if it is
neither made by motion... nor included in a responsive pleading .... ." N.C. R. CIV. P.
12(h)(1).
51. Grinsley, 117 N.C. App. at 334, 451 S.E.2d at 339.
52. IAL; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3)(a) (1993).
53. Grmnsley, 117 N.C. App. at 334, 451 S.E.2d at 339.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (emphasis added).
57. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 335, 451 S.E.2d at 339-40; see infra notes 73-144 and
accompanying text (discussing the precedent relied upon in Grimsley).
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the tortfeasor's position, the carrier is entitled to assert any defenses
available to the tortfeasor.58 Here, Travelers decided to participate
in the action, filed an answer, and therefore became an unnamed
party to the action. Since Travelers's answer failed to raise the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction that it was entitled to raise,
the company "waived its ability to avail itself of that defense... .""
The court concluded that although the insured was not able to obtain
a judgment against the tortfeasor because the action was dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the action against the UM carrier could
proceed because of Travelers's waiver.6' Accordingly, the court
reversed the trial court's order granting Travelers's motion for
judgment on the pleadings.6'
In his dissent, Judge Wynn considered the actual effect of the
majority's holding and concluded that the court improperly interpret
the statutory phrase "legally entitled to recover."62 Judge Wynn
began by stating, "I respectfully dissent because I believe that the
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage statute does not permit a direct
action by plaintiffs against their UM carrier, the consequence of the
majority's holding. ' Judge Wynn agreed with the majority's
conclusion that Travelers's answer signed "Appearing in the name of
the defendant" did not mean that the insurance company also
represented defendant Nelson.' Since Travelers did not represent
the defendant, it could not take any action on behalf of Nelson or
prevent him from asserting any defenses.' While Judge Wynn
agreed with this conclusion, he disagreed that the Grimsleys were
entitled to proceed directly against their UM carrier.6
Judge Wynn rested his dissent on the principle that in order to
be legally entitled to recover from a UM carrier, the insured must
58. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 335, 451 S.E.2d at 339-40; see Brown v. Lumbermens
Casualty Co., 285 N.C. 313, 319, 204 S.E.2d 829, 834 (1974) (stating that any defense
available to the uninsured tortfeasor should be available to the UM insurer). North
Carolina's position on this point differs from the majority of jurisdictions in the United
States, which hold that procedural defenses such as lack of personal jurisdiction or statute
of limitations bars are personal to the tortfeasor and may not be utilized by the UM
carrier. See JERRY, supra note 1, at 652.
59. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 336, 451 S.E.2d at 340.
60. Id.
61. Id
62. Id at 338, 451 S.E.2d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 336, 451 S.E.2d at 340 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 337, 451 S.E.2d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 337-38, 451 S.E2d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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first establish the liability of the tortfeasor because, in North Carolina,
"the UM carrier's liability is derivative of the tortfeasor's liability."'67
Further, Judge Wynn noted that North Carolina Supreme Court
precedent had established that to recover against the UM carrier, a
plaintiff must be legally entitled to recover against the
tortfeasor-that is, the plaintiff must be able to reduce his right to
damages from the tortfeasor to a judgment.' According to Judge
Wynn, since the Grimsleys could not obtain a judgment against
Nelson, the alleged tortfeasor, they were not legally entitled to
recover from Travelers. 9 Based on this interpretation .of the UM
statute, Judge Wynn contended that Travelers could not be held
liable; therefore, it was irrelevant whether Travelers waived the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.70
Judge Wynn provided an alternative argument for deciding the
case. To allow the Grimsleys legal redress for their injuries, Judge
Wynn argued that they should have been granted a time extension to
serve Nelson properly under Rule 6(b), section 1A-1 of the North
Carolina General Statutes.7 Judge Wynn noted that the required
excusable neglect was present in this case because the plaintiff had
relied on the deputy sheriff's certificate as proof of service.72
The North Carolina Supreme Court interprets "legally entitled to
recover" in cases of uninsured motorist disputes to mean that the
insured's right to recover against the insurer derives from the
insured's claim against the uninsured tortfeasor. In Brown v.
Lumbermens Casualty Co.,73 the court held that an insured's claim
against the insurance company for uninsured motorist coverage was
actually a claim for the tort allegedly committed by the uninsured
motorist; accordingly, the tort statute of limitations for the action
governed.74 In Brown, the plaintiff's intestate died in April of 1969
when the car he was driving was struck by an unidentified motorist's
car.7 The plaintiffs car was covered by a standard uninsured motor
67. Id. at 338, 451 S.E.2d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting); see infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
69. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 338, 451 S.E.2d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Wynn, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 339, 451 S.E.2d at 341-42 (Wynn, ., dissenting); see N.C. R. CIV. P. 6(b).
72. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 339, 451 S.E.2d at 342 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
73. 285 N.C. 313, 204 S.E.2d 829 (1974). See generally George H. Pender, Note, The
Duty to Defend. Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 13 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 141 (1990) (analyzing the impact of Brown on the uninsured motorist statute and on
the insurer's duty to defend).
74. Brown, 285 N.C. at 319, 204 S.E.2d at 834.
75. Id. at 314, 204 S.E.2d at 830.
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vehicle policy issued by the defendant, Lumbermens Casualty.6 The
plaintiff filed suit in April of 1972 against her insurer to recover the
policy limit for the death of one insured.77 The defendant's answer
argued that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations
applicable to a wrongful death action.78 The plaintiff insisted,
however, that the three-year contract statute of limitations applied
because her action against the insurer was based on their contract.79
The respective arguments for a tort or contract statute of
limitations turned on whether the phrase "legally entitled. to recover"
was interpreted to require a judgment against the tortfeasor or simply
a demonstration by the insured of fault on the part of the uninsured
motorist.8" The plaintiff argued that
"legally entitled to recover" denotes fault and means only
that plaintiff must be able to establish negligence on the part
of the uninsured motorist which proximately caused the
death of plaintiff's intestate .... Even though the uninsured
motorist's tortious conduct gives rise to plaintiff's rights
under the policy, plaintiff's claim against defendant is based
upon the insurance contract; therefore, the three-year
contract limitation should apply."1
Because the intent of the uninsured motorist statute was (and still is)
to afford protection to motorists harmed by those who are uninsured,
the plaintiff argued that the court should rule in favor of using the
longer contract statute of limitations, thereby affording greater
protection to insureds.'
The insurance company argued that the two-year tort statute of
limitations should apply because for an insured to recover he must
first establish that he is entitled to recover from the tortfeasor s3
The company further contended that, because the purpose of the UM
statute was to put an insured-an innocent victim of an uninsured
76. Id. The policy provided that the insurer would "pay all sums which the insured
or his legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured automobile because of: (a) bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death resulting therefrom... sustained by the insured." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id
79. Id. at 315, 204 S.E.2d at 831.
80. See id. at 315,204 S.E.2d at 831; 1 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERIN-
SURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 7.2, at 247 & n.3 (2d ed. 1992) (observing that most states
require only a demonstration of fault on the part of an uninsured motorist and listing cases
from 16 states so holding).
81. Brown, 285 N.C. at 316,204 S.E.2d at 831.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 316, 204 S.E.2d at 832.
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motorist-in the same position as if the motorist had been insured,
there was no reason why an insured should be given a longer statute
of limitations for a claim against her own insurer."
The North Carolina Supreme Court acknowledged that most state
courts of last resort in the country base an insured's right of action
against an insurance company upon contract law because the insurer's
liability depends on the existence of a contract." Accordingly, these
courts hold that the contract statute of limitations applies.8 6 Follow-
ing its recognition of the argument for a contract statute of limita-
tions, the court proceeded to adopt the opposite position, holding that
an insured's claim against the insurer is based solely upon the
underlying tort action." The court found no logical reason to allow
an insured a longer period during which to sue the insurer when the
company was available for suit during the two-year limitations
period. 8 The court concluded: "To be 'legally entitled to recover
damages' a plaintiff must not only have a cause of action but a
remedy by which he can reduce his right to damage to judgment. 8 9
If the tort statute of limitations against the tortfeasor has expired, the
insured is not able to obtain a judgment against the party at fault;
therefore, the insured is also not entitled to proceed against the
insurer.'f The court stated, "It is manifest, therefore, that despite
the contractual relation between plaintiff insured and defendant
insurer, this action is actually one for the tort allegedly committed by
the uninsured motorist. Any defense available to the uninsured
tortfeasor should be available to the insurer."9'
In Silvers v. Horace Mann Insurance Company,' the North
Carolina Supreme Court again addressed the issue of when an insured
is "legally entitled to recover" from the insurer if the insured's claim
against the tortfeasor has been extinguished or, as in this case, settled.
84. AL
85. Id at 317, 204 S.E.2d at 832-33.
86. See eg., Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 580, 583-84 (La. 1968);
Deluca v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 215 N.E.2d 482,484 (N.Y. 1966); Turlay
v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 488 P.2d 406,412 (Or. 1971); Pickering v. American Employers Ins.
Co., 282 A.2d 584, 588 (R.I. 1971); Schlief v. Harware Dealer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 404
S.W.2d 490, 493 (Tenn. 1966); Sahloff v. Western Casualty & Sur. Co., 171 N.W.2d 914,
915 (Wis. 1969).
87. Brown, 285 N.C. at 319, 204 S.E.2d at 833-34.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 319, 204 S.E.2d at 833.
90. Id at 319,204 S.E.2d at 834.
91. Id
92. 324 N.C. 289, 378 .E.2d 21 (1989).
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In Silvers, the plaintiff's son was killed in a single-vehicle accident
while a passenger in a car driven by James Bell and owned by Robert
Bell.93 The plaintiff, who was covered by an underinsured motorist
policy (UIM policy), filed a wrongful death action against James and
Robert Bell.94 Vithout notice to her insurance carrier, Horace
Mann, and therefore in violation of her policy, the plaintiff entered
into a consent judgment with the tortfeasor Bell and his insurance
carrier." The plaintiff then instituted an action against Horace
Mann to recover the deficiency under her UIM coverage.96 Horace
Mann defended with an argument based on Brown. Because the
plaintiff had released the tortfeasors from any further liability through
the consent judgment, Horace Mann asserted that she was "no longer
legally entitled to recover from the tortfeasors and thus no longer
entitled to recover from defendants."97
The court looked to Brown for guidance in interpreting both the
policy and the statutory provisions that required the insured to be
"legally entitled to recover."98 The court found that, although other
courts interpret the phrase to mean that the insured must only be able
to establish the fault of the uninsured motorist,9  North Carolina's
interpretation views the UIM carrier's liability as derivative in na-
ture."' The case would have been decided against the plaintiff on
this basis, since the court found that a release of the uninsured
motorist would release the insurer of its derivative liability.101
However, since both the policy and the statute contained exhaustion
93. lId at 290, 378 S.E.2d at 23.
94. Id. at 290-91, 378 S.E.2d at 23.
95. Id. at 291-92, 378 S.E.2d at 23.
96. Id. at 292, 378 S.E.2d at 23-24.
97. Id. at 292-93, 378 S.E.2d at 24. The uninsured motorist policy provision (which
included underinsured vehicles) stated, "We will pay damages which a covered person is
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle
because of: 1. Bodily injured sustained by a covered person and caused by an accident;
and 2. Property damage caused by an accident." Silvers, 324 N.C. at 293,378 S.E.2d at 24.
Similar to most policies, this one paralleled the language used in North Carolina's
uninsured motorist provision. /M.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20.279.21(b)(3) (1993).
98. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 293, 378 S.E.2d at 24.
99. Id. at 294, 378 S.E.2d at 25; see; eg., Karlson v. City of Oklahoma City, 711 P.2d
72, 74-75 (Okla. 1985) (holding that "legally entitled to recover" means that the" 'insured
must be able to establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to
damages and prove the extent of those damages' ") (quoting Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co.,
662 P.2d 681, 685 (Okla. 1983)); infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing how
other states have interpreted legally entitled to recover).
100. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 294, 378 S.E.2d at 25.
101. I. at 294-95, 378 S.E2d at 25.
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clauses that were logically inconsistent with other provisions, the court
sought to reconcile them before making its decision."°
Exhaustion clauses in underinsured motorist policies and statutes
provide that underinsured coverage will only apply when the damages
sustained by an insured exceed the-limit of the tortfeasor's liability
coverage-that is, when, by reason of judgment or settlement, the
liability insurance of the underinsured vehicle has been exhausted.1"u
The exhaustion clause, coupled with the language "legally entitled to
recover" in both the policy and the statute provisions, essentially
required the insured "both to preserve the cause of action against the
tortfeasor and to settle the case before seeking UIM benefits."'"
To resolve these inconsistent provisions, the court addressed both the
policy and the statute.
With respect to the policy provisions, the court concluded that
the insured could reasonably have read the policy to require that she
settle her claim with the underinsured motorist before instituting a
claim against her UIM carrier."°  To resolve the ambiguous policy
provisions, the court relied on the principle that contracts are to be
construed against the drafter, who had the best opportunity to protect
its interests.' 6
To reconcile the inconsistent statutory provisions, the court
looked to the purpose and intent of the legislature in drafting the
statute.1' 7  The court noted the statute's remedial purpose of
102. The insurer's UIM policy declared that "[w]e will pay under this coverage only
after the limits of liability under any applicable liability bonds or policies have been
exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements." I&L at 294, 378 S.E.2d at 25. The
North Carolina UIM statute in effect at the time the policy was executed stated, "The
insurer shall not be obligated to make any payment ... to which underinsured motorist
insurance coverage applies ... until after the limits of liability under all bodily injury
liability bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident have been
exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements... ." An Act to Clarify the Law
Concerning Uninsured Motorist Coverage, ch. 777, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 958, 958
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1993)). While the court's resolution of the
exhaustion clause issue is not directly relevant to a discussion of Grimsley, the supreme
court's opinion in Silvers is insightful in demonstrating the court's reliance on the remedial
purpose of the state's UIM statute in order to reach a decision.
103. 3 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 35.2, at 45-47.
104. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 295, 378 S.E.2d at 25.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see Chavis v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 259, 262, 347 S.E.2d 425, 427
(1986); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 630, 319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (1984); 1
WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.6, at 264-66.
107. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296, 378 S.E.2d at 25; see McLean v. McLean, 323 N.C. 543,
548-49, 374 S.E.2d 376, 380 (1988) (recognizing that to resolve internally conflicting
statutory provisions the purpose of the statute should be considered).
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protecting innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists.'
The court, quoting the court of appeals, agreed that" '[t]he statute is
remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed to effectuate its
purpose of providing coverage for damages to injured parties caused
by insured motorists with liability coverage not sufficient to provide
complete compensation for the damages.' "I' Based on principles
of contract interpretation and the remedial purpose underlying the
statute, the court concluded that the insured's settlement with the
underinsured motorist did not bar her from recovering UIM benefits
from Horace Mann." °
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also examined the
purpose and intent of the state's UIM statute to resolve an issue
concerning an insurer's derivative liability and an insured's settlement
with a tortfeasor."' In Gurganious v. Integon General Insurance
Corp., the court of appeals held that the dismissal with prejudice
of the insureds' claim against the tortfeasor did not bar a subsequent
action against the UIM carrier to recover the limits of their UIM
policy." In Gurganious, one of the plaintiffs was injured when the
car in which she was a passenger and which was insured by Integon
General Insurance, was negligently struck by the defendant Tammy
Parker Allen."4 The plaintiffs filed an action against Allen and
notified Integon, informing it that Allen's liability insurer had offered
the extent of her coverage ($25,000) in full settlement." s Integon
failed to match the offer from the tortfeasor's insurance company and
also failed to defend the action-its two courses of action under the
108. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296, 378 S.E2d at 26; see Proctor v. North Carolina Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 221, 224, 376 S.E2d 761, 763 (1989) (stating that "the
purpose of this state's compulsory motor vehicle insurance laws ... was and is the
protection of innocent victims who may be injured by financially irresponsible motorists").
109. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296,378 S.E.2d at 26 (quoting Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co.,
90 N.C. App. 1, 5, 367 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1988)). For other cases similarly construing the
purpose and intent of the legislature, see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life and
Casualty Co., 283 N.C. 87, 90, 194 S.E2d 834, 837 (1973); Wright v. Fidelity & Casualty,
270 N.C. 577, 585, 155 S.E.2d 100, 106 (1967); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Smith, 67 N.C.
App. 632, 636, 313 S.E.2d 856, 860, disc rev. denied, 311 N.C. 306, 317 S.E.2d 682 (1984).
110. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296, 378 S.E.2d at 27-28.
111. Gurganious v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 108 N.C. App. 163,163-68,423 S.E.2d 317,
318-20 (1992), disc rev. denied, 333 N.C. 538 (1993).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 168, 423 S.E.2d at 319-20.
114. Id. at 164, 423 S.E.2d at 318. The policy held by the car's driver included guests
as persons insured and covered them against uninsured motorists. Id.
115. Id. at 164-65, 423 S.E.2d at 318.
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North Carolina UIM statute.11 6  The plaintiffs accepted the
tortfeasor's settlement offer and their action against Allen was
dismissed with prejudice. 7 The plaintiffs then filed a claim against
Integon for underinsured motorist coverage."' The insurer
defended by claiming that because its liability was derivative of the
tortfeasor's liability, and the plaintiffs' claim against the tortfeasor had
been dismissed with prejudice, any action against the insurer was
barred by res judicata." 9
The court examined the supreme court's decision in Silvers v.
Horace Mann Insurance Company 2 and recognized that an
insured's claim against its UIM carrier will not always be barred due
to a final judgment between the tortfeasor and the insured. The
court then distinguished the supreme court's discussion in Silvers
regarding the North Carolina UIM statute, because the statute was
amended in 1985 to provide substantially different procedures for
UIM benefits claims."2 Pursuant to the statute, the insured is
obligated to notify the insurer when the tortfeasor has extended an
116. Id. The UIM statute provides the insurer with two methods of protecting its
subrogation rights. The statute provides:
No insurer shall exercise any right of subrogation or any right to approve
settlement with the original owner, operator, or maintainer of the underinsured
highway vehicle under a policy providing coverage against an underinsured
motorist where the insurer has been provided with written notice before a
settlement between its insured and the underinsured motorist and the insurer fails
to advance a payment to the insured in an amount equal to the tentative
settlement within 30 days following receipt of that notice.... Upon receipt of
notice, the underinsured motorist insurer shall have the right to appear in defense
of the claim without being named as a party therein ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1993).
117. Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 165, 423 S.E.2d at 318.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 324 N.C. 289,378 S.E.2d 21 (1989); see supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
121. Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 165,423 S.E.2d at 318; see Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296,
378 S.E.2d at 27-28.
122. Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 166, 423 S.E.2d at 318. For the text of the 1985
procedures under the UIM statute, which remain the same under the 1993 version, see
supra note 102. See generally John F. Buckley, Note, Underinsured Motorist Coverage:
Legislative Solutions to Settlement Difficulties, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1408 (1986) (discussing the
1985 amendments to the North Carolina UIM statute which were enacted to resolve
settlement conflicts which had not arisen in UM settlements); Melinda R. Ledden, Note,
Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Virginia: The Scope of Protection & the New Underin-
surance Provisions, 69 VA. L. REV. 355 (1983) (discussing the scope of coverage under
Virginia's uninsured motorist statute and the 1982 underinsurance amendments); J. Sue
Myatt, Note, Settlement Procedures in Underinsured Motorist Cases, 14 J. CORP. L. 175
(1988) (describing and evaluating various states' settlement procedures regarding
underinsured motorist policies).
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offer." At that point, the insurer may either "advance a payment
to the insured in an amount equal to the tentative settlement"'"
and thereby reserve its subrogation rights, or "appear in defense of
the claim without being named as a party therein."" According to
the court, because Integon did neither in this case, it did not have the
right to object to the plaintiff's settlement with the tortfeasor.'
Consequently, the court held that Silvers controlled the case despite
the new 1985 procedures because the defendant failed to take
advantage of them."z
The court also pointed out that the 1985 version of the North
Carolina UIM statute "appears to require exhaustion of all liability
policies by judgment or settlement before the UIM carrier must
pay."' 28 The court determined that the plaintiffs reasonably could
have interpreted that section to require that they first settle or obtain
a judgment from the tortfeasor before looking to the UIM carrier for
reimbursement.29 In this case, as the supreme court had done in
Silvers, the court of appeals held that the statute should be liberally
construed to effectuate the remedial intent of the legislature in
passing the act.' Therefore, the court concluded that
[w]here the UIM carrier chooses not to avail itself of those
[new] procedures ... and leaves the injured plaintiffs to
their own devices, it has no right to object to the settlement
123. Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 166, 423 S.E.2d at 318; see N.C. GEN. STAT. §
20-279.21(b)(4).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4).
125. Id.
126. Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 166, 423 S.E.2d at 319.
127. lAl
128. Id. The relevant statute provided: "Underinsured motorist coverage shall be
deemed to apply when, by reason of payment of judgment or settlement, all liability bonds
or insurance policies providing coverage for bodily injury caused by the ownership,
maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehicle have been exhausted." An Act
to Improve the Regulation of Insurance, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 862, 862-64
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1993)).
129. Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 167, 423 S.E.2d at 319.
130. Id at 168, 423 S.E.2d at 319. The court stated:
Just as in Silvers, we look to the purpose of the statute as a guide to the
intent of the legislature. The amendments to the statute in 1985 did not change
the remedial nature of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility
Act. The Act is still to be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose of
providing coverage to motorists injured by underinsured motorists. In light of the
Act's remedial purpose, we hold that plaintiffs are not barred from recovering
UIM benefits from defendant because of the dismissal with prejudice of the
underlying claim against the primary tortfeasor.
Id. at 168, 423 S.E.2d at 320.
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of the primary claim and cannot complain when the insureds
attempt to take the steps they feel necessary to recover from
the UIM carrier ....
In Spivey v. Lowery,' the court of appeals, confronted with a
slightly different factual scenario than that of Gurganious, once again
addressed the issue of an insurer's derivative liability. Here the court
held that the insured's general release of the tortfeasor barred any
claim the insured may have had against the insurer.33 In Spivey,
the plaintiff was traveling in a car driven by her sister and insured by
The Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford) when the
car was involved in an accident with Woodrow Lowery.' With
permission from Hartford, the plaintiff accepted a settlement from
Lowery's liability insurer for $25,000.13s The plaintiff then, without
Hartford's approval, signed a general release that discharged Lowery
from any further claims she may have had with respect to the
accident. 6 The plaintiff then filed an action against Hartford for
UIM coverage.' Hartford defended by arguing that the general
release signed by the plaintiff barred her claim against Hartford
because its liability was derivative of the tortfeasor's liability.38
Although neither party expressly disputed the issue, the court
first reaffirmed that an insurance carrier's liability is derivative of the
tortfeasor's liability. 9 The court stated that this interpretation
applied to both underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage since
the North Carolina UIM statute also provided that liability insurance
extends only to those "legally entitled to recover" damages from the
tortfeasor.' 4 With this in mind, the court ruled that the plaintiff
was no longer legally entitled to recover damages from Lowery
131. Id.
132. 116 N.C. App. 124,446 S.E.2d at 835 (1994).
133. I& at 127, 446 S.E.2d at 837-38.
134. 1 at 125,446 S.E.2d at 836.
135. Id.
136. Id. The release provided that the plaintiff was releasing the tortfeasor, his insurer
Integon and "all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or partnerships of and
from any and all claims of action, demands, rights, [and] damages... whatsoever, which
the undersigned now has ... or which may hereafter accrue ... [as a result of] the
accident." I& (alteration in original).
137. Id. at 125,446 S.E.2d at 836-37.
138. Id
139. Id. at 126,446 S.E.2d at 837 (citing Buchanan v. Buchanan, 83 N.C. App. 428,430-
31, 350 S.E2d 175, 177 (1986) (holding that since an insurer's liability is derivative, there
was no basis of liability once the insured released the tortfeasor), disc. rev. denied, 319
N.C. 224, 353 S.E.2d 406 (1987)).
140. Id. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1993).
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because of the general release signed along with the settlement.141
The court reasoned that "since plaintiff released the tortfeasor,
Lowery, plaintiff may not assert a claim against Hartford because of
the derivative nature of Hartford's liability.""14 Further, although
Hartford consented to the settlement, Hartford did not consent to the
general release of the tortfeasor, which proved fatal to the plaintiff's
claim.'43 The court found that the plaintiff's intent in signing the
release was irrelevant; even though she did not intend to release the
UIM carrier, that was the ultimate effect of her release of the
tortfeasor because of the strict derivative liability of the UIM car-
rier.' 4
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the North Carolina
courts have strained to effectuate the legislative intent behind the UM
and UIM statutes by finding exceptions to Brown's rigid
interpretation of "legally entitled to recover." Grimsley is a continua-
tion of that pattern, as the court of appeals once again struggled to
stay faithful to the supreme court's ruling while protecting the rights
of innocent insured motorists under the state's UM statute. Although
confusing at first glance, the court of appeals' decision in'Grimsley v.
Nelson is understandable, based on precedent.
According to the North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in
Brown'45 and subsequent decisions by the court of appeals,"'46 an
insurer's liability is derivative of the tortfeasor's liability and the
insurer is permitted to assert any defense available to the
tortfeasor.147 This strict literal interpretation of the phrase "legally
entitled to recover" holds that the insured's claim against his insurer
is one based solely on the tort committed by the uninsured motorist
141. Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837. The court distinguished Silvers
and Gurganious by stating: "We find that Silvers and Gurganious are distinguishable from
the case at hand. Neither involved a general release. There is no language in either case
which indicates that an insurer's consent to settlement would render that insurer subject
to suit even if the plaintiff had signed a general release." Id. at 127, 446 S.E.2d at 837.
142. Id. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837.
143. Id. at 127-28, 446 S.E2d at 837-38.
144. Id. at 127, 446 S.E.2d at 838.
145. Brown v. Lumbermens Casualty Co., 285 N.C. 313, 319-20, 204 S.E.2d 829, 834
(1974); see supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
146. Spivey v. Lowery, 116 N.C. App. 124, 446 S.E.2d 835 (1994); Gurganious v.
Integon Gen. Ins. Co., 108 N.C. App. 163,423 S.E.2d 317 (1992), disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C.
538 (1993); see supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text (discussing Spivey); supra notes
111-31 and accompanying text (discussing Gurganious).
147. See Brown, 285 N.C. at 319, 204 S.E.2d at 834.
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and not on the insurance contract."4  Under this view, the
Grimsleys' insurer, Travelers, was entitled to the same defenses as
Nelson, the uninsured motorist, including the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction.149 Travelers waived that defense, however, by
failing to raise it in its answer." The court, consistent with prior
decisions, held that the Grimsleys could proceed solely against their
UM carrier because of Travelers's procedural error. The decision
produced a peculiar result when compared to the strict interpretation
of "legally entitled to recover" favored by the North Carolina
courts." 2 Because the Grimsleys' claim against Nelson was dis-
missed for lack of personal jurisdiction, they technically were not
"legally entitled to recover" from him. The ordinary result would
then be a dismissal of the Grimsleys' claim against their UM carrier;
however, as a result of Travelers's error, the Grimsleys did not lose
their ability to seek benefits from their insurer. The court recognized
that they would not have been allowed to do so absent Travelers's
unintentional waiver.'53
It is readily apparent that Brown carries the potential to produce
inherently unfair results in direct contravention of the legislative
intent behind North Carolina's UM and UIM statutes. Although the
Grimsley court managed to sidestep the unfairness of Brown's strict
mandate, it did so only because the Grimsleys' UM carrier, Travelers,
failed to avail itself of the insurer-friendly Brown doctrine by asserting
the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasor. It is
unlikely that Travelers, or any other North Carolina UM insurer, will
do so again after this decision. Consequently, this Note advocates
that North Carolina adopt the position of the majority of jurisdictions
that have addressed the issue and treat procedural defenses, such as
lack of personal jurisdiction and statute of limitations bars, as
148. Id.; see also Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289,294,378 S.E.2d 21,24
(1989) (construing "legally entitled to recover" to mean that the insurer's liability is
derivative); supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
149. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 334, 451 S.E.2d at 339.
150. IL at 335-36, 451 S.E.2d at 340.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 73-144 and accompanying text.
153. Grimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 335-36, 451 S.E.2d at 339-40. The court concluded:
Furthermore, Travelers, by failing to properly assert the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction in its answer, may not rely on the defense that plaintiffs
cannot 'reduce (their) right to judgment' against defendant because of lack of
personal jurisdiction in determining whether plaintiffs are 'legally entitled to
recover damages' from defendant.
IA at 336, 451 S.E.2d at 340.
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unavailable to UM and UIM carriers. Such an approach would
alleviate the necessity for nifty footwork on the part of the North
Carolina courts (or for handy oversights on the part of UM carriers
like Travelers) to accomplish what is all too clearly the legislative
intent behind UM and UIM statutes. 4
Since the inception of uninsured motorist coverage, the phrase
"legally entitled to recover" has been subject to varying
interpretations.' Insurers have continually argued that the phrase
should be interpreted to mandate that the claim between insured and
insurer should be one for the underlying tort, thereby permitting the
insurer to assert all of the tortfeasor's defenses.1 16 The traditional
argument in favor of interpreting the suit as a tort claim, and the
argument advanced by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Brown,' 7 is that the phrase "legally entitled to recover" should be
literally construed.' This argument contends that if a tortfeasor
can raise a defense that would preclude the insured's claim against
her, then the insurer should also be permitted to raise the defense
against the insured's claim for indemnification. 9
The defenses that a tortfeasor may raise to preclude recovery
have been classified as either substantive or procedural. 6' Substan-
tive defenses that provide the tortfeasor protection from the insured's
claim include the parent-child immunity,161  interspousal im-
munity,'6 governmental immunity,16' and charitable organization
154. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (noting the Silvers court's advocacy
of liberal construction to effectuate the UM statute's remedial purpose).
155. See 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.6, at 264.
156. See ia at 263-64.
157. Brown v. Lumbermens Casualty Co., 285 N.C. 313,319,204 S.E.2d 829,834 (1974).
158. See 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.6, at 264.
159. See id.
160. JERRY, supra note 1, § 133(b)(2), at 652.
161. Id. See generally Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search
of Justifi cation, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (1982) (discussing the origins of the immunity,
its current status and the social costs/benefits that it generates).
162. JERRY, supra note 1, § 133(b)(2), at 652. See generally J. Michael Combs,
Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity. An Analysis of a Dying Doctrine and Its Status in
Tennessee, 47 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1979) (analyzing the immunity's historical basis, its
status in Tennessee, and the effect of then-recent United States Supreme Court decisions
on its viability); Patty Ferraiolo, Case Comment, Uninsured Motorist Coverage and
Interspousal Immunity: Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 396 N.E.2d 528 (Ill. 1979), 57
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 297 (1981) (examining the immunity according to Illinois precedent
and in light of Elkins).
163. 1 WiDiss, supra note 80, § 7.14, at 295. See generally S. Stockwell Stoutamire,
Note, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity Is Alive and Welk Commercial Carrier Corp.
v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979), 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (1980)
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immunity." In the states that continue to recognize these substan-
tive immunities,"6 courts have construed the immunities as absolute
bars to an insured's cause of action against the tortfeasor and the
insurer." While courts permit insurers to assert an uninsured
motorist's substantive defenses, the result is not the same with respect
to what have been referred to as procedural immunities.167
Although "[t]he substantive-procedural distinction is extremely
amorphous,"'" defenses such as the statute of limitations have
usually been viewed as procedural bars.169 Such procedural defenses
are interpreted as personal to the tortfeasor; many states preclude
insurers from using them to prevent an insured from seeking
indemnification. As Professor Widiss acknowledges,
[T]he immunity only absolves the defendant from liability.
Since the uninsured motorist insurance company has no
relation to the tortfeasor and allowing an insured to recover
uninsured motorist insurance benefits does not adversely
affect any interest of... [the uninsured motorist] which the
tort .immunity protects, the tort immunity should have no
effect on whether an insurance company providing first
party, uninsured motorist insurance coverage for an in-
dividual is obligated to indemnify the insured. 1
Although the courts have not considered, in this context, whether
the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is a procedural or substan-
tive defense,"7 it is logically a procedural defense. Under the above
rationale, it would therefore be personal to the tortfeasor and unavail-
able to an insurer.
(providing a brief discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in light of Commercial
Carrier Corp.).
164. 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.14, at 295. See generally Bradley C. Canon & Dean
Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The Abrogation of Charitable
Immunity, 13 LAw & Soc'y REV. 969 (1979) (examining the political and social
consequences of the charitable immunity's decline).
165. Professor Widiss states that "the justification for various tort immunities is
currently undergoing reexamination by the courts. For example, the charitable immunity
is gradually being abolished by judicial decisions. Similar trends in regard to other tort
immunities can also be discerned." 1 WIDiSS, supra note 80, § 7.14, at 297.
166. See JERRY, supra note 1, at 652.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 1d.; 2 IRVIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 18.01[4] (2d
ed. 1981).
170. Id.
171. 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.14, at 296.
172. See JERRY, supra note 1, § 133, at 652; 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.14, at 297.
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In holding that an insured's right to recover from an insurer is
based solely on the underlying tort claim against the uninsured
motorist, North Carolina's literal interpretation of "legally entitled to
recover" represents an extreme minority position.173 Most jurisdic-
tions across the United States construe the phrase to require simply
that injuries result from the negligent conduct of an uninsured
motorist.'74 Under this majority view, the insured's claim against
her UM carrier is based on the contract, not the underlying tort.175
The issue of whether the insured's right to assert a claim based on his
uninsured motorist coverage is based on a tort claim or a contract
claim most often has been litigated in cases like Brown, where the
controversy centered around whether a contract or tort statute of
limitations should govern the action. 6 Although these cases
address the defense of the statute of limitations as a bar to recovery,
and Grimsley concerned the defense of lack of'personal jurisdiction,
the cases are similar in that they all involve "procedural defenses."
173. See 2 SCHERMER, supra note 169, § 18.01 (2d ed. 1981); 1 WIDISS, supra note 80,
§ 7.6; supra text accompanying note 85 (noting the North Carolina Supreme Court's
recognition of the majority view and of its minority stance).
174. 1 WiDIss, supra note 80, § 7.2. See, e.g., Harvey v. Mitchell, 522 So. 2d 771, 773
(Ala. 1988) (stating that legally entitled to recover includes: "(1) establishing fault on the
part of the uninsured motorist; and (2) proving the extent of the damages"); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Elkins, 381 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Il1. App. Ct. 1978) (concluding that legally entitled to
recover means that the insured only has to be able to establish the fault of the uninsured
motorist, not that "the insurer stands in the shoes of the uninsured motorist who is the
tortfeasor"), affd, 396 N.E.2d 528 (1979); Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Lamb, 361 N.E.2d 174,
180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that legally entitled to recover means that the insured
may recover from an insurer only after establishing the fault of the tortfeasor); Winner v.
Ratzlaff, 505 P.2d 606, 610 (Kan. 1973) (construing legally entitled to recover to mean that
insured must be able to prove the fault of the uninsured motorist and that the damages
arose from that fault); Barfield v. Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107, 1112 (Okla. 1987) (stating that
legally entitled to recover "does not mean that an insured must be able to proceed against
an uninsured/underinsured in tort in order to collect uninsured motorist benefits" because
recovery is based on the contract between the insured and insurer); accord Booth v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 218 So. 2d 580,583 (La. 1969); Reese v. Preferred Risk Mutual
Ins. Co., 457 S.W.2d 205,208 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Crossley v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co.,
251 N.W.2d 383,386 (Neb. 1977); Satzinger v. Satzinger, 383 A.2d 753,756-57 (NJ. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1978); DeLuca v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 215 N.E.2d 482,484
(N.Y. 1966).
175. 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.6, at 269. Professor Widiss would have the state
legislatures determine whether the tort or contract statute of limitations should govern UM
actions: "In the absence of legislation, piecemeal judicial application of the tort statute of
limitations to uninsured motorist insurance claims predicated solely on a possible
construction of the term 'legally entitled'.., would be unreasonable as well as unwise."
Id
176. See id. § 7.6, at 263; infra note 177 and accompanying text (listing cases from other
jurisdictions).
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The precedent from other jurisdictions discussed below deals only
with the statute of limitations defense, but it is sufficiently analogous
to lack of personal jurisdiction to be of help. The underlying
rationale of these cases is instructive in determining: (1) whether the
insured's action should be treated as based on the underlying tort or
on the contract, and (2) whether an insurer should be permitted to
utilize all of the same defenses as the uninsured motorist.
The majority of jurisdictions have held that in the absence of an
express contract provision to the contrary, the contract statute of
limitations should apply to an insured's claim against her insurer for
uninsured motorists benefits because the cause of action is based on
the contract.'77 In Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Dierolf,"78 the
Superior Court of New Jersey held that the six-year contract statute
of limitations-not the two-year tort statute of limitations-governed
a demand for arbitration under an uninsured motorist policy.79 In
Dierolf, the insurer sought to prevent its insured from obtaining relief
under his uninsured motorist policy because his demand for formal
arbitration of his uninsured motorist claim was made eight months
after the tort statute of limitations had run."s  Selected Risks
argued that the tort statute of limitations was applicable because
under the policy the insured could recover only if "legally entitled to
recover" from the uninsured motorist.'8' Invoking the same ar-
gument accepted in Brown, the insurer maintained that the insured
"must establish all of the elements of a tort action to obtain recovery,
and in such an action failure to comply with the tort statute of
limitations would be a bar to recovery .... [T]herefore a claimant
who fails to comply with the statute is not 'legally entitled to recover'."'182
177. 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.6. Professor Widiss states, "The appellate courts
almost uniformly hold that in the absence of any provision in the insurance policy coverage
terms, the contract statute of limitations applies." Id. § 7.7, at 269; eg., Burnett v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 408 So. 2d 838, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the
insured's claim against insurer arose out of the contract and therefore that the five-year
contract statute limitations applied to the action); Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 218
So. 2d 580, 583 (La. 1969) (holding that the shorter tort statute of limitations was personal
to the uninsured motorist and could not be used as a defense by the insurer); accord
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spinelli, 443 A.2d 1286, 1290 (Del. 1982); Lemrick v. Grinnell Mut.
Reinsurance Co., 263 N.W.2d 714,717 (Iowa 1978); Van Hoozer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 549
P.2d 1354, 1366-67 (Kan. 1976); Reese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 403 A.2d 1229,
1232 (Md. 1979); Schulz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 244 N.E.2d 546, 549-50 (Ohio Misc. 1968).
178. 350 A.2d 526 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975).
179. Id. at 532.
180. Id at 528.
181. Id,
182. Id,
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The court noted that the majority of jurisdictions813 that have
ruled on the issue have held that the contract statute of limitations
should apply to claims for uninsured motorist benefits rather than the
tort statute of limitations." The court rejected Selected Risks'
argument that "legally entitled to recover" requires a recovery in tort;
instead, the court stated that "legal entitlement.., is a factual issue
which cannot include compliance with a statute of limitations, a legal
issue."'" Further, the court held that institution of a claim against
the uninsured motorist was not a prerequisite to recovery because the
insured's right to recover from the insurer was ultimately based on
their contract.8 6 Based on this reasoning, the court ruled that the
six-year statute of limitations applied to an insured's claim against the
insurer."s
Similarly, in Franco v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"s the Supreme
Court of Texas ruled that the four-year statute of limitations
pertaining to contract actions, rather than the two-year statute of
limitations for tort actions, applied to an insured's personal injury and
wrongful death claim under the uninsured motorist policy."s  In
Franco, the insured sued Allstate to recover for the death of his
daughter and personal injuries he sustained when involved in an
accident with an allegedly negligent uninsured motorist.9 ° Because
the suit was filed three years after the date of the accident, 91
Allstate invoked a statute of limitations defense, arguing that "both
the claim for personal injuries and the claim for death are subject to
the two-year statute of limitations, because they arise not out of a
debt but from a tort alleged to have been committed by the uninsured
motorist."'" In addition, Allstate maintained that, with regard to
the wrongful death claim, the two-year limitation prescribed in the
wrongful death statute should apply."9
183. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
184. Dierolf, 350 A.2d at 529 (citing Annotation, Automobile Insurance: Time
Limitations as to Claims Based on Uninsured Motorist Clause, 28 A.L.R.3d 580, 585
(1969)).
185. Id at 530.
186. Id at 530-31.
187. Id at 531.
188. 505 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1974).
189. Id at 793.
190. Id at 790.
191. Id.
192. Id at 790-91.
193. Id. at 791.
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The court first noted that "the great weight of authority"'94 has
held that the statute of limitations for contracts should apply to
actions by an insured based on a written contract.' 95 The court
stated, "The reasoning of the courts and the texts is that, although
ultimate recovery in this type of action depends upon proof of
damages due to the tort of an uninsured third party, the cause of
action against the insurer arises by reason of the written
contract."' 96 Allstate claimed that, under the contract, its liability
was limited to what the insured was "legally entitled to recover" from
the tortfeasor.'" It further argued that it had the right to assert all
defenses available to the tortfeasor, including a statute of limitations
defense.198 The court rejected Allstate's "narrow definition" and
held that "legally entitled to recover" means "simply that the insured
must be able to show fault on the part of the uninsured motorist and
the extent of the resulting damages .... [I]t is not a bar to recovery
from the insurer because the tortfeasor could have interposed a
statute of limitations."'199 The court also dismissed Allstate's ar-
gument that the wrongful death statute and the two-year limit for
filing a tort action should apply to Franco's claim.' The court
reasoned that since both causes of action, personal injury and
wrongful death, were based on the same insurance contract, the
contract statute of limitations applied to both."
By permitting the insurer to step into the shoes of the uninsured
motorist and assert any defense available to the tortfeasor, North
Carolina is clearly an exception to the majority rule.' Another
exception involves those states that require an action to be filed
against the uninsured motorist before allowing compensation by the
UM carrier.' Professor Widiss notes that in these states, because
194. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
195. Id. at 791.
196. Id at 791-92.
197. Id. at 792.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. IL at 792-93.
201. IM. at 792.
202. See 1 WiDISS, supra note 80, § 7.7, at 273.
203. The states that have such a requirement are Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee
and Virginia. Id.; see Vaughn v. Collum, 224 S.E.2d 416,416 (Ga. 1976); Lawson v. Porter,
180 S.E2d 643, 644 (S.C. 1971) (forbidding ex contractu actions (actions on the contract)
unless judgment has been entered against the tortfeasor in an ex delicto action (action to
establish the tortfeasor's liability)); Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co, 468 S.W.2d
727,728-30 (Tenn. 1971); Rodgers v. Danko, 129 S.E.2d 828,830 (Va. 1963) (distinguishing
between actions ex delicto and ex contractu and allowing the latter only after judgment has
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"the insured is required to file an action against the tortfeasor as a
condition precedent to the right to recover under the uninsured
motorist coverage statute ... the running of the tort statute of
limitations precludes a subsequent insurance coverage claim."' For
example, in Vaughn v. Collum, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the tort statute of limitations should apply because "[i]f there is
no tort liability, there is no responsibility to pay the tort judgment as
provided by the contract." 6
Even if the substantive-procedural/personal-nonpersonal
distinction is not accepted, an additional and equally persuasive
reason exists why the various immunities, including statute of
limitations and lack of personal jurisdiction defenses, should not
preclude an insured from recovering from her insurer. Professor
'Widiss suggests that it is not preferable to decide solely in terms of
semantics whether the insured is legally entitled to recover,2" which
is precisely what the North Carolina Supreme Court did in
Brown.' Instead, according to Professor Widiss, the court should
take a policy-oriented approach and determine if a ."persuasive
reason" exists for shielding an insurer from liability based on a
defense that the tortfeasor was able to plead successfuly.2 In
Professor Widiss's view, what should matter most to the courts is that
the insured will not be compensated if an insurer is permitted to
been entered against the tortfeasor in the former).
204. 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.7, at 273. Professor Widiss also discusses two other
exceptions to the general rule. First, if the policy specifically provides for a shorter statute
of limitations, that limit will often be enforced. Id § 7.11. Second, if the claim is for
wrongful death benefits, and the state's wrongful death statute prescribes a particular
statute of limitations apart from the general statute of limitations for tort actions, that may
be applied. Id. § 7.8. For a case dealing with the applicability of a separate wrongful
death statute of limitations, see Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Exch., 369 N.E.2d 1093 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1977).
205. 224 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 1976).
206. Id.
207. 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, at 296.
208. Brown v. Lumbermens Casualty Co., 285 N.C. 313,319,204 S.E.2d 829,834 (1974).
Refusing to depart from literal construction of the phrase, the court stated:
In our view it would indeed constitute "antics with semantics" to say that a
litigant with a stale tort claim, one against which the applicable statute of
limitations has been 'specifically pleaded, remains "legally entitled to recover"
when his remedy has been taken away! To be "legally entitled to recover
damages" a plaintiff must not only have a cause of action but a remedy by which
he can reduce his right to damage to judgment.
I at 319, 204 S.E.2d at 833.
209. 1 WIDISS, supra note 80, § 7.14, at 296-97.
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assert the tortfeasor's defenses.210 The purpose and intent behind
most uninsured motorist statutes, including that of North
Carolina,' is to ensure that a motorist injured due to the
negligence of an uninsured motorist is not left uncompensated.
Professor Widiss acknowledges this point by stating that
[t]he uninsured motorist insurance statutes, which require
the coverage either to be offered with or included in all
motor vehicle or automobile liability insurance policies,
reflect a strong public policy in favor of providing indem-
nification for persons who are injured by uninsured
motorists.... It is probable that in states where the trend
is to assure that a source of indemnification is available, the
courts will reject the argument that tort immunities should
bar recovery. 1
By allowing insurers to deny recovery to their insureds through
the use of the tortfeasor's defenses, the North Carolina approach is
directly contrary to the public goals behind UM legislation. That an
insured is not entitled to pursue a tort claim against an uninsured
motorist because of a procedural bar such as lack of personal
jurisdiction should not close the door to recovery in the form of unin-
sured motorist benefits from a first-party insurer.2 ' In Grinsley, if
Travelers had raised the tortfeasor's defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction, the Grimsleys would have been prevented from
recovering benefits from their UM carrier 14 In order to implement
legislative intent, North Carolina courts should follow the
interpretation of "legally entitled to recover" used by various other
courts2' in order to ensure that the insured victim receives compen-
sation. Under this interpretation, "legally entitled to recover"
requires only a determination of fault-that is, if the uninsured
motorist was actually at fault the insured should be able to recover
from his insurer despite any procedural reasons why a claim against
the tortfeasor might fail.216
From the above, it is apparent that the North Carolina rule as set
forth in Brown and applied in the cases that followed, such as
Grimsley, should be reconsidered. The supreme court's reliance on
210. Id
211. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
212. 1 Wimiss, supra note 80, §7.14, at 297.
213. See id.
214. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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literal construction of the phrase "legally entitled to recover" is rigid
and does not protect the insured motorist, an interpretation contrary
to the intent and purpose of the UM statute. Further, subsequent
opinions by the North Carolina courts indicate that they have been
trying to circumvent Brown and enable an insured to recover UM
benefits despite not having a suit against the tortfeasor. 7 In these
decisions, the courts looked to the remedial purpose and intent of the
Motor Vehicle- Safety and Financial Responsibility Act in order to
justify the decisions.218
Despite the courts' apparent readiness to effect the remedial
purpose and intent of the statute, Brown has placed significant limits
on the ability of North Carolina courts in other cases to provide a
path to indemnification for injured, insured motorists. For example,
the court of appeals in Spivey v. Lowery 9 had no choice but to
deny the insured's claim for indemnification when she settled with the
tortfeasor and also signed a general release. Were the court
empowered to apply a more flexible interpretation of "legally entitled
to recover," under which the insured is required only to demonstrate
the tortfeasor's fault and prove the extent of her damages, the insured
would still have been entitled to sue her insurer based on their
contract. Under this more equitable reading, the insurer would not
be able to escape liability so easily'
The Brown decision certainly has the potential to generate
decisions that cannot be reconciled with the remedial intent and
purpose of the statute. Grimsley is an excellent example of this point,
217. For example, in Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 378 S.E.2d 21
(1989), although the insured entered into a consent decree and released the tortfeasor
from any claims, the North Carolina Supreme Court still permitted the insured to seek
indemnification from her UIM carrier by seizing upon conflicting exhaustion clauses within
both the contract and the statute and using interpretive tools. Id. at 296, 378 S.E.2d at
27-28; see supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Gurganious v. Integon
Gen. Ins. Co., 108 N.C. App. 163, 423 S.E2d 317 (1992), the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that despite the insured's settlement with the tortfeasor, the insured was not
precluded from seeking recovery from his UIM carrier because of the contract's ambiguous
and conflicting provisions. Id at 167, 423 S.E.2d at 319-20; see supra notes 111-31 and
accompanying text.
218. See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296, 378 S.E.2d at 25; Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 168,
423 S.E.2d at 320.
219. 116 N.C. App. 124, 127-28, 446 S.E.2d 835, 836-38 (1994); see supra notes 132-44
and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion on reforms to make the entire uninsured motorist system more
equitable for insureds, see Gary T. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort Reform: Reformulating
Uninsured Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L.. 419,419 (1987) (criticizing uninsured motorist
plans for failing to reimburse actual out-of-pocket losses and identifying ways to
reformulate UM programs to remedy this problem).
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as the court of appeals strained to find a technical exception to allow
the insureds to continue their claim for UM benefits?2 If Travelers
had not waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction (over the
tortfeasor), the court was prepared to dismiss the Grimsleys' claim
against their insurer based on the Brown principle that the insurer is
entitled to assert any defenses available to the tortfeasor~m Al-
though an equitable result in line with the purpose of the UM statute
was reached in Grimsley, it only came about because Travelers failed
to avail itself of the insurer-favorable Brown rationale. That most
likely will not be the result in the next case with similar facts where
the insurer does not fail to assert the tortfeasor's procedural defense.
When presented with the opportunity on appeal, the North Carolina
Supreme Court should reverse its holding in Brown and come in line
with the view of the majority of other states. If the court follows this
approach and holds that "legally entitled to recover" only requires a
demonstration of fault, that the insured proceeds against her insurer
based on their contract, and that the insurer as a separate entity is not
entitled to assert the tortfeasor's procedural defenses, then North
Carolina courts will not be forced to foreclose an insured's claim
against his insurer based on a harsh, literal reading of "legally entitled
to recover." Such an approach would satisfy the remedial purpose of
the UM and UIM statutes by providing rightful protection of innocent
insureds' interests.
KRISTEN P. SOSNOSKY
221. Griimsley, 117 N.C. App. at 335-36,451 S.E.2d at 339-40; see supra notes 56-61 and
accompanying text.
222. Id at 335-36, 451 S.E.2d at 340 (stating that "although Travelers did have this
defense available to it, Travelers waived its ability to avail itself of that defense by filing
an answer without asserting the defense").
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The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act of 1994: A
Step in the Direction of Restoring Balance
In response to increasing workers' compensation insurance
premiums1 and recent court decisions,2 employer and insurance
industry interests3 approached the General Assembly in 1993 with a
proposal to significantly reshape the workers' compensation system in
North Carolina.4  Their proposal would have redefined the fun-
damental terms "disability" and "injury;"5 shifted the burden of
proof;6 rewritten the provisions governing total disability, partial
disability, and disfigurement injuries;7 eliminated any form of
palliative care; further restricted attorneys' fees;9 and made many
other substantive and procedural changes.0 As a result, the balance
of interests that underlie the workers' compensation system would
1. Following a 1991 rate increase request of 41.8%, insurers filed a 58.4% rate
increase request with the North Carolina Department of Insurance in August 1992.
Reforming Workers' Compensation: A Fictitious Crisis in North Carolina, 25 TRIAL
BRIEFS, Spring 1993, at 30. The 1991 rate request and an older 10% request were
combined and a 15.8% increase was approved in a December 1991 settlement. Id.
2. See, e.g., Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co., 333 N.C. 258,425 S.E.2d 698 (1993); Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, 336 N.C. 200,443 SME.2d 716
(1994). For a discussion of Hyler see infra notes 54-74 and accompanying text; for a
discussion of Charlotte-Mecklenburg see infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
3. While employer and insurance interests might normally have conflicting objec-
tives-employers generally seek enhanced benefits at low costs, while insurance companies
try to maximize profits-their interests coincide on the subject of controlling the costs of
workers' compensation. Rising insurance rates detract from employers' profits, and
increases in the regulated insurance rates may lag behind increased benefit payments,
thereby eating into insurance company profits. Hence, both groups benefit from reining
in perceived runaway costs. Unless otherwise indicated, the rest of this Note will refer to
their collective interests as being those of employers.
4. S. 906, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1993, draft of Apr. 19, 1993, at 1-2 (enacted as
amended by the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679, 1994 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 319 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (Supp. 1994)))
[hereinafter Draft One].
5. See Draft One, supra note 4, § 1.
6. See id. §5.
7. See id. §§ 15-17.
8. See id § 12.
9. See id § 33.
10. See, e.g., id § 6 (making acceptance of any benefits act as a forfeiture of all other
remedies); id. § 7 (eliminating Commission approval requirement for workplace rules
whose violation can create 10% compensation reduction); id § 8 (creating employee
liability for employer's attorney's fees if a settlement offer is refused and the actual award
is not higher than the settlement offer); id § 23 (establishing a requirement of three years
of experience as a licensed attorney for Deputy Commissioners).
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have shifted significantly in favor of employers." This radical
proposal was tempered as other interests, such as workers' rights
advocates and the Industrial Commission itself became involved
during the legislative process." Consequently, what began as an
interest's effort to transform the workers' compensation system by
curtailing benefits' became a broad-based effort to improve the
system in several areas. The final product, the Workers' Compen-
sation Reform Act of 1994,'4 presents advancements in the areas of
cost containment, 5 flexibility,6 and administrative streamlining,'
thereby benefiting all the concerned parties: employers, workers, and
the Industrial Commission.
This Note begins by briefly describing the social balance reflected
in workers' compensation laws,'8 and how that balance has been
altered by recent economic developments.' The Note next analyzes
the General Assembly's response in the 1993-94 legislative sessions'
and the new statute's expected impact on employers, workers, and the
11. The proposal would have limited workers' rights to benefits in numerous and
significant ways, see supra note 10, without any corresponding significant increase in
employers' responsibilities. A common view of the North Carolina workers' compensation
system is that of a compromise that balances the interests of the employer and the worker.
See Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 725-26, 153 S.E. 266, 268 (1930)
(describing the Act as "contain[ing] elements of a mutual concession between the
employer and the employee"); Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124, 125,284 S.E.2d 748,
749 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395,290 S.E.2d 364 (1982) ("Workers' compensation
laws were a statutory compromise .... In exchange for the employer's loss of common law
defenses... the employee gave up his right to common law verdicts.").
12. While many individuals were involved in the process, the following people appear
to have played particularly key roles in negotiating a compromise: for the Industrial
Commission, Chairman Howard Bunn, J. Randolph Ward, Thomas J. Bloch, and Dianne
C. Sellers; for business and insurance interests, John McMillian, William H. Stephenson,
J. Ruffin Bailey, and Allan J. Miles; for workers' interests, R. James Lore, Chris Scott, and
Henry J. Patterson. See J. Randolph Ward, Procedure and the Workers' Compensation
Reform Act of 1994, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION SELECrED TOPICS 1994 284, 298-99
(Wake Forest Univ. 1994).
13. The employers claimed that action was necessary in order to restore balance and
stability to the workers' compensation system. Draft One, supra note 4, at 2 ("Whereas,
the time has come for the General Assembly to restore the Workers' Compensation Act
so that it provides the balance and stability it enjoyed for more than 50 years .... ").
14. Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv.
319 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (Supp. 1994)) [hereinafter
Reform Act].
15. See infra notes 75-99, 108-36, 190-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 100-05, 140-48 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 153-89 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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Industrial Commission.2' Finally, the Note discusses the key role the
newly authorized utilization guidelines will play in determining how
well the 1994 Reform Act restores balance to the workers' compen-
sation system.22
The social policy behind all workers' compensation laws,
including North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act,' is that
employers should provide injured workers and their families with swift
and certain compensation for workplace injuries.' In other words,
industry should be compelled to "take care of its own wreckage."' S
Prior to the enactment of workers' compensation acts, most actions
by workers against their employers were based on negligence26 and
therefore subject to the traditional defenses of the fellow servant
rule27 assumption of the risk,. and contributory negligence.29
However, workers who did recover were able to recover not only for
lost wages and medical costs, but also for pain and suffering.30 This
arrangement resulted in a hit-and-miss system, with long delays and
uncertain results3 ' With the advent of workers' compensation
statutes, workers no longer had to prove employer negligence and the
common law defenses were effectively eliminated?2 In exchange, the
workers gave up the right to compensation for pain and suffering, the
right to a trial by jury, and the right to all other forms of recovery
21. See infra notes 54-189 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
24. See Cabe v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 202 N.C. 176, 186, 162 S.E. 223, 229
(1932); see also LEONARD T. JERNIGAN, JR., NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPEN-
SATION - LAw AND PRACTICE, § 1-1, 1-2 (1988) (giving a brief overview of the history and
purpose behind North Carolina's workers' compensation system).
25. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
26. See DONALD T. DECARLO & MARTIN MINKOWrIZ, WORKERS COMPENSATION
INSuRANCE AND LAW PRACTICE 1-2 (1989); J. MAYNARD KEECH, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA 1929-1940, at 3-4 (1942).
27. Under the fellow servant rule, an employer was not liable if a worker was injured
as a result of negligence on the part of a fellow worker ("fellow servant"). E.g., KEECH,
supra note 26, at 6.
28. The assumption of the risk doctrine barred recovery for injuries resulting from the
ordinary risks of employment, even if the employer's negligence contributed to the injury.
E.g., id at 5-6.
29. Under the contributory negligence doctrine, the injured worker could not recover
from the employer if the worker's own negligence contributed in any degree to the injury.
See id. at 6. All three of these common law defenses impeded workers' recovery. See
DECARLO & MINKOWrrz, supra note 26, at 1; JERNIGAN, supra note 24, § 1-1; ARTHUR
LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 4.30 (Matthew Bender 1994).
30. See JERNIGAN, supra note 24, § 1-1.
31. See DECARLO & MINKOWrHZ, supra note 26, at 4-5; KEECH, supra note 26, at 3-4.
32. JERNIGAN, supra note 24, § 1-1, 1-2.
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against the employer?3 These trade-offs are the essence of the
statutory balance that underlies workers' compensation.'
As with many regulatory statutes, workers' compensation acts
were enacted in response to specific problems. As society evolved
and the character of the workplace changed, the legislature discovered
new problems and amended the statutory schemes to address those
problems. For example, the North Carolina workers' compensation
system initially focused on injuries caused by traumatic accidents 4
As scientific and medical technology progressed, however, pressure
grew to include occupational diseases under the workers' compen-
sation umbrella?.3 Society's view of the balance between employer-
employee interests changed as more information became available,
and the workers' compensation systemwas amended in response.36
The problems that prompted the Workers' Compensation Reform
Act of 1994 arose not so much from a desire to expand the scope of
workers' compensation coverage, but primarily from the economics of
providing the existing coverage3 7 Medical compensation now
represents the largest and the fastest growing portion of workers'
compensation costs.38 Insurers have been forced to raise their rates
33. Id In North Carolina, the worker's compensation system is the exclusive remedy
for workplace injuries. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-9, 97-10.1 (1991). Limited exceptions to
the exclusive remedy provision exist when the employer engages in conduct so unsafe that
there is a substantial certainty of eventual serious injury or death, Woodson v. Rowland,
329 N.C. 330,340-41,407 S.E.2d 222,228 (1991), or where a co-employee acts with willful,
wanton, and reckless negligence, Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710,715-16,325 S.E.2d 244,
248-49 (1985).
34. See J. Randolph Ward, Workers' Compensation: Historical Overview, in
WORKER'S COMPENSATION AND STATE TORT CLAIMS: BECOMING CONVERSANT I-1, 1-2
(N.C. Bar Ass'n 1994).
35. See id
36. Cf. KEECH, supra note 26, at 36-39 (highlighting the change in workers'
compensation as medical information became more available with regard to occupational
diseases); Workmens' Compensation, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in
1935, 13 N.C. L. REV. 355, 446-47 (1935) (explaining the passage of a 1935 amendment
that allowed compensation for 25 occupational diseases).
37. Unlike the cost growth directly attributable to the expansion of substantive rights
that resulted from the discovery of the cause-effect linkage for occupational diseases, see
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text, a larger portion of the cost growth today is
attributable to the escalating costs of medical treatment. For example, over the ten year
period from 1981-82 to 1991-92 the portion of North Carolina's workers' compensation
costs attributable to medical benefits rose from 39.4% to 46.2% and the medical cost per
claim rose from $252 to $883. Compare 27 N.C. INDUS. COMMISSION BIENNIAL REP. 19
(showing medical costs of $49,278,046 for 195,601 claims costing a total of $124,998,621 for
1981-82) with 32 N.C. INDUS. COMMISSION BIENNIAL REP. 15 (showing medical costs of
$108,335, 304 for 122,750 claims costing a total of $234,149,374 for 1991-92).
38. See Ward, supra note 12, at 290-93.
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accordingly, thereby raising employers' costs of doing business. 9
The problems caused by these rising costs were exacerbated by the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Hyler v. GTE Products
Co.' Hyler overruled a seventeen-year old court of appeals decision
that interpreted section 97-47 of the North Carolina General
Statutes4' to apply a two-year statute of limitations to claims for
medical compensation resulting from traumatic injuries.42 After
Hyler, no statute of limitations existed for medical compensation
claims and an injured worker could reopen his compensation claim at
any time without showing a change in condition.43 Insurers
responded to Hyler and the underlying medical cost increases by
requesting a workers' compensation liability insurance rate hike of
fifty-eight percent in 1993 and implementing a forty percent hike in
1994."
Sensing that the balance of employer-employee interests that
underlie the workers' compensation system had tilted too far towards
the worker, and capitalizing on the significant pressure generated by
the rapid rise in workers' compensation insurance rates, thirty-one
state senators introduced legislation to radically alter the structure of
workers' compensation in North Carolina.45  These legislators
proposed to reduce, or at least contain, costs by controlling access to
medical care, reducing eligibility, and limiting coverage through
numerous substantive and procedural changes.6 Even the fun-
damental elements of workers' compensation, such as the definitions
of "disability" and "injury," would have been affected.47 Implemen-
ting this proposal would have dramatically shifted the weight of the
39. See ia at 287; supra note 1.
40. 333 N.C. 258, 425 S.E.2d 698 (1993).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (1991).
42. Hyler, 333 N.C. at 267-68, 425 S.E.2d at 704 (overruling Shuler v. Talon Div. of
Textron, 30 N.C. App. 570, 227 S.E.2d 627 (1976)).
43. Id. ("[N.C. GEN. STAT.] § 97-25 permits the Industrial Commission to order the
employer to pay new or additional medical expenses, even if there has been no material
change in the employee's condition or in available medical treatments.").
44. Ward, supra note 12, at 287. In considering the size of these percentage increases,
it should be noted that, as of 1988, North Carolina had the third lowest workers'
compensation insurance rates as a percentage of pay roll of forty-one states surveyed.
John F. Borton & Timothy P. Schmidle, Workers' Compensation Insurance Rates,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR, March/April 1994, at 1, 20.
45. See Draft One, supra note 4, at 1.
46. For a partial list of these proposed changes see supra notes 4-10 and accompanying
text.
47. See Draft One, supra note 4, § 1.
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workers' compensation balance in favor of employers.4 Although
the Senate deleted some of the more radical provisions,4 9 the version
sent to the House of Representatives remained heavily weighted in
favor of employers. Once in the House, however, the bill underwent
a transformation.50 Without altering the primary cost-containment
thrust of the legislation, representatives of workers' rights and
governmental interests, along with employer representatives,
.substantially rewrote the legislation, balancing the concerns of the
various groups.5 ' The resulting bill, The Workers' Compensation
Reform Act of 1994 (1994 Reform Act), 2 adjusts the workers'
compensation employer-employee balance through changes designed
to contain costs, add flexibility, and streamline administration
While the 1994 Reform Act's changes can be loosely categorized
into the areas of cost containment, flexibility, and administrative
streamlining, the impact of the new statute is more clearly
demonstrated by analyzing how each of the three groups-employers,
workers, and the Industrial Commission-benefitted from the various
changes.
From the employers' perspective, the biggest gain of the 1994
Reform Act is a prohibition on Hyler re-openings of medical compen-
sation awards. Prior to Hyler, both section 97-25 and section 97-47 of
48. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
49. For example, a provision further tightening the exclusive remedy section was
removed. Compare S. 906, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1993, draft of July, 16, 1993, § 6
(enacted as amended by Reform Act, ch. 679, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319 (codified
in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (Supp. 1994))) [hereinafter Draft Five] with
S. 906, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1993, draft of July, 8,1993, § 6 [hereinafter Draft Four].
Also removed were provisions requiring a worker who was claiming permanent total
disability to bear the burden of proving inability to earn any wages in the same or other
employment. Compare Draft Four, supra, § 5 with S. 906, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1993,
draft of May 11, 1993, § 5 [hereinafter Draft Three]. A third provision that was removed
would have allowed offsetting of social security retirement payments against compensation
awards. Compare Draft Four, supra (failing to include the offset provisions) with Draft
Three, supra, § 18. For a synopsis of the various changes see the following editions of
DAILY BULL.: ACTIONS BY N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Inst. of Gov't, Raleigh, N.C.) July 16,
1993, at 8; July 15, 1993, at 8; July 8, 1993, at 5-6; and May 11, 1993, at 9-10.
50. The differences between Draft Five, the last Senate version before going to the
House, and Draft Six, the first House modification, are striking. Compare Draft Five,
supra note 49 with S. 906, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Sess. 1993, draft of June 23, 1994 (Draft
Six).
51. For a list of some of the individuals involved see supra note 12.
52. Reform Act, ch. 679, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Ser. 319 (codified in scattered
sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (Supp. 1994)).
53. See Sandra M. King, Update on Recent Developments in Workers' Compensation
Law, in WORKERS' COMPENSATION SELECTED TOPICS 1994, supra note 12, at 48.
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the Workers' Compensation Act were thought to govern the award of
medical compensation to workers injured in traumatic accidents.54
Section 97-25 authorized the recovery of certain medical expenses as
part of the original workers' compensation award.55 Section 97-47
governed the re-opening of cases and provided that once a final award
had been granted by the Industrial Commission, the award could be
reopened only within two years and then only if the worker could
show a "change in condition."56 In 1976, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals linked the two provisions in Shuler v. Talon Division of
Textron17 by holding that employees seeking continuing medical
expenses under section 97-25 needed to meet the statute of limitations
and "change of condition" requirement of section 97-47.58 This was
the settled interpretation of the workers' compensation statute until
the Hyler decision seventeen years later.
In Hyler, plaintiff Hasseil Hyler injured his left knee while
employed by the defendant, GTE Products Company.59 Hyler
underwent six operations to repair the damage, eventually having the
knee joint replaced with a prosthetic joint in June 1983.' 0 When
Hyler's knee reached the point of maximum medical improvement,
the parties entered into a final agreement, which the Industrial
Commission approved, providing compensation for Hyler's temporary
total disability, his permanent partial disability, and all medical
expenses incurred prior to the date of the agreement.61 However,
the agreement failed to provide for any continuing medical expenses
for monitoring or replacing the prosthetic knee.62 GTE made its
54. See Shuler v. Talon Div. of Textron, 30 N.C. App. 570,576-77,227 S.E.2d 627, 631
(1976), overruled by Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co., 333 N.C. 258, 425 S.E.2d 698 (1993).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25 (1991) ("Medical compensation shall be provided by the
employer."). Medical compensation included "medical, surgical, hospital, nursing, and
rehabilitative services, and medicines, sick travel, and other treatment, including medical
and supplies, as may reasonably be required to effect a cure or give relief." Id. § 97-2(19).
56. Id. § 97-47.
57. 30 N.C. App. 570, 227 S.E.2d 627 (1976), overruled by Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co.,
333 N.C. 258, 425 S.E.2d 698 (1993).
58. Id. at 576-77, 227 S.E.2d at 631. Shuler applied to claimants seeking to reopen
awards to add continuing medical expenses. If the original award included medical
monitoring, however, § 97-25 allowed recovery. Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C.
206, 213, 345 S.E.2d 204, 209 (1986).
59. Hyler, 333 N.C. at 259, 425 S.E.2d at 699.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 268, 425 S.E.2d at 705 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 259,425 S.E.2d at 699. The parties recognized that while the prosthetic knee
had not deteriorated since its surgical insertion, there remained a substantial risk that the
prosthesis would fail at some point in the future, necessitating replacement. Id at 262,425
S.E.2d at 701. Hyler argued that GTE was responsible for the continuing medical
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final payment to Hyler on February 25, 1985.' Twelve months later,
on February 19, 1986, Hyler filed a request to re-open his claim.64
Hyler originally based his request on "a change of condition as
provided in [section] 97-47,"' but later admitted that the "change of
condition" claim was without material basis.'
While Hyler's claim was pending, the North Carolina Supreme
Court determined that section 97-25 authorized recovery of future
medical expenses, including those for medical monitoring, in an
original award of compensation.67 Subsequently, some twenty-five
months after receiving his final payment under the original award
agreement, Hyler amended his claim to include a request for
continued medical expenses under section 97-25.' The Deputy
Commissioner found that there was no change in condition, but
nevertheless approved Hyler's section 97-25 claim. 69  The full
Industrial Commission reversed, ruling that Hyler had failed to show
a section 97-47 "change of condition" as required under Shuler.°
The North Carolina Supreme Court, reversing Shuler's interpretation
of the statute, upheld the Deputy Commissioner's award and ruled
that the General Assembly did not intend modifications of section 97-
25 awards to be subject to the "change of condition" requirement of
section 97-47.71 Therefore, Hyler and those similarly situated were
entitled to request compensation for ongoing medical expenses more
than two years after their last payments.72 Employers and insurers
justifiably became concerned that this new interpretation of the law
expenses to cover the costs of annual medical monitoring and periodic replacement. Id
at 260, 425 S.E.2d at 699.
63. I& at 255, 425 S.E.2d at 699.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 259-60, 425 S.E.2d at 699.
66. Id. at 270, 425 S.E.2d at 705 (Meyer, J., dissenting) ("The parties stipulated and
agreed that the claimant could produce no evidence of a change in condition."); id. at 262,
425 S.E.2d at 701 ("All parties agree that the plaintiff's condition has not materially
changed...").
67. Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206,214-16,345 S.E.2d 204,210-11 (1986).
68. Hyler, 333 N.C. at 260, 425 S.E.2d at 699.
69. Id. at 270, 425 S.E.2d at 705 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The basis for the Deputy
Commissioner's approval of the award in the face of Shuler is not reported in the cases.
70. See i at 260,425 S.E.2d at 699-700. The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed
that § 97-47 applied, but reinstated the award based on undisclosed equitable con-
siderations. Id. at 270,425 S.E.2d at 706 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The opinion of the court
of appeals is unpublished. Id at 260, 425 S.E.2d at 700.
71. Id at 267-68, 425 S.E2d at 704.
72. See id
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exposed them to significantly increased liability' Insurers
responded by raising rates, ostensibly to establish reserves to cover
this new liability 4
New section 97-25.1 at least partially reverses Hyler by reim-
posing a two-year statute of limitations on reopening claims for
medical compensation.75 The two-year period begins "after the
employer's last payment of medical or indemnity compensation.
7 6
The right to additional medical compensation terminates at the end
of the period unless either: (1) the worker files a request for
additional medical compensation with the Industrial Commission; or
(2) the Industrial Commission orders additional medical compensation
on its own motion 7  Thus, within two years after making the last
payment, the employer will know whether additional medical
compensation is a possibility and can arrange for appropriate reserves
if necessary.
This change is a direct response to Hyler and at first glance
appears to return the law to its pre-Hyler state.78 However, upon
closer inspection, the current law is slightly different. First, while
effective as of July 5, 1994, section 97-25.1 applies only prospectively
to "injuries by accident occurring on or after that date., 79  Ap-
parently, rather than choosing to apply the new law to claims initiated
after the effective date, regardless of the injury date, the General
Assembly chose to apply the new law only to claims resulting from
73. See Ward, supra note 12, at 293-94. The National Council on Compensation
Insurance estimated that the decision could increase benefit costs by 17% to 25%. Id.
74. For instance, the North Carolina Rate Bureau asked the Department of Insurance
for a 58.4% increase in rates in 1993 on behalf of the workers' compensation insurance
carriers. Id. at 287; see supra note 1.
75. Reform Act, ch. 679, sec. 2.5, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319, 323 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-25.1 (Supp. 1994)). The new section provides:
The right to medical compensation shall terminate two yeari after the
employer's last payment of medical or indemnity compensation unless, prior to
the expiration of this period, either- (i) the employee files with the Commission
an application for additional medical compensation which is thereafter approved
by the Commission, or (ii) the Commission on its own motion orders additional
medical compensation. If the Conk-nission determines that there is a substantial
risk of the necessity of future medical compensation, the Commission shall
provide by order for payment of future necessary medical compensation.
IaS
76. lML
77. Id. Either alternative, however, must be initiated before the two-year time limit
expires. Id.
78. The term "pre-Hyler" refers to the state of the law between Shuler and Hyler. See
supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
79. Reform Act see. 11.1(g), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 343.
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injuries occurring after the effective date. Thus, the 1994 Reform Act
does not completely respond to employers' concerns about open-
ended liability by creating a definitive transition period to the new
standard; rather, it leaves the door open indefinitely to Hyler-type
reopenings for "old" injuries.' In other words, while section 97-25.1
prevents the production of new liability time bombs for unsuspecting
employers, none of the old liability bombs were deactivated.
In fact, the law only prevents hidden liability time bombs.
Section 97-25.1 explicitly allows the Industrial Commission to order
employers to pay future medical compensation if "there is a substan-
tial risk of the necessity of future medical compensation.""1 Such an
order would require the payment of "necessary" medical expenses,
presumably approving future medical compensation in principle, but
allowing each individual charge to be challenged.' Thus, employers
could still be exposed to open-ended liability through an Industrial
Commission award of future medical compensation; but in such
situations the employer will know the number of such open-ended
claims, something previously impossible under Hyler.
The relationship between this new section and section 97-47's
"change of condition" requirement" is less clear. Under pre-Hyler
law, an injured worker would need to show a "change of condition"
to reopen a compensation award;' 4 after Hyler, no such showing was
80. For instance, the plaintiff in Hyler would not be barred because his accident
occurred before the effective date of § 97-25.1, even if he waited 10 years or more to
request additional medical compensation. See id.
81. Reform Act sec. 2.5, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-25.1 (Supp. 1994)). It appears that the General Assembly intended the phrase
"substantial risk" to be a codification of the Little v. Penn Ventilator Co. standard for
awarding medical monitoring costs. Little v. Penn Ventilator Co., 317 N.C. 206,214, 345
S.E.2d 204, 209 (1986) ("[Fluture expenses which will be incurred to monitor an
employee's medical condition are reasonably required to give relief if there is a substantial
risk that the employee's condition may take a turn for the worse.") (emphasis added).
82. See Henry N. Patterson, Jr. & Maxine Eichner, 1994 Workers' Compensation
Reform Act 10-11 (1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with North Carolina Law
Review). This scheme of "approval in principle, details subject to challenge" is arguably
contrary to one workers' compensation goal-reducing litigation. In effect, this scheme
condones not one, but several possible iterations through the claims process. Except in
rare instances, however, this will not occur, and there may be no alternative that does not
unfairly prejudice either employers or workers.
83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (1991) ("Upon its own motion or upon the application
of any party in interest on the grounds of change in condition, the Industrial Commission
may review any award, and on such review may make an award ending, diminishing, or
increasing the compensation previously awarded. ").
84. See Shuler v. Talon Div. of Textron, 30 N.C. App. 570,576-77,227 S.E2d 627,631
(1976), overruled by Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co., 333 N.C. 258,425 S.E.2d 698 (1993); supra
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required." Because the 1994 Reform Act makes no changes to
sections 97-47 or 97-25, the sections involved in Hyler, and no other
changes address this point,86 the current law does not appear to
change this aspect of the Hyler decision. Apparently the 1994 Reform
Act changes the previous law only for attempts to reopen claims after
the two-year time limit.
Interestingly, the addition of section 97-25.1 was coupled with a
change in the definition of "medical compensation" in section 97-
2(19)Y Rather than limiting medical expenses, however, the change
in definition arguably increases the employer's potential expenses.
The definition was expanded to explicitly cover the replacement of
prosthetic devices "necessitated by ordinary use or medical cir-
cumstances."88 Hence, the combined changes to sections 97-25.1 and
97-2(19), designed to limit employers' exposure in Hyler-type
situations, may bar some claim reopenings, but will actually help
assure, rather than hinder, the recovery of future medical expenses by
workers with injuries-similar to Hyler's-that require prosthetics.
If employers did not get a complete reversal of the Hyler
decision, they were more successful in other cost containment areas.
The 1994 Reform Act strengthens anti-fraud provisions,89 authorizes
the use of managed care organizations,' subjects non-emergency
hospital stays add surgeries to preauthorization,9' prohibits reimbur-
sement of repeat diagnostic testing,' authorizes the Industrial
Commission to set fees for medical services and to establish utilization
notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
85. Hyler, 333 N.C. at 267, 425 S.El2d at 704.
86. See Reform Act, ch. 679, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319 (codified in scattered
sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (Supp. 1994)).
87. Id. sec. 2.6,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
2(19) (Supp. 1994)). The addition of § 97-25.1 and the change to § 97-2(19) were the only
components of Part II, Subpart E of the.1994 Reform Act. Id. secs. 2.5, 2.6, 1994 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-2(19), -25.1 (Supp. 1994)).
88. Id. sec. 2.6,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
2(19) (Supp. 1994)). The statute covers "any original artificial members as may reasonably
be necessary at the end of the healing period and the replacement of such artificial
members when reasonably necessitated by ordinary use or medical circumstances." Id
(emphasis added to indicate 1994 Reform Act modifications).
89. See id. secs. 7.1,7.2, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 332-33 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-882, -88.3 (Supp. 1994)).
90. See id. sec. 2.1, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 319 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-25.2 (Supp. 1994)).
91. See i. sec. 2.2,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 320-21 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-25.3 (Supp. 1994)).
92. See id. sec. 2.3, § 97-26(f), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 322 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-26(f) (Supp. 1994)).
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guidelines,93 and permits employers to pay compensation without
admitting liability under certain circumstances.94
While all of these changes should help control rising medical
costs, they do so in varying degrees. For instance, fraud and
misrepresentation now are punishable as "Class I misdemeanor[s]. ' 95
This represents a significant expansion of the law,96 but its impact
may be limited because fraud is estimated to represent less than five
percent of all workers' compensation costs. 7 Another example of
an attempt to control medical costs is the repeat diagnostic testing
provision.9 Section 97-26(f) permits health care providers to be
reimbursed for repeat diagnostic testing only if "the health care
provider has reasonable grounds to believe a change in patient
condition may have occurred or the quality of the prior test is
doubted." 99 While avoiding duplicative testing will keep costs down,
it remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, the Commission
93. See id. sec. 2.4, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 97-25.4, -25.5 (Supp. 1994)).
94. See id. sec. 3.1, § 97-18(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 324-25 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-18(d) (Supp. 1994)).
95. Id. sec. 7.1, § 97-88.2(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 332 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-88.2(a) (Supp. 1994)). The statute also criminalizes the act of threatening an
injured employee with criminal prosecution to coerce a compensation settlement. Id § 97-
88.2(c), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-88.2(c)
(Supp. 1994)).
96. Previously, the criminal law treated as a felony the " 'obtaining [of] property by
false pretenses,' " which arguably covered claimant fraud. See Ward, supra note 12, at
316-17 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (1993)). However, the new law more directly
addresses misrepresentations and fraud that do not result in payments. See Reform Act
sec. 7.1, § 97-88.2(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 332 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-88.2(a) (Supp. 1994)) ("Any person who willfully makes a false statement or represen-
tation of a material fact for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment,
or assisting another to obtain or deny any benefit or payment under this Article, shall be
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.").
97. See Ward, supra note 12, at 316.
98. Reform Act sec. 2.3, § 97-26(f), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 322 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26(f) (Supp. 1994)).
99. Ide Section 97-26(f) reads in full:
(f) Repeating Diagnostic Tests. - A health care provider shall not
authorize a diagnostic test previously conducted by another provider, unless the
health care provider has reasonable grounds to believe a change in patient
condition may have occurred or the quality of the prior test is doubted. The
Commission may adopt rules establishing reasonable requirements for reports
and records to be made available to other health care providers to prevent
unnecessary duplication of tests and examinations. A health care provider that
violates this subsection shall not be reimbursed for the costs associated with
administering or analyzing the test.
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will second-guess the medical opinions of health care providers
concerning their "reasonable grounds."
Another change in the 1994 Reform Act may have a direct, but
limited, impact on employer responses to injury claims: payment
without prejudice. Prior to the 1994 Reform Act, payments by
employers to injured workers could be viewed as an admission of
liability for the claim and obligate the employer to continue
payment." However, in many instances, particularly early in an
investigation, it may not be clear if the employer ultimately will be
responsible for the claimed injury. The new law provides a detailed
procedure that allows employers to pay compensation to the injured
worker without prejudicing their right to later deny the claim."1 To
encourage timely investigation of injury claims, the payment without
prejudice privilege is limited to ninety days." If the employer
cannot resolve the matter within the ninety-day window, a one-time
thirty-day extension is available.3 However, the employer must
deny liability by the end of the grace period or it will be presumed
that the employer has accepted liability,"4 As a result of this new
procedure, employers may be less reluctant to start the payment
process for questionable claims, at least in theory, since payments
under this option will not lock them into accepting liability. Once
again, however, this change may have limited impact because there
are no incentives for the employer to use the system, and recapture
of any such compensation paid when liability is ultimately denied may
prove problematic at best.0 5
100. See Cary M. Grant, The 1994 Workers' Compensation Reform Act, PUB.
PERSONNEL L. BuLL., July 1994, at 1, 2 (1994).
101. Reform Act sec. 3.1, § 97-18(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 324 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18(d) (Supp. 1994)).
102. Id.
103. It ("Prior to the expiration of the 90-day period, the employer or insurer may
upon reasonable grounds apply to the Commission for an extension of not more than 30
days.").
104. Id. ("If the employer or insurer does not contest the compensability of the claim
or its liability therefor within [the grace period], it waives the right to contest the compen-
sability of and its liability for the claim under this Article."). A delayed discovery
provision for material evidence provides an exception to this rigid rule. Id.
105. Regardless of whether the claim is denied due to fraud, or the injury is simply not
covered by workers' compensation, recovery from the worker who inappropriately received
the compensation may not prove to be cost effective, unless the sums involved are rather
large, because litigation costs could easily outstrip any recovery. In addition, any
fraudulent workers' compensation claim may be grounds for firing the employee, and
recovery from an unemployed individual would be even more difficult. If the employee
remains with the employer, recovery may not be worth the price in workplace morale.
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It is apparent, then, that some of the changes that should help
employers contain costs, such as strengthened anti-fraud
provisions,3 6 limitations on duplicative testing,"° and payment
without prejudice, may be more symbolic than substantive.
Real changes appear in the area of access to health care
providers and direct control of medical costs. New section 97-25.2
allows employers to contract with "managed care organizations,"' "8
typically referred to as Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
to provide medical services."°  The use of IMOs had been
sanctioned under Industrial Commission rules but did not previously
have an explicit statutory basis."0 In addition to authorizing HMO
use, the revised statute also requires workers covered by such an
arrangement to use the HMO before seeking medical care el-
sewhere."' The injured worker must "exhaust all dispute resolution
procedures of a managed care organization before applying to the
Commission for review of any issue related to medical services.""
Internal dispute resolution systems are common in HMO arran-
gements outside the context of worker's compensation." The law
thus allows for similar HMO systems to be used for both workers'
compensation and non-workers' compensation medical benefits,
perhaps allowing for better economies of scale.
Greater potential for cost saving comes from new section 97-25.3,
which covers preauthorizations of non-emergency "inpatient admission
This new system, while allowing more flexibility, forces employers to weigh the costs
of a full hearing against the potential unwarranted payments to the injured worker during
the investigation period. Despite this drawback, the new system provides an option that
was unavailable previously.
106. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
108. The 1994 Reform Act added a definition for "managed care organization" that
references chapter 58 of the general statutes. Reform Act sec. 10.7,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. at 341 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(21) (Supp. 1994)) (defining managed care
organization as "a preferred provider organization or a health maintenance organization
regulated under Chapter 58 of the General Statutes"). For simplicity, this Note will use
the term Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) to refer to all managed care
organizations.
109. Reform Act sec. 2.1, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 319 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-25.2 (Supp. 1994)).
110. Interview with R James Lore, private attorney and member of the Industrial
Commission Advisory Council, in Raleigh, N.C. (Jan. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Lore
Interview].
111. See Reform Act sec. 2.1,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 319 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-25.2 (Supp. 1994)).
112. Ia
113. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 11, r. 12.0914 (Feb. 1995).
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to a hospital, inpatient admission to a treatment center, and inpatient
or outpatient surgery."" 4 Pursuant to this section, an insurer can
require up to ten days advance notice of hospital and surgical
admissions, and has two days to respond to such a request."5  If
preauthorization is not obtained, the insurer can reduce its reimbur-
sement to the health care provider by fifty percent."6 The injured
worker cannot be made responsible for the balance of charges created
by the fifty percent reductionY.7 The section also grants immunity
from civil actions for health care providers who refuse to provide
treatment based on lack of preauthorization." 8 Several important
caveats apply to this section. Most importantly, the preauthorization
requirement does not apply to emergency services nor to any services
provided before the insurer admits liability."9 Given the prevalence
of preauthorization requirements in non-workers' compensation
insurance policies,"E this change modernizes workers' compensation
and brings it into concert with modem non-workers' compensation
health insurance policies.
114. Reform Act sec. 2.2, § 97-25.3(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 319 (codified at
N.C. GEM. STAT. § 97-25.3(a) (Supp. 1994)).
115. Id. § 97-25.3(a)(1)-(2), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 320 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-25.3(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1994)). Provisions are made for the insurer to demand
that the injured worker submit to an independent medical examination within seven days.
Id. § 97-25.3(a)(3), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 320 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
25.3(a)(3) (Supp. 1994)). If the second opinion concurs with the original recommendation
for admission, the insurer is required to give preauthorization unless it denies liability. Id.
§ 97-25.3(a)(5), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 320 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
25.3(a)(5) (Supp. 1994)).
116. Id. § 97-25.3(a)(6), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 320 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-25.3(a)(6) (Supp. 1994)). Section 97-25.3(a)(6) reads:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the insurer may reduce
its reimbursement of the provider's eligible charges under this Article by up to
fifty percent (50%) if the insurer has notified the provider in writing of its
preauthorization requirement and the provider failed to timely obtain
preauthorization. The employee shall not be liable for the balance of the charges.
Id.
117. Id. Instead, the health care provider must absorb the costs itself. Clearly then,
health care providers will have a significant incentive to obtain preauthorizations before
providing any non-emergency services.
118. Id. § 97-25.3(f), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 321 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-25.3(f) (Supp. 1994)).
119. Id. § 97-25.3(b), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 320 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-25.3(b) (Supp. 1994)).
120. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, r. 12.0559, 12.0904-12.0905.
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The medical cost containment measures in sections 97-26, 97-
25.4, and 97-25.5 represent the greatest potential for cost savings.121
Revised section 97-26 partially overturns the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. North
Carolina Industrial Commission.' The Charlotte-Mecklenburg
court invalidated the North Carolina Industrial Commission's attempt
to control workers' compensation hospital costs by adopting a fee
schedule and a per diem reimbursement system.' Prior to adop-
ting the per diem system, the Industrial Commission's practice was to
approve those inpatient hospital medical charges for a workers'
compensation patient that matched a list of "normal charges for
services for that hospital" provided by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
North Carolina, Inc.? 4 Contending that such a per diem system
would reduce costs overall,"z the Commission attempted to con-
solidate the list of charges into five categories and reimburse
according to the average daily charge for each category.' Several
not-for-profit hospitals challenged the Commission's action as being
inconsistent with the then-mandated requirement that charges not
exceed those "as prevail in the same community for similar treatment
of injured persons."" Agreeing with the hospitals, the court ruled
that the Commission lacked statutory authority to structure the fee
schedule as it did." While the court interpreted the statute to
require the Commission to calculate some average charge, it did not
121. Reform Act secs. 2.3-2.4, §§ 97-26, -25.4, -25.5, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 321-
23 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-26, -25.4, -25.5 (Supp. 1994)).
122. 336 N.C. 200, 443 S.E.2d 716 (1994).
123. Id. at 204-05, 223-228, 443 S.E.2d at 719-20, 730-32.
124. Id. at 205, 443 S.E.2d at 720.
125. Id. at 213-14, 443 S.E2d at 724-25.
126. Id. at 204-05, 443 S.E.2d at 719-20.
127. Idt at 206, 443 S.E.2d at 720 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26 (1991)). This
section was substantially revised by the 1994 Reform Act. 'See Reform Act, ch. 679, sec.
23, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319, 321 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26 (Supp.
1994)). Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26 (1991) (stating that pecuniary liability "shall be
limited to such charges as prevail in the same community for similar treatment of injured
persons of a like standard of living") with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26 (Supp. 1994)
(authorizing the Commissioner to establish a schedule of maximum fees for medical
services).
128. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 336 N.C. at 228-29,443 S.E.2d at 733. The court essentially
held that the per diem system could not fit within the statutory framework, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-25,97-26,97-90(a) (1991) (requiring that employers not be charged more than
the prevailing local charges for the specific services rendered), because a per diem
averaging technique necessarily implies that some employers would inevitably be charged
more than their share as measured on an individual occurrence basis, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, 336 N.C. at 217-28, 443 S.E. 2d at 726-732.
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indicate what averaging structure would be acceptable." 9 It simply
held that an aggregate per diem system was beyond the Industrial
Commission's statutory authority at that time."' Thus, the then-
existing statutory structure frustrated at least one attempt to
implement a cost-reducing fee schedule.
The 1994 Reform Act partially overturns Charlotte-Mecklenburg
by expressly authorizing the creation of a fee schedule and the use of
per diem rates."3 Such a fee schedule would apply to any health
care provider, with the major exception of certain hospitals. For
any hospital that participates in the Teachers' and State Employees'
Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (State Plan), section 97-26(b)
requires workers' compensation payments to be equal to what the
hospital would receive under the State Plan. 3 All other health care
providers will be subject to the fee schedule unless they have
contracted for "a different amount or reimbursement
methodology."''M  While this condition seems ambiguous, a
reasonable interpretation in light of the 1994 Reform Act's overall
intent is that a provider can receive reimbursement of less than the
fee schedule rate, as calculated in some other fashion,3 ' but cannot
receive more than the fee schedule rate. In any case, non-hospital
health care providers cannot charge more than their customary non-
129. See id at 224-25, 443 S.E.2d at 731. The court focused on § 97-26.with respect to
its heading, which includes the term "average cost," and the use of the language "such
charges as prevail" within the text of the statute. IeL
130. See id at 224-28, 443 S.E.2d at 731-32.
131. Reform Act, ch. 679, sec. 2.3, § 97-26(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319, 321
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26(a) (Supp. 1994)) ("The Commission shall adopt a
schedule of maximum fees for medical compensation.... [and] may consider any and all
reimbursement methodologies, including.., per diem rates .... ").
132. Section 97-26(a) does not apply to any hospital that participates in the Teachers'
and State Employees' Comprehensive Major Medical Plan. Id. § 97-26(b), 1994 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 322 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26(b) (Supp. 1994)).
133. Id. § 97-26(b), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 322 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-26(b) (Supp. 1994)). The extent to which this change will help control hospital costs
will depend largely on how vigorously the rates under the State Plan are negotiated, thus
creating the real possibility that the workers' compensation rates may be higher than
necessary.
134. Id § 97-26(c), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 322 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-26(c) (Supp. 1994)).
135. For instance, HMO-type providers might be reimbursed at a flat per-visit or per-
month rate rather than on a per-service, basis depending on the providers arrangement
with the employer/insurer.
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workers' compensation rates for service or treatments under workers'
compensation. 36
Even if some of the changes that appear to be for employers'
benefit turn out to be of limited impact,' 7 the combination of
Hyler's statutory limitation, managed care options, preauthorization
requirements, and medical fee schedules should help employers
realize lower workers' compensation costs. These changes directly
address several concerns of employers; accordingly, their passage
should be viewed as a "win" for employers.
Employees also benefitted from the changes in the 1994 Reform
Act. For instance, workers indirectly benefit from the enhanced
incentives to insure." New subsection 97-94(d) provides for both
criminal and civil penalties for "[a]ny person who, with the ability and
authority to bring an employer in compliance [with the insurance
requirements], wilfully and intentionally refuses or neglects to bring
the employer in compliance." 9 Consequently, not only will the
employing company be held accountable, the responsible in-
dividuals-the managers, vice-presidents, etc.-may be held respon-
sible as well.
In addition, workers can now take advantage of the new trial-
return-to-work provisions in section 97-32.1.'1 Previously, if an
injured worker recovering from a total disability returned to work at
his old wage, even for one day, the law presumed that the worker was
no longer disabled and terminated benefits accordingly.' If the
return proved premature or aggravated the injury, the worker faced
the daunting task of attempting to restart the compensation
136. Reform Act sec. 2.3, § 97-26(c), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 322 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-26(c) (Supp. 1994)).
137. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
138. See Reform Act sec. 8.1, § 97-94(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 333-34
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-94(d) (Supp. 1994)).
139. Id.
140. Reform Act sec. 4.1,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 328-29 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-32.1 (Supp. 1994)). Section 97-32.1 provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 97-32, an employee may attempt a trial
return to work for a period not to exceed nine months. During a trial return to
work period, the employee shall be paid any compensation which may be owed
for partial disability pursuant to G.S. 97-30. If the trial return to work is
unsuccessful, the employee's right to continuing compensation under G.S. 97-29
shall be unimpaired unless terminated or suspended thereafter pursuant to the
provisions of this Article.
Id.
141. See Grant, supra note 100, at 3.
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process.142 Even disregarding the uncertainty associated with
reentering the compensation claim system, the prospect of managing
without any compensation for the entire processing time, several
months in some cases, was enough to discourage workers from trying
to return to work until they were certain of their recovery.143 To
encourage workers to return to work earlier, the 1994 Reform Act
provides for a nine month trial return to work period,1" a concept
already used for Social Security disability claimants.14 While
working during this trial period, the worker receives partial disability
compensation pursuant to section 97-30.146 If, however, the trial
return to work is unsuccessful, the worker is entitled to immediate
reinstatement of full disability compensation.147 If the employer
feels that the return to work was successful, but the employee does
not, the employer can no longer rely on the total-recovery
presumption and instead must follow the regular compensation
termination procedures.'
Perhaps workers' largest benefit from the 1994 reform effort lies
not so much in what changed but what remained untouched. The
initial April 19, 1993, proposal149 would have decidedly tipped the
balance in the employer-employee workers' compensation relationship
in employers' favor." The elimination of several of the changes
from the first 1994 Reform Act proposal, particularly the provisions
shifting the burden of proof, limiting attorney's fees, excluding
palliative care, and changing the definition of "injury, 151
142. Id
143. Id.
144. Reform Act, ch. 679, sec. 4.1, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319,32829 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-32.1 (Supp. 1994)).
145. See Patterson & Eichner, supra note 82, at 28-29 (citing Memorandum from L.
Jones to Member of House of Representatives for House PCS for Senate Bill 906 (June
29, 1994)). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592 (1994) (describing the nine month trial work
period for the Social Security system).
146. Reform Act sec. 4.1, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 328-29 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-32.1 (Supp. 1994)).
147. ld. Interestingly, a comparison of the bill drafts suggests that an injured worker
is not necessarily limited to a single "trial return to work." Compare Draft Five, supra
note 49, § 17 (stating that an "employee may attempt a single trial return to work") with
S. 906, N.C. 1993 Sess. § 4.1, draft of June 23, 1994 (enacted as amended by Reform Act,
ch. 679, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319 (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97 (Supp. 1994))) (stating that an "employee may attempt a trial return to work").
148. The normal compensation termination procedures are defined in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-18.1 (Supp. 1994).
149. Draft One, supra note 4.
150. See supra note 11.
151. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
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represented a significant victory for workers, albeit one that merely
maintained a benefit that they already enjoyed. The defeat of these
changes, when coupled with the added flexibility of -the trial return to
work and other minor changes, can be viewed as a "win" for workers.
The major beneficiary of the amendments, however, may be the
Industrial Commission. 2 Several changes wrought by the 1994
Reform Act will streamline the entire compensation payment and
review process, thereby allowing the Industrial Commission to
reallocate its resources and reduce the processing lime for claims.53
The most important of these are the provisions for direct
payment,"s the statutory authorization for administrative ter-
mination of compensation,' 5 and the granting of many court-like
powers for the control of hearings.5 6
For instance, the 1994 Reform Act for the first time authorizes
the direct payment of compensation without prior Industrial Commis-
sion approval of payment agreements.' 7 Section 97-18, governing
the payment of compensation, was substantially rewritten to establish
three main options for employers to respond to claims.'58 First, if
the employer denies the employee's right to compensation, section 97-
18(c) provides that the employer has fourteen days to notify both the
Commission and the employee of its stance and give "a detailed
statement of the grounds upon which the right to compensation is
denied."'5 9  Second, if the employer has reasonable grounds for
uncertainty regarding its liability, section 97-18(d) provides for the
ninety-day "payment without prejudice" option.' 6 Third, and most
152. While the Commission is not one of the interested parties in the workers' compen-
sation system's employee-employer balance, the Commission is charged with regulating and
adjudicating the compensation and review process of that system. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 97-1 to -101 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
153. Such a streamlining will help reduce the backlog of cases which stood at 5,866 as
of March 1994. Ward, supra note 12, at 302.
154. See infra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
157. See Reform Act, ch. 679, sec. 3.1,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319,324-25 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18 (Supp. 1994)) (removing the requirements of an agreement
and requiring an initial payment by the employer within 14 days of notice of the
employee's injury).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 97-18(c), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 324 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-18(c) (Supp. 1994)). The 14-day clock begins when the employer receives written or
actual notice of injury or death. Id.
160. I& § 97-18(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 324-25 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-18(d) (Supp. 1994)). See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text for discussion of
this provision.
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important to the Commission, when the employer accepts liability,
section 97-82(a) now allows payments to begin in many situations
without waiting for the Commission to approve a memorandum of
agreement. 6' Revised section 97-82(a) makes the filing of a
memorandum of agreement discretionary rather than mandatory in
many circumstances.6 2 A memorandum of agreement is still
required for injuries or diseases that result in the death of the worker,
for injuries that are permanent, disfiguring or totally disabling under
section 97-31, and for claims of minors or incompetents."6 In all
other situations, a memorandum of agreement may be filed but is not
required.' 64 Instead, the employer may commence direct payments
to the injured worker upon acceptance of liability." The Industrial
Commission must be notified of any such action," but payments
need not be delayed while waiting for Industrial Commission
161. Reform Act sec. 32, § 97-82(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 326 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82(a) (Supp. 1994)). Section 97-82 provides:
(a) If the employer and the injured employee or his dependents reach an
agreement in regard to compensation under this Article, they may enter into a
memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by the Commission.
An agreement, however, shall be incorporated into a memorandum of
agreement in regard to compensation: (i) for loss or permanent injury,
disfigurement, or permanent and total disability under G.S. 97-31, (ii) for death
from a compensable injury or occupational disease under G.S. 97-38, or (iii) when
compensation under this Article is paid or payable to an employee who is
incompetent or under 18 years of age.
The memorandum of agreement, accompanied by a full and complete
medical report, shall be filed with and approved by the Commission; otherwise
such agreement shall be voidable by the employee or his dependents.
(b) If approved by the Commission, a memorandum of agreement shall for
all purposes be enforceable by the court's decree as hereinafter specified.
Payment pursuant to G.S. 97-18(b), or payment pursuant to G.S. 97-18(d) when
compensability and liability are not contested prior to expiration of the period for
payment without prejudice, shall constitute an award of the Commission on the
question of compensability of and the insurer's liability for the injury for which
payment was made. Compensation paid in these circumstances shall constitute
payment of compensation pursuant to an award under this Article.
IM. sec. 3.2 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994)).
162. Id. sec. 3.2, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 326 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
18 (Supp. 1994)).
163. Id. § 97-82(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 326 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-82(a) (Supp. 1994)).
164. See id
165. Id. § 97-18(b), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 326 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-82(b) (Supp. 1994)).
166. Id. It should be noted that direct payment may resolve the issue of liability but
leave undisturbed other issues such as average weekly wage and period of disability.
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approval.' 67 In essence, the 1994 Reform Act relieved the Industrial
Commission of some substantive responsibilities in many situations by
changing its role from active policing to mere administrative review
for the less serious situations." Of course, streamlining the system
in this way is wholly dependent on the actions of employers and
employees; the parties may still use the memorandum of agreement
system and keep the Industrial Commission actively involved.69
167. Section 97-82 does not require prior Industrial Commission approval. See supra
note 161. This provision arguably reverses at least part of Vernon v. Steven L. Mabe
Builders, 336 N.C. 425,444 S.E2d 191 (1994), where the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that the Commission is required to make a full investigation of settlement agreements.
Id. at 432-33, 444 S.E.2d at 195. The case involved a memorandum of agreement subject
to Commission approval. Id at 427, 444 S.E.2d at 191-92. Since the 1994 Reform Act
exempts some § 97-82 settlements from the Commission approval requirement, a full
investigation may no longer be required in all instances. See Lance Koonce, Vernon v.
Stephen L. Mabe Builders: The Requirements of Fairness in Settlement Agreements under
the North Carolinia Workers' Compensation Act, 73 N.C. L. REy. 2529, 2530-38, 2252-55
(1995) (detailing both Vernon and the confusion surrounding the Commission's role after
the 1994 Reform Act).
This reform perhaps tips the balance of bargaining power in the employer's favor in
those situations where the Commission's approval is not required, since the worker will
no longer have the Commission verifying that the settlement gives the worker all she is
entitled to under the Act. Id. at 2255-58.
168. Less serious situations are those that do not require memorandums of agreement
under § 97-82(a). See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
However, a problem could occur if an unscrupulous employer treats what is actually
a total disability as a partial disability and convinces an unrepresented injured worker to
agree to a finding of permanent partial disability (under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-30 (1991))
rather than permanent total disability (under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1991)). Under the
1994 Reform Act provisions, no memorandum of agreement is required; rather the
employer need only file a unilateral notice with the Commission per § 97-18(b) for which
no review is required. Reform Act, ch. 679, sec. 3.1, § 97-18(b), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 319, 324 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18(b) (Supp. 1994)). It is unclear if the
worker would have any recourse. Section 97-82(a) does include the phrase "otherwise
such agreement shall be voidable by the employee or his dependents," but the context of
this phrase makes it clear that "such agreements" means memoranda of agreement. Id.
see. 3.2, § 97-82(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 326 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
82(a) (Supp. 1994)). It is possible that § 97-18(b) was meant to answer this question by
indicating that a non-memorandum of agreement would be treated as an award of the
Commission but only on the question of compensability and liability, implicitly leaving out
questions of amount and duration of the award. Id. sec. 3.2, § 97-82(b), 1994 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 326 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82(b) (Supp. 1994)). For a more
detailed discussion of this problem see Koonce, supra note 167, at 2553-58.
169. This is because the revised § 97-82 would seem to permit memorandum of
agreement to be used even in those situations where a memorandum of agreement is not
required. See Reform Act sec. 3.2, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 326 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (Supp. 1994)) (stating "they may enter into a memorandum of
agreement") (emphasis added).
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Another significant statutory revision is the explicit authorization
to terminate or suspend compensation without a formal Commission
hearing.170  In Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving Co.,"' the
North Carolina Court of Appeals struck down the Industrial Commis-
sion's administrative procedure for termination of compensation as
being beyond the scope of the Commission's authority." The court
indicated that an informal administrative review was insufficient for
compensation terminations, and required a formal hearing for all
compensation terminations." The decision was vacated by the
North Carolina Supreme Court for lack of ripeness, 4 but the
General Assembly decided to provide a statutory basis for the
administrative procedure before the issue could ripen. A new section,
97-18.1, details the procedure for termination or suspension of
compensation.' Notably, section 97-18.1 avoids enumerating a
substantive basis for terminating compensation and instead focuses on
procedural aspects only. 6 If the employee returns to work for the
same or a different employer, the employer may terminate compen-
sation unilaterally."r Otherwise, the employer must follow a
procedure that parallels the previous Commission procedure with
some minor alterations.' Hence, the statutory change affirms the
170. See id. sec. 3.6, § 18.1(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 327-28 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 18.1(d) (Supp. 1994)).
171. 113 N.C. App. 121, 437 S.E.2d 696 (1993), vacated, 337 N.C. 785, 448 S.E.2d 380
(1994).
172. Id. at 125-26, 437 S.E.2d at 699.
173. See id. at 125-26, 437 S.E.2d at 698. The court did recognize, however, that in
some situations, such as under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-27 and § 97-32, no hearing was
required. See id.
174. Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving Co., 337 N.C. 785, 788-89, 448 S.E.2d 380,
381-82 (1994).
175. Reform Act, ch. 679, sec. 3.6, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 319,327-28 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18.1 (Supp. 1994)).
176. Id.; Patterson & Eichner, supra note 82, at 24.
177. Reform Act sec. 3.6, § 97-18(b), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 327 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18.1(b) (Supp. 1994)); see Patterson & Eichner, supra note 82, at 25.
The ability to terminate payments upon a return to work could arguably be considered
the equivalent of an automatic reopening of the compensation award by the employer.
It is interesting to note that the worker has no corresponding power; workers must go
through the full § 97-47 change of condition procedure. See supra notes 83-86 and
accompanying text. Alternatively, the award could be viewed as subject to a condition that
the worker remain unemployed.
178. The new procedure closely parallels the previous termination procedure known as
a "Form 24" procedure. See Ward, supra note 12, at 284; Patterson & Eichner, supra note
82, at 23-27. In simple terms, the employee and the Commission are notified of the
employer's intent to terminate and the reasons why. Reform Act sec. 3.6, § 97-18.1(c),
1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 327 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18.1(c) (Supp. 1994)).
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employer's right to terminate compensation under certain conditions
without a formal hearing, thereby avoiding the potential increased
workload that would have been required by the court of appeals'
holding in Martin.
Other administrative changes focus directly on the preparation
and management of Industrial Commission hearings and attempt to
simplify the process. 9 For instance, the requirement of "summary
and simple" procedures was expanded to cover discovery; S the
Commission and deputy commissioners were given power "to preserve
order at hearings, to compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses, and to compel the production of books, papers, records,
and other tangible things;"'' testimony by deposition was
authorized;"8 and the Commission was given power to "provide for
and limit the use of interrogatories and other forms of discovery,""
and to sanction for "failure to comply with a Commission order
compelling discovery."' 8 Importantly, the Commission and deputy
If the employee fails to respond within 14 days, the Commission may enter an order
terminating compensation if the employer has supplied a sufficient basis for the
termination. ALa § 97-18.1(c)-(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 327 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-18.1(c)-(d) (Supp. 1994)). If, however, the employee files an objection to the
termination, the Commission can hold an informal telephone hearing among the parties
to determine the appropriate course of action. Id. § 97-18.1(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis.
Serv. at 327-28 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18.1(d) (Supp. 1994)). If the application
for termination of compensation is approved, the employer may terminate payments; if the
application is denied or no conclusion is reached, payments must continue. See ia
Regardless of the outcome, either the employer or the employee may request a formal de
novo hearing pursuant to section 97-83. Id.
It is unclear what reasons would constitute sufficient justification for an employer-
initiated compensation termination under § 97-18.1. Presumably, the Commission would
use the same standards for both formal and informal hearings, and such may have been
the intent of the language in § 97-18.1(d) stating "if [the Commission] finds that there is
a sufficient basis under this Article," language in § 97-18.1(d) but a more explicit recital
would have been helpful. Id. § 97-18.1(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 327-28 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18(d) (Supp. 1994)).
179. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text.
180. Reform Act sec. 5.3, § 97-80(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 329-30 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-80(a) (Supp. 1994)).
181. Id. § 97-80(b), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 330 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-80(b) (Supp. 1994)).
182. Id. § 97-80(d), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 330 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-80(d) (Supp. 1994)).
183. Id. § 97-80(f), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 330 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-80(f) (Supp. 1994)).
184. Id.
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commissioners now also have the "same power as a judicial officer"
to punish for criminal and civil contempt.lss
These changes were designed to "reduce litigation, curb costs,
and help the Commission continue its long-standing statutory duty to
ensure that claims are handled as promptly as possible., 18 6 Other
changes create an ombudsman program to assist "unrepresented
claimants, employers, and other parties, to enable them to protect
their rights,"'" and permit the creation of an advisory council to
assist the Commission on workers' compensation issues."' The
combined effect of the changes renders the workers' compensation
system under the Industrial Commission more self-contained, both
improving efficiencies within the system and reducing the burden on
superior courts.'
The initial goal of cost containment will be partially met by the
1994 Reform Act, but much future work remains to be done in
fleshing out the utilization rules and guidelines authorized by the 1994
Reform Act's addition of sections 97-25.4 and 97-25.5."9 Section 97-
25.4(a) authorizes, but does not command, the Commission to adopt
rules and guidelines for medical care and medical rehabilitation
services;19' section 97-25.5 provides the same authorization for
vocational and other rehabilitation services.' 92 The statutory power
to define what care will be provided under workers' compensation
gives the Commission a powerful tool to contain medical costs. How
effective this power will be, though, depends on the details of any
such guidelines.' 9'
185. Id. § 97-80(g)-(h), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 330-31 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-80(g)-(h) (Supp. 1994)).
186. Patterson & Eichner, supra note 82, at 34.
187. Reform Act sec. 5.2, § 97-79(f), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 329 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-79(d) (Supp. 1994)). The ombudsman can assist unrepresented
claimants, employers, and other parties, but cannot represent claimants at compensation
hearings. Id.
188. ld. sec. 5.1,1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 329 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77.1
(Supp. 1994)).
189. Under prior law, the Commission was forced to work through the superior courts
in order to enforce orders compelling attendance, testimony, and like matters. Lore
Interview, supra note 110.
190. Reform Act sec. 2.4, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-25.4, 25.5 (Supp. 1994)).
191. Id. § 25.4(a), 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §
25.4(a) (Supp. 1994)).
192. Id § 25.5, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 323 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25.5
(Supp. 1994)).
193. The Advisory Council called for by § 97-77.1, Reform Act sec. 5.1,1994 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 329 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-77.1 (Supp. 1994)), is currently
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The net effect of this change is threefold. First, from a
procedural standpoint, the battle for substantive benefits may move
behind the scenes. Defining the medical benefits provided by
workers' compensation will fall, at least initially, to the guideline
drafting committee(s). Instead of being fought on the legislative or
judicial fronts, the battle will be waged in an administrative committee
room. While the guidelines will need to be "consistent with this
Article [Workers' Compensation],' 94 the new sections seem to give
a great deal of discretion to the Commission in defining what will be
"consistent."' 95  Perhaps not until disputes over the guidelines'
contents percolate through the system will the elected legislators or
the elected judiciary become involved again. Secondly, the new
sections will take the decision on what is required to treat injured
workers out of the hands of physicians and other health care
providers, and place it into the hands of the Commission. Rather
than being able to respond to individual circumstances and advan-
cements in medical technology, health care providers will have to
contend not only with the insurance bureaucracy but also the even
more intransigent government bureaucracy. Last, the battles over the
guidelines will distract the parties from another highly effective
method of reducing workers' compensation costs: reducing the
number and severity of accidents through increased workplace safety.
If the number of accidents can be reduced, the overall costs of
workers' compensation, both monetary and social, can be contained
even in an era of health care inflation. 6 Despite these concerns,
utilization of rules and guidelines are an integral part of the managed
care response to increasing health care costs. Such rules and
guidelines are necessary to help restore balance to the workers'
compensation system in North Carolina.
The Hyler decision focused the pressure to reform the workers'
compensation system to a point where legislative inertia could be
beginning work on these guidelines. Lore Interview, supra note 110.
194. Reform Act sec. 2.4, §§ 25.4(a), 25.5, 1994 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv at 323 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25.4(a), 25.5 (Supp. 1994)).
195. See id (giving little guidance to the Commission apart from the statement in § 97-
25.4(a) that "the Commission may consider, among other factors, the practice guidelines
adopted by the boards and associations representing medical and rehabilitative
professionals," and § 97-25.5's similar precatory language).
196. By reducing the number of accidents, the increased economic cost of claims-both
compensatory and medical--can be offset by lowered overall claim expenses achieved
through a reduction in the total number of claims. In addition, there would be less societal
disruption since wage earners who avoid serious injury do not have to deal with the
disruptions caused by serious injuries.
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overcome. After employers and the insurance industry started the
ball rolling, however, the action became a multi-party effort to
improve the system."9  The various interests-employers/insurers,
workers, and the Industrial Commission itself-all recognized that the
system was unbalanced in some fashion, and each had its own agenda
for re-establishing balance. In the end, all three saw a portion of their
respective agendas adopted: measures were established to contain
medical costs,198 the administrative process was streamlined,1 and
flexibility was introduced into the system." The Workers' Com-
pensation Reform Act of 1994 does not solve all the system's ills, but
it is a step in the direction of restoring the balance. Determining how
big a step, and whether the balance now tilts in favor of employers,
in favor of workers, or is level, will depend on how the details are
implemented.
JOHN RICHARD OWEN
197. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 75-99, 108-36, 190-96 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 153-89 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 100-05, 140-48 and accompanying text.
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Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders: The Requirements of
Fairness in Settlement Agreements under the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act
No question is ever settled
Until it is settled right
Ella Wheeler Wilcox'
Advocates of workers' compensation statutes have long pointed
to a putative compromise between the interests of employers and
employees-said to reside at the core of workers' compensation
theory-to bolster' the claim that such extrajudicial systems are
inherently fair.2 According to the prevailing interpretation of this
compromise, employees give up a right to sue at common law, and
employers relinquish extensive common law defenses against
employee tort actions, in exchange for a system of guaranteed but
limited benefits for injured employees.3 The courts in many states,
and the North Carolina courts in particular,4 .have accepted this
reasoning in toto, and fashioned from it a pervasive standard of
fairness for transactions made pursuant to the statutes.
1. ELLA WHEELER WILCOX, Settle the Question Right, in CINEMA POEMS AND
OTHERS 55, 55 (1919).
2. Despite the prevalence of this view, it is by no means clear that the rights
employees and employers relinquish under the workers' compensation system are
equivalent in practice. See, e.g., Fleming v. K-Mart Corp., 312 N.C. 538, 552, 324 S.E.2d
214, 222 (1985) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (noting the inequalities often inherent in workers'
compensation adjudications). This Note seeks in part to encourage a largely semantic, but
symbolically significant, alternative view- that the compromise in workers' compensation
is also a goal, rather than solely a fixed starting point for the law. See infra notes 154-55
and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702,704 (4th Cir. 1955) (stating
that workers' compensation provides "for mutual concessions by employee and
employer"); Winslow v. Carolina Conference Ass'n, 211 N.C. 571, 579, 191 S.E. 403, 408
(1937) (noting that workers' compensation "contemplates mutual concessions by employee
and employer"); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723,725, 153 S.E. 266,268
(1930) (reasoning that workers' compensation "contains elements of a mutual concession
between the employer and employee by which the question of negligence is eliminated");
Andrews v. Peters, 55 N.C. App. 124,125,284 S.E.2d 748,749 (1981), disc rev. denied, 305
N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364 (1982) ("Workers' compensation laws were a statutory
compromise.... In exchange for the employer's loss of common law defenses ... the
employee gave up his right to common-law verdicts.").
4. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
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In a recent decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court extended
its evolving interpretation of the equitable considerations that arise
under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act")5
by requiring the Industrial Commission to investigate fully all
settlement agreements for equity in the bargaining process.6 The fact
that the decision may have dramatic consequences for the Commis-
sion's workload and procedural methodology underscores the supreme
court's dedication to fairness in all aspects of the administration of the
Act. However, the reinvigoration of this fairness doctrine may be
short-lived. Shortly after the court handed down the decision in
Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders,' the North Carolina Legislature
passed the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994 ("Reform
Act"),' which throws some of the seemingly obvious implications of
Vernon into question.9 Most importantly, the inconsistencies between
Vernon and the new reforms may significantly distort employers' and
employees' understanding of the submission and approval process, as
well as the legal effect, of all settlement agreements under the Act.10
In Vernon, the North Carolina Supreme Court confronted the
issue of whether the North Carolina Industrial Commission, in
approving a Form 26 compensation agreement1 executed between
an employer and an injured employee, is required to make a
determination that the settlement is fair and just. 2 The court held
that, to ensure that compensation agreements are reached in a
manner in accord with the intent and purpose of the Act, the
Commission is required to act in a judicial capacity when approving
Form 26 settlements, and therefore is obligated to make a full
investigation of the agreement.Y The court's decision is in harmony
with both the spirit of the Act and judicial precedent, but flatly
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -143 (1994).
6. Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, 336 N.C. 425, 434, 444 S.E.2d 191, 196
(1994).
7. 336 N.C. 425, 444 S.E2d 191 (1994).
8. Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 319
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1994)); see also John Richard
Owen, Note, The North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act of 1994: A Step in the
Direction of Restoring Balance, 73 N.C. L. REv. (1995) 2502 passim (summarizing the
major changes to North Carolina workers' compensation law made by the Reform Act).
9. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
11. Two types of settlement agreements are recognized by the Workers' Compensation
Act: memoranda of compensation, filed either on Industrial Commission Form 21 or Form
26; and compromise settlement agreements. See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
12. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 427,444 S.E2d at 191-92.
13. Iat at 432, 444 S.E.2d at 195.
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overrules the Industrial Commission's own interpretation of the duties
it must fulfill when approving compensation agreements.14 This Note
reviews the facts and holding of Vernon,' and then examines the
statutory background of the supreme court's decision, as well as the
evolution of the court's fairness doctrine in its precedent. 6 This
Note focuses in particular on the parameters that the court has
established in requiring the Industrial Commission to act in a judicial
capacity when reviewing settlement agreements.17 The Note con-
structs a model of the court's fairness doctrine 8 and analyzes the
practical consequences of the model on employers, employees, and
the Industrial Commission. 9 The Note also addresses the logical
consistency of Vernon in the context of its precedent,' as well as the
difficulties Vernon presents in light of the Reform Act.2 Finally, the
Note presents a number of particular administrative challenges that
Vernon poses, along with potential solutions for some of those
questions.22
Homer R. Vernon injured his back lifting a heavy door while
employed by Stephen L. Mabe Builders.' The employer Builders
admitted liability, agreed to pay workers' compensation to Vernon,
and executed a Form 21 "Agreement for Compensation for
Disability," which the Industrial Commission later approved.24
When Vernon's condition reached its maximum medical
improvement,' his doctor determined that Vernon had a permanent
disability and thus could not resume employment2? On the same
day, Stephen L. Mabe Builders terminated temporary total disability
payments to Vernon? Subsequently, the employer's insurance
company mailed Vernon a Form 26 "Supplemental Memorandum of
Agreement as to Payment of Compensation" and stated that, upon
14. See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 23-71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 72-142 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 155-79 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 195-202 and accompanying text.
23. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 427, 444 S.E.2d at 192.
24. Id.
25. I& at 428,444 S.E.2d at 192. On August 13,1987, the Vernons' doctor determined
that Vernon had a 15% permanent disability in his back. Id
26. Id
27. Id
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approval of the form by the Commission, benefits would resume.4
The insurance company's correspondence only indicated that Vernon
was entitled to scheduled benefits under section 97-31 of the Act
totaling forty-five weeks of compensation.29 The memorandum did
not mention that Vernon might be eligible for benefits under section
97-29, which provides compensation for permanent total disability?
As a consequence of this omission, no mention was made of the fact
that under Whitley v. Columbia Lumber Manufacturing Co.3' an
employee entitled to benefits under both section 97-29 and section 97-
31 may choose the more favorable remedy?2 Vernon was illiter-
ate33 and signed the agreement without seeking legal counsel or
further information about workers' compensation?4 When the
Commission received the Form 26 from Vernon, a claims department
employee, pursuant to Commission policy, approved the agreement
with only a cursory examination of the form and attachments. 35 The
claims department employee was also unaware of the significance of
the Whitley decision to Vernon's case?6
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-29 (1994). The omission apparently was unintentional.
According to the court of appeals, "[the defendant] was of the opinion that [the plaintiff]
could return to work and thus was entitled to benefits for permanent partial disability."
Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, 110 N.C. App. 552,557,430 S.E.2d 676,680 (1993),
rev'd, 336 N.C. 425,444 S.E.2d 191 (1994). That is, the employer did not believe that the
employee was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Moreover, the court of
appeals upheld the Industrial Commission's finding that no misrepresentation had been
made to Vernon, and that therefore the settlement would not be overturned on those
grounds. Id.
31. 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986).
32. Id. at 95-96, 348 S.E.2d at 340; see Vernon, 336 S.E2d at 428, 444 S.E.2d at 192.
33. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 428,444 S.E2d at 192. Vernon's wife read the agreement and
accompanying correspondence to him. Id
34. Id.
35. Id. The claims employee, who was not an attorney, "simply checked the rating
listed on the form against the physician's report attached thereto, verified the payment
information, and approved the agreement." Ia. The court of appeals noted that a deputy
commissioner had found that
it was the Industrial Commission's policy not to substitute its judgment for the
parties or act as an advocate for either side as long as the information in the file
supported the settlement agreement. Plaintiff was free to make an election of
remedies, and the Commission would approve the resulting settlement as long as
there was supporting documentation and the settlement complied with the law.
Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, 110 N.C. App. 552,555,430 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1993),
rev'd, 336 N.C. 425, 444 S.E.2d 191 (1994).
36. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 428, 444 S.E.2d at 192.
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Two years later, Vernon moved to set aside the previous
agreement in order to pursue a claim for permanent total disability
under section 97-29.?' The Commission denied the plaintiff's motion,
determining that there had been no error in approving the agreement
due to fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake, or undue influ-
ence. 8 The court of appeals affirmed this denial, and also held that
there was no requirement in the Act, case law, or Industrial Commis-
sion rules that approval of a Form 26 agreement be based on a deter-
mination that the settlement was fair?9 In a dissent, Judge Wynn
cited precedent indicating that the Industrial Commission was
responsible for ensuring fairness in any settlement proceeding.4° The
plaintiff brought an appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court
pursuant to the dissent.4'
Taking up the issue on direct appeal-whether the Industrial
Commission must determine that a Form 26 settlement agreement is
fair-the North Carolina Supreme Court first addressed the Workers'
Compensation Act's general treatment of settlements. Writing for the
majority, Justice Whichard began by referring to North Carolina
General Statute 97-17,42 which authorizes settlements if reached in
37. Id.
38. Id. Under § 97-17, approved memoranda of settlements become awards of the
Commission and, although they may be re-opened, they may not be overturned by the
Commission or the courts unless the plaintiff shows fraud, misrepresentation, mutual
mistake, or undue influence. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
39. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 428, 444 S.E.2d 192. The court of appeals did not elaborate
on its reasoning, citing only Industrial Commission rules and the absence of express
statutory requirements to the contrary in concluding that Form 26 agreements "in proper
form and conforming to the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act will be
approved by the Industrial Commission." Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, 110 N.C.
App. 552, 558, 430 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1993) (citing Workers' Compensation Rules of the
N.C. Industrial Comm'n, Rule 501(4) (1992)), rev'd, 336 N.C. 425,444 S.E.2d 191 (1994).
The court of appeals did not address the underlying logic (or lack thereof) for the different
treatment of Form 26 compensation agreements and compromise settlement agreements,
which-as the court of appeals noted-require a fairness determination. Id.; see infra
notes 99-119 and accompanying text (discussing compromise agreements). Justice Meyer,
in his dissent from the supreme court opinion, suggested that the Commission was free to
draft rules that differed between the two types of agreements, as long as the rules
themselves ensure fair settlements. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
40. Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders, 110 N.C. App. 552, 559-60, 430 S.E2d 676,
680 (1993) (Wynn, J., dissenting) (citing Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C. 660, 663, 75 S.E.2d
777, 780 (1953)), rev'd, 336 N.C. 425, 444 S.E.2d 191 (1994).
41. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 427, 444 S.E.2d at 192. Under North Carolina's rules of
appellate procedure, an "appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court from any decision of
the Court of Appeals rendered in a case ... [i]n which there is a dissent." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-30(2) (1994).
42. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 429, 444 S.E.2d at 193.
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accordance with the Act and approved by the Industrial Commis-
sion.43 He then described the two types of voluntary agreements
recognized by the Commission under this section.' The first type,
compromise or "clincher" agreements, may be reached in contested
cases, and usually take the form of a lump-sum payment to the
employee in exchange for an irrevocable termination of the employ-
ee's claim.45 The second type, compensation agreements, arise in
uncontested cases, and take basically the same form as benefits
rendered by a successful adjudication of a claim under the Act.46
The court then focused on section 97-82, which required the filing
of an Industrial Commission form and an accompanying medical
report pursuant to a settlement agreement,47 and quoted language
from Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc suggesting that the section was
designed to safeguard employees against unequal bargaining power
and to facilitate agreements that meet the objectives of the Act.49
The court concluded that Biddix was the source of the proposition
that the Commission acts in a judicial capacity when it approves a
settlement50  The court further noted that in evaluating a
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1994). Section 97-17 reads as follows:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to prevent settlements made
by and between the employee and employer so long as the amount of compen-
sation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with the provisions
of this Article. A copy of such settlement agreement shall be filed by employer
with and approved by the Industrial Commission: Provided, however, that no
party to any agreement for compensation approved by the Industrial Commission
shall thereafter be heard to deny the truth of the matters therein set forth, unless
it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Commission that there has
been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake,
in which event the Industrial Commission may set aside such agreement.
Id
44. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 429-30, 444 S.E.2d at 193.
45. Id. at 430, 444 S.E.2d at 193 (citing N.C. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, BULLETIN:
INFORMATION ABOUT THE NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION AcT 5 (1
January 1993)); see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text. Compromise settlements
are not submitted on Commission forms, but are drawn up by the parties. See infra note
99 and accompanying text.
46. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 430, 444 S.E.2d at 193; see infra notes 96-102 and accom-
panying text. Compensation agreements are submitted on Commission Forms 21 and 26.
See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
47. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 56,1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117, 139 (amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994)). The legislature substantially
altered the language of § 97-82 with the enactment of the Reform Act. See infra notes 89-
94 and accompanying text.
48. 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953).
49. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 430-31, 444 S.E.2d at 193-94 (citing Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663,
75 S.E.2d at 780).
50. Id.
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compromise agreement in Caudill v. Chatham Manufacturing Co.,5
it had assumed that "the Commission approves voluntary settlements
'only after a full investigation and a determination that the settlement
is fair and just.' ,,'2 The defendants in Vernon argued that because
compromise agreements represent conclusive determinations of
employees' rights, they are therefore more appropriately the subject
of fairness inquiries;53 the court, however, found that the statements
in Biddix and Caudill apply to Form 26 compensation agreements as
well.
Despite the fact that the Commission had for years interpreted
the distinctions between the two types of settlements to require
differential treatment,55 the court held that when the Commission
approves any type of compensation agreement it acts in a judicial
capacity, and thus must make a full 6 investigation and determination
that the agreement is fair. Specifically, the court held that where an
employee is entitled to remedies under two alternative sections of the
Act, the Commission must ensure by means of a full inquiry that the
more favorable remedy has been made available to the employee.57
The court restated its interpretation of the interplay between sections
97-29 and 97-31, which provide permanent total disability and a
schedule of benefits for partial disability, respectively. Previously,
when the court had addressed mutually exclusive sections of the act
in Gupton v. Builders Transport8 and Whitley v. Columbia Lumber
Manufacturing Co.,5 9 it had read these mutually exclusive sections to
51. 258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962).
52. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 431,444 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting Caudill, 258 N.C. at 106, 128
S.E.2d at 133).
53. Ia- at 433, 444 S.E.2d at 195. The defendants pointed to the fact that Form 26
agreements do not preclude claims for changes in the employee's condition or for future
medical costs, whereas compromise agreements result in an absolute forfeiture of the
employee's rights. Id.
54. Id. at 432-33, 444 S.E2d at 195.
55. The court stated unequivocally that the Commission's interpretations of statutory
intent do not bind the courts, although those interpretations may be evidence of the
proper interpretation. Id. at 433, 444 S.E2d at 195 (citing Ferrell v. Department of
Transp., 334 N.C. 650, 661, 435 S.E.2d 309, 317 (1993) (quoting Commissioner of Ins. v.
Automobile Rate Office, 294 N.C. 60, 76, 241 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1978))).
56. Id.
57. Id, at 432-33, 444 S.E2d at 195.
58. 320 N.C. 38, 357 S.E.2d 674 (1987).
59. 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986).
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confer upon an employee the right to choose the more favorable
remedy. o
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, the court found that
the Commission had not acted in its judicial capacity in approving the
Form 26 agreement, 6' and that the medical report's indication that
the plaintiff was permanently disabled "was sufficient evidence upon
which the Commission could have based a conclusion that the
agreement was not fair and just and in accord with the intent and
purpose of the Act."'62 Therefore, the court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded the case to -that court, with instructions to
remand to the Industrial Commission for a full investigation of the
settlement agreement.' Responding to the secondary issue before
60. Gupton, 320 N.C. at 42-43, 357 S.E.2d at 677-78 (comparing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
97-29 and 97-30); Whitley, 318 N.C. at 97-100,348 S.E.2d at 341-42 (comparing N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 97-29 and 97-31). Thus, where an employee's injury is specifically included in the
§ 97-31 schedule of injuries, but also results in permanent disability, as in Vernon, the
employee may receive benefits under § 97-29 instead of § 97-31.
61. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 195-96. The court said that the claims
department employee who reviewed the compensation agreement "apparently assumed,
rather than determined, that plaintiff was knowledgeable about workers' compensation
benefits .... Thus, in approving the Form 26 compensation agreement.., the Commis-
sion did not, as the statute requires, act in a judicial capacity to determine the fairness of
the agreement." Id.
62. Id at 434, 444 S.E.2d at 196. The court described one purpose of the Act as
follows:
"[T]he entire compensation system has been set up and paid for, not by the
parties, but by the public. The public has ultimately borne the cost of compen-
sation protection in the price of the product, and it has done so for the specific
purpose of avoiding having the disabled victims of industry thrown on private
charity or public relief. To this end, the public has enacted into law a scale of
benefits that will forestall such destitution. It follows, then, that the employer
and employee have no private right to thwart this objective by agreeing between
them on a disposition of the claim that may, by giving the worker less than this
amount, make him a potential public burden."
Id. at 432, 444 S.E.2d at 194-95 (quoting 3 ARTHUR LARsON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 82.41, at 15-204 to 15-205 (1993)) (alteration in original). Ironically, the
court took this quote from Larson's discussion of the negative consequences of
compromise agreements, which the court has held are legal in North Carolina. See infra
notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 435, 444 S.E.2d at 196. Describing remand procedure, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals has indicated that
the full Commission must strictly follow this Court's mandate without variation
or departure.... Ordinarily upon remand the full Commission can comply with
this Court's mandate without need of an additional hearing, but upon the rare
occasion that this Court requires an additional hearing upon remand the full
Commission must conduct the hearing without further remand to a deputy
commissioner.... Such an additional hearing without remand to the deputy
commissioner avoids the additional delay in cases where the resolution of a
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the court, the majority found that the court of appeals improvidently
allowed the plaintiff's petition for discretionary review regarding the
plaintiff's claims of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, and
mistake.64
Justice Meyer, writing in dissent, contended that the Industrial
Commission's adoption of a relatively perfunctory method of
approving Form 26 agreements did not mean that "the Commission
views itself as without responsibility to ensure the fairness of all
voluntary settlement agreements." 6 Justice Meyer believed that the
Commission was upholding its responsibility to ascertain the fairness
of a settlement when it determined that the submitted form
authorized compensation that was facially in accord with the Act.66
In doing so, Justice Meyer argued, "the Commission thereby properly
abides by a legislative determination of what is a fair settlement in
compensation for the injuries sustained by the employee."67 Addres-
sing the issue of the alternative remedies afforded by sections 97-31
and 97-29, he stated that simply because "the employee in this case
may have been eligible for a more favorable settlement does not
make the settlement he chose unfair., 61 Justice Meyer presumed
that when the legislature enacted the two sections it made the deter-
mination that either remedy would be sufficient compensation for the
specified injuries, regardless of the fact that one of the remedies was
more favorable." Justice Meyer therefore concluded that the court's
decision threatened to force Commission employees "to become
advocates and render advice as to fairness in the many thousands of
... form settlements that are submitted each year."7  This threat,
he warned, might lead the Commission to require injured employees
to enlist counsel before submitting settlement agreements, a policy
that would be antipodal to the stated goals of workers' compen-
sation. '
plaintiff's claim has already been long delayed.
Crump v. Independence Nissan, 112 N.C. App. 587, 590, 436 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1993)
(citations omitted).
64. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 435, 444 S.E.2d at 196.
65. Id. at 436, 444 S.E.2d at 197 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see also infra note 100
(describing the Commission's rule dictating the approval process for compensation
agreements).
66. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 436, 444 S.E.2d at 196 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 436, 444 S.E.2d at 197 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 437, 444 S.E.2d at 197 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
69. I& at 436-37, 444 S.E2d at 197 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
70. I& at 438, 444 S.E.2d at 198 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
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A review of the statutory backdrop for Vernon is complicated by
the passage of the Reform Act less than one month after the Vernon
decision was handed down.72 Although the narrow holding of
Vernon is still good law, the Reform Act has fundamentally altered
one statutory section relevant to the decision, which this Note will
discuss later.73 The first relevant section of the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act, however, remains unchanged. Section
97-17 is the enabling provision for settlement agreements between
injured employees and their employers.74 The language of the
section is written in the negative,75 suggesting that settlements are to
be the norm, rather than the exception to fully-adjudicated claims.76
As such, settlements serve one of the major purposes of the Workers'
Compensation Act: "certain and speedy relief"'77 The majority of
workers' compensation claims in North Carolina, and indeed
nationwide, are settled.7" Settlements must, however, meet certain
72. Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 319
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1994)).
73. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1994).
75. Id. ("Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to prevent settlements.").
76. I& This interpretation is especially clear when § 97-17 is read in conjunction with
the pre-reform version of § 97-82. In White v. Shoup Boat Corp., 261 N.C. 495, 135 S.E.2d
216 (1964), the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that
[t]he Legislature when it enacted our first Workmen's Compensation Act
anticipated employers and employees would, in most cases, be able to reach an
agreement with respect to the employee's rights to compensation. Hence it
inserted in the Act a provision authorizing such agreements when made in the
manner prescribed by the Industrial Commission.
Id. at 497, 135 S.E.2d at 218 (discussing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 92-82).
77. Cabe v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 202 N.C. 176, 186, 162 S.E. 223,229 (1932);
see also Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 709, 295 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1982)
(stating that the Act was "enacted to provide swift and sure compensation to injured
workers without the necessity of protracted litigation" (citation omitted)); Barnhardt v.
Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C. 419,427, 146 S.E.2d 479,484 (1966) (stating that one "purpose
of the Workers' Compensation Act is... to provide a swift and certain remedy"). The
Reform Act takes this dedication to swift relief a step further, allowing employers to make
direct payments to employees without requiring Commission approval. See infra notes 90-
94 and accompanying text.
78. In the Industrial Commission's 1990-1992 biennial report, uncontested cases are
said to account for "approximately 95% of the claims reported each year." 32 N.C. INDUS.
COMM'N BIENNIAL RE'. 2 (1990-92). This estimate has not changed significantly for over
thirty years. See eg., Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254, 258,221 S.E.2d 355,
358 (1976) (citing Smith v. Red Cross, 245 N.C. 166, 95 S.E.2d 559 (1956)) (stating that
"more than 95 percent of all claims for compensation based on industrial injuries have
been disposed of by agreements executed in conformity with the statute"). Nationwide,
"[t]he vast majority of compensation claims are disposed of by agreement, without contest
either at the administrative or at the judicial level." 3 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMENS' COMPENSATION § 82.00, at 15-1194 (1994).
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criteria. First, the "amount of compensation and the time and manner
of payment" specified in a settlement must conform to the terms of
the Act.79 Read literally, this suggests that if the employee brings a
full claim, the settlement should reflect exactly the level of compen-
sation set out in the Act for the injuries incurred. 0 Second, the
agreement must be "filed by [the] employer with and approved by the
Industrial Commission."'" Section 97-17 also provides that parties
to a settlement may not contest the truth of such an agreement, once
it is approved, except on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation,
undue influence, or mutual mistake.'
Employers and employees under the Act' receive further
guidance from section 97-82, which spells out the procedure that most
section 97-17 settlements should follow.' For all compensation
settlements, pre-reform section 97-82 stated that the agreement must
be recorded as a "memorandum of agreement" on a form85 pre-
scribed by the Industrial Commission.86 Echoing the language of
section 97-17, pre-reform section 97-82 stated that the memorandum
must then be fied with and approved by the Commission, and added
the requirement that the agreement be accompanied by the
employee's medical reportY An agreement that was not approved
by the Commission was voidable by the employee. 8
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1994).
80. See id
81. Id.
82. Id; see also Stanley v. Brown, 261 N.C. 243, 247, 134 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1964)
("[The] Commission has the inherent power, upon application made in due time, to relieve
a party from a judicial determination of his rights when the decision is a product of
mistake, fraud or excusable neglect." (citations omitted)); Brookover v. Borden, Inc., 100
N.C. App. 754,756,398 S.E.2d 604,606 (1990) ("Where an employee accepts benefits from
an agreement for compensation ... duly approved by the Commission, the employee may
attack and have such agreement set aside only for fraud, misrepresentation, undue
influence, or mutual mistake." (citation omitted)); Buchanan v. Mitchell County, 38 N.C.
App. 596, 598, 248 S.E.2d 399, 400 (1978) (citing N.C. GEN. STAr. § 97-17) (stating that
agreements between an employer, the employer's insurer and the employee "may be set
aside when 'there has been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or
mutual mistake' "), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 583, 254 S.E.2d 35-36 (1979).
83. According to § 97-3, all employees and employers in North Carolina are presumed
to be covered by the Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-3 (1994), with certain exceptions, such as
employers with fewer than three employees, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1994).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994).
85. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text (discussing the various possible
interpretations of what, if anything, § 97-82 requires for compromise settlements).
86. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 56,1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117, 139 (amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The same concerns for overburdening the administrative capacity
of the Industrial Commission that motivated Justice Meyer's dissent
in Vernon were also voiced in the North Carolina legislature during
the summer of 1994, leading to dramatic reform of section 97-82.
Under the Reform Act, compensation settlements are no longer
mandatory in lieu of a claim. 9 Amended section 97-18 now allows
employers to choose to make direct payments to employees, rather
than complete formal voluntary settlements under sections 97-17 and
97-82.90 Upon making the initial payment to an employee, the
employer is required to file a new form prescribed by the Commission
that will contain the weekly amount of compensation being paid, as
well as other information.91 This information may later be reduced
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994). The full text of § 97-82 is reproduced below.
Brackets surround language that was stricken by the amended statute, and the new
language is italicized:
Memorandum of agreement between employer and employee to be submitted to
Commission on prescribed forms for [approval.] approva" direct payment as
award. (a) If [after seven days after the date of the injury, or at any time in the
case of death,] the employer and the injured employee or his dependents reach
an agreement in regard to compensation under this Article, they may enter into
a memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by the [Industrial
Commission,] Commission. [accompanied by a full and complete medical report,
shall be filed with and approved by the Commission; otherwise such agreement
shall be voidable by the employee or his dependents.] An agreement, however,
shall be incorporated into a memorandum of agreement in regard to compensation:
(i) for loss or permanent injury, disfigurement, or permanent and total disability
under G.S. 97-31, (ii) for death from a compensable injury or occupational disease
under G.S. 97-38, or (iii) when compensation under this Article is paid or payable
to an employee who is incompetent or under 18 years of age. The memorandum
of agreement, accompanied by a full and complete medical report, shall be filed
with and approved by the Commission; otherwise such agreement shall be voidable
by the employee or his dependents. (b) If approved by the Commission,
[thereupon the] a memorandum of agreement shall for all purposes be enfor-
ceable by the court's decree as hereinafter specified. Payment pursuant to G.S.
97-18(b), or payment pursuant to G.S. 97-18(d) when compensability and liability
are not contested prior to expiration of the period for payment without prejudice,
shall constitute an award of the Commission on the question of compensability of
and the insurer's liability for the injury for which payment was made. Compen-
sation paid in these circumstances shall constitute payment of compensation
pursuant to an award under this Article.
1d.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18 (1994).
91. Id. The information required by the new form closely parallels the information
required by Form 21. Henry N. Patterson & Maxine Eichner, The 1994 Workers'
Compensation Reform Act, Remarks at the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers
Workplace Torts & Workers' Compensation Continuing Legal Education Seminar (Nov.
18, 1994), in WORKPLACE TORTS & WORKERS' COMPENSATION: CUTTING EDGE
WORKPLACE LITIGATION ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE ARCHITECTS OF THE 1994
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to a written agreement pursuant to section 97-82(a),9 but in many
uncontested cases the employer and employee may not choose to do
so.9a However, compensation pursuant to section 97-31, compen-
sation pursuant to death benefits under section 97-38, and compen-
sation payable to a minor or an incompetent must still be fied and
approved pursuant to section 97-82.'4 Therefore, the amending
language would not seem to change the result for cases similar to
Vernon, where a settlement pursuant to the section 97-31 schedule of
injuries would still have to be incorporated into a memorandum of
agreement, and it similarly would not change the result for
agreements the parties voluntarily choose to put in writing.
The Industrial Commission has designated two forms-Form 21
and Form 26-as the prescribed settlement forms referred to in
section 97-82.9' Form 21 is the standard memorandum of agreement,
presumably used to record any initial settlement between the
parties.96 Form 26 is a supplemental memorandum of agreement,
WORKERS' COMP REFORM Acr (1994), at 13-14.
92. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994).
93. Under § 97-82(b), direct payment by an employer pursuant to § 97-18(b), or direct
payment that goes uncontested for the period for payment without prejudice described in
§ 97-18(d), becomes an award of the Commission, similar to an approved settlement. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 97-82(b) (1994). However, whereas approved settlements can only be
reopened or overturned due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, or mutual
mistake, direct payments are awards only for purposes "of compensability of and the
insurer's liability for the injury." Id. Presumably, this means that employees can challenge
direct payments by contesting the amount of compensation or other relevant matters, but
that employers cannot deny compensability.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82(a) (1994). It seems clear, therefore, that the legislature
intended to leave the Vernon decision undisturbed when it revised the Act, as it declined
to alter § 97-82 insofar as that section required Commission approval for compensation
settlements pursuant to § 97-31. See i; see also PATrERSON & EICHNER, supra note 91,
at 14 (observing that form agreements must continue to be used for agreements under §
97-31).
95. In Hyler v. GTE Products Co., 333 N.C. 258,425 S.E.2d 698 (1993), Justice Meyer
described the role of the forms in the context of a typical settlement:
The overwhelming majority of workers' compensation claims are resolved
consensually in [this] manner[:] ... compensability is admitted; medical expenses
are paid; the injured claimant is compensated for temporary-total and permanent-
partial disability pursuant to Form 21 and Form 26 Agreements; and subject to
a change in condition, this resolution of the claim is approved by the Commission
and becomes final, a Form 28 is filed, and the claim is closed.
I. at 269, 425 S.E.2d at 705 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
96. Under the Commission's rules, Rule 103 lists as official forms of the Commission
Forms 21 and 26, although it does not describe the forms beyond their titles. N.C. INDUS.
COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C. Industrial Commission, Rule 103,
Official Forms, in N.C. GEN. STAT., Annotated Rules, 518 (1992). Another rule describes
the procedure for "Agreement for Payment of Compensation," and specifically mentions
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presumably used to record subsequent arrangements for additional
compensation. 7 Forms 21 and 26 are used only to record compen-
sation agreements; 8 compromise or "clincher" agreements, by
contrast, are not submitted on Commission forms, but are drawn up
by the parties.99 The distinction between compensation agreements
and compromise agreements is significant. Compensation agreements
are simply standard voluntary settlements between the employer and
employee, routinely screened and approved by the Commission,"°°
which become awards of the Commission when reduced to writing
and certified,'' subject to reopening for a change of condition."°
Compromise agreements, on the other hand, are more controversial.
Their nature, and especially their legitimacy, have proven to be
daunting questions for the courts."°  Furthermore, although
compromises were not the subject of the Vernon court's attention, the
court did adopt the Industrial Commission's standard for reviewing
such agreements as the standard the court would require for future
Forms 21 and 26. N.C. INDUS. COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C.
Industrial Commission, Rule 501, Agreements for Payment of Compensation, in N.C. GEN.
STAT., Annotated Rules, 522-23 (1992).
97. See NORTH CAROLINA INDUS. COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the
North Carolina Industrial Commission, Rule 103, Official Forms, in N.C. GEN. STAT.,
Annotated Rules, 518 (1992).
98. Id.
99. Michael K. Gordon, Closing and Re-Opening Cases, Settlements and Lump Sums,
INSTITUTE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION (N.C. Bar Association and N.C. Bar Association
Foundation), October 1-2,1982, at VI-14 to -15. The fact that compromise agreements are
not submitted on Commission forms suggests that they are not contemplated by § 97-82.
See infra notes 155-84 and accompanying text (discussing the possible statutory sources for
compromise agreements).
100. Industrial Commission Rule 501 describes the process of submission and approval
of compensation agreements, and states that such settlements "in proper form and
conforming to the provisions of the Act will be approved by the Industrial Commission."
N.C. INDUS. COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C. Industrial Commission,
Rule 501, Agreements for Payment of Compensation, in N.C. GEN. STAT., Annotated
Rules, 521-22 (1993).
101. See Hyler v. GTE Products Co., 333 N.C. 258, 268, 425 S.E.2d 698, 705 (1993)
(Meyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254,
258-59,221 S.E.2d 355,358 (1976); Tabron v. Gold Leaf Farms, Inc., 269 N.C. 393,396-97,
152 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1967) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17); White v. Shoup Boat Corp.,
261 N.C. 495,498, 135 S.E2d 216,218 (1964); Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163,166,130 S.E.2d
39, 41 (1963) (citation omitted); Smith v. Mecklenburg County Chapter Am. Red Cross,
245 N.C. 116,120,95 S.E.2d 559,562 (1956) (citation omitted); Tucker v. Lowdermilk, 233
N.C. 185, 188, 63 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1951) (citation omitted).
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-47 (1994); Crump v. Independence Nissan, 112 N.C.
App. 587, 592-93, 436 S.E.2d 589, 594 (1993).
103. See, e.g., 3 LARSON, supra note 78, §§ 82.40-82.43, at 15-1204 to -1207 (1994)
(discussing the merits of permitting compromise agreements).
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review of compensation agreements. 4 Therefore, it is important to
understand the role compromise agreements play in the resolution of
workers' compensation disputes.
Compromise agreements often arise where the injured worker's
claim is questionable, and typically involve a relinquishment by the
employee of all right to further benefits under the Act, in exchange
for either a lump sum or some other type of payment that affords less
compensation than would be specified by the Act pursuant to a valid
claim."°  A compromise agreement represents a complete relin-
quishment by the employee of any rights under the Act, and thus
there is no right to reopen a case after the Commission approves a
compromise settlement."° However, the Commission or courts may
overturn the compromise agreement if the employee shows fraud,
104. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
105. Arthur Larson offers a simple example to illustrate the nature of a workers'
compensation compromise settlement:
Claimant has received an injury which, if compensable at all, calls for 400 weeks'
compensation; his wage basis is clearly the maximum of $210 a week; there is,
however, a serious question whether the injury arose out of and in the course of
employment; can the claimant accept, for example, 200 weeks' compensation at
$210, or 400 weeks' at $105, or a lump-sum of $42,000?
3 LARSON, supra note 78, § 82.30, at 15-1196. Less troublesome than compromises in
which potential compensation is actually reduced or substantial rights are relinquished are
those which simply represent a desire by the employer or insurer to foreclose future
payments. An employer may, for instance, offer an injured employee a lump sum equal
to the present value of the cumulative weekly benefits that would otherwise be due under
the Act. The Commission is empowered under § 97-44 to approve certain lump-sum
payments. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-44 (1994).
106. In an early North Carolina case, Morgan v. City of Norwood, 211 N.C. 600, 191
S.E. 345 (1937), an employee sought to rescind, on the grounds of change of condition, a
compromise settlement that had been approved by the Commission. Id. at 605, 191 S.E.2d
at 348. The court found the agreement to be final and binding, although it did not discuss
whether the agreement was approved pursuant to any particular section of the Act. Id
at 606-07, 191 S.E. at 348-49.
In Caudill v. Chatham Mfg. Co., 258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962), the court noted
the holding in Morgan, but did not expressly determine whether compromises were
binding under § 97-17 or § 97-82. Id. at 106, 128 S.E.2d at 133. The majority in Glenn v.
McDonald's, 109 N.C. App. 45, 425 S.E.2d 727 (1993), held that compromise settlements
were not only binding, but represent an award of the Commission under § 97-82. I at
48, 425 S.E.2d at 729-30. However, it appears that Glenn does not correctly state North
Carolina law, see infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text, so the question probably
remains open in North Carolina as to whether compromises become actual awards of the
Commission on approval. That is, § 97-82 only seems to grant this status to approved
compensation agreements, and it is questionable whether that section applies to
compromises. See infra notes 168-76 and accompanying text. As a practical matter,
however, there is probably little difference between a binding settlement and an award of
the Commission, because both are equally enforceable.
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misrepresentation, undue influence, or mutual mistakeY Because
the compromise settlement represents an irrevocable closing of an
employee's "claim," both courts and legislatures have been inclined
to look with some suspicion on such agreements, although in North
Carolina that discomfort never reached such a level that the legis-
lature barred compromises altogether, as some states have done.1
Although a literal reading of the Act would seem to prohibit conces-
sions -section 97-17 requires that the amount provided by a
settlement be "in accordance with the provisions of this Ar-
ticle""--North Carolina traditionally has allowed compromises."'
Rule 502 of the Industrial Commission states that "[a]u compromise
settlements must be submitted to the Industrial Commission for
approval. Only those agreements deemed fair and equitable and in
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1994).
108. See, e.g., Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 78 A.2d 709, 713 (N.J. 1951) (stating that
employers and employees "are not themselves free to bargain for the surrender of the
right of compensation under the statute"); American Gas Co. v. Klingerman, 74 A.2d 169,
171 (Pa. 1950) (holding that agreements providing for relinquishment of right to receive
payments on terms contrary to workers' compensation act are null and void). "In the
absence of any [express] statutory clause [allowing compromise agreements], the majority
rule appears to be that a claimant cannot validly agree to take less compensation than that
specified by the statute." 3 LARSON, supra note 78, § 82.31, at 15-1198 to -1199; see also
if. at 15-1199 n.39 (listing and discussing cases that represent the majority view).
109. At most, the Act is facially neutral as to compromises. See generally 3 LARSON,
supra note 78, § 82.31, at 15-1197 to -1202 (discussing the statutory language of settlement
provisions in various workers' compensation statutes).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1994).
111. Early in the higtory of the Act, in McGill v. Bison Fast Freight, 245 N.C. 469, 96
S.E.2d 438 (1957), the North Carolina Supreme Court determined that "the only
'settlement' contemplated by G.S. §§ 97-17 and 97-82 is a settlement in respect of the
amount of compensation to which claimants are entitled under the Act." Id. at 476, 96
S.E.2d at 444. Upholding a compromise settlement by the widow of an employee despite
the fact that she had mistaken the applicable law in agreeing to the compromise, id. at 475,
96 S.E.2d at 443, the court held that a compromise for compensation outside of the Act
in exchange for a waiver of the right to bring all claims was not prohibited, or even
touched on, by those sections. Id. The widow argued that because the compromise had
not been approved by the Industrial Commission, it did not bar a claim under the Act.
See iU at 476, 96 S.E.2d at 444. The court, however, believed that the compromise
settlement did not have to be approved to be valid, because it was not a settlement "in
respect of the amount of compensation." Id. (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-17,97-
82). Later, however, the Commission and courts began to require that parties submit
compromise settlements for approval pursuant to the Act, se e.g., Caudill v. Chatham
Mfg. Co., 258 N.C. 99, 106, 128 S.E.2d 128, 133 (1962), leading to the paradoxical result
that McGill, one of the original sources from the North Carolina Supreme Court for the
validity of compromise agreements, would probably be overruled today because the
compromise in that case was not submitted to the Commission. See McGill at 472-73, 96
S.E.2d at 441.
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the best interests of all parties will be approved."" The rule then
enumerates a series of threshold requirements to which compromise
agreements must conform before the Commission will approve the
settlement.1 3
These requirements are an outgrowth of the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Caudill v. Chatham Manufacturing
Co.," 4 which addressed the issue of whether a compromise agree-
ment allegedly reached under a mutual mistake of fact could be
rescinded." 5 Finding that there was no mutual mistake of fact, the
court stated that "[t]he law permits compromise settlements between
employers and employees who are bound by and subject to the
Workmen's Compensation Act, provided they are submitted to and
approved by the Industrial Commission.""16 More significantly, the
court also stated that "[t]he law... undertakes to protect the rights
of the employee in contracting with respect to his injuries. The
presumption is that the Industrial Commission approves compromises
only after a full investigation and a determination that the settlement
is fair and just."" 7 In the context of Caudill, one could argue that
the court alluded to the presumption of a full and fair investigation
only to posit that the parties were assumed to have been equitably
situated, rather than to imply that the Commission was actually
presumed to have made an investigation beyond a facial review of the
compromise settlement."' Indeed, if the court had expected the
decision to effect a substantive change in the approval process of the
Commission, it likely would have devoted more attention to the
"presumption" in the opinion. Regardless, the Commission now
makes a more thorough examination of compromise settlements,
pursuant to Rule 502."'
112. N.C. INDUS. COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C. Industrial
Commission, Rule 502, Compromise Settlement Agreements, in N.C. GEN. STAT.,
Annotated Rules, 522-23 (1992).
113. Id.
114. 258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962).
115. Id. at 102, 128 S.E.2d at 130.
116. Id at 106, 128 S.E.2d at 133 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17).
117. Id.
118. This argument is similar to the one proffered by the defendants in Vernon in
regard to compensation agreements: that as long as the compromise agreement is " 'in
proper form and conforming to the provisions of the Act,' "it is valid. 336 N.C. at 433,
444 S.E2d at 195 (citing N.C. INDUS. COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the
North Carolina Industrial Commission, Rule 501(4), in N.C. GEN. STAT., Annotated Rules,
522-23 (1992)).
119. The Commission's examination of the information required by Rule 502, see supra
notes 112-13 and accompanying text, however, does not represent the type of affirmative
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Tuing to the Industrial Commission's obligations in examining
settlements generally, it is established that when the Commission
approves any settlement pursuant to sections 97-17 and 97-82 of the
Act it is acting in a judicial capacity. The Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inca"
court's reasoning in this regard has remained uncontroverted for over
four decades."' The Biddix court stated that, as an administrative
agency charged with overseeing the Workers' Compensation Act, the
Commission has a special, although limited, judicial authority."
The court determined that the agency's judicial authority is invoked
when an employee submits a claim for benefits under section 97-
24." Furthermore, the court stated that the Commission's judicial
authority is also invoked when it is asked to approve a voluntary
settlement, because section 97-82 requires assurances that such
settlements have been made in accordance with the provisions of the
Act." The court in Biddix also pointed to the binding effect of
approved settlements on the parties to buttress the holding that the
Commission is acting in a judicial capacity."z
An approved settlement is equivalent to an award of the
Commission," is enforceable by court order,"z and is binding on
investigation of claims that Vernon might be read to demand. See infra text accompanying
note 198.
120. 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953).
121. See id. at 662-63, 75 S.E.2d at 780. In Biddix, an employer paid an injured
employee's medical bills in full. After the bills were paid, the employee brought a
workers' compensation claim, even though the twelve-month limitation period had already
run. Id. at 661-62, 75 S.E.2d at 778-79. The employee claimed that the payment of
medical bills constituted a waiver of the waiting period, but the court disagreed and held
that the claim was not valid. Id. at 666, 75 S.E.2d at 782. In ruling on this issue, the court
carefully laid out the functions of the Industrial Commission. Id. at 662-64, 75 S.E.2d at
779-80.
122. I& at 662-63, 75 S.E.2d at 779-80.
123. Id. at 663,75 S.E.2d at 780. Under this section, when the employee and employer
do not agree on compensation, a claim must be submitted to the Industrial Commission
within twelve months after the injury. Id.
124. Id.; accord Letterlough v. Atkins, 258 N.C. 166, 168, 128 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1962).
125. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S.E.2d at 780 (citing Tucker v. Lowdermilk, 233 N.C.
185, 63 S.E.2d 109 (1951)); see also Pruitt v. Knight Publishing Co., 289 N.C. 254,258,221
S.E.2d 355,358 (1976) ("[A]n agreement for the payment of compensation, when approved
by the Commission, is as binding on the parties as an... award of the Commission.");
Roberts v. Carolina Tables of Hickory, 76 N.C. App. 148, 150,331 S.E.2d 757,758 (1985)
(stating that approved settlements are binding absent a finding of fraud, misrepresentation,
undue influence, or mistake).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994); see Pruitt, 289 N.C. at 258, 221 S.E.2d at 358;
Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S.E.2d at 780; Martin v. Piedmont Asphalt & Paving Co., 113
N.C. App. 121, 123, 437 S.E.2d 696, 697 (1982) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds,
337 N.C. 785, 789, 448 S.E.2d 380, 382 (1994) (per curiam).
2546 [Vol. 73
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
the parties unless set aside for fraud, mistake, misrepresentation or
undue influence.' That is, a settlement made in accordance with
section 97-82 has exactly the same effect as an award rendered by the
Commission in exercise of its judicial authority to review a full claim.
Furthermore, in interpreting the scope of the Commission's judicial
mission, the supreme court confirmed in Biddix that the Commission
must act as an arbiter of fairness in approving voluntary settlements.
As the majority observed in Vernon, the Biddix court stated that the
Commission must " 'assure fair dealing.' "I9 In Caudill,30 the
court took this reasoning one step further and stated that it was
presumed that the Commission made a full investigation of
compromises.ul
Another area of workers' compensation law that has been
examined by the North Carolina Supreme Court is the intersection of
mutually exclusive remedies. In Whitley v. Columbia Lumber
Manufacturing Co.,' the court addressed a claim by an employee
who was permanently and totally disabled, and therefore potentially
eligible for lifetime benefits under section 97-29, but whose injury was
also listed in the schedule of benefits in section 97-31.131 Citing
legislative intent,' rules of statutory construction, 35 and the
policy of the Workers' Compensation Act, 6 the court held that
127. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994); see Pruitt, 289 N.C. at 258, 221 S.E.2d at 358;
Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S E2d at 780.
128. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1994); see Brookover v. Borden, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 754,
756,398 S.E.2d 604,606 (1990); Roberts, 76 N.C. App. at 150,331 S.E.2d at 759; Buchanan
v. Mitchell County, 38 N.C. App 596,598,248 S.E.2d 399,400 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296
N.C. 583,254 S.E.2d 35-36 (1979). Correlatively, settlements that are not approved by the
Commission are not binding on the parties. Baldwin v. Piedmont Woodyards, Inc., 58 N.C.
App. 602, 603, 293 S.E.2d 814, 815 (1982).
129. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 430, 444 SME.2d at 194 (quoting Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75
S.E.2d at 780); accord Smith v. Mecklenburg County Chapter Am. Red Cross, 245 N.C.
116, 121, 95 S.E2d 559, 563 (1956).
130. 258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962).
131. hi. at 106, 128 S.E.2d at 133; see supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
132. 318 N.C. 89, 348 S.E.2d 336 (1986).
133. Id. at 89-90, 348 S.E.2d at 336.
134. Id at 96-97, 348 S.E.2d at 340-41. Section 97-31 states that benefits conferred
under its provisions are to be "in lieu of" any other compensation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
31 (1994). The court believed that the legislature inserted the "in lieu of" language in
response to an earlier supreme court decision, rather than with the intent to make § 97-31
controlling over all other provisions. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 96-97, 348 S.E.2d at 340-41.
135. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 98, 348 S.E2d at 341. The court placed special emphasis on
the "liberal construction" rule. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
136. The court stated:
Allowing a totally and permanently disabled employee lifetime compensation
effectuates the purpose of the Act to compensate for lost earning ability....
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section 97-31 was not an exclusive remedy, and that the employee was
entitled to the more favorable benefits under section 97-29.137 The
decision marked a drastic change from earlier interpretations of the
"in lieu of" language in section 97-31,11 which had been read to
preclude recovery under other sections when section 97-31 ap-
plied. 9 One year later, in Gupton v. Builders Transport,14° the
court addressed a case in which an employee's injury was covered
under both the section 97-31 schedule of benefits and section 97-30,
which provides permanent partial disability compensation. 41  The
court, analogizing the situation to the one in Whitley, held that the
employee was entitled to choose "the more munificent remedy.1
1 42
In neither case, however, did the court confront the issue of intersec-
ting remedies in relation to voluntary settlements.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis in Vernon is
grounded on slim case precedent, but on what appeared to be a
substantial foundation of legislative policy and intent, at least prior to
passage of the Reform Act. Biddix and Caudill were the only two
supreme court cases of note that addressed first impression issues of
the Commission's obligations when reviewing settlements, and
although the extension of Caudill to compensation agreements may
have been unexpected,143 it is easily defensible. The court's
reasoning derives from an expansive theoretical conception of the
equitable nature of workers' compensation law, and from the
Equity [also] strongly supports the result we reach in this case.... [Plaintiff]
enjoys no prospect of gainful employment. He will continue to require benefits
for a period long after the compensation authorized by section 31(13) becomes
depleted.
Whitley, 318 N.C. at 99, 348 S.E.2d at 342.
137. Id. at 90, 348 S.E.2d at 337.
138. See supra note 134; generally J. Cameron Furr, Jr., Note, Whitley v. Columbia
Manufacturing Co.: Abolishing the Exclusive Remedy Requirement for the Scheduled
Injuries Section of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, 66 N.C. L. REV. 1365
(1988) (discussing the impact of Whitley on North Carolina workers' compensation law).
139. Whitley, 318 N.C. at 93-96, 348 S.E.2d at 338-40.
140. 320 N.C. 38, 357 S.E.2d 674 (1987).
141. Id. at 38-39, 357 S.E.2d 675-76; see N.C. GEM. STAT. § 97-30 (1994).
142. Gupton, 320 N.C. at 42, 357 S.E.2d at 678. Justice Meyer, who wrote the dissent
in Vernon, also voiced disagreement with the majority in both Gupton and Whitley,
expressing his belief that the legislature's intent was "to make scheduled benefits the
exclusive form of benefit for persons sustaining scheduled injuries." Whitley, 318 N.C. at
101, 348 S.E.2d at 342 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see Gupton, 320 N.C. at 44-49, 357 S.E.2d
at 679-82 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
143. Its extension certainly must not have been expected by the Industrial Commission,
given the differential treatment that the agency has accorded the two types of agreements.
See supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
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conscious effort that the court has made to turn that theory into
practice at the administrative level. It is possible to construct from
Vernon and the court's prior decisions a descriptive model of the
equitable nature of the Industrial Commission's judicial authority,
particularly with regard to the agency's review of initial claims and
settlements. Although the scope of that model may now be in doubt
due to the narrowing of the use of compensation agreements under
the Reform Act,1" it remains valuable as a guide to the court's
vision of workers' compensation. Additionally, it now also serves as
a measuring rod for the distance between the court's interpretation of
the Commission's judicial responsibilities prior to the Reform Act and
the legislature's vision of the Commission's role as embodied in the
Act.
To understand better the court's interpretation of the Commis-
sion's responsibilities, picture the court's fairness model as a cross-
section of the Earth's atmosphere. Just as the atmosphere is
composed of several layers, so might workers' compensation theory
and practice be viewed as a hierarchy of institutional requirements.
Each lower level draws upon a higher level for guidance, and under
the court's view all share a fundamental concern for the equitable
resolution of workers' compensation claims.
The outermost level overarching all of workers' compensation
theory and practice-the exosphere, so to speak--is the original
compromise that the legislature imposed upon the employers and
employees of the state when it enacted the first workers' compen-
sation act.' 45 As a response to widespread criticism of the inequities
of prevailing employer-employee law,' workers' compensation laws
were, and still are, seen as an equitable solution. Given this pre-
sumed birth in equity, the Act itself constitutes the second layer of
the model. The third layer consists of the courts, which have
construed the Act's provisions liberally to effect the equitable
purposes of the Act, rather than indulge in technical or strict
interpretations that would distort the statutory equilibrium.'47
144. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
146. See 1 LARSON, supra note 78, § 5.00-.30, at 2-11 to -25 (tracing the evolution of
the workers' compensation movement).
147. See Harrel v. Harriet & Henderson Yams, 314 N.C. 566, 576, 336 S.E.2d 47, 53
(1985); Watkins v. City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 282, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976);
Hewett v. Garrett, 274 N.C. 356,360,163 S.E.2d 372,375 (1968); Hartley v. North Carolina
Prison Dep't, 258 N.C. 287, 290-91, 128 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1962); Guest v. Brenner Iron &
Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 452, 85 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1955); Graham v. Wall, 220 N.C. 84, 90,
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Acting pursuant to the Act, the Industrial Commission occupies the
final and lowest layer of the model. The courts, with an equitable
mission that arises both from the Act and from the nature of the
judiciary, should not only ensure that equity has been served within
the statutory framework in individual cases, but that the procedures
of the Commission reflect the statutory goals. Vernon can thus be
understood as the supreme court's effort to enlist the Commission as
an enforcer of the court's interpretation of the Act.1"
The court had previously identified some role for the Commission
as a guarantor of equity. Ideally, the Commission should always act
in an equitable fashion with regard to employers and employees,
although as an administrative agency it is only required to do so when
it undertakes its judicial role.149 As the Biddix court stated, the
Commission "stands by" to ensure fairness in reviewing all voluntary
settlements and claims."5 The Commission essentially functions as
a court of equity in those instances. In Caudill,151 the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court took an important step in extending the equitable
responsibilities of the Commission to a new stratum. By presuming
that the agency makes a full and fair investigation of compromise set-
tlements, the court indicated the broad procedural framework it
believed the Commission should adopt.5 - The Commission drafted
Rule 502 in response, which helped ensure that both parties to a
compromise agreement stand on equal footing.153 Finally, in
Vernon, the court commanded the Commission to make a full
investigation of all settlements.Y This level of equity enfor-
16 S.E.2d 691,695 (1941); Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38,40, 153 S.E. 591,
593 (1930). The courts have also stated on numerous occasions that the liberal
construction doctrine should be applied in favor of the employee, presumably because of
the inherently unequal bargaining positions of the two parties. See Ashley v. Rent-A-Car
Co., 271 N.C. 76, 86, 155 S.E.2d 755, 763 (1967); Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co., 266 N.C.
419, 427, 146 S.E2d 479, 484 (1963); Keller v. Electric Wiring Co., 259 N.C. 222, 225, 130
S.E.2d 342, 344 (1963).
148. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Letterlough v. Atkins, 258 N.C. 166, 168, 128 S.E.2d 215, 217 (1962)
("The Industrial Commission is not a court of general jurisdiction [but] is an administrative
board with quasi-judicial functions and has a special or limited jurisdiction created by
statute and confined to its terms.").
150. Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 663, 75 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1953).
151. 258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128 (1962).
152. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
153. N.C. INDUS. COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the N.C. Industrial
Commission, Rule 502, in N.C. GEN. STAT., Annotated Rules, 522-23 (1992).
154. 336 N.C. at 433, 444 S.E2d at 195; see also infra notes 192-94 and accompanying
text (discussing the issue of whether a full investigation might require affirmative activity
by the Commission).
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cement-the troposphere, in the atmospheric parlance-clearly
imposes an entirely new and vigorous element on the Commission's
standard procedures.
The court's dedication to fairness in all aspects of workers'
compensation, and its insistence that the Industrial Commission's
actions reflect the same dedication, is particularly appropriate if one
views the basic compromise between employer and employee rights
not only as the atmosphere in which workers' compensation law
develops, but also as the goal towards which it strives. Because no
compromise can be perfect, the courts, the legislature, and the
Commission should avow a continuing obligation to refine the
compromise at all levels of the Act's governance. The Vernon court
took a crucial step in that direction.
The only major inconsistency in the court's opinion derives from
its discussion of the difference between compromise and compen-
sation agreements, and this inconsistency has plagued the court for
decades. First and foremost, it is unclear which section or sections of
the Act contemplate compromise agreements. The Vernon court
quotes Biddix as interpreting both section 97-17 and section 97-82 to
require the Commission to " 'assure fair dealing in any voluntary
settlement.' "155 However, the Biddix court makes no mention of
section 97-17, and refers only later in the decision to section 97-82, in
reference to "settlement[s] in which compensation is granted,"'5 6
thus giving no guidance as to whether compromise settlements are
considered by section 97-82. In McGill v. Bison Fast Freight,57 the
court expressly stated that neither section 97-17 nor section 97-82
contemplate compromises."8 Five years later, in Caudill, the court
said that "[t]he law permits compromise settlements... provided they
are submitted to and approved by the Industrial Commission."'5 9
Thus, Caudill contradicted McGill at least as to section 97-17.' 6
155. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 430, 444 S.E2d at 194 (citing Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C.
660, 663, 75 S.E.2d 777, 780 (1953)).
156. Biddix, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S.E2d at 780.
157. 245 N.C. 469, 96 S.E.2d 438 (1957).
158. Id. at 476, 96 S.E.2d at 444.
159. Caudill v. Chatham Mfg. Co., 258 N.C. 99, 106, 128 S.E.2d 128, 133 (1962) (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17).
160. Additionally, White v. Shoup Boat Corp., 261 N.C. 495,135 S.E.2d 216 (1964), one
of the few other cases in which the supreme court has considered settlement agreements,
does not appear to help locate a firm statutory basis for allowing compromises. In that
case, the court notes § 97-82 only as an enabling section for settlements, and does not refer
to compromises at all. Id. at 497, 135 S.E.2d at 218. The White majority indicates that
Smith v. Mecklenburg County Chapter Am. Red Cross discusses § 97-82 settlements, id.,
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Curiously, the Vernon court failed to take note of a recent North
Carolina Court of Appeals decision, Glenn v. McDonald's," which
interpreted the above precedent to mean that the Commission would
approve compromise agreements "in accordance with" sections 97-17
and 97-82.162 At issue in Glenn was a compromise agreement that
the plaintiff sought to have reinstated after the Commission rescinded
it on the ground that, prior to Commission approval, the defendants
had attempted to revoke the agreement. 16 The court of appeals
refused to rescind the agreement, asserting that under sections 97-17
and 97-82 compromises become awards of the Commission on
approval and are binding on the parties."6 The court anticipated
the reasoned decision in Vernon quite accidentally, by misstating
precedent: The court apparently relied on Biddix v. Rex Mills for the
presumption that the "Commission approves a settlement agreement
only after a full investigation to determine whether the settlement is
fair and just."'" The court commingled the decisions in Biddix and
Pruitt, which pertained to different types of agreements, without
explanation and, one suspects, unintentionally.166 Thus, the con-
but Smith does not specifically mention that statutory provision. 245 N.C. 116, 95 S.E.2d
559 (1956).
161. 109 N.C. App. 45,425 S.E.2d 727 (1993). The Vernon court also failed to mention
several other recent court of appeals decisions that dealt with settlements. In Brookover
v. Borden, Inc., 100 N.C. App. 754, 398 S.E.2d 604 (1990), an employee who had signed
a Form 26 agreement that was later approved by the Commission argued for rescission.
id. at 754,398 S.E.2d at 605. The plaintiff claimed that he had been unaware of his right
to choose between remedies under §§ 97-30 and 97-31 when he signed. Id. at 755, 398
S.E.2d 605; see supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing the right to choose
remedies under Gupton v. Builders Transport, 320 N.C. 38,357 S.E.2d 674 (1987)). The
similarities between Brookover and Vernon are striking, but Brookover did not allege
improper review by the Commission, and the court of appeals ruled in favor of the
defendant, citing precedent holding that approved settlement agreements are binding.
Brookover, 100 N.C. App. 754,756,398 S.E2d 604,606 (1990) (citing Tabron v. Gold Leaf
Farms, Inc., 269 N.C. 393, 152 S.E.2d 533 (1967)). A similar argument was advanced, and
also rejected by the court of appeals, in Crump v. Independence Nissan, 112 N.C. App.
587, 592-93, 436 S.E.2d 589, 593-94 (1993).
One lesson to be learned by comparing Vernon to Brookover and Glenn is that
excellent lawyering may sometimes wring water from an apparently dry sponge. The
plaintiff's counsel, by deciding to attack the judicial processes of the Commission, made
an inspired tactical move for the client.
162. Glenn, 109 N.C. App. at 47, 425 S.E.2d at 729.
163. It at 45-46, 425 S.E.2d at 728.
164. It. at 48, 425 S.E.2d at 729-30. Glenn was apparently the first and only North
Carolina case to explicitly read compromise agreements as grounded in § 97-82. This may
simply have been a misinterpretation of precedent. See infra notes 168-79 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the various possible statutory bases for compromise agreements).
165. Glenn, 109 N.C. App. at 48, 425 S.E.2d at 729-30.
166. See &L
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fusing language of the opinion, mixing as it does the definitions of
compromise and compensation agreements, does not definitively
establish a statutory basis for compromises.167
As a result of these decisions, it was unclear what requirements
were imposed on compromises by the Act prior to Vernon. At a
minimum, Caudill appeared to require that such settlements follow
the strictures of section 97-17.1" However, it was unclear whether
the mandates of section 97-82 applied.169  The title of pre-reform
section 97-82 contemplated memoranda of agreement submitted "in
the form prescribed by the Industrial Commission."' Compromise
agreements are not filed on Commission forms,7 so at first blush
section 97-82 seemed not to apply. However, the language in the
body of the provision said only that memoranda of agreements are to
be submitted "in the form prescribed by the Commission,"'72
suggesting perhaps that compromise settlements were in fact
contemplated by section 97-82, since the rules of the Commission
described the "form" that compromise agreements should take. 3
Reading sections 97-17 and 97-82 together under the latter
interpretation, section 97-17 would require first that all agreements be
in accord with the provisions of the Act, and further require filing of
agreements and approval by the Commission.' 4 Pre-reform section
97-82, under this interpretation, would only add three specifications:
that the agreement be in (or on) the prescribed form, that a medical
report accompany the filing, and that approvals would transform
167. The court of appeals did, however, correctly cite Biddix's admonition that "the
Commission may not look to records, files or evidence not presented to it [or] base its
decision on information not contained in the record before it." IL, 425 S.E.2d at 730
(citing Biddix v. Rex Mills, Inc., 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777 (1953)). By requiring "full
investigation" of settlements, the Vernon court chose not to revive this language from
Biddix, which would seem to limit the scope of the Commission's ability to "investigate."
Vernon, 336 N.C. at 432-33, 444 S.E.2d at 195.
168. Caudill v. Chatham Mfg. Co., 258 N.C. 99, 106, 128 S.E.2d 128, 133 (1962).
169. See id. The Caudill court did not discuss § 97-82.
170. The North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 56, 1929 N.C. Sess.
Laws 117, 139 (amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994)).
171. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
172. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 56,1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117, 139 (amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994)).
173. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. This interpretation, of course,
depends on reading "memorandum of agreement" to mean more than just agreements
filed on Forms 21 or 26. Perhaps this is what the Court of Appeals assumed in Glenn v.
McDonald's. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-17 (1994).
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settlements into awards.175 On the other hand, if section 97-82 was
read as not applying to compromises, then the number of re-
quirements imposed by the Act on compromises were actually fewer
than those imposed on the non-controversial compensation
agreements, surely an odd result."6
The Vernon court had the opportunity to resolve the issue of
where compromises find their statutory "home," but did not choose
to do so, and may have inadvertently engendered even more
confusion. In Vernon, the court dismissed the defendant's contention
that the Commission's differential treatment of compromise and
compensation agreements was justified, stating that the legislature did
not distinguish between the two, and that both "finally determine the
employee's rights."' Indeed, both are "final" in some respects, but
compromise agreements are conclusive as to all of the employee's
rights, whereas compensation agreements may be re-opened for
change of condition.' 8 The court's statement ignores the fact that
the two kinds of settlements spring from different situations, have
different characteristics, and that the consequences of those differen-
ces have been widely discussed, even if not by the North Carolina
legislature or courts."9  Even if the Vernon court's logic is jus-
tifiable, its language was careless. The court presumably meant only
to imply that, as to the level of review required, the legislature did not
distinguish between compromise and compensation agreements.
However, the juxtaposition of its discussion of sections 97-17 and 97-
82 and its statements about the similarity of the two agreements might
also be read to suggest that the two agreements should receive similar
treatment generally, an articulation that may promote even greater
confusion for claimants under the Reform Act.
175. North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, ch.120, § 56,1929 N.C. Sess. Laws
117, 139 (amended by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994)).
176. In the absence of strict statutory requirements, the Commission and courts acted
to raise the standard by imposing a more rigorous "approval" process for compromises,
and now Vernon has raised the standards for compensation agreements to the same level.
177. 336 N.C. at 433, 444 S.E.2d at 195.
178. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
179. See 3 LARSON, supra note 78, § 82.31, at 15-1198 to -1199 (comparing various
states' approaches to compromise agreements). Furthermore, the legislature's choice not
to distinguish between compensation agreements and compromises in the Act itself is not
as unambiguous a statement as the court insists. The Industrial Commission has statutory
authority to adopt rules in furtherance of the Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-80 (1994), and
the legislature's decades of silence in the face of rules that clearly differentiate between
the two'types of agreements must at least suggest that its intention was not being subverted
by the Commission here.
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With the passage of the Workers' Compensation Reform Act of
1994, the Vernon court's disappointing discussion of compromise
agreements gained more significance. Regardless of how the courts
or the Commission read the Act to allow compromises, it is not at all
clear how claimants or employers have read the statute. If a
substantial number have considered section 97-82 to apply to
compromises, as the court of appeals apparently did in Glenn, the new
language of section 97-82 and the discussion in Vernon may create
even more perplexity. The new language of section 97-82 says simply
that the parties "may" file settlements, with certain specific excep-
tions.' ° This change, from mandatory approval by the Commission
to voluntary reduction of agreements to writing, presumably reflects
the legislature's intent to accommodate the new "direct payment"
option: under section 97-18(b), when an employer "admits the
employee's right to compensation," the employer must file infor-
mation about the agreement, but no approval is necessary.'
However, on its face the language would also seem to allow any type
of agreement reached between the parties to go without review and
approval by the Commission. Thus, if parties now read this to allow
compromise settlements to be made without reduction to writing and
approval by the Commission, the Commission might never review
agreements that are clearly inequitable'" for employees." On
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994); see supra note 89-94 and accompanying text. This
new language in § 97-82, allowing direct payments without approval, seems to conflict with
the plain meaning of § 97-17, which allows a settlement agreement in lieu of an actual
claim but requires approval of such agreements by the Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
97-17 (1994).
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18(b) (1994); see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
However, amended § 97-18(b) retains pre-Reform Act language indicating that the
Commission can, in appropriate cases, determine "that payment in installments should be
made monthly or at some other period," rather than the standard weekly installments,
leaving the possibility open that some type of review of direct payments might be
undertaken by the Commission. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18(b) (1994). See infra notes 193-
94 and accompanying text (proposing an intermediate level of review for direct payments).
182. These inequitable agreements may not be limited to compromises, but also may
include the more standard compensation agreements, as Vernon demonstrates. Although
the legislature attempted to draft § 97-82 to prevent inequitable "compensation
agreements" like the one in Vernon from going unreviewed, see supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text, it is not at all clear whether the effort addressed all potential
inequities. Consider, for example, a case in which an employer initially makes direct
payments to an employee pursuant to the § 97-30 permanent partial disability provision
rather than pursuant to the § 97-29 permanent total disability provision, to which the
employee is actually entitled. Before the passage of the Reform Act, this type of
"mistake" would presumably have been corrected during the Commission's review and
approval process. However, with the direct payment option, such employer mistakes will
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the other hand, if only section 97-17 applies to compromises, then by
the terms of that provision the employer and employee should file
even an informal compromise "settlement" for Commission ap-
proval.1 4
be filed with Commission, but might never be reviewed. The Commission is not required
to approve uncontested payments under § 97-18, and therefore its judicial authority is not
invoked unless one of the parties chooses to contest the payments before the statute of
limitations expires (although it may be invoked after "closing" in a petition for reopening).
Thus, the employee could challenge the benefits she is receiving at a later date, but this
assumes that the employee is knowledgeable about her options, an assumption the courts
have been unwilling to make. Under a broad reading of the supreme court's logic in
Vernon, even agreements that both parties are happy with should not stand if they
represent choices that are undesirable from a systemic point of view, because the public
is the ultimate payor of any shortfall in benefits. See supra note 62.
183. By the terms of § 97-18(a), it appears that compromise settlements reached on or
before the fourteenth day after the injury would also represent an employer's admission
of the "employee's right to compensation," and therefore require both that an employer
begin payments immediately and that it file notice with the Commission concurrently.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-18(b) (1994). However, it is unclear whether the filing requirement
is duplicative of the requirements of Rule 502, or exclusive, in which case Rule 502 would
no longer be valid, and §§ 97-17 and 97-18 would be in conflict as to whether Commission
approval is required. Both logic and rules of statutory construction suggest that the
sections should, if possible, be read as consistent with one another, and here the best
option is to read the § 97-18 requirements as duplicative, since the information required
by that section is also required by the rule. The only difference would be that Commission
approval would still be required.
Without further guidance from the legislature or the Commission, however, an
employer trying to interpret the requirements for compromise settlements now must
choose between three conflicting interpretations. First, if it takes the position that Rule
502 and § 97-17 still represent the proper course of action, it will follow the steps required
by the rule and submit the compromise for approval. However, if the compromise is seen
as an admission of the compensability of injury, has the employer now violated § 97-18(b)
if it does not begin sending payments to the employee? As a second option, if the
employer instead follows § 97-18(b), begins making payments pursuant to the settlement,
and files the information required by that section with the Commission, has it violated §
97-17 by not submitting the compromise for approval? Even if it has not violated the Act,
the employer has certainly left itself open to further attacks from the employee, since the
direct payments do not automatically become an award of the Commission. Finally, the
employer might take the position that § 97-82 allows agreements between the parties to
be reduced to writing if desired, but that such formalization is not required. If the parties
then do not reduce the agreement to writing, the employer could be liable under § 97-17
for not filing the settlement, and under § 97-18(b) for not commencing payments.
184. The question may be reduced to this: are any "agreements" in regard to
compensation "settlements"? Prior to the Reform Act, the courts would have clearly
answered in the affirmative--"settlement" was used broadly to describe the only other
means of proceeding under the Act besides a full claim. See supra notes 74-88 and accom-
panying text. Thus, the only subjects for § 97-82 memoranda of agreement to address
were settlements. Now, however, when an employer admits liability, he must begin
making direct payments under § 97-18, and if the employee does not institute a challenge
the payments eventually become the equivalent of a partial award. Have the parties
actually reached a "settlement?" The statute provides no guidance on the matter, but a
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Under the Reform Act, the North Carolina legislature seems to
have taken the position that streamlining the administrative processes
should be one of the primary concerns in devising ways to improve
worker's compensation."s In essence, the new direct payment
provisions... are an attempt to move more money into employees'
hands more quickly, but the policy risks more full claims in exchange
for a greater volume of cases that will never even have to be reviewed
by the Commission." Thus, the legislature's reforms and the
Vernon decision seem to be in conflict in regard to basic animating
policy:18
the court would demand more initial scrutiny by the Commission, to
avoid full adjudication later."8 Since the legislature was careful to
preserve the Vernon decision in regard to the compensation
agreements most likely to be inequitable, the larger question that
arises is how often compensation agreements will be used now that
the direct payment option is available.
logical way to reconcile §§ 97-17, 97-18 and 97-82 is as follows: Direct payment should be
considered neither "an agreement in regard to compensation" nor a "settlement," but
simply a preliminary agreement as to liability. A full "agreement in regard to compen-
sation" could follow, and be reduced to a "memorandum of agreement" if desired. But
such an agreement might also be reached by default if the employee accepts what the
employer is sending without complaint.
Determining whether this agreement is a settlement or not would be only an exercise
in semantics if not for § 97-82, which adds the requirement of Commission approval if the
agreement is indeed a settlement. Therefore, it is preferable not to consider any
agreement that is not reduced to a memorandum of agreement a settlement-otherwise,
the permissive language of 97-82 for compensation agreements cannot be reconciled with
the mandatory approval requirements of § 97-17.
185. See OWEN, supra note 8, at 2507, 2520-26.
186. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
187. See also OWEN, supra note 8, at 2521-23 (discussing the direct payment provisions
in the context of changes wrought by the Reform Act).
188. Both the legislature and the judiciary may be acting with equity as an overriding
concern, but the legislature's actions surely have more diverse roots. In theory, the
legislature has more of the various goals of workers' compensation in mind, including
concerns for business growth and administrative ease. See supra OWEN, note 8, at 2502,
2505-06. (suggesting that the forces that lead to 1994 reform were originally centered in
industry). The legislature thus might be able to strike a better balance between the
competing interests, as it presumably did when it created the workers' compensation
system originally. The court, however, single-minded in its pursuit of equity in individual
cases, might theoretically be following more closely the highest stated goal of the system.
189. Perhaps most significantly, this conflict between Vernon's implications and the
clear import of the Reform Act may result in a problem for the Commission: By allowing
the parties to bypass the Commission when arranging compensation payments, the Act
may foster future claims by dissatisfied employees who allege the Commission failed its
obligation to inspect the fairness of settlements. See infra text accompanying note 197.
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While no longer mandatory, the usefulness of formal compen-
sation agreements has by no means been eviscerated by the Reform
Act. An employer may choose to make direct payments without
reducing an agreement to writing, but this leaves the employer open
to future claims by the employee as to the proper amount of
compensation.' °  Alternatively, an employer could reduce the
agreement to writing and thereby preclude most future claims by the
employee-but this raises the possibility that the Commission might
find the compensation inappropriate, under a Vernon analysis. The
choice between the direct payment method and the compensation
agreement method therefore represents a calculated risk. Ultimately,
the Reform Act probably forces most employers to continue to
carefully track the compensation provisions of the Act, to begin to
make direct payments, and then eventually to reduce the terms to
writing so as to foreclose future claims. The danger that arises is that
in the case of an illiterate or uninformed employee, an unscrupulous
employer might intentionally choose a lower benefit package than the
one prescribed by the Act in that situation, and gamble that the
employee will never challenge the payments. In such a case, unless
the Commission makes at least a facial review of the information filed
by the employer in order to discover the discrepancy, considerable
inequity might result.
It seems likely that, given the extent of the fairness inquiry
mandated by Vernon, a litigant will one day question the respon-
sibilities of the Commission in handling direct payments under section
97-18. Although the legislature provided that such payments need not
be "approved" by the Commission, the courts may still find a way to
invoke the Commission's judicial authority when filing the payment
information, using the liberal construction rule.19' As Vernon
demonstrates, the court has interpreted Commission approval which
results in an agreement becoming an "award" of the Commission to
require significant review." Perhaps the Commission or the courts
can fashion an intermediate standard for the new direct payment
provision that would be consistent with both the legislature's intent
and the supreme court's vision. Direct payments become awards of
the Commission as to "compensability of and the insurer's liability for
the injury,' or what might be described as "partial" awards.
190. See supra note 93.
191. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
193. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-18(b), 97-82(b) (1994).
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Thus, perhaps the Commission should undertake a cursory review of
the filing similar to the kind it gave to compensation agreements prior
to Vernon, to determine whether the benefits parallel the benefits
prescribed by the Act. This would not guarantee fairness, but at least
it should screen out the most egregious misapplications of the Act.
It would also ensure that actual compromises, where the employer
and employee have made concessions, will attract the attention of the
Commission, at which point a more careful scrutiny of the settlement
would be appropriate. 9"
Meaningful judicial action, of course, often incurs substantial
costs, and the Vernon decision is no exception. A number of
consequences of the decision are significant, if not as complicated as
the compromise/compensation agreement question. First, Rule 501(4)
of the Workers' Compensation Rules, which described the process for
submitting compensation agreements prior to Vernon, is now invalid,
at least as currently applied. 95 Perhaps more important, but flowing
logically from that consequence, is the fact that the court asserted its
determination not to be bound by interpretations of the Commission
regarding provisions of the Act. 6 This assertion places all of the
Commission's rules in play for future litigation. Ia another related
matter, the decision also means that employees now may at least
bring a claim that the Commission's approval of compensation
agreements was not based on a full investigation, opening up another
new avenue for litigation under a system that was designed to
194. That is, the Commission should determine as a general matter whether
compromise settlements should still proceed according to Rule 502, or whether they should
only be filed according to § 97-18(b). The former method is more appropriate, see supra
note 183, and consistent with § 97-17. The screening process would thus act as a "net" to
catch compromise settlements that employers erroneously believe to be subject only to the
strictures of § 97-18(b).
195. N.C. INDus. COMM'N, Workers' Compensation Rules of the North Carolina
Industrial Commission, Rule 501, Agreements for Payment of Compensation, in N.C. GEN.
STAT., Annotated Rules, 522-23 (1992). The rule states that agreements "will be ap-
proved" if the correct procedures are followed, and although the Commission previously
interpreted "will" to require an almost automatic approval if the information provided on
the form was facially consistent with the Act, see Vernon, 336 N.C. at 433, 444 S.E.2d 195,
it can easily be read as less conclusive if "approval" is now defined as "full and fair inves-
tigation." Note that if the court had followed the same reasoning it used in Caudill, see
supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text, it could have reached a different result by
"presuming" that "approval" meant that the Commission had fully investigated the
settlement, and deferring to the agency's policies on the matter. Of course, this deference
would have been more difficult to support, because of the clear evidence of mistake of law
on the part of the claims employee.
196. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 433, 444 S.E.2d at 195; see supra notes 55-56 and accom-
panying text.
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discourage formal adjudication."9 It is also likely that the courts
will be forced to define the scope of Commission review required by
Vernon in future decisions. Under the broadest interpretation of the
holding, a detailed affirmative investigation might be required, which
clearly is even more than the Commission has undertaken for
compromise settlements in the past. 8
Will this mean, as the dissent warned, that employees who accept
settlements will be required to seek counsel before approval is
granted?' ) Will it mean that Commission claims processors must
be familiar with all recent legal decisions that may impact set-
tlements?' Will it mean that the Commission will require
employers to provide such information to employees on some type of
boilerplate form? Or can the Commission elude the clear import of
the decision in Vernon by creating a detailed rule such as Rule 502,
listing dozens of requirements that must be met before approval is
granted?"°  Answers to any of these questions would be pure
speculation; although the preceding discussion hints at some of the
possibilities, the only certain result of Vernon is an extended period
of increased uncertainty.'
Without question, Vernon v. Stephen L. Mabe Builders is the
most significant judicial decision interpreting the obligations of the
Commission in reviewing uncontested workers' compensation cases
since Biddix, especially given the strong language requiring affirmative
action on the part of the Commission. The court went out of its
way' to bring Commission review of compensation settlements
197. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (describing the requirements of
Rule 502 of the Workers' Compensation Rules). But see supra note 167 (noting possible
limitation on the Commission's ability to investigate).
199. Vernon, 336 N.C. at 438,444 S.E.2d at 198 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer's
obvious hyperbole is not without some resonance. One of the goals of the workers'
compensation system is to speed compensation to employees, see supra note 77 and accom-
panying text, but by placing the burden on the Commission to investigate, the court has
risked making the agency overcautious in its interaction with the parties.
200. The court's disapproval of the failure of the claims employee in Vernon to act on
the Whitley decision certainly seems to imply such an obligation. See Vernon, 336 N.C. at
434, 444 S.E.2d at 195-96; Whitley, 318 N.C. 89, 90, 348 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1986).
201. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
202. As another example, the decision specifically addressed only Form 26 agreements,
but there seems to be no logical reason for assuming that Form 21 agreements are not also
subject to the same requirements now.
203. The court could have simply stated that the agreement in Vernon, purporting to
be a compensation agreement, was in reality a de facto compromise agreement since it
represented concession by the employee of a valuable statutory right. As such, the court
could have rendered its decision only on the authority of Caudill and Commission Rule
2560 [Vol. 73
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS2
under the reach of the equitable requirements set out in Caudill,4
and in the Commission's own Rule 502 in order to reconcile the
Commission's view of fairness with the court's own. The decision was
reasonable, and although it may lead to substantial administrative
complications for the Industrial Commission, it quite correctly erected
a new level of protection for the employees most vulnerable to
inequitable bargaining practices on the part of employers. The
Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994 represents a counter-
balancing reduction in the protection offered to employees, at least in
regard to compensation in situations where the employee is never
advised of her various compensation options.' In its haste to enact
legislation making compensation more swift and sure, the North
Carolina General Assembly may have reduced somewhat the scope
of the Vernon decision. But Vernon also points out the need to
subject even streamlined direct payments to some minimum level of
review. Furthermore, it seems likely that in many cases compensation
agreements retain a great deal of utility for both employers and
employees, and thus the requirements that the supreme court has
imposed on Commission review of such agreements will continue to
represent the, most profound demonstration of the judiciary's
commitment to fairness in all of workers' compensation law.
LANCE KOONCE
502.
204. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
205. Workers' Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679, sec. 3.2, § 97-82, 1993 N.C.
Sess. Laws 319, 326 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-82 (1994)).
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